The Future of Prosecutions under the International Criminal Court by Olubokun, Charles Oluwarotimi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Future of Prosecutions under the International Criminal Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
Charles Oluwarotimi OLUBOKUN 
 
 
 
 
Department of Law, Brunel University London 
 
 
 
April 2015 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
This is to certify that this thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD Law degree of Brunel 
University London is exclusively my work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work 
of others; I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from published or unpublished work of 
others have been duly acknowledged.  
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided full 
acknowledgement is made. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe 
the rights of any third party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
Special thanks to my supervisors Professor Benedict Chigara, without whom this would not 
have been possible, he went beyond the call of duty to mentor me not only academically but 
also emotionally during tough times from the inception of the programme and Professor 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Brunel University Law School Administrative Team; the University’s 
Students finance team, Students office staff, Law School Academic Staff particularly Dr 
Gerard Conway, Dr Olufemi Amao, Dr Akalemwa Ngenda and of all Professor Abimbola 
Olowofoyeku ‘Kabio osi’ of Brunel Law School London; Professor Abass Ademola ‘special 
thanks’ and to all Brunel PhD Law (baked, baking, and unbaked) candidates/colleagues.  
To my Dad and Mum special thanks for your support, whilst Mum kept reminding me to put 
God first at all times, my late Dad would be in disbelieve of this accomplishment but he 
actually instilled the foundation of ‘hard work and honesty’ as the best policy.  
My friends who provided unimaginable support all through the period, I am extremely 
grateful especially to Idowu Oyewole, Pastor and Pastor Lola Godwin Okorie, Charles 
Ajuchi, Femi Olupono, Commodore and Mrs Tunji Beckley, Reverend and Reverend 
Charmaine John Howard, Anthony and Emma Billington, Brett Jordan, Dennis, Paul, Mr and 
Mrs Olufalowo, Valerie, the diaconate of Northolt Park Baptist Church, Cosmas Anyakudo, 
Henry C. Uzokwe, Dr Kema Alexis Foua, Muath Al-Zoubi, and Dr Yahaya Alshammari. 
To my wife ‘Jokes’ congratulations, because she will keep the certificate for life whilst I keep 
the copy, this is in honour of her invaluable support; to my children Jentegbe and Jenyokale 
congratulations also for all your survival strategies and understanding being unable to be with 
you at all times during this period.  
Last but not the least, are my ‘siblings’ and their immediate families: Professor Jibowu 
Olubokun, Pastor Ireti Olubokun, Pastor Yinka Owoseje, Barrister Olakunle Olubokun, Mrs 
Colonel Famakinwa Bimbo and Debola Olubokun a massive thanks for all your support and 
contributions.  
Thank you, thank you and thank you to everyone. 
 
 THIS AWARD IS DEDICATED TO  
 
 
THE  
 
 
CHIBOK GIRLS 
 
 
 
Chibok, Borno State, North East of Nigeria 
iv 
 
Contents 
 
Declaration …………………………………………………………………... ii 
Acknowledgement …………………………………………………………… iii 
Contents……………………………………………………………………… iv 
Table of Cases……………………………………………………………….. ix 
The International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice………………………………………………………………………… 
ix 
The International Criminal Court……………………………………………. ix 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia…………….. x 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda……………………………. xii 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone………………………………………… xiii 
Other Courts and Tribunals………………………………………………...… xiii 
Table of Treaties……………………………………………………………… xvii 
Bilateral and Multilateral Conventions and Treaties…………………………. xvii 
Statutes and Legislations of England and Wales…………………………… xix 
European Conventions and Treaties………………………………………… xx 
Table of Journal Abbreviations……………………………………………… xxii 
Table of Other Acronyms……………………………………………………. xxiii 
Abstract……………………………………………………………………… xxvii 
Chapter One…………………………………………………………………. 1 
Introduction………………………………………………………………… 1 
1.1      Preamble……………………………………………………………… 1 
1.2      Overview and Methodology…………………………………………. 3 
1.3      Structure of the Study………………………………………………... 7 
Chapter Two………………………………………………………………. 14 
           Theoretical Approach to Crime and the International Criminal Court... 14 
2.1      Introduction…………………………………………………………… 14 
2.2      Conceptualising Criminality………………………………………….. 15 
2.3      The Genealogy of International Criminal Prosecutions………………. 17 
2.4      The Concept of Jurisdiction…………………………………………... 22 
2.5      Immunity under the Rome Statute…………………………………… 30 
2.6      Deferral and Acceptance of Jurisdiction……………………………… 32 
v 
 
2.7      Activating The Exercise of Jurisdiction……………………………… 35 
2.8      Complementarity under the Statute………………………………….. 40 
2.9      Admissibility under the Rome Statute………………………………… 42 
2.10    Ne Bis in Idem and the International Criminal Court………………... 43 
2.11    Structures, Situations, Cases and the International Criminal Court….. 47 
2.12    The Court’s Intermediaries…………………………………………… 54 
2.13    The theory of Organisation Behaviour……………………………….. 55 
2.14    Conclusion……………………………………………………………. 59 
Chapter Three……………………………………………………………….. 60 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute……………………………………………….. 60 
Part one………………………………………………………………………. 60 
War Crimes…………………………………………………………………... 60 
3.1.1     War Crimes………………………………………………………….. 60 
3.1.2     War Crimes under the Rome Statute………………………………… 61 
3.1.3     The Use of Specific Weapons under the Rome Statute……………... 63 
3.1.4     The Overlap of Crimes………………………………………………  64 
3.1.5     International and Non-International Armed Conflicts……………… 65 
3.1.6     Other Situations, the Civilian Population and Combatants………… 75 
3.1.7     Conscription, Enlistment and Use of Children as a War Crime……. 77 
3.1.8     The Democratic Republic of Congo War Crime Trials…………….. 80 
3.1.9     Reparations. ………………………………………………………… 84 
3.1.10   Conclusion………………………………………………………….. 85 
Part Two……………………………………………………………………. 86 
Crimes Against Humanity………………………………………………… 86 
3.2.1     Introduction……………………………………………………….. 86 
3.2.2     Crimes Against Humanity (crimen contra omnes) Under Customary 
Law…………………………………………………………………………… 
87 
3.2.3     Codification of Crimes Against Humanity In the Rome Statute……. 89 
3.2.4     The Policy Element Challenge……………………………………… 92 
3.2.5     The Challenge of the Term ‘Organisation’…………………………. 94 
3.2.6     Gender Crime a Crime Against Humanity………………………….. 103 
3.2.7     Persecution and Some other Crimes Against Humanity……………. 104 
3.2.8     Conclusion…………………………………………………………… 108 
vi 
 
Part 3…………………………………………………………………………. 109 
The Crime of Genocide……………………………………………………… 109 
3.3.1      Introduction………………………………………………………… 109 
3.3.2     The Concept of Genocide…………………………………………… 109 
3.3.3     Responsibility for Genocide under the Rome Statute………………. 110 
3.3.4     Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part (Dolus Specialis)…………….. 113 
3.3.5     Responsibility, Intent and Joint Criminal Enterprise………………... 118 
3.3.6     The Auto-Genocide Principle……………………………………….. 119 
3.3.7     Obligation to Cooperate under the Genocide Convention………….. 120 
3.3.8     Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide………………… 121 
3.3.9     Conclusion………………………………………………………….. 125 
Part Four……………………………………………………………………… 126 
The Crime of Aggression…………………………………………………….. 126 
3.4.1     Introduction…………………………………………………………. 126 
3.4.2     Background to the crime of Aggression…………………………….. 127 
3.4.3     Deliberations up to Kampala………………………………………… 132 
3.4.4     Challenges before the Review Conference………………………….. 133 
3.4.5     The Kampala Definition of the Crime of Aggression………………. 136 
3.4.6     Article 8 bis and Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression……….. 138 
3.4.7     Who will be bound by Article 15 bis? ................................................ 142 
3.4.8     The Crime of Aggression and Liability of Non-Military Leaders….. 144 
3.4.9     Consistency with the Rome Statute………………………………… 147 
3.4.10   The Consensus and Conditions For the Exercise of Jurisdiction…… 151 
3.4.11   Beyond the Kampala Review Conference………………………….. 153 
3.4.12   Challenges Ahead After the Kampala Conference Accord………… 154 
3.4.13   Conclusion………………………………………………………….. 156 
Chapter Four……………………………………………………………… 159 
Challenges Prosecuting under Article 5 of the Rome Statute………………. 159 
4.1        Introduction………………………………………………………… 159 
4.2       Stratifying the Challenges of the International Criminal Court……… 160 
4.3       Challenges Intrinsic to the Court…………………………………….. 161 
4.4     Funding and Budgetary Challenges…………………………………… 171 
4.5     Charges Representative of Crimes……………………………………. 173 
vii 
 
4.6     Challenges within the Court’s Judiciary (the Chambers)…………….. 175 
4.7     Speed of Proceedings and Trial………………………………………. 176 
4.8     Restorative Justice……………………………………………………. 178 
4.9     Internal Oversight Mechanisms………………………………………. 179 
4.10   Judges of the International Criminal Court…………………………… 180 
4.11   Challenges Extrinsic to the International Criminal Court…………….. 182 
4.12   Ratification of Aggression, External Complexities and the Court……. 194 
4.13   The Effectiveness of Victims Participation……………………………. 196 
4.14   The State of Reparations………………………………………………. 200 
4.15   Responses to the Court’s Requests……………………………………. 201 
4.16   States and the Immunity Challenge Before the Court………………… 205 
4.17   External Influences On The International Criminal Court……………. 207 
4.18   Conclusion…………………………………………………………….. 209 
Chapter Five………………………………………………………………. 211 
The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court……………………… 211 
5.1     Preamble………………………………………………………………. 211 
5.2     Jurisprudence on Immunity before International Tribunals…………… 212 
5.3     Immunity, Security Council Referrals and the International Criminal 
Court…………………………………………………………………………. 
215 
5.4     Article 5 Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court…………. 217 
5.5     Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court v Ad Hoc Tribunal’s 219 
5.6     Jurisprudence of the ICC over Self Referrals………………………….. 221 
5.7     The Court’s Jurisprudence over Some Situations…………………… 225 
5.8     Gender Crimes and the International Criminal Court’s Jurisprudence... 246 
5.9     Transitional Justice Jurisprudence and the International Criminal 
Court…………………………………………………………………………. 
249 
5.10   Jurisprudence Over the definition of the Crimes against Humanity….. 252 
5.11   Conclusion…………………………………………………………….. 259 
Chapter Six………………………………………………………………….. 261 
The Future of the International Criminal Court………………………………. 261 
6.1    Research Findings….......……………………………………………….. 261 
6.2    Recommendations……………………………………………………… 263 
6.3    Future of Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court……………. 273 
viii 
 
6.4    Final Remarks………………………………………………………….. 275 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………….. 277 
Textbooks…………………………………………………………………….. 277 
Articles……………………………………………………………………….. 287 
Websites……………………………………………………………………… 305 
Reports and Resolutions……………………………………………………… 306 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Table of Cases 
International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice 
 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports (2007)  
 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the 
Application, ICJ Reports (2006) 
 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) ICJ Reports 
(2002) 
 
Belgium v Senegal, Judgment, ICJ GL No 144, ICGJ 437 (ICJ 2012), 20th July 2012 
 
Case concerning Maritime Delimitation (Qatar v Bahrain) 1995 ICJ 6 
 
Case of armed conflict (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) ICJ reports 2005 
 
Case of Military activity in and against (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) 1986 ICJ Rep 14 Court) 
 
Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) Memorial of the Republic of 
Namibia Botswana/Namibia 1999 ICJ 1045 
 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) ICJ Reports (1995) 
 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States) (Provisional 
Measures) ICJ Reps (1992) 
 
Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations ICJ Reports (1949) 
 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1991) 
 
Societe Commerciale De Belgique, Belgium v Greece, Judgment, PCIJ Series A/B No 78, 
ICGJ 331 (PCIJ 1939), 15th June 1939, Permanent Court of International Justice  
 
The Case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ (ser A) No 10 (Sept 71927) 
International Criminal Court 
 
The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC‐01/04‐01/07 judgment 
(25 March 2008)  
 
The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo ICC-02/11-01/11(28 February 2013) 
The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/13) (20 March 2014) 
x 
 
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No ICC-02/05-01/09 Warrant of 
Arrest, (July 12, 2010) 
The Prosecutor v Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, Case No ICC-1/09-02/11 (23 January 2012) 
Situation in Uganda ICC-02/04-547 Warrant of Arrest issued for Vincent Otti July 2005 
The Prosecutor v Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein Case No ICC-02/05-01/12 (1 March 
2012) Arrest warrant yet to be executed 
The Prosecutor v Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Judgment, ICC- 02/05-02/09 (23 April, 2010)  
The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 
74 of the Statute (14 March 2012) 
The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda Case No ICC-01/04-02/06 (10 February 2014) 
The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment (7 March 2014) 
Sentence (23 May 2014) 
The Prosecutor v Harun and Kushayb, Case No ICC-02/05-01/07 Judgment (27 April 2007) 
The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana Case No ICC-01/04-01/10 (23 December 2011) 
The Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10) (ICC-01/04-01/10-514) (30 May 2012) 
The Prosecutor v Joseph Kony et al (ICC-02/04–01/05) (13 October 2005) 
The Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, Case No ICC-01/09-01/11 (10 September 2013) 
The Prosecutor v Francis et al (ICC-01/09-02/11-495-AnxA-Corr 05-10-2012 2/18 RH T) 
protocol establishing a redaction regime  
The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12 Judgment 18 December 2012 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
The Prosecutor v Blaskić IT-95-14-T (2000) 122 ILR1, 'Lašva Valley' 
The Prosecutor v Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of 
the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 1997 
The Prosecutor v Delalić et al, Case No (IT-96-21-T) (IT-96-21-A) 20 February 2001 
The Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošović, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11bis,  
The Prosecutor v Erdemovic (Case No IT-96-22-T), Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 
1996, (1998) 108 ILR 180 
The Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No IT-95-17/I-T, (1999) 38 ILM 317  
The Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 April 2008 
The Prosecutor v Kupresˇkic´ et al (IT-95-16-T) (IT-95-16-A) 23 October 2001 
The Prosecutor v Limaj et al, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 30 November 2005 
xi 
 
The Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac Case No IT-97-25-T; (IT-97-25-A) 17 September 2003 
The Prosecutor v Milošović, et al Case No IT-99-37 initial indictment 22 May 1999 
The Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging 
Jurisdiction Joint Criminal Enterprise Case No IT-99-37-AR72 ICTY, 21 May 2003 
The Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka et al, (IT 98-30/1-T); (IT 98-30/1-A) (28 February 2005) 
The Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No (IT-98-33-T); (IT-98-33-A) 19 April 2004 
The Prosecutor v Radoslv Brdanin Case No IT-99-36-T Judgment 1 September 2004 
The Prosecutor v Rajic, indictment review to Rule 61 of the RPE, 13 September 1996 
The Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, (IT-99-l37-I) Judgement, 16 June 2004 
The Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, (IT-99-l37-I) Preliminary Motions, 8 November 2001 
The Prosecutor v Stakic Judgment Case No IT-97-24-T ICTY Trial Chamber 31 July 2003 
The Prosecutor v Stankovic, Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11bis, 27 May 2005 
The Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić (Decision on the objection of the Republic of Croatia to the 
issuance of subpoenae duces tecum), IT-95-14-T, 110 ILR 607; 106 ILR 609; 108 ILR 69  
The Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić Case IT-95-14-T, 110 ILR 607; 106 ILR 609; 108 ILR 69  
The Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, 
Dragan Papic, Vladimir Santic, IT-95-16-T  (14 January 2000) 
The Prosecutor v Stakic Judgment Case No IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006) 
Prosecutor v Blagojevic and Jokic Judgment IT-02-60-A (ICTY), 9 May 2007 
The Prosecutor v Limaj et al, Case No IT-03-66-T; IT-03-66-A (27 September 2007) 
The Prosecutor v Boskoski and Tarculovski (IT-04-82-T) (IT-04-82-A) 10 July 2008 
The Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, et al (IT-04-84-T) (IT-04-84 A) 19 July 2010 
The Prosecutor v Popović et al, Case No IT-05-88, Judgment (June 10, 2010) 
The Prosecutor v Mico Stanisic and Zupljanin, (IT-08-91-T) (IT-08-91-A) (14 October 2013)  
The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, 101 ILR 1; 105 ILR 419; 105 ILR 479 
The Prosecutor v Naser Oric (IT-03-68-T) (2006) IT-94-1-AR72, 105 ILR 453; 35 ILM 32 
The Prosecutor v Nikolic, Case No IT-94-2-R61, IT-94-2-AR73 (5 June 2003) 
The Prosecutor v Jelisić (Goran) Judgment, Case No IT-95-10-A ICTY (5 July 2001) 
The Prosecutor v Martić, Case No IT-95-11-T; IT-95-11-A (8 October 2008) 
The Prosecutor v Milan Martić, Case No IT-95-11-T; ICTY-IT-95-11-A (8 October 2008)   
The Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 1996 
The Prosecutor v Aleksovski, Case No IT-95- 14/1-A, 24 March 2000 
The Prosecutor v Kristic, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001 
The Prosecutor v Sikirica et al (IT-95-8-I) (31 August 2001)  
xii 
 
The Prosecutor v Blagojevich´ et al (IT-02-60-T) 3 October 2002 
The Prosecutor v Krstic´ (IT-98-33-T) (IT-98-33-A) 19 April 2004 
The Prosecutor v Milošović, Slobodan (IT-02-54) 14 March 2006 
The Prosecutor v Vidoje Blagojević (IT-98-33/1) 8 July 2009 
The Prosecutor v Momcilo Perisic, Case NO IT-04-81-A (28 Feb 2013)  
The Prosecutor v Mrkšić et al, Case No IT-95-13/1-T Judgment IT-95-13/1; 5 May 2009 
The Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-T) (IT-95-17/1-A) 21 July 2000 
The Prosecutor v Kunarac et al IT-96-23-T&; IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 2001) 
The Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvocka et al, (Judgment), IT-98-30/1-T; IT-98-30/1-A (28 
February 2005) 
The Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez, (IT-95-14/2); (IT-95-14/2-A) (17 December 2004) 
The Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić, ICTY (IT-95-5/18-I) (19 October 2009) 
The Prosecutor v Ratko Mladic - Case No IT-95-5/18-1, (8 November 2002) 
The Prosecutor v Zenjnil Delalic´ et al (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998)  
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
The Prosecutor v Alfred Musema (Judgment) ICTR-96-13-A (27 January 2000) 
The Prosecutor v Bagilishema, (Judgment) ICTR-95-1A-T 9 (7 June 2001) 
The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana & et al, (Judgment) ICTR-99-52-A (28 Nov 2007) 
The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze 
(Judgment), ICTR-99-52-A (ICTR) (28 November 2007) 
The Prosecutor v Georges Anderson Rutaganda (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T 6 December 1999 
The Prosecutor v Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR-95-1A-T) ICTR-95-1A-A (3 July 2002) 
The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) 
The Prosecutor v Joseph Kanyabashi, (Judgment) ICTR-96-15-T (18 June 1997) 
The Prosecutor v Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T, (Judgment) (ICTR-98-44A-A) (23 May 2005) 
The Prosecutor v Kambanda, (Judgment) ICTR 97-23-S (4 Sept 1998) 
The Prosecutor v Kanyabashi (Judgment) ICTR-96-15-T (18 June 1997) 
The Prosecutor v Kayishema & Ruzindana, (Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T, 127 (21 May 1999)  
The Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza (Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003 
The Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza ICTR-97-20-T; ICTR-97-20-A (20 May 2005)  
The Prosecutor v Nahimana et al ICTR-99-52-T; ICTR-99-52-A (28 November 2007) 
The Prosecutor v Nyramasuhuko, et al (Judgment) Case No ICTR-98-42-T, (June 24, 2011) 
xiii 
 
The Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana (Judgment) ICTR 00-60-T (13 April 2006) 
The Prosecutor v Rutaganda, (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T, ICTR-96-3-A (26 May 2003) 
The Prosecutor v Serashugo (Judgment) (ICTR-98-39-S) (2 February1999)   
The Prosecutor v Simon Bikindi (Judgment) ICTR-01-72-T; ICTR-01-72-A (18 March 2010) 
Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
The Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 31 
May 2004 
The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa (the CDF Accused) (Sentencing 
Judgment), SCSL-04-14-T, (9 October 2007) 
The Prosecutor v Taylor, (Judgment) SCSL-03-01-T, (May 18, 2012) 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Judgment) No SCSL-03-1-T (26 April 2012) 
The Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, (Judgment) SCSL-04-15-t (2 March 2009)  
Prosecutor v Brima et al, Judgement, (Judgment) (SCSL-04-16-A) 22 February 2008 
Other Courts and Tribunals 
 
Akdivar et al v Turkey; Application No 21893/93, ECHR  
Anthony Enahoro et al v General Abdulsalami Abubakar Case No 03-3089, 408 F3d 877 (23 
May 2005) (Customary Immunity of Heads of State) 
 
AP v Italy; Admissibility, UN Doc CCPR/C/31/D/204/1986, Communication No 204/1986, 
IHRL 2495 (UNHRC 1987) 
 
Attorney General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5 (Israel) 
Attorney General v Adolf Eichmann Crim Case No 40/61, in the District Court of Jerusalem  
Banković and et al v Belgium and ors, Admissibility, App no 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII, 
[2001] ECHR 890, (2007) 44 EHRR SE5, 11 BHRC 435, (2001) 123 ILR 94, IHRL 3273 
(ECHR 2001), 12th December 2001, European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR, Grand 
Chamber 
 
Bartkus v Illinois 359 US 121 (1959) 
Bodner v Banque Paribas, 114 F Supp 2d 117, 128 (EDNY 2000)  
Bowoto v Chevron Corp, No C 99-02506 SI, 2007 WL 2349336, at 29 (ND Cal (2007)) 
Brown v Ohio 432 US 161 
BVerfGE 75, 1 2 BvM 2/86  
Chua Han Mow v United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 
xiv 
 
CR v United Kingdom (A/335–B) (1995) 21 EHHR 363, ECHR  
Cutting case 1866 
Decision on the Extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo ILM Vol 42, No 4 (July 2003), pp 
888-914 (June 2003) (Supreme Court of Mexico) 
Eyston v Studd (2 Plow 459, 75 Eng Rep 688 1574) ‘prose by Edmund Plowden 1579’  
Fagan v Met Police Com [1969] 1 QB 439 [1968] 3 All ER 442 [1968] 3 WLR 1120, 52 Cr  
Fiehe v RE Householder Co, 125 So 2, 7 (Fla 1929) 
Forti v Suarez-Mason, 694 F Supp 707, 710-12 (ND Cal 1988) 22 USC 2151 (2006)  
Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence et al, (No 05-184) 415 F 3d 33 (29 Jun 2006) 
Re: Henfield’s Case, 11 F Cas 1099, 1107 (CCD Pa 1793) (No 6,360)  
In R v Haigh (2010) EWCA Crim 90, (2010) All ER (D) 19 (Feb) 
Jorgic v Germany, App No 74613/01, Eur Ct HR 2007 
Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F 3d 232, 236 (2d Cir 1995)  
Kazubowski v Kazubowski, 45 Ill 2d 405, 259, NE2d 282, 290 
Ken Wiwa et al v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 626 FSupp 2d 377, 384 (SDNY 2009)  
Khulumani v Barclay Nat Bank, Ltd, F3d (2d Cir 2007)  
Korberly v Hungary [GC] ECtHR App no 9174/02, (2008)  
Loizidou v Turkey, App No 15318/89, Case No 40/1993/435/514, A/310, [1995] ECHR 10 
McMullen v Hodge WL 4062 (Tex34, 23) (1849) 
Narciso González Medina et al v Domincan Republic, Case 11 324 (2010))  
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 (Australia) 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, 244 F Supp 2d 289, (2003)  
Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 
R (Al-Saadoon) v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 7 Court of Appeal (UK) 
R (Al-Saadoon) v Secretary of State for Defence, [2008] EWHC 3098 
R (on the application of J S) Sri Lanka v Secretary of State for the Home Department On 
appeal from: [2009] EWCA Civ 364, SC [2010] UKSC 15, WL 889364, 2010 
 
Rivard v United States 375 F2d 882, 885 
R v Bartle and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), [1999] UKHL 17, [2000] 1 AC 147  
R v Blaue [1976] 61 Cr App R 271 
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 
[1988] 4 All ER 897; [1999] 1 All ER 577; [1999] 2 All ER 97 
R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998] 4 All ER 
897; [1998] 3 WLR 1456 
xv 
 
R v Dytham, (1979) BQ 722 (1979) 3 AII ER 641 
R v Finta, [1994] 1 SCR 701 
R v Gibson & Procter (1918)  
R v Jones et al [2006] UKHL 16 
R v Larsonneur (1933)  
R v Naughton (2001)  
R v White [1910] 2 KB 124 
Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir 1994)  
Ryuichi Shimoda et al v The State (Tokyo District Court) 7 December 1963  
Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F Supp 2d 1116 (CD Cal 2002) 
Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher [1949] 2 KB 481 
Sivakumar v Canada (Employment and Immigration Minister) (CA), [1994] 1 CF 433  
State v Robbins (1943), 221 Ind 125, 46 NE2d 691 
SW v United Kingdom, Series A, No 335-B, 22 November 1995  
Tachiona v Mugabe, 234 F Supp 2d 401, 416, 426 (SDNY 2002)  
Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 
The Dover Castle case of (Commander Karl Neumann) (Hospital Ship) 1921 
The IG Farben case by VI (US Military Tribunal in Germany) (8 August 1947) 
The Prosecutor v Klaus Barbie, 1983, Cass crim, 1984 DS Jur 113 GP Nos 352–54, 710 (18 
20 Dec), 1983 JCP II G, Nr 20, 107, JDI 779 (1983), in 78 ILR 124 (1988), (Barbie 1) 
judgment of 26 January 1984, Cass crim, 1984 JCP II G, Nr 20, JDI 308 (1984) in 78 ILR 
132 (1988) (Barbie 2); judgment of 20 December 1985, Cass crim, 1986 JCP II G, Nr 20, 
655, JDI 146 f (1986), in: 78 ILR 136 (1988) (Barbie 3); judgment of 3 June 1988, in 100 
ILR 330 (1995) (Barbie 4) 
 
The Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza, Case No 97-20-T; 97-20-A, 269 (20 May 2005)  
The Prosecutor v Touvier, 100 ILR 341, 358 (1992)  
United States v Alfried Krupp et al, Krupp Trial, US Military 1948 
United States v Altstoetter, (The Justice Case), 3 Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under CCL No 10, at 284 (1948)  
United States v Carl Krauch et al (The IG Farben Trial) (Case VI) 30 July 1948 
United States v Darnaud 25 F CAS 754, 760 (CCED Pa 1855) (No 14,918)  
United States v Fawaz Yunis (Crim A No 87-0377) 681 F Supp 896 at 9001-1 (DDC) 1988 
United States v Haun 26 F CAS 227, 231 (CCSD Ala 1860) (No 15,329)  
United States v Josef Altstoetter et al (1947) 
United States v Otto Ohlendorf et al, (1948) 
xvi 
 
United States v Smith, 18 US (5 Wheat) 153 at 163-2 (1820)  
United States V Wilhelm von Leeb et al, 12 LRTWC 1 at 59 (1948) 
United States v Yousef 327 F.3d 56 (US 2nd Cir. 2002) (US) 
United States v Yunis (1991) 30 ILM 403 (US) 
US v Lanza et al 260 US 377 (43 SCt 141, 67 LEd 314) 
Van Oosterwijck v Belgium, Application No7654/76, ECHR, 3/1979/31/46 (4 October 1980) 
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No. 1 
(1987) 
Warner v MPC (1969) 2 AC 256 
Woolmington v DPP (1934) AC 462 HL 
Xuncax v Gramajo, 886 F Supp 162, (D Mass 1995)  
Yasser Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWCA Civ 222, CA 
(England and Wales) 18 March 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xvii 
 
Table of Treaties 
Bilateral and Multilateral Conventions and Treaties 
 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) 
 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning 
the prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of Democratic 
Kampuchea (6 June 2003)  
 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945)  
 
Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (April 1998)  
 
Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945)  
 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (Geneva, 12 August 1949)  
 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva, 12 August 1949)  
 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949)  
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, 12 
August 1949)  
 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (10 December 
1984) 
 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (The Hague, 29 July 1899 
and 18 October 1907) 
 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The 
Hague, 14 May 1954)  
 
Convention for the protection of World cultural Heritage (Paris 16 November 1972); UN 
treaty Series Volume 1037 p151 
 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft [Hijacking Convention], 860 
UNTS 105, entered into force 14 October 1971 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (New York, 14 December 1973) 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 
xviii 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989)  
 
Convention Respecting the laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 18 October 1907) 
 
GA Res 95(1) 1 UN GAOR, Resolutions 188, UN Doc A/64/Add1 (1946) Codification and 
development of Nuremberg Principles. 
 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (New 
York, 21 December 1965) 
 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(New York, 30 November 1973) 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966)  
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966)  
 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (25 May 2000)  
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977)  
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8 June 1977) 
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III) (8 December 2005)  
 
Regional Treaties, Agreements, Declarations and Related, Treaty on International Penal Law, 
23 January 1889 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998)  
 
The Control Council for Germany No 3, (CCL 10) Official Gazette of 50 – 55 36 ILR 31 
(31st January, 1946) 
 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Dec 1948, 78 
UNTS 277 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
 
The Geneva Protocol of 1925, Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 
 
The Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277, TS No 539 
 
The Hague Declaration (IV 2) concerning asphyxiating gases of 1899; The Hague, 29 July 
1899 
xix 
 
 
The Kellogg–Briand Pact 1928 
 
The Treaty of Washington of 1922; The treaty was agreed at the Washington Naval 
Conference, DC November 1921 to February 1922; signed on 6 February 1922 an attempt to 
prevent a naval arms race that began after World War I 
 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied & Associated Powers and Turkey Signed at Sevres - 
August 10, 1920 
 
Treaty of Peace with Italy (Paris, 19 February 1947) 
 
Treaty of Versailles (Versailles, 28 June 1919) 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed and adopted by the General Assembly 10 
December 1948 
 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Vienna, 18 April1961) 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969)  
 
Statutes and Legislations of England and Wales  
 
Slave Trade Act 1807, on 25 March 1807 the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act received its 
royal assent, abolishing the slave trade in the British colonies and making it illegal to carry 
enslaved people in British ships 
 
Slave Trade Act 1824  
Slave Trade Act 1843  
Slave Trade Act 1873 
The Act of Union England and Scotland 1707 
The Act of Union England and Wales 1536 and 1543 is a series of laws passed in the English 
Parliament 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998  
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994  
The Criminal Law Act 1977 
The Football Offences Act 1991 (amended by the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 
1999) forbids indecent or racialist chanting at designated football matches 
 
The Public Order Act 1986 England, Wales, and Scotland 
The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006  
 
xx 
 
European Conventions and Treaties 
 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 
November 1950) 
 
European Convention on Extradition (13 December 1957)  
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (20 April 1959)  
The Amsterdam Treaty, officially the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the 
European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related 
acts, was signed on 2 October 1997, and entered into force on 1 May 1999; it made 
substantial changes to the Treaty of Maastricht, which had been signed in 1992. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam meant a greater emphasis on citizenship and the rights of individuals, an 
attempt to achieve more democracy in the shape of increased powers for the European 
Parliament, a new title on employment, a Community area of freedom, security and justice. 
 
The European Economic Community (EEC) (1958) an international organisation created by 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to bring about economic integration (a common market) among 
its six founding members: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West 
Germany. The EEC also known as the Common Market in the English-speaking world and 
sometimes referred to as the European Community even before being officially renamed in 
1993 as such. It gained a common set of institutions along with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as one of 
the European Communities under the 1965 Merger Treaty (Treaty of Brussels). 
 
The Maastricht Treaty (formally, the Treaty on European Union or TEU) undertaken to 
integrate Europe was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European 
Community in Maastricht, Netherlands. On 9–10 December 1991, the same city hosted the 
European Council which drafted the treaty. Upon its entry into force on 1 November 1993, it 
created the European Union and led to the creation of the single European currency, the euro. 
The Maastricht Treaty has been amended by the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon.  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon (initially known as the Reform Treaty) is an international agreement 
which amends the two treaties which form the constitutional basis of the European Union 
(EU). The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and 
entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which also is 
known as the Treaty on European Union, and the Treaty of Rome (1958), which also is 
known as the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEEC). At Lisbon, the Treaty of 
Rome was renamed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
 
The Treaty of Nice was signed by European leaders on 26 February 2001 and came into force 
on 1 February 2003. It amended the Maastricht Treaty (or the Treaty on European Union) and 
the Treaty of Rome (or the Treaty establishing the European Community which, before the 
Maastricht Treaty, was the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community). The 
Treaty of Nice reformed the institutional structure of the European Union to withstand 
eastward expansion, a task which was originally intended to have been done by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, but failed to be addressed at the time. 
 
xxi 
 
The Treaty of Rome, officially the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(TEEC), is an international agreement that led to the founding of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) on 1 January 1958. It was signed on 25 March 1957 by Belgium, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The word Economic was deleted 
from the treaty's name by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 
 
xxii 
 
Table of Journal Abbreviations 
 
American Journal of International Law      AJIL  
American Society of International Law      ASIL  
British Yearbook of International Law      BYbIL  
Cambridge Law Journal        CLJ 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law      CYbIL  
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law      Col JTL  
Columbia Law Review        Col LR  
Criminal Law Forum         Crim LF  
European Journal of International Law      EJIL  
European Law Review        EL Rev 
Fordham International Law Journal       FILJ  
Georgetown Journal of International Law      Geo JIL  
Harvard Human Rights Journal       HHRJ  
Harvard International Law Journal       HILJ  
Human Rights Quarterly        HRQ  
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law     ILSA JICL  
International and Comparative Law Quarterly     ICLQ  
International Review of the Red Cross      IRRC  
Journal          J  
Journal of Conflict and Security Law      JCSL  
Journal of International Criminal Justice      JICJ  
Law and Contemporary Problems       L&CP  
Law Quarterly Review        LQR 
Leiden Journal of International Law       LJIL  
Melbourne Journal of International Law      Melb JIL  
Michigan Journal of International Law      Mich JIL  
Modern Law Review         MLR 
New England Law Review        NELR  
New Law Journal         NLJ 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics   NYJILP  
xxiii 
 
New York University Law Review       NYULR  
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies       OJLS 
Proceedings of the American Society of International law    ASIL Proceedings  
Stanford Journal of International Law      Stan JIL  
Texas Law Review         Tex LR  
Virginia Journal of International       Law VJIL  
Yale Journal of International Law       YJIL  
Yale Law Journal         YLJ  
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law     YbIHL 
 
Table of Other Acronyms 
 
Affirmed          affd 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights     ACHPR 
African Union Mission in Sudan       AMIS 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur    UNAMID 
And following         ff 
Article/articles         art/arts 
Cambridge University Press        CUP 
Chapter/chapters         ch/chs 
Chapter/chapters (of statutes)       c/cc 
Consolidated Treaty Series        CTS  
Convention Against Torture        CAT 
Criminal          Crim  
Criminal Law Review        Crim LR 
Democratic Republic of Congo       DRC 
Economic Community of West African States     ECOWAS 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group   ECOMOG 
Edition          edn 
Editor/editors          ed/eds 
European          Eur  
European Convention on Human Rights      ECHR 
European Court of Human Rights       ECtHR 
xxiv 
 
European Human Rights Reports       EHRR 
European Treaty Series        ETS 
European Union         EU 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia    ECCC 
Footnote/footnotes (internal to the work)      n/nn 
For example          eg 
Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV       GC I- IV 
Human Rights Watch        HRW 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights      IACtHR 
International          Intl  
International and Comparative Law Quarterly     ICLQ  
International Centre for Transitional Justice      ICTJ 
International Court of Justice       ICJ  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights    ICCPR 
International Criminal Court        ICC 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda      ICTR 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia    ICTY 
International Law Reports        ILR 
International Legal Materials        ILM 
International Military Tribunal       IMT 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East     IMTFE 
Iraqi High Tribunal         IHT  
Law or Legal          L  
Legal Studies          LS 
NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina    SFOR 
Non-governmental Organisation       NGO 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization       NATO 
Number/numbers (of a Report etc)       No/Nos 
Office of the Prosecutor       OTP 
Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal     OUCLJ 
Oxford University Press        OUP 
Paragraph/paragraphs        para/paras 
Part/parts          pt/pts 
Peace support operation        PSO 
xxv 
 
Pre-Trial Chamber         PTC 
Public Law          PL 
Quarterly          Q 
Regulation/Regulations        reg/regs 
Report(s)          Rep 
Review          Rev 
Rex/Regina          R 
Rule/rules          r/rr 
Rules of Engagement         ROE 
Rules of Procedure        ROP 
Schedule/schedules         sch/schs 
Secretary-General (of the United Nations)      SG 
Section/sections         s/ss 
Special Court for Sierra Leone       SCSL  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General     SRSG 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon       STL  
State Immunity Act         SIA  
Subsection/subsections        sub-s/sub-ss 
That is          ie 
United Kingdom         UK  
House of Lords         HL 
United Nations         UN 
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia     UNAMIC 
United Nations General Assembly       UNGA  
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste     UNMIT 
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina     UNMIBH 
United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire      UNOCI 
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea     UNMEE 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo       UNMIK 
United Nations Mission in Liberia       UNMIL 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone      UNAMSIL 
United Nations Mission in the Sudan      UNMIS 
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor     UNMISET 
United Nations Operation in Somalia      UNOSOM 
xxvi 
 
United Nations Protection Force       UNPROFOR 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia    UNTAC 
United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor    UNTAET 
United Nations Treaty Series        UNTS  
United States          US 
United States Armed Forces        USAF 
United States Freedom of Information Act      FOIA 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights      UDHR 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties      VCLT  
Volume/volumes         vol/vols 
Yearbook          YB 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission     YBILC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxvii 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines prosecutorial challenges of the International Criminal Court (ICC/the 
court) in relation to the dwindling legitimacy prosecuting under Article 5 of the Rome Statute 
and other relevant international law principles. The study attempts a prognosis of the future 
shape of ICC prosecutions in light of the challenges and proposes reforms to the operations of 
the Court and its constitutive instrument to improve the dispensation of justice. 
The focus of the study is substantive international criminal law, developments in relevant 
case laws of international courts and tribunals, structure and procedures of the ICC and 
relevant principles within the context of elements of the Crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the Crime of aggression. The thesis further evaluates the role of the 
Court as it ensures international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the ‘Rule of 
law’, uphold the principles of international humanitarian law, human rights law and combat 
impunity being the first permanent treaty-based international criminal court with the intent 
and purpose of ending impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community and thus contributes to the prevention of such crimes. Additionally, 
the International Criminal Court advances international criminal justice, particularly with 
regard to victims by providing not only legal justice but also participation in the process and 
restorative justice to rebuild the society after mass violence.  
The thesis is an analysis of the prosecutorial challenges at the International Criminal Court, 
using its legal framework and jurisprudence to establish facts and reach new conclusions. 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Preamble   
This thesis examines the challenges affecting the effective functioning of the International 
Criminal Court (the Court/ICC); proffers probable solutions and the future shape of the Court 
under the Rome Statute.
1
 Pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
52/160 of 15 December 1997, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
in Rome, Italy, on the establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted the Rome 
Statute on 17
th
 July 1998, and became operational, upon ratification and enforcement on 1
st
 
July 2002.
2
 Year 2003 saw the first set of judges elected and the Prosecutor of the Court 
appointed.  
The Creation of the Court is underpinned by the ‘Rule of Law’3 and meant to ensure that 
perpetrators of serious crimes are held accountable within the framework of a global 
jurisdiction, if they were beyond the reach of justice in their own country. The legal 
framework of the ICC created a permanent jurisdiction, to focus investigation and 
prosecution on the most serious crimes of international concern, the ambit of the Court to 
dispense not only legal justice but also transitional justice is enshrined in the Statute. As John 
Rawls has observed that justice is the bond of society without which any association of 
human beings would struggle to subsist.
4
  
The Rome statute has become a necessary and fundamental tool in the campaign against 
impunity. It contains a comprehensive codification of the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, based on the free and voluntary consent of 
the international community, and reflects the development in international criminal law and 
                                                          
1
 2187 UNTS 3; 37 ILM 999 (1998) adopted 17 July 1998, Rome, Italy, entered into force 01 July 2002 (ICCSt). 
2 ibid, Article 126 (1) entry into force, ‘This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 
60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations’. 
3
 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 8
th
 edn, London 
1885); Thomas Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, London 2010) 3-6; Bingham also accredits the Rule of 
Law to Aristotle by a quote: ‘that it is better for the law to rule than one of the citizen’.  
4
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Reissued edition, , US 2005) 3; ‘Justice is the first 
virtue of social institutions .... A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is 
untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished 
if they are unjust. ...Justice is not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. 
2 
 
justice. The Court will only prosecute those accused of these crimes if the State is unwilling 
or genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution.
5
 The Rome Statute does not 
expressly lay claims to universal jurisdiction as of itself, but the Substantive crimes 
enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute are customary in nature, thereby subject to universal 
jurisdiction.
6
  
This research understudy’s how the ICC became engulfed in circumstances that tend to 
compromise its credibility and or legitimacy. How and what can be done to improve the 
‘State of affairs’?  To accomplish the intent and purpose underlining its establishment, 
ruminating on these, the research will examine three main issues such as: how has the 
jurisdiction of the Court been established after the enforcement of the Rome Statute? What 
are the Challenges facing the Court? And in what ways if any, has the jurisprudence of the 
Court contributed to the current ‘state of affairs?’ The thesis sets out to establish the need to 
further augment the Rome Statute, either through amendments or creation of an additional 
legal framework in light of new realities to enhance the capacity of the Court in order to 
actualise the purpose and intent of the Statute. Noting Louis Henkin’s contentions that 
enforcement is a weak link in the International Legal System,
7
 the Significance therefore, is 
the focus on the limits within the legal framework of the Court reverberating external 
challenges; delegitimating the authority of the Court; leading to compromising it credibility 
and performance.  
The research attempts to underscore the Intrinsic and Extrinsic problems, affecting internal 
and external motivations towards the Court. It seeks to make a contribution to scholarship in 
the area of international criminal law. The distinctiveness of this dissertation is the focus on 
the behaviour (theory of Organisations) of the Court as an entity. Although, this is not the 
first research on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, nor will it be the last, 
but, it adds to the reservoir of knowledge in the subject area and to that end maintains the 
impetus of the discussion on the important enquiry that affects the dispensation of justice by 
the Court. 
                                                          
5
 ICCSt (n I) Article 17 (1) (a), (3); Hans‐Peter Kaul, ‘The International Criminal Court Current Challenges and 
Perspectives’ Salzburg Law School on International Criminal Law (USA 2011). 
6
 Abass Ademola, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa, Rationale, Prospects and Challenges’ (2013) 24 
European Journal of International Law 933. 
7
 Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State Sovereignty’ (1995) 25 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 31, 41.  
 
3 
 
1.2 Overview and Methodology 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) 1946 Judgment at Nuremberg
8
 and the setting up 
of the International Law commission (ILC) to codify the 7 point decision of the Nuremberg 
Trials accepted today as customary in international law, favours the argument that State 
sovereignty has been challenged.
9
 The traditional precept of State sovereignty is the 
exclusivity of national claims to jurisdiction over her citizens, but part of the Codification 
declared that ‘international crimes are committed by individuals and any person who commits 
an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to 
punishment.’10  
This thesis critically evaluates the Challenges associated with the enforcement of 
international criminal law by the International Criminal Court and argues that there are some 
fundamental weaknesses in the Enforcement Mechanisms applicable to the law, an 
unconscious offshoot deliberately calibrated into the legal framework establishing the Court 
on the notion that States Sovereignty should always prevail, against the backdrop that once an 
organisation is formed such an organisation should be allowed to grow if the intent and 
purpose for creating it is still relevant. A vivid example of such organisation and growth is 
the European Union which has grown from mere cooperation between States to Supra-
nationalism.
11
    
                                                          
8
 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 American Journal of International Law 258 (1945); United 
Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ‘London Agreement’, 8 August 1945. 
9
 1950 International Law Commission Year Book Vol 11, 374; UN Doc A/CN 4/SER.A/1950/Add 1; 44 
American Journal of International Law (Supp) 15 (1950) Principles of international law recognised in the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal 1950; In Resolution 177 (II) of 21 
November 1947, the General Assembly instructed the International Law Commission to formulate the principle 
of international law recognised in the Charter of the IMT and in the judgment of the Tribunal. The commission 
determined that as the General Assembly had affirmed the principle, it should not evaluate the principle qua 
principle of international law but merely formulate them. The seven Nuremberg principles have aided much of 
the development in international criminal law.   
10
 ibid, Principle 1. 
11 George Bermann et al, Cases and Materials on European Union Law (West Academic Publishing, 3rd edn, 
USA 2011); The success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) led the Political Leadership of the 
initial six member States to enter into the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957 which launched in 1958 the 
European Economic Community (EEC) subsequently, the Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union 
(EU) as an over-arching structure in 1993, and modified substantially the EEC, renamed the European 
Community (EC), the Treaties of Amsterdam in 1999 and Nice in 2003 made important amendments. The 
Treaty of Lisbon, effective 1December 2009, substantially amended the initial Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union and absorbed the EC into the European Union. Comprehensive treatise on the law, history, and structure 
of the European Union co-authored by Fordham International Law Journal, faculty advisor Professor Roger 
Goebel Fordham Law Library, European Union Legal Research Guide; 
<http://lawlib1.lawnet.fordham.edu/research/eu.pdf > Accessed 30 April 2014. 
4 
 
Another argument central to this thesis is the lack of adequate authority accompanying 
delegated responsibilities (proportionality theory) to the International Criminal Court for 
enforcement of justice consequent upon a breach of substantive international criminal law; 
incongruent with the achievement of global justice for mankind. In the words of Blaise 
Pascal, ‘Justice without force is [no justice] powerless…’12 The thesis also argues that the 
administration of international criminal law requires the International Criminal Court to 
develop acceptable standards on the issue of gravity and admissibility for coherent 
application in situations, and that the Court ought to remain apolitical. Further arguments are 
that prosecution of heinous crimes committed in a territory cannot be properly executed by 
heavy reliance on the State Party because of their common interest with the perpetrators of 
the Crime, assuming they are not in themselves guilty of the Crime. Prior to the ICC 
enforcement of judgments of international tribunals have been through cooperation and use of 
co-opted States coercive powers, which the ICC recognises through the Complementarity 
principle.
13
 However, the Court being majorly dependent on the ‘Host State’ for access to 
collection of evidence, initial detention and arrest of the accused has severely thwarted proper 
undertaking of the Court’s functions.14 
However, this thesis is a doctrinal study,
15
 a traditional theoretical legal analysis, the 
orientation and designed is to enable its findings to be useful in ensuring utmost credibility 
and legitimacy in the jurisdiction, decisions and improve current implementation regime of 
international criminal law and justice by the Court. Different areas of law theories contributed 
to the research, namely public international law, international criminal law, international 
humanitarian law, international human rights law, domestic criminal law, commercial law 
and such other theories like Organisational Behaviour (OB) became relevant. The thesis 
engages textual analysis of legislations, treaties, case laws and legal academic writings, with 
directions and motivations highly influenced by the authorship and knowledge of academics 
such as Dapo Akande, Benedict Chigara, William Schabas, Abimbola Olowofoyeku, 
                                                          
12 Blaise Pascal, Thoughts on Religion and Philosophy (William Collins edition, Glasgow 1838). 
13
 ICCSt (n 1) Article 17; para 10 of the preamble to the Statute which states that: Emphasising that the 
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions. 
14
 William A Schabas, ‘Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts’ (2008) 19 Criminal 
Law Forums 5. 
15
 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 4
th
 edn, Oxford 2012)19-20; Saul Becker 
and others Understanding Research for Social Policy and Social Work Themes, Methods and Approaches, 
Understanding Welfare Social Issues, Policy and Practice (Series Policy Press, 2
nd
 edn, UK 2012) 12 – 15. 
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Manisule Ssenyojo, Abass Ademola, Illias Bentakers, Gerard Conway, Nicholas Tsagorius, 
Anthony Cassese, Akalemwa Ngenda and Laila Sadat to mention a few.
16
    
The principles’ underlining the jurisprudence of international criminal prosecution up to and 
after the advent of the ICC has been examined. The thesis analyses in the first place the 
substantive crimes within the Rome Statute to fully understand the developments in 
international criminal law to the present day. It is argued that the ICC Statute reflects a sui 
generis legal regime in respect of these crimes. Theoretically, the research progresses towards 
analysing the ICC as a legal entity inundated with prosecutorial challenges in the process of 
redressing injustice and establishing responsibility for the most serious crimes of concern to 
humanity.
17
 
When an assertion is made, the researcher attempts to produce the evidence; in so doing 
present arguments to establish the assertion through critical examination of primary and 
secondary sources of data. Consequently, a summation is reached through rigorous analysis 
of legislative Acts, bills, commentaries and debates by notable authorities present during the 
drafting of the Statute which provides an in-depth insight into the factual intentions and 
importance behind the Articles of the Statute. Legislations and their travaux préparatoires 
most times are obtained in their original form and in English. Analysing the travaux 
préparatoires of the ICC Treaty is aimed at establishing the legal reasoning, opinions, 
intentions and reservations of States that participated during the 1998 Rome Conference.  
Furthermore, the assessment of relevant reports, journals and reviews as secondary sources of 
data was crucial; in the process, consideration was given to factors like, the authenticity of 
                                                          
16
 ibid.  
17 Article 4 of the Rome Statute specifies that the Court shall have ‘international legal personality’. The ICC’s 
international legal personality flows also from the doctrine by the International Court of Justice that an 
International Organisation must be deemed to have those powers which are essential to the Performance of its 
duties. Similarly, it can be concluded that the ICC is an international organisation ie a new form of integrated 
international judicial organisation, in that it is not subject to instructions from governments of States Parties. 
Under the Statute the Court is composed of various organs vested with either legislative or executive powers. 
Lastly, the ICC has supranational powers, it can, for instance, issue arrest warrants with binding force for 
National Authorities; Sascha Rolf Lüder, ‘The legal nature of the International Criminal Court and the 
emergence of supranational elements in international criminal justice’ (2002) 84 International Review of the Red 
Cross 79; Ian Brownnlie, Principles of Public International Law (8
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 
58-59; Jennings and A Watts (ed), Oppenheim’s International Law I (Longman , 9th edn, London 1996)119-120.  
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documents through cross-referencing to identifying its origin. Again, credibility of issues 
raised in such documents is examined to ascertain accuracy or sincerity, bearing in mind that 
reports sometimes reflect the views of those responsible for producing it; it was therefore 
essential to conceptualise the information gathered. Representativeness is a natural 
consequence of this approach, leading to systematic and rigorous evaluation to objectively 
interpret the information and accordingly, attribute to it the appropriate weight. 
Consequently, an empirical investigation was not undertaken for this research due to 
sufficiently available empirical data, the basis for which a classical doctrinal analysis was 
engaged. The need to explore different opinions at national and international levels in 
pertinent subject areas arose due to the legitimacy challenge facing the ICC. In order to 
examine these, critical analysis of theories are undertaken to compare the status quo with the 
original intent of the Court’s design. Hence, it became apparent in the course of this research 
that the ICC was limited in its capacity to fully understand some of the crimes peculiar to 
some State Parties in which it is to adjudicate over, therefore, the current situation falls short 
of the goals and ideals of the Court. Suggestions reached to alleviate some of the difficulties 
encountered by the Court, are deduced from the doctrinal approach to the investigation, 
which is devoid of quantitative analysis. The method of systematic analysis does not include 
physical observation, collection and analysis of data, field interviews and or collation of 
questionnaires.  
A close examination of the legal framework of the ICC enables the Court to act where 
possible to forestall the execution of crimes under its jurisdiction. The ICC is a permanent 
court with the capacity to intervene in ongoing conflict situations – even prior to the outbreak 
of conflict in some cases – CAH assumes a preventive role at the ICC that it could not 
assume at the ad hoc tribunals,
18
 given that jurisdiction over its commission attaches prior to 
the outset of war.
19
 The Court currently has 123 member States (as of January 2015) of which 
34 are African Union (AU) members. A number of crimes are peculiar to Africa; one of such 
is the Unconstitutional Change of Government (UCG), undoubtedly a common sources of 
conflict in Africa, examples are that of: Mubarak of Egypt and the situation in Côte d'Ivoire 
                                                          
18
 UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993): 32 ILM1203 (1993) (ICTY); UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994): 33ILM 1598 (1994) 
(ICTR). 
19
 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey 2011) 5-7. 
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(Gbagbo) to mention a few.
20
 The unconstitutional takeover of government and its direct 
impact on the peace and stability in African countries and their communities are evidence of 
situations and cases under investigations by the Court.
21
 The Rome Statute is limited to the 
most serious international crimes, which, although common to the whole of humanity, are 
often committed in the aftermath of the breakdown of law and order.
22
 Hence, while the ICC 
prosecutes crimes mostly committed after violence or disorder being already ensued (it has 
no jurisdiction over UCG) in a State, by criminalising UCG the ICC could aim to prevent the 
occurrence of such crimes ab initio through the proscription of acts that may precipitate 
violence and disorder in member states.
23
 
A limitation of this research is that although the crime of aggression has been defined and 
awaiting ratification and enforcement, analyses of the crime have been purely based on the 
Statute, commentaries and other secondary sources of data. There has been no real situation 
or cases in this regard. Interestingly, the Russian/ Ukraine, Crimea case would have been a 
wonderful opportunity to test the jurisdiction of the Court in this regard but unfortunately the 
research would have been completed before the entering into force on 1 January 2007 of the 
crime of aggression under the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
1.3 Structure of the Study 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 starts with the presumption that international 
criminal law entails basic understanding of the workings of national criminal law concepts, 
the Criminal laws of States limit anti-social behaviour to guarantee a safer community.
24
 The 
Chapter further evaluates the theoretical basis for the practice of modern international 
criminal law exemplified through the legal framework of the ICC. Therefore, the chapter 
provides much of the background to the thesis and should be read first as a foundation to 
subsequent chapters. It elaborates basic definitional terms and clarifies some phrases that will 
be commonly used throughout the study, thorough examination of some concepts such as: 
complementarity, admissibility, gravity, ne bis idem and other core theories underlining the 
establishment, operation and acceptance of the Court are made, illuminating further on 
                                                          
20 Abass Ademola, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa, Rationale, Prospects and Challenges’ (2013) 24 
European Journal of International Law 933; see also Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Introduction the Application of 
Public International Law to the Crisis in Libya’ (2012)14 International Community Law Review 305-307.  
21 ibid. 
22
 ibid. 
23
 ibid. 
24
 Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law, (Palgrave Macmillan, 8
th
 edn, London 2013) 3-5; Larry May, Crimes 
against Humanity A Normative Account, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) 80-90. 
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current state and practice of international criminal law. The Chapter also introduces the 
theory of Organisational Behaviour, a concept if properly understood and implemented 
within the Court could to a reasonable extent minimise some of the prosecutorial challenges 
facing the Court. 
Chapter 3 critically examines the substantive crimes (Article 5) of the Rome Statute, the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Court and ‘as is’ established under public international law 
to date. The Chapter is presented in four parts; each part evaluates a substantive crime under 
the Court’s jurisdiction enumerated below:   
Part one: War Crimes  
Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines war crimes as grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 as well as other serious violations of the Laws and Customs of war. A 
war crime can be committed within the framework of both national and international 
conflicts. War crimes and crimes against humanity are the inescapable odious consequence of 
the ruthless use of armed forces.
25
 The ICC will typically pass sentences in three dimensions: 
imprisonment, fining and confiscation. Imprisonment is the principal sanction for war crimes, 
confiscation and fining being accessory punishments, it can be an adjunct to the primary 
sanction but cannot be imposed independently.  
Part two: Crimes Against humanity  
Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack. Murder, Extermination, Enslavement, Deportation 
or forcible transfer of population, Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, Torture, Rape, Sexual Slavery, 
Enforced Prostitution, Forced Pregnancy, Enforced Sterilisation, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity, Persecution against any identifiable group or collectively on 
Political, Racial, National, Ethnic, Cultural, Religious and Gender as defined in paragraph 3, 
or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of 
                                                          
25
 Hans‐Peter Kaul, ‘The International Criminal Court Current Challenges and Perspectives’ [2011] Salzburg 
Law School on International Criminal Law; United Nations Charter Article 2 (4) 
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the Court enforced disappearance of persons, the Crime of Apartheid, Other inhumane acts of 
a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or 
physical health. 
Following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,
26
 crimes against humanity became recognised as 
a category of offenses under international law by the General Assembly,
27
 although, there is 
no specialised convention on CAH,
28
 but the ILC took up the issue of crimes against 
humanity as part of its work on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind which was finalised in 1996, but never adopted.
29
 The ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals in the 1990s re-codified CAH.
30
 Subsequently, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,
31
 the Special Panels in East Timor and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal contained CAH as 
a category of offences,
32
 and their prosecutors charged it extensively. William Schabas noted 
that CAH charges became more successful than war crimes and almost always more 
successful than genocide cases.
33
  The jurisdiction of the ICTY includes two Articles on war 
crimes (Articles 2 on grave breaches and 3 on other violations of the Laws and customs of 
war), genocide (Article 4), and crimes against humanity (Article 5). The Article 5 contains a 
provision linking the crime – like it did at Nuremberg – to armed conflict, providing that the 
                                                          
26
 82 UNTS 279 (1945); 14 State Dept Bull 391 890 TIAS No 1589. 
27
 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
(United Nations General Assembly Resolution) Dec 11 1946 GA Res 95(l) UN Doc A/64/Add 1 (1946); ILC, 
Report on the formulation of Nurnberg principles, prepared by the Special Rapporteur, J Spiropoulos A/CN4/22 
12 April 1950; Yearbook of the International law commission (1950) II. 
28
 Sadat Leila N, ‘Crimes against Humanity in the Modern Age’ (2013) 107 American Journal of International 
Law 334; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court UN Doc A/CONF 183/9, adopted 17 July 1998 
entered into force 1 July 2002 Article 22(2). 
29 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session (1996) 2 Year Book of 
International Law Commission; 45 UN Doc A/CN4/SER A/1996/Add 1 Part 2; Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes 
Against Humanity Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, US 
2011)171-83; Roger S Clark,‘History of Efforts to Codify Crimes Against Humanity from the Charter of 
Nuremberg to the Statute of Rome in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed), Forging a Convention for Crimes against 
Humanity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014). 
30
 UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993) 32 ILM1203 (1993); UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994): 33ILM 1598 (1994). 
31
 Established by an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000. The Special Court for Sierra Leone shall function 
in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute; see also the Special Tribunal for Lebanon established 
1
st
 March 2009, with the primary mandate to hold trials for the people accused of carrying out the attack of 14 
February 2005 killing 22 people, including the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, and injured 
many others. 
32
 On the Amendment of UNTAET Regulation No 2000/11 on the Organisation of Courts in East Timor and 
UNTAET Regulation No2000/30 on the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, s 9 UNTAET/REG/2001/25 
(14 September 2001) East Timor Statute GA Res 57/228, 57
th
 Sess, UN Doc A/RES/57/228 at Art 5 (18 
December 2002) ECCC Statute. 
33 William A Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) 185-86 ‘war crimes are perhaps more useful than CAH in 
certain types of atrocity crime situations – but nevertheless contain an important grain of truth at its core’. 
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Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when 
committed in armed conflict, whether of international or national in character, and directed 
against any civilian population.
34
 The text of Article 5 is based upon Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter, but with the important addition of imprisonment, rape and torture to the 
list of illegal acts. 
Part three: The Crime of Genocide  
Article 6 of the Statute defines Genocide as: any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group by methods such as: 
killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent birth within 
the group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Views urging a 
relaxation of the high standards placed on the definition of Genocide have been mostly 
rejected by international courts and tribunals,
35
 notably by the ICTY, which found most of the 
ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia to be a case of CAH,
36
 notwithstanding that more 
than 200,000 deaths, 50,000 rapes and 2.2 million displacements resulted from Serbs attacks 
on Bosnian Muslims.
37
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) aligned itself with this 
jurisprudence in Bosnia & Herzegovina v Serbia & Montenegro declining to interpret the 
                                                          
34
 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Introduction the Application of Public International Law to the Crisis in Libya’ 
(2012)14 International Community Law Review 305-307; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, SC Res 827, UN SCOR, 48th Sess UN Doc S/RES/827 at Article 5 (25 May 2003) ICTY 
Statute International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess UN Doc S/RES/955 at 
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 The General Assembly characterised ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina as genocide, GA Res 
47/121 para 10 UN Doc A/RES/47/121 (Dec 18,1992) in pursuit of the abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’, 
which is a form of genocide and the European Court of Human Right found in Jorgic v Germany, 2007-III 
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Judgment para 580 (12 July 2007) The Trial Chamber is aware that it must interpret the Convention with due 
regard for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, recognising that, despite recent developments, customary 
international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of 
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36
 The use of persecution as a head of crime was critical to the ICTY to properly capture the Crime of ethnic 
cleansing. 
37
 Prosecutor v Popović et al, Case No IT-05-88 Judgment (10 June 2010). 
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Genocide Convention more liberally in a case involving States as opposed to individual 
criminal responsibility.
38
 
Part four: The Crime of Aggression 
During the Plenary sessions of the Rome Statute, the crime of aggression was made a core 
crime within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, but did not enter into force because 
it was undefined and the jurisdictional conditions not set out.
39
 However, in 2010 at Kampala, 
Uganda, the Rome Statute was amended by consensus. The amendments to the Statute 
(Article 8bis on the Crime of Aggression) will be unenforceable until one year after 30 State 
Parties have ratified it and a decision taken by two thirds of State Parties to activate the 
jurisdiction after 1 January 2017.
40
 Safeguards presumably are in place to deter politicisation 
of the Court’s prosecution of aggression.41 The Statute establishes a unique jurisdictional 
regime in which the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) would have to obtain a majority vote of 
six judges of the Court’s pre-trial division the restriction is stricter on the OTP’s ability to 
investigate aggression than other core crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.42   
Chapter 4 examines key prosecutorial challenges of the Court in its legitimating process. The 
chapter views the Court as a legal entity,
43
 and the challenges are considered in two 
perspectives termed ‘intrinsic and ‘extrinsic’ (internal and external to the Court), primarily 
the external challenges are more or less a spillover effect of the internal challenges. These 
prosecutorial challenges affect reasonably the internal and external motivations towards the 
Court. The external motivation is a reflection of the external rewards (acceptance/rejection) 
towards the Court, the internal rewards or motivation towards the Court exemplifies the 
performance or its work force (behaviour is often guided by reason) to accomplish a high 
level and standards of performance to deliver impeccable results at all times in order to 
accomplish the overall objectives of the Court. The chapter also discusses the need to 
                                                          
38 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosn and Herz v 
Serb and Mont 2007 ICJ (February 26); Leila N Sadat, ‘Crimes against Humanity in the Modern Age’ (2013) 
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 M H Jackson and others ‘The International Criminal Court Confronting Challenges on the Path to Justice’ 
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 Harold Koh, Stephen Rapp, ‘US Department of State US Engagement with the ICC’ <www.iccnow.org/> 
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standardise the threshold of the Gravity regime in order to create transparency, resulting in 
improved credibility for the Court.   
Chapter 5 examines the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court and also considers 
the jurisprudence of other ad hoc tribunals. The jurisprudence of the ICC over crimes against 
humanity is specifically highlighted by the Courts decision in the post-election crises in 
Kenya.
44
 The researcher analyses various situations handled by the Court having met the 
admissibility and gravity threshold requirements. In all, as of the time of concluding the 
research the Court handled a total of about 23 cases out of the numerous communications to 
the ICC by the international community. However, recently, prosecution of the Kenyan 
President collapsed for lack of evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt the charges 
against him, and the case against Al-Bashir the Sudanese President has also been 
discontinued for better utilisation of recourses.  
Chapter 6 the final chapter, concludes the Study with recommendations and the possible 
future of the International Criminal Court. It pins together the research findings to establish 
the thesis and underscores the potentials of the International Criminal Court. While it is 
enviable to limit political interference in international criminal justice process, seldom is it 
possible to completely eliminate this interference. However, preventing political interference 
at the national level is certainly more successful than what can be achieved internationally. 
International war crime trials are inherently political and this is perhaps not surprising when 
one considers the parties involved and the issues being litigated. International Criminal Law 
is woven with a high degree of political involvement in the trial process. At the moment the 
credibility of the ICC and its ability to fulfill its duty is dwindling within the international 
community, this thesis has examined the situation and proffers ambitious recommendations.  
By and large, the enforcement of criminal law within a society is necessary to protect the 
fabric of the Society. International Criminal Law should guarantee peace and security and be 
more concerned protecting humanity from atrocities and impunity.
45
 Regardless of the current 
fate of the Court, the future of international criminal justice globally lies not in the duplicity 
and or duplication of international judicial institutions but in the ICC prosecutors discharging 
                                                          
44
 The 2007–08 Kenyan crises a political, economic, and humanitarian crisis that erupted in Kenya after former 
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their duties and responsibilities with candour and impartiality.
46
 The ICC must be alight with 
new realities. The aggressive behaviour of Russian in Ukraine, though beyond the Scope of 
this study calls for the operation of an impeccable international criminal court, even after the 
enforcement of the crime of aggression in January 2017, can the Court muscle-in on Russia? 
As it is, the United Nations (Resolution 334 xxix) is ineffective based on the veto power 
doctrine. Next chapter will examine fundamental theories of international criminal law. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Approach to Crime and the International Criminal Court 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine relevant theoretical elements and terminologies 
peculiar to prosecutions under the legal framework of the International Criminal Court (the 
Court)
1
 a profound international treaty that establishes a permanent international criminal 
court to deal with the most serious crimes of concern to humanity such as: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression,
2
 defined in the Statute based on 
customary international law and in accordance with the United Nations
3
 (UN) mandate to 
ensure international peace, security and the ‘rule of law’4 under chapter VII of the ‘UN 
Charter’ (Articles 39-41)5 in juxtaposition with the functions and powers of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC).
6
  
The chapter starts by establishing the concept of crime; differentiating between 
treaty/transnational crimes
7
 and crimes under the jurisdiction of the court, noting key 
principles most relevant to international criminal law such as complementarity,
8
 ne bis in 
idem,
9
 prosecutional discretion, triggering of jurisdiction,
10
 gravity, and admissibility. It 
concludes with an insight on the theory organisational behaviour. 
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1885). 
5
 UN Charter (n 3). 
6
 ibid.  
7
 Transnational crimes will include but not limited to: drug trafficking, trans-border organised criminal 
activities, counterfeiting, money laundering, financial crimes, terrorism, and wilful damage to the environment 
and child trafficking. 
8
 ICCSt (n 1) Article 17; Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal 
Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Brill Leiden 2008).  
9
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2.2 Conceptualising Criminality 
Criminal law entails some basic understanding and workings of the law; one question that 
readily comes to mind is what constitutes a crime? Over the years the purposes of those who 
frame or enforced criminal laws have been many. Consequently, it is not easy to state the 
total aims of criminal law, the authors of a new code of criminal conduct are in a position to 
state their objectives at the outset. The general purpose however, is that, criminal laws of 
states limit anti-social behaviour to guarantee a safer community.
11
 Crimes (except strict 
liability crimes) have two basic (objective and subjective) ‘elements’.12 Actus Reus (AR), 
guilty act, voluntary act or omission (objective elements) to which criminal responsibility can 
attach and Mens Rea (MR), intent or guilty mind, criminal intent (subjective element) which 
makes the performance of a particular act a crime.
13
 The event or state of affairs is called the 
Actus Reus, whilst the state of mind is known as the Mens Rea of the crime.
14
 The AR 
amounts to a crime when accompanied by appropriate MR;
15
 the absence of either element 
weakens the liability for an offence. However, ‘strict liability’ offences16 do not require mens 
rea such as possession of ‘hard drugs’ is an example of common law strict liability offence.17 
Elements of crimes are to be proven to convict in a court of law.
18
 Murder is an intentional 
killing of a human being at peace time. The elements are that the defendant must have (1) 
intention (malice aforethought) (2) caused the death
19
 (3) of a human being (4) at Queens 
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 Smith and Hogan, J C Smith, Criminal Law (10
th
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Peace. To obtain a conviction, the State (prosecutor) must prove all the elements of the crime 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’.20 
Criminality originates from prior legal prohibition and not before such prohibitions. There 
can be no crime (Nullum crimen sine lege) without law.
21
 A prohibited act, should be spelt 
out in advance to constitute a crime, it is a tenet of the ‘rule of law’ that the law must be 
accessible and so far as possible intelligible, predictable, be sufficiently clear that a course of 
action can be based on it.
22
 The law is ex post facto, if created after behaviour has occurred 
making such behaviour illegal.
23
 It is imperative that criminal laws be written in precise terms 
so that citizens can foresee what conduct is unlawful. People are punished for what they do 
(R v White) rather than for what they think.
24
 A failure to act at common law ordinarily is not 
a crime, but Statute often make it an offence to omit to do something (an obligation R v 
Dytham)
25
 where for instance individuals have predetermined legal/special responsibility or 
duty: R v Gibson & Procter, child-neglect and Tax laws are examples.
26
 Threatening to act 
and attempting a criminal act can both be criminal offenses.
27
 Similarly, in most jurisdictions 
conspiring to commit a crime is an offence. Conspiracy Statutes criminalise taking steps to 
carry out a plan to commit a crime.
28
 
                                                          
20
 R v Haigh (2010) EWCA Crim 90, (2010) All ER (D) 19 (Feb), case of a 'shaken baby', the difficulty for the 
prosecution was that there was no evidence at all on the basis of which the jury could reasonably have decided 
whether the defendant had had the intent to kill or to cause really serious harm on the one hand, or the lesser 
mental intent which would have been sufficient for manslaughter on the other; if the evidence is incapable of 
proving which of two possibilities is true, a jury must not be allowed to reach a verdict that can only be based on 
speculation. Accordingly, the conviction for murder was quashed and a conviction for involuntary manslaughter 
was substituted; Woolmington v DPP (1934) AC 462 HL. 
21
 A tenet of criminal law; a guiding principle of international criminal justice, the general prohibition against ex 
post facto laws, known as the Nullum crimen sine lege principle or retroactive criminality, criminalising conduct 
that occurred before prohibition. The Nuremberg trials was an exception; Belgium v Senegal: The International 
Court of Justice Affirms the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite Hissène Habré under the Convention against 
Torture. Judgment of 20 July 2012 in spite of Senegal’s claims. 
22
 Tom Bingham, The rule of law (Allan Lane Penguin books 2010) 37. 
23
 ICCSt (n 1); The Nuremburg Tribunal regarded an exception to this principle. 
24
 R v White [1910] 2 KB 124, medical reports revealed that a mum died from a heart attack, not the poison 
placed in her tea. The defendant was not liable for her murder as his act of poisoning the milk was not the cause 
of death. He was liable for attempt. The case also establishes the 'but for' test, would the result have occurred 
but for the actions of the defendant? If the answer is yes the defendant is not liable.  
25
 R v Dytham (1979) BQ 722 (1979) 3 AII ER 641; Brown (1841) Car & M 314, citizens duty to assist the 
police (1992) Crim LR 611; Smith and Hogan, J C Smith, Criminal Law, 10
th
 edition, LexisNexis Butterworths 
(2002) 60. 
26
 R v Gibson & Procter (1918) Family duty, R v Naughton (2001) when there could be said to be a duty to act. 
27
 Catherin Elliot and Frances Quinn, Criminal Law (6
th
 edn, Pearson Longman, England 2006) 32-50. 
28
 The Criminal Law Act 1977 s1, see also Article 25 ICCSt. 
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Offences under the jurisdiction of the ICC need a mental element.
29
 Article 30(1) ICCSt 
states: ‘Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge’. 
2.3 The Genealogy of International Criminal Prosecutions 
The 1474 Breisach trial set the pace for international criminal justice. The Holy Roman trial 
with about 28 Judges
30
 presiding over the case, in 1474, the Duke of Burgundy hired Peter 
von Hagenbach to raise an army to occupy the German city of Breisach. The Duke acquired 
the city in exchange for services rendered to the Holy Roman Empire; uninterested in the fate 
of the distant German townspeople, the French Duke ordered Peter to collect massive (taxes) 
exactions. When the townspeople rebelled, the Duke ordered Peter to sack, pillage, rape, and 
burn the city. Peter obeyed his superior's orders. The attack on Breisach was horrendous, the 
news spread throughout the empire, that the situation was a 'crime against the laws of God 
and Man'.
31
 Leaders of the twenty-six member states of the Holy Roman Empire, fashioned a 
tribunal of juries from Alsace, Switzerland and elsewhere who acted as international judges 
to prosecute Peter (a Dutch), for crimes committed on the order of a French head of state (the 
Duke). The trial is considered the first, ever, international criminal trial.
32
At the trial, Peter 
sought to exhibit the written (defence) orders of the Duke of Burgundy, but the judges 
refused him to do so, creating the impression that subordinates in Peter's position should not 
execute superiors orders when they are so manifestly 'against the laws of God and Man'. 
Consequently, the court's refusal shielded the Duke from responsibility. Peter was sentenced 
to be drawn and quartered.
33
 The Duke of Burgundy benefited from the impunity, thus, 
political considerations prevailed over justice.
34
 
                                                          
29
 P Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’ in S R Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: 
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational Publishers Inc US 2001). 
30
 Gordon Gregory S, ‘The Trial of Peter Von Hagenbach: Reconciling History Historiography and International 
Criminal Law’ (University of North Dakota - School of Law (February 16, 2012) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2006370> accessed 01/05/2014. 
31
 Cherif M Bassiouni, ‘Perspectives on International Criminal Justice’ (2010) 50 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 269, 298.  
32
 ibid; Robert B Rosenstock, Essay: Mclean Lecture on Law: ‘The Proposal for an International Criminal 
Court’ (1994) 56 The University of Pittsburgh Law Review 271; Jordan Paust, ‘Selective History Of 
International Tribunals And Efforts Prior To Nuremberg’ (2004)10 International Law Students Association 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 207; Michael Scharf and Schabas, William Slobodan Milosevic on 
Trial: A Companion (Bloomsbury Academic, New York 2002). 
33
 A brutal method of causing death. 
34 Cherif M Bassiouni, ‘International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective’ in Antonio Cassese (eds) The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, New York 2009) 132. 
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International criminal justice re-emerged in 1918 with the victorious allies of World War 
1(WW1). The Treaty of Versailles
35
 announced intentions to prosecute the German Kaiser 
Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern and other,
36
 for the supreme offence against international 
morality and sanctity contained in Articles 227, 228, 229 and 230,
37
 the Allied States 
unsuccessfully demanded the extradition of the Kaiser from Netherlands, where he had 
established residency.
38
 Politics again prevailed over justice at the cost of a precedent in an 
international Treaty.
39
 The inability to prosecute the German war criminals,
40
 led the Allies in 
1923 to agree to have Germany take over the task under German laws. The German Supreme 
Court sitting Leipzig to try 45 defendants from the initial 21000 only tried 22 and a maximum 
of 3 years imprisonment for the crime of sinking a hospital ship with over 600 wounded 
people.
41
 In addition, the Allies decision to forgo the prosecution of Turkish officials for the 
massacre in 1915 of an estimated 200,000 Armenian civilians, confirms the interests in 
Turkey to help face-off the expansion agenda of the newly established Bolshevik regime in 
Russia in 1917 that was greater than the need for justice for the Armenians,
42
 another political 
undertone? However, the four major Allies
43
 in 1943 at the Moscow declarations affirmed 
their intention to prosecute the Axis powers for war crimes;
44
 by 1945 they drafted the 
                                                          
35
 225 CTS 188 adopted 26 June 1919; entered into force on 10 January 1920. The treaty is divided into 16 
parts. Part VII, entitled penalties consists of four Articles (227-30) that evince an early attempt to establish 
individual responsibility for war crimes and to create an early attempt to establish individual responsibility for 
war crimes and to create tribunals for their adjudication. In the event Kaiser Wilhelm II successfully escaped 
prosecution through Dutch sanctuary and only 9 alleged German war criminals were tried before a Leipzig court 
and not a military tribunal as envisaged by Article 228.  
36
 James F Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First 
World War (Greenwood Press, Westport 1982) 177–178. 
37
 Treaty of Versailles (n 35) 
38
 Quincy Wright, ‘The legal Liability of  the Kaiser’ (1919) 13 American Political Science Review 121  
39
 Cherif M Bassiouni, ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 years the need to establish a Permanent International 
Criminal Court’ (1997) 10 (11) Harvard Human Rights Journal 50; UN doc CAN 4/L 532/corr 1 UN doc A/CN 
4/L 523/corr 3; Cherif M Bassiouni, ‘International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective’ in Antonio 
Cassese (eds) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, New York 
2009) 132. 
40
 The non-extradition of the Kaiser. 
41
 Werner Hans Erhard, ‘The Nuremberg Trial against Major War Criminals and International Law’ (1949) 43 
American Journal of International Law 223; A Von Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials (Chicago; Regnery, 
1959); The Leipzig trials were a series of war crimes trials held by the German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) 
following the end of World War I; E J Janeczek, Nuremberg judgment in the light of international law (Genève, 
Imprimeries populaires; 1949) 83. 
42
 Western Europe Cooperation with Turkey a necessity to prevent Russia from uncontrolled access from the 
Black Sea to Mediterranean, hence the need for Turkey as a barrier against communist expansionism. Although, 
the Treaty of Sevres included a provision to prosecution Turk officials but replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, 
which did not contain such a clause, Instead a secret protocol which gave Turkish Nationals total amnesty. 
Realpolitik prevailed as Treaty of Serves was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne, which contained no 
provisions for Turkish Nationals to be tried in Turkey, (the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Power and 
Turkey) 10 August 1920.  
43
 The United States, Britain, France and Russia.  
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Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT or Nuremberg);
45
 signed, 6 August with 
19 other States establishing the IMT at Nuremberg which ultimately prosecuted 22 major war 
criminals. Although, the Nuremberg Charter is not a legislative Act, but included ‘Crimes 
against Peace’ ‘War Crimes’ and Crimes against Humanity.46 The charge of crimes against 
peace was a carryover of the failed efforts of the Allies to prosecute the German Kaiser
47
 
under the Treaty of Versailles. Crimes against humanity became a manifestation of the failed 
attempts of the 1919 prosecution of the Turkish officials for what was then known as ‘crimes 
against the laws of humanity’. The precedent of the post WW1 experience helped shaped 
international criminal justice in 1945 and onwards, known as victors’ justice because it only 
prosecuted the defeated.
48
 
The Allies in 1947
49
 proceeded to prosecute the defeated Japanese, unlike the IMT, the 
IMTFE
50
 or The Tokyo tribunal promulgated by an order issued by the Supreme Allied 
Commander for the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, the US did not want to give any 
role to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the proceedings, because that the 
later joined the war against Japan just three weeks before the defeat of Japan; did not want 
the USSR to have political influence in post war Japan.
51
 The IMTFE Charter modeled after 
the IMT, exemplified more of governing Japan than prosecuting Japanese Emperor Hirohito 
and his associates. Consequently, the Head of State of Japan escaped responsibility despite 
allowing his country on the side of Germany attacking the US at Pearl Harbour in violation of 
the law of customs of war.
52
 No member of the Allied forces got prosecuted for war crimes.
53
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 Cherif M Bassiouni, The London International assembly; Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal 
Law (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 18- 35. 
45
 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 American Journal of International Law 258 (1945) United 
Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), 8 August 1945. 
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 Kai Ambos, ‘Crimes against Humanity and the International Criminal Court’ in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed), 
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American Journal of International Law 223; August von Knieriem and Nicholas R Doman, ‘The Nuremberg 
Trials’ (1960) 60 Columbia Law Review 412-423. 
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 ibid. 
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 Post World War II (WW11) prosecutions.  
50
 14 State Dept Bull 391,890; TIAS No 1589, (IMTFE). 
51
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52
 ibid. 
53
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The Allied Control Council Law No 10 (CCL No 10)
54
 governed the prosecution of war 
criminals within each of the Allied occupation zones in Germany.
55
 The definition of CAH in 
Article II (1) (c) of CCL No 10 for Germany
56
 removed the requirement of a connection 
between crimes against peace and war crimes.
57
 This modification enabled the United States 
tribunals to delink CAH from armed conflict in United States v Josef Altstoetter
58
 (Justice 
Case) and United States v Otto Ohlendorf (Einsatzgrupen Case)
59
 another significant 
development that emerged from these tribunals relates to the restriction of the definition of 
CAH to systematic commission of severe State sponsored delicts.
60
 While the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Charters required that CAH evidence a connection to aggression or war, this 
supplementary requirement was left out of CCL No 10. 
After World War II, the Cold War began; efforts to advance international criminal justice 
gave way to the political conflict between East and West. The United Nations (UN) efforts to 
establish an international criminal court and develop a code of offences against peace and 
security of mankind continued but without a successful outcome. Politics again prevailed 
over the advancement of international criminal justice.
61
 Consequently, advancement in 
international criminal law prosecution was slow until 1992 when the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) established a commission of experts
62
 to investigate violations of 
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 No 3, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 50 – 55, (31st January, 1946); 36 ILR 31. (CCL 10) 
to try war criminals not deemed to be of dominant character in those parts of Europe occupied by the Allies.  
55
 Allied Control Council Law No 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
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 edn, 
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Humanity’ (1997)17 Boston College Third World Law Journal171. 
56
 Ibid; Prosecutor v Akayesu ICTR- 96-4-T Trial Chamber Judgment 565-66 (2 September 1998); McMullen v 
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Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS No 539. 
57
 Phylilis Hwang, ‘Defining Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ 
(1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 457. 
58
 United States v Josef Altstoetter et al ‘Justice Case’ (1947). 
59
 United States v Otto Ohlendorf et al, (1948). 
60
 P Hwang, ‘Defining Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1998) 
22 Fordham International Law Journal. 
61
 Cherif M Bassiouni, ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 years the need to establish a Permanent International 
Criminal Court’ (1997) 10 (11) Harvard Human Rights Journal 50; UN doc ACN 4/L 532 (1996) 15 July 1996 
revised by UN doc CAN 4/L 532/corr 1, UN doc A/CN 4/L 523/corr 3. 
62
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 (Establishing a Commission of Experts to Examine and 
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resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, Recalling paragraph 10 of 
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international humanitarian law (IHL) in former Yugoslavia.
63
 The report of the commission 
led the UNSC to establish in 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY)
64
 after the ICTY, came the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
65
 to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of IHL in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in neighbouring States, between 
1 January to 31 December 1994, the Tribunal prosecuted a number of persons.
66
 The 
ICTY/ICTR demonstrates the will of the international community to curb impunity within the 
realm of international legality
67
 as against a creation by victorious powers at the end of an 
armed struggle.
68
 The tribunals became land marks in international criminal prosecutions, 
which helped pave way for the establishment of the ICC.
69
 The purpose of the ICC in 
theory
70
 includes retribution, deterrence, expressivism,
71
 restorative justice and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
its resolution 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992, in which it reaffirmed that all parties are bound to comply with the 
obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually 
responsible in respect of such breaches, Recalling also its resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, in which, 
inter alia, it demanded that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and all military forces in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law, 
Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings and the continuance of the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
63
 ibid; S/RES/827 (1993) 25 May 1993; adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting on 25 May 
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reconciliation.
72
 Theoretical bases for these goals overlap,
73
 with the goals of international 
criminal justice in particular and the theories of punishment,
74
 the difficulty to rely solely on 
national courts to enforce international laws, also aided the establishment of the ICC coupled 
with coordinating the players in the International sphere being increasingly complicated. 
Therefore, the ICC provides improved centralised system of laws complete with a set of 
comprehensive norms.  
2.4 The Concept of Jurisdiction  
 
Jurisdiction is the power of a sovereign to regulate or otherwise impact upon people, property 
and circumstances and reflects basic principles of states sovereignty. Jurisdiction is a central 
feature of any sovereignty, it is an exercise of authority which may alter, crate or terminate 
legal relationships and obligations. Jurisdiction although primarily territorial, is not 
exclusively so tied and may be based on other grounds. The complexity of the concept of 
jurisdiction often leads to jurisdictional competence questions and conflicts as to the extent of 
the authority of particular courts. The Rome Statute establishes the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court in line with international law such that jurisdiction could be 
established through territorial, nationality of offender (active personality), nationality of 
victim (passive personality) subject matter jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction (erga 
omnes) of the crimes within the Statute.
75
 Territorial jurisdiction is the most favoured
76
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(forum delicti commissi), the place and law where the crime was committed,
77
 jurisdiction 
based on the nationality of victims. Jurisdiction based on the nationality of offender or the 
right of a state to protect her interests is infrequent.
78
 The Nuremberg Tribunal exercised 
jurisdiction ‘to persons acting in the interest of the European Axis countries,79 who are 
accused of crimes within the Tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction,80 thus its jurisdiction was 
personal in nature; defendants had to have acted in the interests of the European Axis.
81
  
At the ICTY
82
 jurisdiction is confined to crimes committed on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, subsequent to 1991, the jurisdiction therefore is territorial.
83
 Jurisdiction of the 
ICTR
84
 is over crimes committed in Rwanda from 1993 – 1994; over crimes committed by 
Rwandan nationals and in neighbouring countries in the same period,
85
 accordingly its 
jurisdiction is both territorial and personal.
86
 State Parties that signed up to the Rome Statute 
did so for the ICC to have jurisdiction over their territory and nationals.
87
 The drafters of the 
Rome Statute sought to limit the ability of the Court so that national courts can exercise the 
first jurisdiction.
88
 Only when domestic justice systems are ‘unwilling’ or genuinely ‘unable’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
However, his counsel argues that the Universal principle is not applicable because neither hostage-taking nor 
aircraft piracy are heinous crimes encompassed by the doctrine. He urges further, that the United States does not 
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447; Burns H Weston, Richard A Falk, Anthony D'Amato, International Law and World Order: A Problem-
Oriented Course book (American Casebook Series, 2nd edn, West Group 1990) 564; Cutting case 1866. 
76
 S S Lotus (France v Turkey) 1927 The Permanent Court of International Justice (ser A) No 10 (Sept 7); The 
Treaty of International Penal Laws 1889 states: ‘Crimes are tried by the Courts and punished by the laws of the 
nation on whose territory they are committed irrespective of the nationality of the actor or of the injured’; 
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 edn, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009) 58.  
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 William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4
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 edn, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2011) 63-89; The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988, The Scottish court 
(Netherlands) a special sitting of the High Court of Justiciary set up under Scots law in the Netherlands, for the 
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over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988. 
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to prosecute a heinous crime can the ICC prosecute, known as positive complementarity.
89
 
Under international law, universal jurisdiction (quasi delicta juris gentium)
90
 applies to some 
crimes but not limited to piracy,
91
 slave trade,
92
 hijacking, threats to air-travels,
93
 attacks on 
diplomats,
94
 nuclear safety,
95
 terrorism,
96
 apartheid;
97
 torture
98
 and trafficking in persons, 
however, these crimes are outside the scope of this research.   
Although, the application of universal jurisdiction is widely recognised for genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes but universal jurisdiction is not specifically granted to the 
ICC within the statute.
99
 The travaux préparatoires highlighted how Article 12
100
 became a 
compromise reached for the Court to have jurisdiction over nationals of State Parties and over 
crimes committed on their territory.
101
 Professor Sharon Williams commented that though the 
provision is far from perfect but was all that was possible at the time.
102
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Jurisdiction under the Rome Statute - jurisdiction, a measure of the extent of the Courts 
authority established in Articles 5, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 24 and 126 of the Statute,
103
 shall be 
limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.
104
 Crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court provide lists of punishable offences.
105
 Article 11 deals 
with jurisdiction ratione temporis,
106
 Article 12 relates to pre-conditions to the exercise of 
jurisdiction; sets out territorial jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
107
 Article 19
108
 
necessitates that the Court satisfies it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.
109
 This led 
the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 to authorise the arrest warrant against Thomas Lubanga.
110
 The 
concept of jurisdiction also arises with regard to national justice systems, Article 17
111
 on 
complementarity requires the Court to defer to national prosecutions, unless the state with 
jurisdiction over the crime is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate and prosecute the 
crime.
112
 Whilst Article 18 refers to information and the States that would have normally 
exercised jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.
113
 The Court’s jurisdiction is established 
and understood in the following contexts:  
 Jurisdiction ratione materiae (subject matter jurisdiction) ‘crimes to be tried before 
the ICC?’ 
 Jurisdiction ratione personae, ‘who can be tried?’ 
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 Jurisdiction ratione temporis ‘crimes committed after the Statute comes into force’ 
 Jurisdiction ratione loci, territorial jurisdiction. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae), jurisdiction ratione materiae refers to the 
four substantive crimes which can be tried before the Court namely: Genocide, Crimes 
against Humanity, War crimes and the Crime of Aggression.
114
 The preamble of the Statute 
and Article 5 describe these crimes as ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the International 
Community’, the crimes are ‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity’115 
Temporal Jurisdiction (ratione temporis), jurisdiction ratione temporis refers to crimes 
committed after the entry into force (1 July 2002) of the Rome Statute. States which become 
Parties afterwards, the competence of the ICC holds only for the Crimes committed after the 
Statute comes into force for such States. However, it would suffice that either the State where 
the Crime was committed or that the Nationality of the author of the Crime be party to the 
Statute for the competence of the ICC to be exercised. The ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over crimes committed prior to entry into force of the Statute.
116
 As well, Article 24 declares 
that no person shall be criminally liable for conduct prior to entry into force of the Statute 
making the Statute prospective.
117
 This was elaborated in the Lubanga case, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I held: on the issue of temporal application of the Statute ... In conformity with 
Article 126 (1)...the second condition would be met pursuant to Article 11 of the Statute if the 
crimes underlying the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo were committed after 1 July 
2002..., the Chamber considers that the second condition has also been met.
118
 Furthermore, 
regarding international crimes committed in Venezuela and referred to the ICC, the 
prosecutor stated that: ‘...The events occurred prior to the temporal jurisdiction of the Court 
and so cannot be considered for investigation under the Statute.’119  In the case of States that 
became parties to the Statute subsequent to its entry into force, the Court has jurisdiction only 
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over crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute with respect to such States,
120
 
for example, Colombia ratified the Statute in August 2002, several weeks after the entry into 
force on 1 July 2002. The Statute entered into force for Colombian on 1 November 2002, in 
accordance with Article 126,
121
 the Court cannot therefore prosecute any case based on the 
Columbian ratification for the period 1 July – 1 November 2002.122  
The exception to the general rule concerning temporal application of the Statute is the 
possibility for a State to make ad hoc declaration recognising the Court’s jurisdiction over 
specific crimes,
123
 even if the State is not a party to the Statute,
124
 such declarations, 
formulated in accordance with Article 12(3) of the statute, would appear to be retroactive by 
their very nature. Uganda made such a statement, labelled ‘Declaration on Temporal 
Jurisdiction.’ Uganda accepted the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed 
following the entry into force of the Statute on 1 July 2002. The legality of the declaration 
appears to have been assumed by Pre-Trial Chamber III, which took note of it when it 
confirmed the Arrest Warrant against Joseph Kony.
125
  
Jurisdiction ratione temporis is different from retroactive crimes.
126
 International human 
rights law prohibits retroactive (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) crimes and 
punishments.
127
 Similar pronouncements can be found in the Eichmann case of 1961
128
 and in 
the Erdemovic judgment of the ICTY.
129
 Significantly, ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ is also set 
out in Articles 22 and ‘nulla poena sine lege’ in Article 23 ICCSt.130 The ICC is different 
from the Nuremberg, the Tokyo or the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY/ICTR) constituted to judge 
crimes already committed. The standard adopted by the European Court of Human Rights 
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with respect to retroactive crimes is that they must be foreseeable by an offender.
131
 The issue 
of ‘continuous crimes’ remain undecided; it will be for the Court to determine how it will be 
handled.
132
 However, Article 24 (1) reads: no person shall be criminally responsible under 
this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.’133 This reflects a 
compromise to address delegates obsessed with the question of continuous offences, noted by 
William Schabas. 
Jurisdiction Territorial (Ratione Loci), the Court’s jurisdiction is over serious crimes 
committed on the territory of State Parties regardless of the Nationality of the offender. 
Article 12 (2) of the Statute requires that the jurisdiction extends to the territory of States that 
accepts the Court on an ad hoc basis and on a territory so designated by the SC. Territory 
includes crimes committed on board vessels or aircraft registered in the State party,
134
 Some 
territories are beyond the reach of the Court: the High Seas (common heritage of mankind), 
Antarctica and Outer-space. If atrocities are committed in these places, jurisdiction will be 
established on the basis of the Nationality of the offender.
135
 
Many National jurisdictions extend the concept of territorial jurisdiction to include crimes 
that create effects upon their territory such that, it could be argued in case of a conspiracy to 
commit genocide,
136
 the Court might have jurisdiction even if the conspirators hatched their 
plan outside the territory where the Crime is to take place. Similarly, an order to take no 
prisoner is a crime even if nobody acts upon the order
137
 it could be committed outside the 
territory of a State but might be deemed to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, if the 
effects bear upon the territory in the semblance of incitement and abetting. Although, the 
silence of the Statute on effects jurisdiction and a strict interpretation of Article 12 might bar 
such a concept. Approving the Arrest Warrant for the five Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
leaders in Uganda and for Thomas Lubanga in Congo, the Pre-Trial Chamber observed that 
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the crimes alleged are committed on the territory of the referring State and SC Resolution 
1593 empowers the Court to prosecute crimes committed in Darfur.   
During ratification, a few States made declarations that there is no specific provision in the 
Statute concerning the territorial scope of the Court compared to many other multilateral 
international (Genocide Convention) instruments.
138
 Netherlands, declared that the Statute 
applies not only to its European territory but also to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. 
Denmark declared it did not intend the Statute to apply to the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland.
139
 The effect of excluding the reach of the Court from a territory which, on its 
own, has no right to correct the situation because neither the Faroe Islands nor Greenland are 
sovereign States and as a result they cannot accede to the Statute. Thus, the Court might take 
the lead in Loizidou v Turkey case
140
 and rule that the Danish declaration is illegal reservation 
with no effect in accordance with Article 120 of the Statute on reservations thereby 
recognising jurisdiction over the disputed territories, this problem is theoretical now since 
Denmark withdrew the declaration in 2006.
141
 
Personal Jurisdiction (Ratione Personae), the Statute provides that the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
only over natural persons, Article 25 (1), of at least eighteen years of age (Article 26) at the 
time the crime was committed.
142
 There is no immunity under the Statute due to official rank 
(Article 27 (1)) of the accused person.143 Pursuing moral persons developed during the Rome 
conference. The discussion on this subject raised disagreements amongst many States, that it 
was decided not to integrate this competence in the Statute, but the Court has jurisdiction 
under Article12 (2) (b) over nationals of non-party states that accept the Court’s jurisdiction 
on an ad hoc basis by virtue of a declaration,
144
 or pursuant to a decision of the Security 
Council,
145
 creating jurisdiction, on the Nationality of the offender such an offender will be 
subject to prosecutions. Territory not Nationality seems to be the order of prosecution to date. 
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In Uganda and the DRC prosecutions, no allegations that accused persons are State Party 
nationals, nor did the SC give the Court jurisdiction over the Acts of Sudanese nationals 
committed outside of Sudan, whereas the ICTR had jurisdiction to prosecute crimes on 
Rwanda territory and crimes committed by Rwandan nationals in neighbouring states.
146
     
The Communication received for the Prosecutor to act in accordance with Article 15 ICCSt, 
noted several allegations of acts perpetrated by the Nationals of coalition forces during the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
147
 Upon investigation, he pointed to the fact that inquires have been 
made concerning nationals of the United Kingdom with respect to acts perpetrated on the 
territory of Iraq a non-party state,
148
 and concluded that it did not meet adequately the 
admissibility requirements of the Court. An exception to the general principle of jurisdiction 
over nationals is explicitly set out in the Statute with respect to persons under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the offence.
149
 However, the ICTY noted that its Article 6
150
 is purely 
jurisdictional in nature, rejecting as unfounded, the proposition that there was no criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed by persons under the age of eighteen under either 
conventional or customary international law.
151
 Despite Articles 27 of the ICC Statute, a look 
at Article 98 of the Statute tends to grant the bilateral agreement negotiated by the United 
States and international obligations of States a form of immunity.
152
 These agreements do not 
in reality create immunity for nationals of the USA. They simply purport to relieve a State 
Party from an obligation to arrest and transfer individuals subject to a request from the 
Court.
153
 A State Party may also invoke Article 98(2), its agreement with the non-party State 
and decline to comply without necessarily violating its duties under the Rome Statute.  
2.5 Immunity under the Rome Statute  
The Court has extended the scope of immunity under Article 98 ICCSt, to address the issue 
of personnel of the UN and non-member States, in spite of the Nuremberg principles and the 
1948 Genocide Convention,
154
 also rules of national/international laws that create immunities 
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or shelter individuals from criminal prosecutions are of no effect before the Court for States 
Party members.
155
 Traditionally, immunities have taken two main forms first, some States, 
through their constitution, provide that their Head of State and government officials or 
elected representatives are immune from prosecution. Secondly, under customary 
international law incumbent Heads of States, foreign ministers and diplomats (immunity 
ratione personae) cannot be prosecuted by the Courts of other States, some States have had to 
consider constitutional amendments in order to eliminate such special regimes and thereby 
make their legislation consistent with the Statute. The 2002 ruling in the Arrest Warrant case, 
the ICJ (International Court of Justice) recognised that an incumbent or former minister of 
foreign affairs may not have immunity before some international tribunals,
156
 where it has 
jurisdiction.
157
 The Court also considered Article 27 of the Rome Statute which provided it 
with a basis for concluding that incumbent Heads of State and similar officials, such as 
foreign ministers, might not be protected by traditional immunities, as a matter of customary 
international law.
158
 
There is an important practical exception, however, that can serve to shield certain classes of 
persons from prosecution. The Court is prohibited, pursuant to Article 98(1), from proceeding 
with a request for surrender or assistance if this would require a requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law as concerns a third State, unless the 
latter consents if diplomatic immunity falls into such a category. It means that, while a State 
Party to the Statute may not shelter its own Head of State or Foreign Minister from 
prosecution by the ICC, the Court cannot request the State to cooperate in surrender or 
otherwise with respect to a third State. Nothing prevents the State Party from doing this if it 
so wishes, and once the Head of State was taken into actual custody of the Court, he/she 
would be treated like any other defendant.  
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Furthermore, Article 98(2) was intended to ensure that a rather common class of treaties 
known as ‘Status of Forces Agreements’ (SOFAs) would not be undermined or neutralised by 
the Statute.
159
 SOFAs are used to ensure that peacekeeping forces based in a foreign country 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of that country’s courts. The United States have attempted 
to pervert Article 98(2), drafting treaties that shelter all American nationals from the Court; 
several States Parties have succumbed to Washington’s pressure and agreed to such 
arrangements.
160
 Article 27(2) ICCSt does refer to immunity, the content is of a substantive 
rather than procedural. Cherif Bassiouni Chair of the Drafting Committee at the Rome 
Conference noted: there is no conflict between Article 27(2) and Article 98(1) these Articles 
should have been merged into a single provision in order to avoid confusion.
161
 The effect of 
Article 27(2) is to foreclose State Parties from invoking immunities before the Court and to 
make a defence of immunity unavailable to an accused national of a State Party. Article 27(2) 
does not really apply to nationals of non-Party States. Any immunity that they may have as a 
result of customary or treaty law cannot be removed simply because a group of states have 
decided, by treaty, that such immunities cannot be invoked before an institution of their own 
creation.
162
 
2.6 Deferral and Acceptance Jurisdiction  
The SC may prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in accordance with Article 16 of 
the Statute called ‘Deferral’ of jurisdiction with a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter
163
 asking the Court to suspend prosecution, in such a case, the Court may not 
proceed. Sequel to this, the UNSC resolution 1422, adopted on 12
th
 July 2002, after the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute,
164
 the SC granted immunity from prosecution by the ICC to 
the UN peacekeeping personnel from countries not party to the ICC
165
 The resolution, passed 
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at the insistence of the United States, which threatened not to renew all UN peacekeeping 
missions (including UN Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, [to be] renewed same day)
166
 
unless its citizens were protected from trial by the ICC.
167
 Resolution 1422 came into effect 
on 1 July 2002 for a period of 12 months, renewed again for twelve months by Resolution 
1487, on 12 June 2003. But, the SC repudiated renewal in 2004 after pictures emerged of US 
troops abusing Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib. The US withdrew its demand
168
 the legality of 
the resolution draws some scrutiny, Article 16 contemplates specific situations or 
investigation rather than some blanket exclusion of a category of persons. Moreover, Article 
16 of the Statute says that the Council must be acting pursuant to Chapter VII
169
 UN Charter, 
applicable only when there is a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression. 
Ironically, some UN authorised missions are not created pursuant to Chapter VII of the 
Charter and there is a debate whether or not the SC resolutions can have their legality 
reviewed by courts.  
The ICJ is hesitant to pronounce on this, because the ICJ and the Council are principal organs 
of the UN and the ICJ feels the Charter does not establish a hierarchy where one principal 
organ of the UN can review the decision of the other, although, this does not apply to the ICC 
which is not created by the Charter of the UN, so not an organ of the UN. The ICTY 
considered the review of the legality of Resolution 827, its constitutive act in the Tadic´s 
case.
170
 Resolution 1422 is seen as an abuse of powers of by the SC whose legality, 
theoretically, may well be challenged in later proceedings before the ICC.
171
 Peacekeepers 
have been alleged to have participated in crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
these matters are to be dealt with by their National courts, although, this has not been the 
case. Reasonably, Resolution 1422 is generally seen as bullying from the United States. Other 
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occasions where the SC excluded individuals from the Court’s jurisdiction are: firstly, with 
Resolution 1497 of August 2003, which declares ‘that current or former officials or personnel 
from a contributing state, which is not a party to the Rome Statute, shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing state for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of 
or related to the Multinational force or UN stabilisation force in Liberia, save such exclusive 
jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing state.
172
 
Similarly, Resolution 1593, adopted in March 2005, which refers the situation in Darfur to 
the Court (which has since been challenged by Sudan and the African Union) states that 
Nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan 
not a State Party to the Rome Statute shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that 
contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in 
Sudan established or authorised by the Council or the African Union (AU), unless such 
exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State.
173
 Aside the 
Jurisdiction resulting from ratification of the Statute by a State Party, Article 12(3) of the 
Statute authorises a non-party state to accept jurisdiction of the Court on an ad hoc basis over 
specific crimes,
174
 such accepting State, shall cooperate with the Court in accordance with 
part 9.  
Although, there is no consequence if an accepting state fails to cooperate.
175
 Cote d’Ivoire 
and Uganda made declarations in respect of Article 12(2). Cote d’Ivoire signed the Rome 
Statute on 30 November 1998, but did not ratify the instrument until 14 December 2010, 
Uganda, in support of her application for arrest warrants for the Leaders of the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA), the Prosecutor included a declaration on the temporal jurisdiction, 
dated 27 February 2004, Uganda accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed 
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following the entering into force of the Statute on 1 July 2002. Since, Uganda ratified the 
Rome Statute on 14 June 2002, it entered into force in Uganda on 1 September 2002, two 
months after the Statute entered into force. Although no explicit provision allows for a State 
Party to back date the effect of its ratification, presumably Article 12(3) is the authority for 
Uganda’s declaration of temporal jurisdiction because, a State may also accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court, by allowing the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to begin a 
preliminary investigation, without having to ratify the Statute.
176
Article 12(3) is the residue of 
a provision in the 1994 draft statute of the International law Commission (ILC) by which 
State consent was contemplated on a case by case basis.
177
 The wording of Article 12 and 13 
suggest that what is envisaged is an investigation that has already been initiated by the 
Prosecutor that is then followed by a request that the state concerned consent to 
jurisdiction.
178
 The Prosecutor could well make use of Article 12(3) as a way of addressing 
impunities in territories that may not yet be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
179
 
2.7 Activating the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
The Nuremberg tribunal prosecuted ‘major war criminals of the European Axis’. The 
Prosecutor determines who those individuals might be. Similarly, the Prosecutors of the 
ICTY/ICTR and the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) had free reign to identify 
suspects.
180
 The ICTY jurisdiction was limited to crimes committed on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia, in effect, the instrument establishing the Tribunal was also its ‘trigger’.181 
The situation is different with the ICC.
182
 The Court’s focus of prosecution is not pre-
determined like the earlier tribunals. Also, significant differences exist between the 1994 ILC 
draft and the final version in the Statute.
183
 The Rome Statute establishes that the Court may 
open a preliminary examination of a situation in a state or region that has been in conflict 
based on three (triggers) possibilities.
184
 First, by referring a situation to the Court by a State 
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Party, second, by the Security Council (SC) and lastly, by the Prosecutor (Proprio Motu) in 
accordance with Article 13 (c) entitled the ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction’.185  
State Party referral mechanism became the first to be ‘triggered’ before the Court. Though, 
States are usually reluctant to complain against one another save for exceptional 
circumstances.
186
 Hence, States referral ‘situations’ within own borders, known as ‘self-
referral;’187 intended to induce the Court to prosecute rebel groups operating within.188 The 
Government of Uganda on 16 December 2003 made the first referral.
189
 The second referral 
came from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2004,
190
 also by December 2004, the 
Central African Republic (CAR) made a referral to the Court.
191
 Article 14 ICCSt sets out the 
terms for referral of a ‘situation’ by a State Party.192 Referrals must be in writing.193 The 
triggering of jurisdiction of the Court by either the SC or a State Party is known as referral.
194
 
Nothing in the travaux préparatoires or in the various commentaries by participants in the 
drafting process suggests that a State referring a case against itself preferred the term referral 
                                                          
185
 The Court may exercise jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article 5 in accordance with the 
provisions of this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A situation in which 
one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation 
in respect of such a crime in accordance with Article 15. 
186
 Daniel D Ntanda Nsereko, ‘The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related Issues’ (1999) 10 
Criminal Law Forum 87,109. 
187
 Paola Gaeta, ‘Is the Practice of “Self-Referrals” a Sound Start for the ICC?’ (2004) 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 949. 
188
 Antonio Cassese, ‘Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 434,436. 
189
 Mohamed El Zeidy, ‘The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity Principle: An 
Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC’ (2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review 83; 
Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04–01/05) Decision to Convene a Status Conference on the Investigation in the 
Situation in Uganda in Relation to the Application of Article 53, 2 December 2005 paras 3–4. 
190
 ICC-01/04–01/06-32-AnxA1 (21 March 2004). 
191
 Referrals from the Central African Republic (CAR) an ICC State Party on 21 December 2004 to the ICC  
Prosecutor, a letter from the Government of CAR, referring to the Court crimes within the jurisdiction 
committed in the country from 1 July 2002. On May 22, 2007, the Prosecutor accepted the CAR’s request to 
investigate the situation. The Prosecutor explains that sexual violence is the principal focus of the investigation 
because sexual crimes outnumbered killings. A peculiarity of the conflict is the high reported number of victims 
about 600 within five months. Other dimensions are rapes by multiple perpetrators, in front of third parties and  
or with forced participation of relatives. The scale and gravity of the conduct are sufficient to warrant 
investigation under international criminal law. The individuals who ordered and authorise the acts could face 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
192 Article 14 states (1) A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation 
for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of 
such crimes. (2) As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be accompanied by 
such supporting documentation as is available to the State referring the situation. 
193
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 Rule 45. 
194
 William Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, Cambridge University Press, 
England 2011) 146-165 
37 
 
to complaints. The drafting history of Article 14 of the Rome Statute leaves little doubt that 
what was contemplated was a ‘complaint’ by a State Party against another State.195 ‘Self-
referral’ encourages States to defer to the ICC rather than assume their responsibilities to 
prosecute, Paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute encourages member States to 
exercise their criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ this is 
‘positive complementarity’. The Statute does not contemplate the possibility of a State 
referring a case, then withdrawing it.
196
 The term ‘trigger’ is a helpful metaphor.197 Once the 
jurisdiction has been ‘triggered’ it cannot be ‘un-triggered’.198 The decision not to proceed 
after a State Party referral rests with the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chambers and in 
accordance with Article 53 of the Statute or with the SC, pursuant to Article 16 on 
‘deferral.’199 
The second triggering Mechanism for jurisdiction of the Court is through the SC referral. 
There is no detailed provision in the Statute concerning SC referral compared to State Party 
referrals. The SC referral is governed by Article 13(b), which authorises the Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes within Article 5, referred to the Prosecutor by the SC acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.’200 The SC referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the 
ICC is a recommendation by the International Commission of Inquiry in its January 2005 
report.
201
 The Commission stated that the Sudanese justice system was unable and unwilling 
to address the situation in Darfur.
202
 In March 2005, the SC referred the ‘Situation in Darfur’ 
to the Court under Resolution 1593.
203
 Resolution 1593 specifically declares that the Council 
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is acting under Chapter VII.
204
 This is consistent with the Statute referring the Darfur/Sudan 
conflict. 
Crimes that go beyond the trivial or de minimis range in national jurisdiction are more often 
than not prosecuted. Giving the Prosecutor the power to initiate prosecution is the mechanism 
most analogous to domestic justice systems, for an international tribunal based on 
complementarity, ‘the discretion to prosecute will be wider, and the criteria upon which such 
prosecutorial discretion could be exercised are nebulous and complex, based on the work of 
the other two tribunals,
205
 it is a challenge to the Prosecutor choosing from many meritorious 
complaints with appropriate situations for international intervention, than to weed out weak 
or frivolous ones,
206
 this favours the argument that the Court would have less work if it relies 
solely on State Parties and the SC to trigger its jurisdiction.
207
 Non-governmental 
organisations made the proprio motu prosecution one of their battle cries,
208
 some powerful 
States vigorously opposed the idea, fearful that the position might be occupied by an NGO-
friendly litigator with an attitude.
209
 
Article 15 of the statute, alleviates some fear, the Prosecutor’s independence is tempered with 
oversight from the Pre-Trial Chambers.
210
 Accompanying the proprio motu powers is the 
concept of complementarity,
211
 the Court would not proceed if a national jurisdiction is 
investigating or prosecuting. However, if the Prosecutor concludes that there is a ‘reasonable 
basis’ for proceeding with an investigation, the Prosecutor must submit a request for 
authorisation of an investigation to a Pre-Trial Chamber.
212
 The Pre-Trial Chamber must 
confirm that a ‘reasonable basis’ for investigation exists; in addition make a preliminary 
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determination that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.
213
 This does not mean 
that issues of jurisdiction and admissibility are settled or that the Court is prevented from 
reversing its initial assessment at some later stage. Should the Pre-Trial Chamber reject the 
Prosecutor’s request, subsequent application for authorisation based on new facts or evidence 
can be made.
214
 
The Prosecutor could determine that the information provided does not justify proceeding on 
the matter, in such a case he is required to inform those who provided the information. An 
unsatisfied informant is without further recourse and may not challenge or appeal the 
Prosecutor’s decision, although the Statute explicitly contemplates the possibility of new 
facts being re-submitted.
215
 The Prosecutor in determining whether to exercise his proprio 
motu powers is required to consider three factors. First, he must determine whether the 
available information provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed.
216
 Second, he must assess whether 
the case would be admissible in accordance with Article 17 of the Statute, whether the 
national courts are unwilling or unable genuinely to proceed, and lastly assessing the notion 
of ‘gravity’. If these conditions are met, the Prosecutor must also give consideration in the 
‘interests of justice’.217 The ‘gravity’ criteria and the ‘interests of justice’, provide enormous 
space for highly discretionary determination.  
Finally, it is part of the policy to request arrest warrants or summons to appear only when a 
case is nearly trial-ready in order to facilitate the expeditiousness of the judicial 
proceedings,
218
 in respect to communications or submissions filed pursuant to Article 15, the 
reliability of the source of information obtained and the information itself shall be 
preliminarily examined to determine whether the alleged criminal conduct may fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court ratione materiae, personae, loci and temporis,
219
 and whether a case 
is or would be admissible,
220
 in accordance with Article 14?
221
 The Prosecutor’s proprio motu 
power to initiate an investigation with authorisation from a Pre-Trial Chamber is a very 
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important mechanism under the Statute. This procedure provides the legal basis to carry out 
investigations where states have failed to refer an objectively serious situation. The 
Prosecutor should use this power with responsibility and firmness, ensuring strict compliance 
with the Statute.
222
  
2.8 Complementarity under the Statute 
The complementarity regime
223
 of the ICC overcomes problems associated with the 
concurrent system of the ad hoc tribunals
224
 and establishes a better relationship with national 
justice institutions by providing that the ICC will only prosecute crimes, if national judicial 
systems are ‘legitimately unable or unwilling;’ central to the ICC mandate and a means of 
respecting national sovereignty. The principle defines the legal and functional relationship 
between National courts and the ICC.
225
  Paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 17 of the 
Statute come to bear, on how these pieces fit together.
226
 How and which course of action to 
take? The evolution of the concept could be traced to the 1937 draft treaty on terrorism and 
the post- World War II tribunals.
227
 Complementarity is crucial not only to the ICC, but also 
an underlying paradigm of international criminal justice.
228
 A State is obliged to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes within its territory.
229
 
Complementarity fundamentally encourages State Parties to implement provisions of the 
Statute by strengthening their National jurisdiction over the Crimes listed in the Statute the 
Sovereignty of such a State will remain unaffected; free of any interference by the ICC. 
Paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the Statute recalls that ‘it is the duty of every State to exercise 
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its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’. The ICC can only 
deal with limited cases and has to rely on direct enforcement through State Parties.
230
 
The ICCSt does not define the term ‘complementarity’231 neither is complementarity an 
absolute principle, but rather, one subject to variations depending on the circumstance of its 
application.
232
 The provision is far from being perfectly drafted, leaving its full understanding 
and interpretation to the assessment of the Court.
233
 Whilst domestic jurisdictions enjoy 
primacy to deal with their own alleged human rights violations, only if remedies were 
deemed ‘inadequate or ineffective’, could the ICC proceed.234 The theory of complementarity 
has been described as essential for acceptance of the Statute by States
235
 and often referred to 
as the underlying principle,
236
 the corner stone.
237
 Thus Article 17 functions as a barrier to the 
existence of jurisdiction.
238
 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC recognises this 
by providing that the Court shall rule on any challenge to its jurisdiction first before dealing 
with matters of admissibility.
239
 
The complementarity regime, strikes a very delicate balance between judicial independence 
and the competing interests of State sovereignty.
240
 However, there is overwhelming desire 
by some States to keep own courts from being overshadowed by the ICC, leading to a 
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growing consensus among countries’ responses to complementarity.241 Theoretically, the 
ICC’s presence should incentivise states to investigate and prosecute cases of core 
international crimes, to avoid any infiltration by the ICC into cases occurring on their 
territories.
242
 Positive complementarity has encouraged genuine national proceedings, 
reliance on national and international networks and participation in a system of international 
cooperation. The 2010 Kampala Review Conference, the first conference on the Rome 
Statute, concluded that States require stronger national frameworks to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction. The conference asserted that a more systematic approach towards empowering 
national legal orders was needed.
243
 Basically, complementarity functions as a catalyst for 
National courts, it is likely that significant obstacles to effective domestic prosecution of ICC 
crimes will persist due to destroyed or seriously weakened legal systems.
244
 The systemic 
nature of these crimes remain unchanged and so do the obstacles to national prosecutions, 
already apparent in situations that appeared before the Court, like obstacles to the domestic 
prosecution of crimes committed in Uganda, the DRC and Sudan largely correspond to those 
that existed in situations prior to coming into force of the Statute.
245
 Another reason for the 
complementarity regime is the fear on the part of prospective State Parties that the ICC would 
become a Supra-national criminal court and would result in countries losing domestic control 
of criminal prosecutions.
246
 
2.9 Admissibility under the Rome Statute 
 
The Court would admit cases under Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, where (a) the case is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, (b) the case has 
been investigated by a State with jurisdiction and the State decides not to prosecute the 
person(s) concerned (in the two instances, the Court has to preclude the possibility that the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out such investigation or prosecution before it 
can admit the case) a case would be admissible if national proceedings were undertaken for 
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the purpose of shielding the person(s) from criminal responsibility, (c) the person(s) 
concerned have already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, the 
principle of ne bis in idem sets in and (d) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court. 
2.10 Ne Bis in Idem and the International Criminal Court 
The double jeopardy ‘autrefois acquit or ne bis in idem’ concept originates from Roman Civil 
Law; found in common law jurisdictions, that no legal action can be instituted twice for the 
same cause of action. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)
247
 guarantees the right to be free from double jeopardy
248
 however it does not apply 
to prosecutions by two different sovereigns
249
 unless relevant extradition Treaty expresses a 
prohibition. That a person should not be prosecuted more than once for the same criminal 
conduct
250
 ‘the double jeopardy rule,’251 is found in various legal systems.252 It is the criminal 
law version of a broader principle, aimed at protecting the finality of judgments, and reflected 
in the doctrine Res Judicata.
253
 Although, differing views can be found among writers, 
advocates and a substantial body of opinion holds that the principle (ne bis in idem) is not 
recognised as a rule of custom, even though there is somewhat more support from Schabas, 
Bassiouni et al
254
 for the rule as a general principle of international law.
255
 Ne bis in idem 
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operates at three levels; firstly, it operates in relation to multiple prosecutions within a state 
(internal application). Secondly, it operates between different sovereigns (first-tier 
international application). Thirdly, it operates with respect to relations between states and 
international tribunals (second-tier international application). Furthermore, the nature of 
transnational crimes and the applicable jurisdictional principles
256
 could leave defendants at 
risk of prosecution for international crimes by a number of sovereigns, as well international 
criminal tribunals. 
The Rome Statute creates a different form of Ne bis in idem under Article 20.
257
 The 
jurisdiction of the ICC to try individuals who have been the object of sham proceedings in a 
national court is technically an exception to the principle. Whereas a person may not be 
prosecuted twice for the same crime, however, Article 20 enables the Court to prosecute 
persons for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, even after being tried for the same 
crime in a national court if: 
A) The proceedings were aimed at shielding the person from criminal responsibility; or 
B) The procedure was not independent or impartial in accordance with the norms of due 
process
258
 recognised by international law, and was conducted in a manner which, in 
the circumstance, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice. 
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Criminal justice would have been rendered, only when rendered in accordance with due 
process and other international standards. In order for the ICC to begin a new trial, the 
violation of procedural safeguards must have been committed with the aim of preventing the 
person concerned from being brought to justice. Ne bis in idem affects the functioning of the 
entire legal system,
259
 whether national or international, separately or in conjunction with 
each other. The importance of the principle is evinced by the fact that it is not only built into 
the criminal procedure acts, but also a basic human right.
260
 
Additionally, Ne bis in idem can be seen as an aspect of the complementarity approach of the 
Court to National courts. In contrast the ad hoc tribunals had concurrent and primacy of 
jurisdiction over National courts (Article 10 of ICTY Statute and Article 9 of ICTR Statute 
state that the ne bis in idem principle can be enforced mainly to clarify that the ad hoc 
tribunal's sentences are ‘stronger’ than those of domestic courts) whereas, the jurisdiction of 
the ICC is said to be secondary or complementary to National jurisdiction.
261
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However, as a principle in Article 38(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ)
262
 ne bis in idem is not a ‘general principle of criminal law’ as Kittichaisaree notes, the 
placing of ne bis in idem provisions in the Statute reflects the fact that ne bis in idem is so 
closely related in the scheme of the Statute to admissibility; it is a procedural bar to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction (rather than a ground for excluding responsibility).
263
 It prevents the state from 
attempts to retry facts underlying an acquittal.
264
 
The double jeopardy protection could be limited by the dual sovereignty doctrine. The 
doctrine, set out in United States v Lanza
265
 establishes that the double jeopardy clause does 
not bar prosecutions for the same offence at state and federal level. Although, the so called 
‘sham exception’ limits further prosecutions by different sovereigns if the second prosecution 
is a cover for a prosecution by the first sovereign, who failed at its first attempt, this is a 
limited and narrow exception.
266
 Additionally, Article 20 does not protect against multiple 
criminal prosecutions by different contracting parties. This is yet another indication of the 
limited protection afforded by the Ne bis in idem formulation in the Rome Statute. Whilst 
Article 20 ICCSt does not preclude the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over the conduct of 
persons who have been granted amnesty via truth commissions
267
 and amnesty tribunals
268
 
Article 53
269
 permits the prosecutor to abandon an investigation, if it would not serve the 
interest of justice. Article 20 (2) ICCSt grants States the opportunity to prosecute defendants 
for national crimes outside Article 5 ICCSt, a further examination of this article from the 
perspective of human rights, reveals obvious limitations of the Ne bis in idem defence. It is 
submitted that Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute contains a legitimate limitation of state 
sovereignty in the two exceptions that have been created. Firstly, the limitations on 
sovereignty are narrow in scope. Secondly, National legal systems cannot be wholly trusted 
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to genuinely prosecute international criminals.
270
 Grave international crimes, such as 
Genocide, often go hand in hand with insecure or illegitimate domestic legal systems, 
because international criminals may be able to bring enormous pressure to bear on domestic 
actors thereby decreasing the prospects of an impartial hearing, as Judge Cassese stated in 
Tadić.271 ‘It would be a travesty of law and betrayal of the universal need for justice, should 
the concept of state sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human rights.’272 
2.11 Structures, Situations, Cases and the International Criminal Court  
Understanding the Structures and functions of the Court is imperative to appreciate the 
Challenges the Court faces jurisdictionally.
273
 The Jurisdiction of the Court rests on Article 5 
of the Statute.
274
 Preliminary examinations by the Court to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction over a situation is based on temporal, territorial, personal and subject matter 
guidelines set out in the Statute. Appreciating the distinction between situations and cases 
within the Court’s process is necessary. If a preliminary examination establishes that the 
Court has jurisdiction over a situation, a full investigation into that situation may commence. 
‘Cases’ relate to ‘tangible’ incidents and ‘specific’ suspects that emerge from the 
investigation of a particular situation.
275
 The ICC (a court of last resort) is designed to 
complement existing national judicial systems.
276
 Thus, the jurisdictional limits are only 
applicable if the relevant National court proves either unwilling or genuinely unable to 
investigate a situation.
277
 
Article 34 of the Statute establishes four organs of the Court known as the Court’s structure. 
 
I) The Presidency  
II) The Chambers (judiciary) 
III) The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and  
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IV) The Registry.  
The Presidency is charged with the overall function and administration of the Court 
(excluding the OTP, which operates independently). It is comprised of three judges who 
serve three-year terms and selected from within the Court.  
The Chamber is made up of three divisions:  
Pre-Trial Chamber  
Trial Chamber and 
Appeals Chamber 
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, there shall be 18 judges of the Court.
278
 The 
Presidency, acting on behalf of the Court, may propose an increase in the number of judges 
specified above.
279
 The OTP handles situations referred to the Court. Lastly, the Registry 
serves as a non-judicial head of administration for the Court, and run by the Registrar.
280
 This 
office functions under the Authority of the President of the Court.
281
Managerially, this is 
counter-productive, undermines specialisation and detrimental to the principle of checks and 
balances which is part of the overall problems of efficiency and effectiveness within the 
International Criminal Court. Although, not stated as an organ of the Court in the Statute, the 
Assembly of States Parties
282
 (ASP) plays an important role in the Court’s performance. It 
acts as an oversight mechanism to the organs of the Court, especially the OTP, the Presidency 
and the Registry. The ASP is the only body vested with the right to make amendments to the 
Rome Statute
283
 and it’s made up of one representative from each state party; having a vote 
each. States that have signed the Statute without ratify it, are ‘observer states,’284 they could 
participate in the proceedings of the ASP without voting. The ASP elects 21 individuals to 
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serve a three year term on the executive committee, known as the Bureau.
285
 The ASP is also 
vested with the authority to establish other subsidiary bodies to carry out its functions.
286
 
The Court also includes a number of semi-autonomous offices such as the Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims and the Office of Public Counsel for Defence. These Offices fall under 
the Registry for administrative purposes but otherwise function as wholly independent 
offices. The Statute also founded an institution for restorative justice called the Trust Fund 
for Victims (TFV).
287
 The TFV was established specifically for addressing the needs of those 
who have suffered the most from violence during conflicts involving crimes investigated by 
the Court.’288 Furthermore, the TFV is mandated to enforce reparations ordered by the Court, 
provide physical, psychosocial rehabilitation and support to victims of crimes that falls within 
the jurisdiction and investigation of the Court.
289
 Thus, the TFV exists in order to alleviate 
the pain and suffering of individuals and communities by providing a means of recovery. 
This makes the ICC a unique court, not just for holding perpetrators of the worst crimes 
responsible for their acts, but also for working to restore a positive semblance of normalcy in 
the lives of victims.
290
  
In investigating a situation, the OTP must determine ‘admissibility’ according to Article 53 
ICCSt. It must assess complementarity
291
 and the gravity of the situation. This is central to 
the Courts mandate as a means of respecting national sovereignty.
292
 Consequently, the lack 
of effective national implementation of the ICC legislation leaves the OTP to open 
investigations in an increasing number of situations. However, there has been no coherent 
applicable guideline for assessing the gravity threshold by the OTP. Subsequently, it has 
become excessively reliant on the PTC-I interpretation of the gravity threshold
293
 and has 
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applied it inconsistently, undermining the OTP’s ability to remain independent, objective, and 
impartial.  
The Challenge of Preliminary Examination - in order to distinguish situations that warrants 
investigation from those that do not, and in order to manage the analysis of the factors set out 
in Article 53(1).
294
 Preliminary examination is conducted in all situations brought before the 
OTP to determine whether the criteria established in Article 53 of the Statute is met.
295
 The 
OTP, on the basis of the facts and information available and in the context of the overarching 
principles of independence, impartiality, and objectivity, determines whether a situation 
warrants an investigation.
296
 The preliminary examination is initiated by a referral to the 
Prosecutor by a State Party,
297
 the UNSC
298
 or by the Prosecutor acting proprio motu.
299
 
While each phase focuses on a distinct statutory factor for analytical purposes, the Office 
applies a holistic approach throughout the preliminary examination process.
300
The Prosecutor 
uses a filtering process, in four phases to analyse the seriousness of communications 
received, using information made available and seeking additional information, the OTP 
determines whether a situation is of ‘reasonable basis to proceed.’301 The four phases listed in 
the ICC-OTP November 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations are: 
302
 
•  Phase 1 provides an initial assessment of all information on alleged crimes received 
under Article 15 (communications). The purpose is to analyse and verify the seriousness 
of information received, filter to identify those that appear to fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. Specifically, initial assessment distinguishes between communications relating 
to: a) matters which are manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court; b) a situation 
already under preliminary examination; c) a situation already under investigation or 
forming the basis of a prosecution; or d) matters which are neither manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court nor related to situations already under preliminary examination 
or investigation or forming the basis of a prosecution, and therefore warrant further 
analysis. Communications deemed to be manifestly outside the Court’s jurisdiction may 
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be revisited in light of new information or circumstances, such as a change in the 
jurisdictional situations. Communications deemed to require further analysis will be the 
subject of a dedicated analytical report which will assess whether the alleged crimes 
appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore warrant proceeding to the 
next phase. Such communications shall be analysed in combination with open source 
information such as reports from the United Nations, non-governmental organisations and 
other reliable sources for corroboration purposes.
303
 
 Phase 2 represents the formal commencement of a preliminary examination of a 
given situation, it focuses on whether the preconditions to exercise jurisdiction under 
Article 12 are satisfied and whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the 
alleged crimes fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court. The analysis is 
conducted in respect of all Article 15 communications that were not rejected in Phase 
1, as well as of information arising from referrals by a State Party or the SC, 
declarations lodged pursuant to Article 12(3), open source information, and testimony 
received at the seat of the Court. Phase 2 analysis entails a thorough factual and legal 
assessment of the crimes allegedly committed in the situation at hand with a view to 
identifying the potential cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Court.
304
 
 Phase 2 (a): analyses focus on issues of temporal, territory or personal jurisdiction.  
 Phase 2 (b): analyses focus on alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.305 
The Office considers crimes committed on a large scale, as part of a plan or policy. 
The Office may gather information on relevant national proceedings if such 
information is available at this stage. Phase 2 leads to the submission of an ‘Article 5 
report’ to the Prosecutor, in reference to the material jurisdiction of the Court as 
defined in Article 5 of the Statute.
306
 
 Phase 3 focuses on the admissibility of potential cases in terms of complementarity 
and gravity pursuant to Articles 17. Phase 3 leads to the submission of an ‘Article 17 
report’ to the Prosecutor, in reference to the admissibility issues as defined in the 
Statute.
307
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 Phase 4 examines the interests of justice. It results in the production of an ‘Article 
53(1) report,’ which provides the basis for the Prosecutor to determine whether to 
initiate an investigation in accordance with Article 53(1).
308
 
A situation must satisfy all necessary jurisdictional requirements to be admissible, followed 
by the issues of admissibility of a situation, first, in the context of complementarity and 
second, in the context of gravity.
309
 
The Challenge within the Requirement of Gravity- The gravity threshold is essential in 
determining whether a situation is or not admissible. The OTP reviews information 
concerning subject matter jurisdiction.
310
 To date, the only judicial interpretation of the 
gravity threshold was from the PTC-I, when reviewing the Court’s first situation in the DRC; 
emphasised that the ‘gravity threshold provided for in Article 17(1) (d) of the Statute must be 
applied.’ ‘At the stage of initiation of investigation of a situation, that the relevant situation 
must meet such gravity threshold’ and crimes should be evaluated based on how 
‘systematically or large-scale’ they were conducted. The PTC-I provided a framework for 
applying the gravity threshold, unlike in the Statute, in determining admissibility.
311
 It is 
arguably important adhering to a more clarified gravity threshold, successful conviction came 
out of the PTC-I, illustrating the potential that clarifying the gravity threshold for 
admissibility could result in delivering convictions and meaningful justice to those affected. 
Since, the PTC-I provided this description in reference to the DRC’s specific situation but 
unsupported by legal parameters, the gravity threshold for admissibility of a situation must be 
standardised, making it applicable to all situations.
312
 Without explicit definition or set of 
guidelines for using gravity during admissibility, the Prosecutor is left with too much 
prosecutorial discretion.
313
 This leads to inconsistent implementation of the gravity threshold 
for admissibility which breads inconsistent and debatable results. The heavy reliance by the 
OTP results in narrow evaluation of factors in determining situations admissibility because of 
the synonymous use of ‘gravity’ with ‘systemic’ or ‘large scale’, as implied by the PTC-I. 
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‘Systemic’ refers to the ‘organised nature of acts of violence and the improbability of their 
random occurrence’ while large-scale concerns ‘the widespread nature of the attack.’  
The Prosecutor, in the 2013 policy paper on preliminary examinations, stated, the gravity for 
admissibility includes an ‘assessment of the scale, nature, manner and impact of the alleged 
crimes committed in the situation,’ emphasising that the OTP must assess ‘gravity in relation 
to the most serious crimes alleged and to those who appear to bear the greatest responsibility 
for these crimes. The PTC-I required systematicity or scale as a condition of the gravity 
threshold in Article 17(1) (d) and the OTP has implemented these conditions analogously 
with gravity for admissibility. Also, the OTP primarily considers quantitative (numerical) 
factors such as number of victims, when determining admissibility. This narrow evaluation of 
the factors determining the admissibility of a situation is evident when considering why the 
OTP dismissed the situation in Iraq.
314
 The Court in 2006 received over 240 relevant 
communications expressing ‘the concern of numerous citizens and organisations regarding 
the launching of military operations and the resulting human loss’ by the United Kingdom 
(UK) soldiers in Iraq. The number of victims of the inhumane treatment allegedly caused by 
the UK national soldiers in Iraq came to between 4 and 12. The OTP reported that the crimes 
had been committed within the Court’s jurisdiction and thus considered the gravity 
threshold.
315
 The OTP concluded that no more than twelve deaths fell within the jurisdiction 
of the Court that could be included in a potential investigation.
316
 Consequently, the OTP 
dismissed the situation in Iraq on the basis of gravity, stating further that this dismissal is 
considered in respect of other situations currently under investigation that features thousands 
of wilful killings.
317
  However, after years of the UK failing to prosecute direct perpetrators 
among its troops in Iraq, it is time for the Court to step in says Andreas Schueller, a legal 
adviser at the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights.
318
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Also, the Statute does not define the criteria for gravity in determining a situation’s 
admissibility even in the Rule of Procedure (RPE) or other governing documents.
319
 It 
remains a vague expression. It is difficult for the Prosecutor to effectively explain the 
reasoning behind the gravity threshold when finding a situation admissible.
320
 Besides, it is 
used over a range of situations; the interpretation has led the OTP to become overly reliant on 
quantitative factors a trade-off on qualitative factors equally important in determining the 
gravity of a situation. Quantitative factors refer to numerical data, such as the number of 
victims whilst qualitative factors refer to categorical data, such as target vulnerability. Thus 
the OTP’s commitment to independence, objectivity, and impartiality while conducting 
preliminary examinations could be undermined. Including a list of qualitative factors for the 
OTP to consider would lead to a more credible examination and alleviate prosecutorial 
discretion during prioritisation of admissible situations. Thus the gravity threshold remains 
ambiguous and ill-defined yet an important determinant for a situation's admissibility.
321
 
Once guidelines have been established, an increase in transparency will aid the overall 
advancement of the Court’s legitimacy.322  
2.12 The Court’s Intermediaries 
The ICC as a global court is required to investigate around the world in countries with very 
different cultures, histories, languages and conflicts. As a result, the Court depends on 
partners in its work with advice and background information about the context in which it is 
operating. The Court needs local partners to help conduct outreach in local languages in the 
field, liaise with victims and witnesses, or facilitate victims ‘participation in legal 
proceedings. Consequently, the Court relies on a group of people generally referred to as 
‘intermediaries.’323 These are people or organisations that help the Court to connect with 
witnesses and others facilitating activities such as locating or communicating with victims, 
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2014  
55 
 
particularly in settings without proper communication (mobile phone) coverage or 
transportation access.
324
 In the Lubanga’s case, the Court faced issues of how to manage 
interactions with intermediaries.
325
 For security concerns, the Court may provide protection 
for intermediaries because they may be at risk on account of the activities of the Court.’326 
The Court had found that three intermediaries may have been persuaded, encouraged, or 
assisted witnesses to give false evidence,
327
 which could amount to a crime under Article 70 
of the Rome Statute and which the prosecutor can investigate under Rule 165 of the RPE.
328
 
Although, the Chamber did not direct the Prosecutor to stop working with intermediaries, 
instead it signified that the Prosecutor could not delegate its investigative work to 
intermediaries. In 2011 the Court finalised the Draft Guidelines on Intermediaries which was 
considered at the ASP meeting in November 2012. 
2.13 Theory of Organisation Behaviour 
The objective of this section is to provide a new approach to understanding the International 
Criminal Court not just as a court but as an international organisation. The creation of the 
Court is an important development in international law and international organisations 
founded upon international cooperation; with a well grounded understanding of the dynamics 
within an international organisation such as the ICC it is needless to say that its effectiveness 
will be better accomplished. At the core of this approach is the giving of a much higher 
profile to the issue of the nature of organisations.
329
 The theories of Organisation Behaviour 
(OB) will be used as a set of conceptual tools that will help in classifying and explaining the 
phenomena in this area of research.
330
 The fundamental assumption of this section is that an 
understanding of the nature of organisations is an inextricable part of the understanding of the 
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behaviour of the organisation.
331
 Consequently, understanding the behaviour of organisations 
such as the International Criminal Court could also pave way to nip in the bud some of the 
Courts challenges; thereby induce performance (within and outside the Court) with a better 
understanding of the Courts stance and the achievement of its objectives.  
An organisation exists when two or more persons agree to collaborate over a period of time 
or in perpetuity in order to achieve certain goals.
332
 Organisations can be understood or 
described in different metaphors
333
 such as: a machine (a classical view),
334
 Organisms (the 
organic view), Brains (the cybernetic view), Culture (a product of their dominant values), 
political systems (concerned with the distribution of power), psychic prisons (sources of 
stress for individuals), flux and transformation (constantly changing organisms), instruments 
of dominium (a means of exerting power, however legitimate).
335
 For the purpose of this 
thesis, only a few of the metaphors will further be explained for a broader view. An 
organisation viewed from the perspective of a machine, is that organisation seen as a 
purpose-driven device (the machine metaphor)
336
 an assumption that a common goal or 
purpose exists (such as combating impunity and the rendering of not only legal justice but 
also transitional justice) and there should be a predominant focus on the design and approach 
as a means to ensure achieving overall intent and purpose of such an organisation like the 
Court for instance. The machine metaphor approach, underscores the formal design of 
organisations (the legal framework) and outcomes may be explainable in terms of design 
flaws (the issue of sovereignty as a design flaw in the Statute) leading to malfunctioning, 
fundamental upon such design flaws.
337
 Furthermore, defining an organisation as an 
‘Organism’ is the intension to treat it as a living thing (a legal entity)338 with parts as in a 
human body, to a large extent functionally differentiated and interdependent such that the 
survival of the whole depends on adequate functioning of all parts. This biological 
representation continues if we consider organisations as operating in an environment (social, 
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economic) to which they must adapt if they are to survive.
339
Additionally, defining 
organisation as a ‘political system’ is the notion and privilege that an organisation is a forum 
where participants interact in pursuit of a range of interests, some interests will be common, 
others will differ; some will be complimentary and some will conflict. This does not mean 
that the legitimate organisational goals are subverted but that organisations by their nature 
and creation are political.
340
 Lastly, from the cultural perspectives, the essence of 
organisations stems not in the complex of tasks and structures, rules and procedures as 
assumed by models such as the machine approach but rather in the realm of shared systems of 
beliefs and values,
341
 such as the dictates of the Nuremberg principles, to hold individuals 
accountable for their misdeed.    
Organisational behaviour is the field of study that investigates organisations from multiple 
viewpoints, methods and levels of analyses
342
 to determine how organisational structures 
affect behaviour within, outside and in relation to other organisations. There are three main 
theories within this study, namely, Micro, Meso and Macro studies. Micro organisational 
behaviour studies focus on individual and group dynamics in an organisational setting. Team 
studies are popular parts of organisational behavioural studies, it examine the best ways to 
form, use and lead teams in a variety of situations to accomplish utmost performance. ‘Meso’ 
scale structures, involves the study of power, culture, and the networks of individuals in 
organisations. ‘Macro’ organisational analysis/theory studies whole organisation and conflict 
zones, including how they adapt. What strategies, structures and contingencies guide them as 
organisations? In addition, macro-organisational behavioural research looks at an 
organisation as a whole. It studies how organisations progress and how their strategies 
regarding employees and leadership affect the performance of the entire organisation.
343
 This 
is the part of the field that may recommend a flat organisation with few levels of management 
over a complex bureaucracy or a model using inspirational leadership instead of more 
aggressive programs. Organisational Behaviour therefore, encompasses what might be called 
management theory. This is a loosely knit body of knowledge about the behaviour of people 
in organisations, which aims to explain behaviour in terms of achievement of work goals, 
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especially concerned with issues of goal setting, resource deployment, employee motivation, 
team-work, leadership, control, co-ordination and performance measurement.
344
  
In addition, Organisational behaviour studies the impact individuals, groups, and structures 
have on behaviour within organisations, it is an interdisciplinary field that includes sociology, 
psychology, communication and management.
345
 Organisational behaviour focuses on 
organisational and intra-organisational issues and relates to everyday practices of 
organisations leading over a long period to the culture of the organisations. Many factors 
come into play whenever people interact in organisations. Modern organisational studies 
attempt to understand and model these factors. Organisational studies seek to control, predict 
and explain that Organisational Behaviour can play a major role in organisational 
development, enhancing overall organisational performance, as well as enhancing individual 
and group performance, satisfaction, and commitment. 
A reward, real or elusive, presented after the occurrence of an action, is intended to trigger 
the behaviour to occur again. This is enabled by associating positive meaning to the 
behaviour. Studies show that if the person receives the reward immediately, the effect is 
greater, and decreases as delay lengthens. Repetitive action-reward combination can cause 
the action to become habit.
346
 Motivation is the driving force that causes the flux from desire 
to will,
347
 for instance, hunger is a motivation that elicits a desire to eat. Motivation is an 
inner drive to behave or act in a certain manner. Motivation can be looked at as a cycle where 
thoughts influence behaviours and behaviours thus drive performance. Performance will 
impact thoughts and the cycle becomes cyclical. Each facet is comprised of many multi-
faceted dimensions where attitudes, beliefs, intentions, effort, and withdrawal all affect the 
amount of motivation one has. Rational motivation refers to the idea that entities are rational 
and that behaviour is guided by reasons. However, recent research (on Satisficing) has 
significantly undermined the idea of homo economicus
348
 or of perfect rationality in favour of 
a more ‘bounded rationality theory.’ The field of behavioural economics is particularly 
concerned with the limits of rationality in economic agents. 
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Motivation is derivable from two sources: oneself and other people. The two sources are 
called intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation respectively. An in-depth analysis of the 
theory of motivation would be unnecessary for the purpose of this dissertation. It is however 
mentioned here for two main reasons. Firstly, to establish the basis for analysing the 
challenges of the Court as internally and externally related. Secondly, to establish that 
internal and external motivation towards the Court can elicit performance and minimise some 
of the Court challenges.  
2.14 Conclusion 
In this chapter we examined the theoretical concepts of implementing the current regime of 
international criminal law as established within the Rome Statute, elaborating on key 
operational principles of the Statute which set the stage for further complex analysis of the 
Court’s operations, prosecutions and challenges. Additionally, we examined the limits and 
jurisdictional basis of the Court such as complementarity, ne bis in idem, admissibility and 
gravity, in determining whether a situation under preliminary examination provides a 
reasonable basis to proceed, without undermining relevant sections within the legal 
framework of the Court. Since, complementarity and gravity play a vital role in determining a 
situation’s admissibility, the ICC must work to improve the ability of national jurisdictions to 
try cases domestically and also create adaptable guidelines for applying the gravity threshold 
in order to ensure that the OTP remains impartial when determining which situations to 
investigate. In addition, the chapter briefly examines alleviating the sufferings of victims 
through restorative justice with the Trust Fund for Victims, and reviews the Courts 
jurisdiction (ratione materiae, personae, loci and temporis), and other related provisions 
within the Statute to enable proper focused investigations on the most serious crimes of 
international concern these crimes will be examined in-depth in the next chapter, and 
concludes by examining some theories of organisations that could if adequately implemented 
challenge some of the prosecutional challenges the Court faces.    
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Chapter 3 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute 
 
All men are equal before the law. [Nobody should be above the law]. More men and women in this world are 
united by the conviction that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression cannot 
go unpunished – regardless of the nationality and the rank of the perpetrators. 
   Hans‐Peter Kaul 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the Suī generis of crimes in Article 5 of the Rome Statute (the statute)1 
and their development over time, the purpose of the chapter is also to help us appreciate the 
travaux préparatoires at the Rome Conference in 1998.
2
 Understanding these enable 
understanding and analysing the prosecutorial challenges established in chapter four and the 
jurisprudence of the Court considered in chapter five. The substantive crimes: war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime aggression are the subject matter (ratione 
materiae) jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, the chapter is divided into four parts; each part 
examines a substantive crime. 
Part one 
3.1.1 War Crimes 
‘...it is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously…’3 
War crimes are serious violations of treaty rules and or of customary laws of war. The 
dictates of war crimes established within recent developments in international law and 
international criminal law particularly the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court
4
 
and relevant cases will be examined in this section of the Chapter. The Appeals chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated in Tadic Interlocutory 
Appeal that: ‘war crimes must consist of a serious infringement of an international rule. That 
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the rule violated must either belong to the corpus of customary law or be part of an applicable 
treaty, and entail criminal responsibility of the person(s) breaching the rule.’5 Consequently, 
war crimes may be perpetrated in the course of either international or non-international armed 
conflicts. It is a violation of the rules regulating wars.
6
 Since Tadic, it has been widely 
accepted that serious violations of laws on internal armed conflict can no longer be over 
looked.
7
 This is further supported by Article 8
2
 (2) ICCSt.
8
 
3.1.2 War Crimes under the Rome Statute  
 
Under the Rome Statute war crimes could be committed by: (A) Grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions (GC) such as: Article 50 GC I,
9
 Article 51 GC II,
10
 Article 30 GC III
11
 
and Article 147 GC IV.
12
 The four Geneva Conventions include prohibited conducts such as 
willful killing, torture, inhuman treatment, hostage taking, extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property. Grave breaches must be committed in the context of an 
international armed conflict and against persons or property protected under the GC.
13
 The 
GC requires States to legislate effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering 
the commission of, any of these gave breaches and bring them to justice irrespective of their 
nationality. A vast body of substantive rules exists comprising what are traditionally called 
‘the law of The Hague’ and ‘the law of Geneva’. The former includes the Hague conventions 
of 1899 and 1907 on international warfare. These rules provide for various categories of 
lawful combatants and regulate combat actions and treatment of persons who do not or no 
longer take part in conflict (civilians, prisoners of war, wounded and the sick).
14
 The later, 
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comprises various GC (the four Conventions of 1949 and the two additional Protocols of 
1977), However, the Third Geneva convention of 1949 regulates various classes of lawful 
combatants, thereby updating the Hague rules; in addition the first Additional Protocol of 
1977 to some extent updates those rules of the Hague law which deals with means and 
methods of combat.
15
 (B) A category of war crimes, cover serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in international armed conflicts from other sources such as:  I) The 1899 
Hague Declaration (IV, 3) concerning expanding bullets The Hague, 29 July, II) the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol.
16
 (C) Lastly, are the categories of serious violations of the law and 
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of international character such as common Article 
3 to the GC. Common Article 3 includes a prohibition of acts such as violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture. Not all 
serious violations of international humanitarian law have been included within the definition 
of war crimes in the Rome Statute,
17
 for instance no provisions dealing with unjustifiable 
delay in the reparations of prisoners of war or civilians or on the launching of an 
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects unless one equates 
such an attack with an attack against the civilian population which is a war crime under the 
Statute.
18
 Given that several delegations contested the customary law status of some 
provisions of Additional Protocol I, certain serious violations were omitted and other 
prohibitions such as: the prohibition on disproportionate attacks and attacks against the 
natural environment Article 8 (2) (a) (b) (iv) ICCSt included only, after a modification of the 
treaty language. 
Articles 6, 7, 8
2
 and 15bis set out the list of crimes over which the court will have jurisdiction 
i.e. Genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, to provide 
greater certainty and clarity concerning the content of each crime, some states felt it 
necessary to develop specific texts on elements of crimes (EOC).
19
 This consequently led to 
the creation of Article 9 of the ICCSt. It states that the elements of crime shall assist the 
Court in the interpretation and application of Article 6, 7, and 8
2
 ... Also Article 21 states that 
the Court shall apply the Elements of crime on the basis of these rules; the EOC will guide 
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future Judges through the interpretation of provisions on crimes contained within this 
statute... 
3.1.3 The Use of Specific Weapons under the Rome Statute 
The Statute covers few war crimes relating to the use of specific weapons, a consequence of 
the difficulty encountered in reaching a consensus at the Rome Conference. Excluding 
nuclear weapons whilst listing other weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical and 
biological weapons, was unacceptable to a number of states. They feared that prohibiting 
some weapons of mass destruction while remaining silent on nuclear weapons would give 
tacit approval to the legality of nuclear weapons,
20
 thus, it was necessary to exclude all 
weapons of mass destruction from the Statute for the time being. The weapons provisions in 
the Statute are therefore restricted to those weapons that are prohibited under IHL.
21
 These 
restrictions appear in paragraphs (b) xvii, xix and (e) xiv of Article 8
2
,
22
 bearing in mind that 
the chemical and biological restrictions emanated from the 1925 Geneva gas protocol often 
interpreted as including the proscription of the use of chemical weaponry. However, Article 
8
2 
(2) (b) (xx) ICCSt allows for future expansion of the list of prohibited weapons through an 
amendment procedure.
23
 
Under the Statute deliberate attacks against civilian population, individual civilians or 
undefended non-military objectives
24
 stated in Articles 8
2
 (2) (b) (i) or Article 8
2
 (2) (e) (i) is 
a war crime. In spite of the ICTY’s decision in Tadic25 that customary law rules prohibiting 
the use of specific weapons are also relevant to non-international armed conflict. A 
reasonable amount of the provisions in Article 8
2
 applicable to international armed conflicts 
are not in the section on non-international armed conflict. Other gaps seen, in the war crimes 
applicable to internal conflict is the no provision on prohibition of intentionally starving the 
civil population.
26
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The failure to include all serious violations of IHL in the Rome Statute means that states are 
obliged to repress such violations.
27
 A) State Parties to Additional Protocols I&II must 
provide for the repression of those grave breaches in Articles 11 and 85 of that Protocol, 
which are not included in the Rome Statute. B) State Parties to the Amended Mines 
Protocol,
28
 the Ottawa Treaty and the adopted second protocol, to the 1954 Hague 
Convention on Cultural Property
29
 must implement the provisions relating to the penal 
repression. 
Paragraph 6 in the General introduction (EOC)
30
 refers to the term ‘unlawfulness’ which 
could act as a place marker that refers to relevant provisions of IHL, such as the war crime of 
deportation Article 8
2
 (2) (a) (vii) ICCSt can only occur in situations where Article 49 (2) and 
(3) of the Geneva Convention (GC) IV, which describe lawful evacuations, are not 
applicable. The war crime of destruction and appropriation in the sense of Article 8
2
 (2) (a) 
(iv) ICCSt must be read in conjunction with the provisions dealing with different kinds of 
protected property in the GC.
31
  
3.1.4 The Overlap of Crimes 
 
Paragraph 9 of the general introduction to the EOC deals in general terms with problems of 
overlap of crimes.
32
 It indicates that a particular conduct may constitute several crimes. This 
statement is a lot relevant to sexual crimes which are not only specific crimes under Article 7 
(1) (g), Article 8
2
 (2) (b) (xxii) and Article 8
2
 (2) (e) (vi) ICCSt , but may also fulfill the 
conditions of torture, inhuman treatment or other general crimes, such as willfully causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or health.
33
 War crimes defined in Article 8
2
 (2) (a) 
(i) – (iii) and (v) – (viii) ICCSt must be committed against persons protected under the GC.34 
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In the case of Article 8
2
 (2) (a) (iv) of the Statute, acts or omissions must be committed 
against property regarded as protected under the GC. ‘Protected property’ is not generally 
defined in the GC. Instead, the Conventions contain a description of property that cannot be 
attacked, destroyed or appropriated. In particular the following provisions throughout the GC 
have to be mentioned. Articles 19, 33- 35 GC I; Articles 22, 24, 25, GC II and Articles 18, 
19, 21, 22, 23, 33, 53, 57 GC IV.
35
  
3.1.5 International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
A fundamental requirement for a charge under Articles 8
2
 (2) (A-F) of the Statute,
36
 is the 
existence of an armed conflict be it international or non-international in character. It follows 
then that if the Prosecutor fails to prove the existence of a relevant armed conflict it will be 
impossible to establish charges against the accused.
37
 Relying on jurisprudence from the PTC 
and the ‘ICTY’, an international armed conflict exists ‘whenever there is resort to armed 
conflict between States.’38 Whilst a non-international armed conflict is established when 
States have not resorted to armed force but:  
i) the violence is sustained and has reached a certain degree of intensity, and  
ii) Armed groups with some degree of organisation, including the capability of imposing 
discipline and the ability to plan and carry out sustained military operations. 
Additionally, Article 8
2
 (2) (f) of the Statute stipulates that the conflict must be 
‘protracted’ for these purposes.39 
It is suggested that armed groups with the ability to undertake sustained operations, as 
revealed by their ability to train troops and participate in numerous battles
40
 will fall under a 
non-international armed conflict in character. Although, there might be some evidence of 
assistance provided by some states, applying the overall control tests, as adopted by the ICC 
and ICTY it might fall short of the threshold for direct intervention.
41
 Neither the presence of 
multi-national forces nor the direct intervention by state military force is sufficient to 
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constitute an armed conflict of international character, as the part played by these forces may 
not result in two states opposing one another.
42
  
During the Lubanga trial, in determining whether the relevant conflict was international 
between September 2002 and 2 June 2003 and non-international between 2 June 2003 and 13 
August 2003, the PTC confirmed the charges against the accused on the basis of Articles 8
2
 
(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8
2
 (2)(e)(vii) of the Statute, although the Prosecutor had only charged the 
accused with the conscription and enlistment of children under the age of fifteen years to 
have participated actively in hostilities, within the context of a non-international armed 
conflict under Article 8
2
 (2) (e) (vii) of the Statute.  
Although, there is no definition of armed conflict in the Statute or in the EOC document,
43
 
the introduction to the EOC sets out that: The elements for war crimes under Article 8
2
 
paragraph 2, of the Statute shall be interpreted within the established framework of the 
international law of armed conflicts
44
 as with the Rome Statute,
45
 neither the Geneva 
Conventions nor their Additional Protocols (I &II) explicitly defined ‘armed conflict.46 The 
definition of this concept has been considered by other international tribunals and the 
Chamber has derived assistance from the jurisprudence of the ICTY
47
 which defines it as:  
‘An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted violence between governmental 
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within 
a State’. IHL applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and 
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion 
of peace is reached or in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful 
settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian 
law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or 
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in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control 
of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place.
48
  
International armed conflicts relate ‘to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognised by one of them.’49 
The notion of ‘armed conflict’ has, from 1949, replaced the traditional notion of ‘war.’50 
According to the Commentary of the first Geneva Convention,’51 the substitution of ‘armed 
conflict’ for ‘war’ is deliberate. One may argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of 
‘war’. A State can always pretend, when it commits a hostile act against another State, that it 
is not making war, but merely engaging in a police action, or acting in legitimate self-
defence.
52
 The expression ‘armed conflict’ makes such arguments less easy. Any difference 
arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed 
conflict even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.’ The ICTY confirmed 
in Tadic that ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States.’53 This definition has since been used by other international bodies.54 These provisions 
also apply ‘to cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a high contracting party, 
even if the said occupation meets with no resistance.’55 Under States responsibility in 
unlawful acts, a conflict between government and rebel forces within a country becomes of 
international character where rebel forces are de facto agents of a third State. Thus, the 
conduct is attributable to the third State.
56
 The EOC require that the alleged criminal conduct 
(war crime) ‘took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict.’57  
Therefore, the law of armed conflicts applies in two situations:  
I) Non-international armed conflicts and  
II) International armed conflicts,  
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Technically, ‘armed conflicts not of international character,’ are conflict which ‘does not 
involve a clash between nations’ the phrase bears its literal meaning58 and determined by 
party rather than by territory.
59
 Article 8
2
 (2) (f) of the Statute, Paragraph 2 (e) applies but 
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that 
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups.
60
 Relying on 
AP II to the Geneva Conventions and the Tadić case, PTC I determined that ‘the involvement 
of armed groups with some degree of organisation and the ability to plan and carry out 
sustained military operations would allow the conflict to be characterised as an armed 
conflict not of international character.’61 
The Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case agrees with this approach and notes that Article 8
2
 
(2) (f) of the Statute only requires the existence of a ‘protracted’ conflict between ‘organised 
armed groups.’ It does not include the requirement in AP II that the armed groups need to 
‘exercise such control over a part of [the] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations.’62 It was therefore, unnecessary for the Prosecution to 
establish that the relevant armed groups exercised control over part of the territory of the 
State.
63
 Furthermore, Article 8
2
 (2) (f) does not incorporate the requirement of an organised 
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armed groups ‘under responsible command’, as set out in Article 1(1) of AP II of the GC.64 
Instead, the ‘organised armed groups’ must have a sufficient degree of organisation in order 
to enable them to carry out protracted armed violence.
65
 
When deciding if a body was an organised armed group (for the purpose of determining 
whether an armed conflict was not of international character), the following non-exhaustive 
list is potentially relevant, the group’s internal hierarchy; the command structure and rules; 
the extent to which military equipment, including firearms, are available; the group’s ability 
to plan military operations and put them into effect; and the extent, seriousness, and intensity 
of any military involvement.
66
 None of these factors are individually determinative. The 
criteria should be applied flexibly when deciding whether a body was an organised armed 
group or not, given the limited requirement in Article 8
2
 (2) (f) of the Statute that the armed 
group be ‘organised.’ 
The intensity of the conflict is also relevant for in determining whether an armed conflict is 
not of international character,
67
 because under Article 8
2
 (2) (f), the violence must be more 
than sporadic or isolated. The ICTY held that the intensity of the conflict should be ‘used 
solely as a way to distinguish an armed conflict from banditry, unorganised and short-lived 
insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to IHL.’68 The ICTY added what 
should be taken into account, ‘the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed 
clashes, their spread over territory and over a period of time, the increase in the number of 
government forces, the mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among both parties to 
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the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) and if so, whether any resolution on the matter has been passed?’69  
Traditionally, non-international armed conflicts ‘civil wars’ were considered purely internal 
matters of States, in which no international law provisions applied.
70
 This became modified 
with the adoption of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (1949), States agreed 
on minimal guarantees to be respected during non-international armed conflicts.
71
 Unlike 
violence between the armed forces of States, not every act of violence within a State 
constitutes an armed conflict. The threshold of violence needed for the IHL to apply for non-
international armed conflict is therefore higher than for international armed conflicts. In spite 
of the extreme importance of defining the lower threshold below which IHL does not apply at 
all, Article 3 does not offer a clear definition of the notion of non-international armed 
conflict.
72
 Accordingly, it was agreed that Protocol II ‘[s]hall apply to all armed conflicts not 
covered by Article 1 of Protocol I and which takes place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident or other organised armed groups under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.’  
It should be noted that this fairly restrictive definition applies only to Protocol II. It does not 
apply to Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.
73
 Practically, there are thus 
situations of non-international armed conflict in which only common Article 3 will apply, 
because the level of organisation of the dissident group is insufficient for Protocol II to apply, 
or the fighting is between non-State armed groups. Conversely, common Article 3 will apply 
to all situations where Protocol II is applicable. Moreover, the ICC Statute provides an 
intermediary threshold of application. It does not require the conflict to be between 
governmental forces and rebel forces alone; that the latter control part of the territory, or that 
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there be a responsible command.
74
 The conflict must, however, be protracted and the armed 
groups must be organised.
75
 
Today, there is a general tendency to reduce the difference between IHL applicable in 
international and non-international armed conflict, due to the Jurisprudence of the 
international criminal tribunals, the influence of human rights and some treaty rules adopted 
by States have moved the law of non-international armed conflicts closer to the law of 
international armed conflicts, it has often been suggested by some to eliminate the difference 
altogether. In many fields where treaty rules still differ, the convergence has been rationalised 
by claiming that under customary international law the differences between the two 
categories of conflict have gradually disappeared. The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) study on customary IHL,
76
 reached the conclusion that 136 (and arguably even 
141) out of 161 rules of customary humanitarian law, many of which are based on rules of 
Protocol I applicable as a treaty to international armed conflicts, apply equally to non-
international armed conflicts.  
At the outset some academics,
77
 practitioners
78
 and the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals
79
 
have questioned the usefulness of the distinction between international and non-international 
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armed conflicts, chiefly in light of their changing nature. The Chamber, for the purposes of 
the Lubanga’s trial reiterated that the international and non-international distinction is not 
only an established part of the international law of armed conflict, but more importantly is 
enshrined in the relevant statutory provisions of the Statute, under Article 21 and must be 
applied. The Chamber does not have the power to reformulate the Court’s statutory 
framework.
80
 The ICTY recognised that, depending on the actors involved, conflicts taking 
place on a territory at the same time may be of a different nature.
81
 The Chamber endorses 
this view and accepts that international and non-international conflicts may coexist.
82
  
The Statute does not define ‘international armed conflict.’83 But relying on Common Article 
2 of the Geneva Conventions, ICRC Commentary thereto, and the ICTY Tadić Appeal 
judgment, the PTC I determined that an armed conflict is international: if it takes place 
between two or more States; this extends to the partial or total occupation of the territory of 
another State, whether or not the said occupation meets with armed resistance. In addition an 
internal armed conflict that breaks out in the territory of a State may become international – 
depending on the circumstances and character – if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict 
through its troops (direct intervention) or if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed 
conflict act on behalf of that other State (indirect intervention).
84
 It is widely accepted that 
when a State enters into conflict with a non-governmental armed group located in the 
territory of a neighbouring State and the armed group is acting under the control of its own 
State, ‘the fighting falls within the definition of an international armed conflict between the 
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two States.’85 However, if the armed group is not acting on behalf of a government, in the 
absence of two States opposing each other, there is no international armed conflict.
86
  
The PTC II in the Lubanga case, on this issue, concluded that ‘an international armed conflict 
exists in case of armed hostilities between States through their respective armed forces or 
other actors acting on behalf of the State.’87 As regards the degree of control of another State 
over armed group acting on its behalf, the Trial Chamber concluded that the ‘overall control’ 
test is the right approach. This will determine whether an armed conflict not of international 
character may have become internationalised due to the involvement of armed forces acting 
on behalf of another State. A State may exercise the required degree of control when it ‘has a 
role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in 
addition to financing, training, equipping and or providing operational support to that 
group.’88 The PTC I adopted this approach.89 Moreover, footnote 34 of the EOC stipulates 
that the term ‘international armed conflict’ includes a ‘military occupation,’ for all the crimes 
coming within Article 8
2
 (2) (a) of the Statute. PTC I held that a ‘territory is considered to be 
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the 
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be 
exercised.’90 
                                                          
85
 Sylvain Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual 
situations’, (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 70, 90; Prosecutor v Tadić Judgment paras 84, 90, 
131,137,145; Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010)154,155; 
Jelena Pejić, ‘Status of Armed Conflicts’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed) Perspectives on the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007) 92, 93. 
86
 Jean Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary – Volume I Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (2002) 32; Any 
difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within 
the meaning of Article 2 …; Sylvain Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal 
concepts and actual situations’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross pages 70 ; Jelena Pejić, ‘Status 
of Armed Conflicts’, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed) Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007) 92, 93.  
87
 ICC-01/05-01/08-424, para 223. 
88
 Prosecutor v Tadić Appeal Judgment para 137 (emphasis in the original); ‘Control by a State over 
subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall character (and must comprise 
more than the mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment or training); ibid, para 137 
Prosecutor v Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95- 14/1-A Judgment (24 March 2000);  Prosecutor v Delalić et al., Case 
No IT-96-21A, Appeals Judgment, (20 February 2001) para 26; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez, Case No IT-
95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgment (17 December 2004) paras 306 – 307. 
89
 ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para 211. 
90
 ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, para 212, relying on ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) Judgement of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005 and Articles 
42 and 43 of Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on land, 18 October 1907. Article 42 reads: ‘Territory is considered 
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the 
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.’ Article 43 reads: ‘The authority of the 
legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his 
74 
 
The Chamber notes the reference in Article 8
2
 (2) (b) to ‘the established framework of 
international law’ and applies equally to the crimes set out in the Article.91 The crime of 
‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed 
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities’ as set out in Article 82 (2) (b) (xxvi) 
of the Statute falls within ‘the established framework of international law’ as one of the 
‘serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.’ The 
prohibition is based on Article 77(2) of AP I to the GC.
92
 This Protocol applies to armed 
conflicts between States, as indicated by Common Article 2 of the GC.
93
 It follows that for 
the purposes of Article 8
2
 (2) (b) (xxvi) of the Statute, ‘international armed conflict’ includes 
a military occupation.  
In accordance with the test set out, to determine whether the Union of Congolese Patriots/ 
Forces Patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (UPC/FPLC) was a party to an international 
armed conflict in Ituri, the relevant inquiry is whether between September 2002 and 13 
August 2003, the UPC/FPLC, the Armée Patriotic Congolaise (APC) and the Forces de 
Resistance Patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI) were used as agents or ‘proxies’ for fighting between 
two or more States (namely Uganda, Rwanda, or the DRC) for these reasons and applying 
regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, the Chamber changes the legal characterisation 
of the facts to the extent that the armed conflict relevant to the charges are non-international 
in character.
94
 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the armed conflict between the 
UPC/FPLC and other armed groups between September 2002 and 13 August 2003 are non-
international in nature.
95
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Although, according to the traditional doctrine, the notion of international armed conflict was 
limited to armed contests between States. However, during the Diplomatic Conference of 
1974-1977, which lead to the adoption of the two Additional Protocols of 1977, this 
conception was challenged and it was finally recognised that ‘wars of national liberation’96 
should also be considered as international armed conflicts. 
3.1.6 Other Situations, the Civilian Population and Combatants 
Situations of internal violence and tension which do not meet the threshold of non-
international armed conflicts, do not warrant the application of IHL as established in Article 
1(2) of AP II, which states: ‘This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.’97 The non-applicability of IHL does not 
necessarily mean lesser protection for the persons concerned. In such cases, human rights 
rules (better administered by the Court of human rights)
98
 and peacetime domestic (criminal) 
law would apply; they are more restrictive, for instance, regarding the use of force and 
detention of enemies, while IHL gives States greater latitude on these two aspects. 
In the conduct of hostilities, Article 50(1) of Protocol I
99
 defines civilians as: 1) A civilian is 
any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A 
(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of 
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 2) The 
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civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 3) The presence within the 
civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not 
deprive the population of its civilian character.
100
 If they have fallen into enemy hands, 
Article 4 of Convention IV defines as protected civilians all those who fulfil the nationality 
requirements and are not protected by Convention III. This would mean that any enemy who 
is not protected by Convention III falls under Convention IV. 
Combatants are members of armed forces. The main feature of their status in international 
armed conflicts is that they have the right to directly participate in hostilities. If they fall into 
enemy hands, they become prisoners of war who may not be punished for having directly 
participated in hostilities. It is often considered that customary law allows a detaining power 
to deny its own nationals prisoner-of-war status, even if they fall into its hands as members of 
enemy armed forces, such persons may be punished under domestic law for their 
participation in hostilities against their country. 
The prohibition against attacking civilians stems from a fundamental principle of IHL, the 
principle of distinction, which obliges warring parties to distinguish at all times between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly to direct their operations only against military objectives.
101
 In its advisory 
opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) described 
the principle of distinction, along with the principle of protection of the civilian population, 
as ‘the cardinal principle contained in the texts constituting the fabric of Humanitarian Law’ 
and stated that ‘states must never make civilians the object of an attack.’102 
The Crimes defined in Article 8
2
 (2) (c) ICCSt cover serious violations of Article 3 Common 
to the four Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. It must be noted in accordance with the 
principle of distinction and protection of the civilian population, only military objectives may 
be lawfully attacked. A widely accepted definition of military objectives is given by Article 
52 (2) (3) of Additional Protocol 1 as: ‘those objects which by their nature, location, purpose 
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
                                                          
100
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101
 Protocol 1 (n 99) Article 48 of additional Protocol 1; this Article enunciates the principle of distinction as a 
basic rule. 
102
 ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of the Threat or use of nuclear Weapons, ICJ report 1996 para 78. 
77 
 
capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.
103
 In the case of doubt, it shall be presumed not to be used.
104
 
The Galic judgment - and to a certain extent, the Shimoda case – explored one of the most 
important facets of the contemporary law of armed conflict: the need to distinguish between 
combatants (who may be targeted, as long as the weapons used are not meant to cause 
unnecessary suffering and destruction) and persons who are not or who no longer actively 
participating in hostilities should be spared and never to be targeted. Attacks on legitimate 
target are to limit incidental (collateral) damage and keep suffering to a minimum, 
disproportionate damage and unnecessary sufferings are unlawful.
105
 
3.1.7 Conscription, Enlistment and Use of Children as a War Crime 
During the Lubanga trials, the jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
106
 
had been considered by the Trial Chamber. Although, decisions of other international courts 
and tribunals are not part of the directly applicable law under Article 21 of the Statute,
107
 but 
the wording of the provision criminalising the conscription, enlistment and use of children 
under the age of 15 within the SCSL Statute
 108
 is identical to Article 8
2
 (e) (vii) of the Rome 
Statute. Therefore, the SCSL’s case law assisted in interpreting relevant provisions of the 
Rome Statute.
109
 Article 4(3) (c) of AP II to the 1949 GC includes an absolute prohibition 
against the recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 in hostilities (in the context of 
armed conflicts not of international character)
110
 children who have not attained the age of 
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fifteen shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in 
hostilities.
111
 
Additionally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
112
 a widely ratified human rights 
treaty, requires State Parties to ‘take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years do not take part directly in hostilities,’ and to ‘refrain 
from recruiting persons under that age into armed forces’ for all types of armed conflicts.113 
The provisions recognise that ‘children are particularly vulnerable and require privileged 
treatment in comparison with the rest of the civilian population.’114 Other objectives 
underlying these prohibitions are securing their physical and psychological well-being, this 
includes not only protection from violence, fatal and non-fatal injuries during fighting, but 
also, serious trauma that can accompany recruitment including separating children from their 
families, interrupting/disrupting their education and exposing them to an environment of 
violence and fear.
115 The SCSL opined that where a child under 15 is allowed to voluntarily 
join an armed force or group, his or her consent is not a valid defence.
116
 Additionally, the 
SCSL’s Trial Chamber in the case of Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa ‘CDF case’117 
concluded that: 
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‘The distinction between voluntary enlistment and forced enlistment is somewhat contrived. 
Attributing voluntary enlistment in the armed forces to a child under the age of 15 years, 
particularly in a conflict setting where human rights abuses are rife, is of questionable merit.’ 
Therefore, the PTC underscores that the offence of conscripting and enlisting is committed at 
the moment a child under age 15 is enrolled into or joins an armed force or group, with or 
without compulsion. In the circumstance, conscription and enlistment are dealt with together, 
notwithstanding the Chamber’s earlier conclusion that they constitute separate offences. 
These offences are continuous in nature;
118
 they end only when the child reaches 15 years of 
age or leaves the force or group.
119
 The EOC
120
 require that ‘the conduct took place in the 
context of and was associated with an armed conflict.’ The travaux préparatoires of the 
Statute suggests that although direct participation is not necessary, a link with combat is 
nonetheless required.
121
  The Preparatory Committee’s draft Statute had postulated a broader 
interpretation in one of the footnotes:  
The words ‘using’ and ‘participate’ have been adopted in order to cover both direct and 
active participation in military activities linked to combat such as scouting, spying, sabotage 
and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints.
122
 It would not cover 
activities clearly unrelated to the hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase or their use 
as domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation. However, use of children in a direct 
support function such as acting as bearers to take supplies to the front line, or activities at the 
front line itself, would be included within the terminology.
123 
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It is noted that Article 4(3) (c) of AP II does not include the word ‘direct.’124 Addressing the 
three relevant acts, namely conscripting, enlisting and participating actively (children under 
the age of 15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities), in each instance the conduct 
is not defined in the Statute,
125
 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE)
126
 or in the EOC.  
3.1.8 The Democratic Republic of Congo War Crime Trials 
After the determination of admissibility by the ICC, Thomas Dyilo Lubanga was transferred 
to ICC custody in March 2006. The ICC Prosecutor charged Lubanga with three counts of 
war crimes for the recruitment and use of child soldiers.
127
 The trial commenced on 18 
November 2008, against him as the founder of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) rebel 
forces in Congo’s eastern Ituri district. Lubanga pleaded not guilty, his defence team 
maintains that he is being used as a scapegoat for other more senior militant leaders.
128
 The 
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had been referred to the ICC by the 
DRC itself in 2004 after Lubanga had been charged in the domestic justice system.
129
 The 
referral was with regard to all possible crimes committed during the second Congo war and 
afterwards the ratione temporis was limited due to the entry into force of the Rome Statute 
with regard to Congo on 1 July 2002. During this conflict, Lubanga was a military 
commander in the Mouvement de Libération and later the founder of the Union of Congolese 
Patriots (UPC). The UPC was involved in large-scale murder, torture, rape of civilians and 
forced conscription of child soldiers.  
After murdering nine members of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, Lubanga and 
other militia leaders were captured by Congolese authorities; after the ICC issued a warrant 
of arrest, their transfer was effected to the ICC, charged with war crimes of enlisting and 
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conscripting children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in hostilities a crime 
under the Statute.
130
 
The PTC 1 granted status of participants to victims in the case,
131
 the first time in 
international criminal law, for victims to participate in criminal proceedings before an 
international court (though common within the civil law system). The charges were 
confirmed by the PTC in early 2007. However, the Trial Chamber later imposed a stay of 
proceedings because the Prosecutor could not disclose a large number of documents due to 
‘source’ confidentiality containing potentially exculpatory information relevant to the 
preparation of the defence, making a fair trial impossible.
132
 The Trial Chamber ordered the 
release of Mr. Lubanga due to the impossibility to guarantee a fair trial.
133
 The Prosecutor 
appealed these two decisions, which led to the Appeals Chamber upholding the decision to 
stay proceedings and that Lubanga nonetheless would stay in custody pending a new 
determination. On 18 November 2008 the Trial Chamber lifted the stay of proceedings 
because the reasons for the suspension had ‘fallen away.’ The Trial Chamber I of the ICC 
later convicted Thomas Lubanga Dyilo on 14 March 2012, for conscripting, enlisting and 
using child soldiers,
134
 a war crime under the Statute,
135
 for a non-international armed conflict 
in the Ituri region of north eastern DRC between September 2002 and August 2003.
136
 
The Lubanga judgment, the first of its kind by the Court, brings to a close six years of 
proceedings on the Thomas Lubanga case since February 2006. Though the trial was 
suspended twice for due process,
137
 first before the trial began, when the prosecutor failed to 
disclose information to the defence counsel (due to source confidentiality), and second, when 
the prosecutor refused to disclose the identity of an intermediary, the ICC judges thus 
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reversed the procedural approach of other international tribunals by prohibiting witness 
proofing,
138
 a move which may have contributed to the first witness in the case to initially 
seek to retract his testimony on the stand.
139
  
A maximum sentence according to Article 77(1) (a) of the Rome Statute cannot be more than 
thirty years (life sentences are possible on extreme gravity of the crime and individual 
circumstances of the convicted person)
140
 this, the Prosecutor had prayed for, but in 10 July 
2012, Thomas Lubanga was handed a 14-year jail sentence by the ICC over the use of child 
soldiers. The six years already spent in custody (from 16 March 2006) is deducted from the 
sentence, noted by the presiding Judge Adrian Fulford. The 30-year prison sentence 
recommended by the Prosecutor for Mr Lubanga was rejected by the Judges who stated that 
such a sentence ‘would be inappropriate in the case’ as it can only be justified by extreme 
gravity of crimes and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. However, the 
Trial Chamber unanimously convicted Thomas Lubanga and found that ‘conscription’ and 
‘enlistment’ are forms of recruitment that refer to ‘coercive’ or ‘voluntary’ incorporation, 
respectively, into an armed group,
141
 distinguishing it from the offense of using children to 
participate actively in hostilities.
142
 It therefore concluded that consent of the child did not 
constitute a valid defence.
143
 With respect to children who may have indirect roles in a 
conflict, the Chamber ruled that it is necessary to determine if ‘the support provided by the 
child to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target.’144 The 
majority found that it could not consider whether sexual violence would be incorporated 
within this definition since the Prosecutor did not plead these facts; however, the majority 
indicated it could consider whether this should be considered in sentencing and 
reparations.
145
 Presiding Judge Fulford issued a separate opinion and Judge Odio Benito 
wrote a separate and dissenting opinion. Judge Odio Benito stated that sexual violence could 
be considered ‘using’ children in armed conflict.146 Additionally, she found that the reference 
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to ‘National armed forces’ under Article 82 (2) (b) (xxvi) of the Rome Statute should not be 
construed narrowly to exclude militia groups.
147
  
Thomas Lubanga was charged with committing the crimes through coordination with other 
senior leaders within the UPC, particularly others in charge of military operations.
148
 The 
Trial Chamber found that co-perpetration involves two objective elements, namely: (I) the 
existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons embodying a 
sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary course, would result in the commission of a 
crime; and (ii) essential contribution to the common plan by the accused that resulted in the 
commission of the relevant crime.
149
 The majority also found that co-perpetration was based 
upon the theory of collective control over the crime.
150
 Judge Fulford’s separate opinion 
disputed that there was no basis for this theory under the Rome Statute, and he rejected the 
argument that there was a hierarchy of liability within the Rome Statute.
151
 Instead, he 
preferred elements that complied better with a plain reading of the Rome Statute.
152
 
Regarding the mental element, the Chamber found it necessary to prove that (I) the accused 
and at least one other perpetrator meant to conscript, enlist or use children under the age of 
fifteen to participate actively in hostilities or that they were aware that in implementing their 
common plan this consequence ‘will occur in the ordinary course of events;’ and (ii) the 
accused was aware that he provided an essential contribution to the implementation of the 
common plan.
153
  
The Trial Chamber concluded that a non-international armed conflict took place in the DRC 
at the time of the charges and relying on Regulation 55,
154
 the Chamber amended the legal 
characterisation of the charges, which the PTC initially found pertain to armed conflict of 
international
 
character.
155
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3.1.9 Reparations   
Trial Chamber I of the ICC in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case, established the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations on 7 August 2012. The decision is to be notified in 
accordance with regulation 31
156
 of the Regulations of the Court to the office of the 
Prosecutor and others.
157
 On 14 March 2012, the Chamber issued its judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute.
158
 On the same day it issued a scheduling order establishing the 
timetable for sentencing and reparations.
159
 Reparation is not new to the Congolese, because 
the principle exists in Congolese criminal law. Article 258 of the Congolese civil code 
provides ‘that any act whatsoever of a man that causes damage to another obliges him who 
bears responsibility for the damage to repair it.’160   
Judges Adrian Fulford, Elisabeth Odio Benito, and René Blattmann stated the importance of 
reparations in international criminal law that reparations go ‘beyond the notion of punitive 
justice, towards a solution which is more inclusive, encourages participation and recognises 
the need to provide effective remedies for victims.’ Reparations are specifically mentioned in 
Article 75 of the Rome Statute, which lists restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation as 
forms of reparations. The judges also noted that reparations with symbolic, preventative, or 
transformative value may be appropriate. The Registry submits that although Article 75(1) of 
the Statute does not give victims a right to reparations, the Chamber is entitled to establish 
this general principle, and the Registry invites the Chamber to take this step.
161
 In this 
context, it is argued that the Chamber is able to rely on the existing principles and rules of 
international law, including those relating to the international law of armed conflict, and it is 
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material, physical, or immaterial; 2) The fault; 3) The causal link between the damage suffered and the fault 
committed. Also, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Military Judiciary Code (2002) provides: Article 77: 
Action for reparation of damage caused by an offence falling under the competence of the military jurisdiction 
can be undertaken by the injured party by becoming a civil party at the same time and before the same judge as 
the public prosecution action. Article 226: When the military jurisdiction is seized, the party injured by the 
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submitted that the Court can derive assistance from the national laws of various legal systems 
of the world, in accordance with Articles 21(b) and (c) of the Statute.
162
 
Rule 97(1) of the RPE states: ‘the Court may award reparations on an individualised basis or, 
where it deems it appropriate, on a collective basis or both,’ and the judges emphasised that 
the Court adopts a collective approach which ensures reparations reach those victims who are 
currently unidentified. It was held that individual and collective reparations are not mutually 
exclusive and may be awarded concurrently. Lubanga may not be prevented from 
participating in symbolic reparations, such as tendering public apologies, since the Court has 
declared him penniless. The Court stated that reparations for victims will primarily be 
handled by the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV)
163
 and reporting to a different Trial chamber of 
the ICC.
164
 The TFV created by the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC,
165
 has a mandate 
to implement Court-ordered reparations and provide physical and psycho-social support to 
victims of crimes within the Rome Statute. Its funds are usually through contributions from 
states and private donors. Furthermore, the Chamber recommended that an interdisciplinary 
team of experts be retained to provide assistance to the Court
166
 in five areas: (1) assessing 
the harm suffered by victims; (2) looking at the effect that the crime of using children in 
armed conflict had on their families and communities; (3) identifying the most appropriate 
types of reparations; (4) establishing those individuals or communities that should receive 
reparations; and (5) accessing funds for reparations purposes. 
3.1.10 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this segment has examined war crimes in totality, as currently considered 
under international criminal law and the International Criminal Court. The chapter 
investigates the concept of conduct of war under international humanitarian law, customary 
law, the Geneva Convections and its Additional Protocols. Further examinations include the 
conviction for war crimes by the ICC of the ‘DRC’ War lord. It also considered relevant 
jurisprudence of some ad hoc tribunals that have helped formulate to date laws regulating 
prohibitions and conduct during war. The next segment analyses crimes against humanity 
under the International Criminal Court.  
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Part Two 
Crimes Against Humanity 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
This part of the chapter examines crimes against humanity (CAH) under customary 
international and treaty law within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
(Articles 5 and 7) of the Rome Statute (the Statute).
167
 The roles of the ICC in prosecution 
and prevention of the crime as predicted in its normative framework.
168
 Critical analysis in 
respect of the ICC’s capacity to prevent and prosecute perpetrators of the Crime, drawing 
upon the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Diplomatic Conference and interpreting the 
Statute in light of its object and purpose. CAH as intended by the framers of the Statute is a 
response to widespread or systematic human rights violations against civilian populations.
169
 
Understanding the theoretical basis and application of the elements of CAH has been 
rendered difficult by the absence of a consistent definition and uniform interpretation of the 
crime.
170
 The scope of CAH is also difficult to determine precisely at any given point because 
of the absence of a specialised convention on the crime.
171
  
The theory of CAH under the Statute seeks to respect States sovereignty and also faithful to 
the purpose for which the Court was created to prevent and punish unimaginable atrocities 
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity. The ICC is a permanent court with capacity to 
intervene in on-going conflict situations or prior to the outbreak of war in some cases as 
compared to the ad hoc tribunals, such as the intervention in the Libyan situation before the 
atrocities mature completely. This chapter further examines the complexity of CAH and the 
provisions in the Statute that only CAH of the highest threshold will be dealt with and 
concludes that the Statute does not cover CAH under customary law.   
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3.2.2  Crimes Against Humanity (Crimen Contra Omnes) Under Customary Law 
The customary definition of CAH can be found in charters and laws used for prosecution of 
the Crime. After World War II, in 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
(UNGAR) 177 (11) of 21 November 1947 authorised the International Law Commission 
(ILC) to document the (seven) Nuremberg Principles which have become customary 
international law principles.
172
 Article 6 (c) of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
Charter,
173
 the International Military Tribunal for the far East (IMTF/Tokyo Charter)
174
 and 
the Control Council Law 10
175
  all have similar definitions of CAH which states that:  
‘CAH...murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population...Or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds...Whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of 
the country where perpetrated.’176  
Meaning, under customary international law, CAH does not require a state or organisational 
(Krstic) policy,
177
 the customary law concept of CAH is broader than the concept under ICC 
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jurisdiction.
178
 It is also unnecessary that perpetrators of the Crime must be of a particular 
status, such as state actors, belligerent, or member of an organisation. There is no requirement 
that an inhumane act must be widespread or systematic or be part of some widespread or 
systematic conduct, cause great or serious injury, or be in furtherance of some state or 
organisational policy. Hence, attacks on civilians can constitute CAH under customary 
international law.
179
 
In 1993 the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) issued a report with respect to the 
Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
180
 enumerating additional 
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International Crimes, (2008) 98 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 953-974  (a State plan or policy as an 
element of a crime against humanity would have many advantages in terms of coherence and judicial policy.) 
Moreover, human rights are violated when crimes against humanity are committed and it is informing that 
human rights violations can occur at the hands of private perpetrators, with or without any plan or policy and 
regardless of the fact that violations are not widespread or systematic. Jordan J Paust, ‘The Other Side of Right: 
Private Duties under Human Rights Law’ (1992) 5 Harvard Human rights Journal 51; (stating the many crimes 
against humanity and other international crimes committed by private actors) from a human rights perspective. 
178
 Paust Jordan, ‘The International Criminal Court Does Not Have Complete Jurisdiction over Customary CAH 
and War Crimes’ (2010) 43 John Marshall Law Review University of Houston Law Centre. 
179
 ibid. 
180
 SC res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993) (ICTYSt). 
89 
 
limiting elements not in any traditional international legal instruments.
181
 The Secretary 
General’s (SG) report did not adopt the approach regarding ‘inhumane’ acts found in the 
customary definitions but used a new limitation set forth in the phrase ‘of a very serious 
nature.’ Though, the ICTY Statute did not adopt the SG’s definition, instead, it used the 
phrase ‘the following crimes . . . directed against any civilian population’ then lists several 
types of acts that constitute such crimes, including ‘murder’ and ‘inhumane acts.’182 It does 
not contain any limitation that would require either a widespread or systematic act. Moreover, 
as in the case of customary CAH, no plan or policy (Prosecutor v Krsti’c) is required
183
  and the 
acts against civilians need not be engaged in ‘on national, political, ethnical, racial or 
religious grounds.’184 Despite the definition in the ICTY’s Statute, the ICTY proffered 
startling new limitations seen as judicial activism or attempts at judicial legislation,
185
 such 
as, the opinion that acts against civilians must be ‘organised and systematic’ despite the fact 
that these two limiting words do not appear in the Statute of the ICTY or in any of the 
traditional international legal instruments.
186
 
3.2.3 Codification of Crimes Against Humanity In The Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute codified CAH bearing that no post-Nuremberg multilateral treaty defined 
the Crime,
187
 unlike genocide
188
 and war crimes.
189
 Though, skirmishes and inconsistent 
elaborations of the Crime exist in various texts adopted by the Security Council (SC),
190
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States and the International Law Commission (ILC).
191
 In 1996 the Preparatory Committee 
report that took up the ILC’s 1994 Draft Statute for the ICC, expressed the view that the 
definition of CAH could await completion of work on the draft Code of Crimes.
192
 The 
framers of the Rome Statute not only codified the jurisdictional and procedural rules for the 
Court, but also sought to define the crime as well.
193
 During the negotiation process in 1998 
and prior, little precedent existed emerging from the ad hoc tribunals since they decided on 
few cases and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) had not been established.
194
 Thus 
the pull of relevant knowledge and experience necessary to shape the ICC’s approach to cases 
and develop as an outgrowth and or of contribution to customary international law became 
unavailable to the framers.  
Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTR
195
 and the ICTY about 
the importance of prosecuting sex and gender crimes,
196
 coupled with decisions from the 
Tadić case197 and the trial (not the decision) in Akayesu,198 led States to propose changes and 
amendments to the definition of CAH as against that of the Tribunal Statutes.
199
 The 
possibility also that the Rome Statute could be relevant to non-State Parties and their 
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Nationals through referral of a situation by the SC, made it significant that the Rome Statute 
represents a codification of customary international law, uniformly applicable.
200
 The 
chapeau elements contained armed conflict nexus found in the ICTY Statute following the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. Discriminatory intent requirement present in the ICTR and 
later in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
201
 Statute became 
discarded.
202  
The Statute employs the rubric ‘widespread or systematic’ (as opposed to ‘and systematic’), 
which follows the provisions of the SCSL,
203
 ECCC
204
 and ICTR Statute.
205
 Other Acts 
added include provisions on crimes of sexual violence as in SCSL and ICTR but that they 
must be of ‘comparable gravity’ to the other crimes involving sexual violence set forth in 
Article 7(1) (g) which expands considerably the ambit of persecution in Article 7(1) (h) 
beyond the narrow grounds of ethnic, racial, religious, political and national found in the 
ICTR and the ECCC Statute,
206
 it also includes enforced disappearance of persons and the 
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Crime of apartheid as new specific acts constituting CAH. The framers rejected appeals from 
some governments to add economic and environmental crimes, preferring the list to include 
only crimes already found in other international instruments, or clearly understood to be 
predicate acts of CAH under customary international law.
207 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute contains four separate preconditions that must be satisfied 
before jurisdiction attaches in a particular case in which CAH are charged. The Elements of 
Crimes,
208
 adopted after the Rome Statute pursuant to Article 9 of the ICC Statute, refer to 
these as ‘contextual’ elements.209 (1) the commission of the crime as part of a ‘widespread or 
systematic attack;’210 (2) against a civilian population;211 (3) with knowledge of the attack;212 
(4) and involving ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple commissions of acts against any 
civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or Organisational policy to commit 
such attack.’213 
3.2.4 The Policy Element Challenge 
The addition of a ‘policy’ requirement, which many commentators  and jurisprudence of the 
Court suggest systematicity is required even if crimes are ‘widespread’,214 as well as the 
‘multiple acts’ element, the ‘attack’ element, and various limiting provisos in the Statute’s 
elements of crimes suggest that at least some State Parties during negotiations successfully 
limit the potential scope of application of CAH by cumulating elements that had been found 
in earlier instruments or writings of scholars on the question,
215
 particularly true of the 
‘planning’ or ‘policy’ element, which had appeared as only one of many possible criteria to 
be used to distinguish CAH from ‘ordinary crimes.’ During the meetings of the ICC 
preparatory committee in 1996,
216
 policy element was not included in the Zutphen 
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Intercessional Draft of 1998,
217
 nor was it included in the penultimate draft Statute adopted 
by the Preparatory Committee in April of 1998 that was sent to the Diplomatic Conference in 
Rome,
218
 but appeared in the Bureau Discussion Paper released on July 6, 1998, in the final 
weeks of the Diplomatic Conference.
219
 According to participants in the negotiations, 
proponents argued that the existence of a policy . . . unites otherwise unrelated inhumane 
acts, so that in the aggregate they collectively form an ‘attack’. 220  
Additionally, the policy element was conceived as a flexible test, of a lower threshold than 
the term ‘systematic,’ which was understood as a much more rigorous test.221 It was added to 
break a deadlock between members of the likeminded group who preferred the rubric 
widespread or systematic, and states wishing to use the formula ‘widespread and 
systematic’.222 A commentary on the Statute notes: ‘the anxiety had been to exclude isolated 
and random acts and ordinary crimes under national law, from the scope of CAH.’223 At the 
same time, the addition of the policy element was controversial, attracting ‘sustained 
criticism from non-governmental organisations’224 although not novel, it was not well-
understood to be an element of CAH in customary international law. The French Courts had 
required evidence of a ‘common plan’ in their jurisprudence on CAH interpreting Article 6(c) 
of the Nuremberg Charter
225
 and some have suggested the same for certain decisions 
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rendered under Control Council Law No 10.
226
 However, no ad hoc tribunal statute included 
a similar element, the ICTY/ICTR had rejected it,
227
 and the French position is questionable 
as a matter of textual interpretation.
228
 Most observers conclude its addition in the Rome 
Statute was to ensure that isolated, uncoordinated and haphazard acts of individuals are 
excluded.
229
 
3.2.5 The Challenge of the Term ‘Organisation’ 
The term ‘Organisational’ in Article 7(2) (a) ICCSt, although, not defined in the Statute, but 
the intention is to address actions taken by non-state entities in  cases involving States 
disintegration such as the former Yugoslavia, this include attacks on civilians by well 
organised hierarchical non-state actors. While, Cherif Bassiouni insists that ‘the policy’ must 
be one generated by a State, some observers and participants at the Rome Conference 
disagree, and claim that the policy need not be one of a State. It can be an organisational 
policy from non-state actors or private individuals, who exercise de facto power behind the 
policy, the provision in the Article reflects the contemporary position on this issue.
230
  On this 
matter the researcher tends to favour the approach of the school of thought of Cherif 
Bassiouni et al.
231
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Additional jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR is available to the Preparatory 
Commission during the Rome Conference although it is unclear how much those 
jurisprudence influenced the drafters, particularly the contextual or ‘chapeau’ elements which 
emerged as some of the controversial elements of the Preparatory Commission’s work.232  
The elements supply subsidiary means of interpretation to the Court as regards the 
interpretation and application of Article 7
233
 and other relevant Articles of the Statute. The 
application of Article 7 by the ICC and a reliance on Article 22 strict rules of construction to 
keep the ICC faithful to the text of the Statute. Yet neither the Statute nor the EOC offer 
much assistance in the interpretation of Article 7, for there is no definition of ‘civilian 
population’ ‘widespread; ‘systematic’ attacks, or ‘organisation’ and virtually no guidance as 
to the meaning of ‘policy to commit an attack.’ Thus, the job of definition, interpretation and 
application of Article 7 falls by default to ICC Prosecutor in the first instance, and the Court’s 
judiciary upon review.  
The ICTY and ICTR dealt with the aftermath of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan crises, whilst 
the ICC pursuant to Article 7 of the Rome Statute has more specific definition that goes 
beyond that of the ICTY and ICTR.
234
 Given the overlap between contents of CAH in the 
Rome Statute and that of the earlier Statutes (ICTY/ICTR) the decisions of the latter will 
plausibly be compelling on the decisions of the ICC.
235
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The elimination of the connection of CAH with armed conflict in the Rome Statute reflects 
the current state of international law,
236
 which rejects the need for such a nexus. Although, 
the ICTY Statute does require a link with armed conflict, this requirement has often been 
interpreted in decisions emerging from the ICTY as a restriction on ICTY's jurisdiction rather 
than a restriction in the definition of CAH. Although, in Tadic´ the ICTY held that, at 
customary law, CAH could be committed ‘on behalf of entities exercising de facto control 
over a particular territory but without international recognition or formal status of a ‘de jure’ 
state or by a terrorist group or organisation.’237 
However, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, who chaired the drafting committee at the Rome 
Conference, disagrees that Article 7 ICCSt enlarges the concept of CAH so as to cover non-
state actors. In his three-volume work, The Legislative History of the International Criminal 
Court,
238
 he argues: Article 7 does not bring a new development to CAH, namely, its 
applicability to non-state actors. If that were the case, the mafia, for example, could be 
charged with such crimes before the ICC, and that is clearly neither the letter nor the spirit of 
Article 7 of the Statute. A question had arisen after 9/11 as to whether a group such as al-
Qaeda, which operates on a worldwide basis and capable of inflicting significant harm in 
more than one state, falls within this category... such a group does not qualify for inclusion 
within the meaning of CAH as defined in Article 7 ICCSt, and for that matter, under any 
definition of that crime up to Article 6(c) of the IMT, notwithstanding the international 
dangers that it poses . . . The text of Article 7(2) clearly refers to State policy, and the words 
‘organisational policy’ do not refer to the policy of an organisation, but the policy of a state. 
It does not refer to non-state actors.
239
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The most authoritative statement against Professor Bassiouni’s position is that of the Appeals 
Chamber of ICTY, buried in a footnote
240
 in its judgment in Kunarac.
241
 The Appeals 
Chamber was addressing the issue from the standpoint of customary international law, by 
which its provisions are deemed to be consistent with custom.
242
 The Appeals Chamber said 
that practice ‘overwhelmingly supports the contention that no such requirement exists under 
customary international law,’243 and cited a number of authorities in support,244 such as: 
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, the Nuremberg judgment, national cases from 
Australia, Israel, Canada and the Secretary General’s report on the draft Statute of the 
Tribunal, various materials of the ILC, without detailed explanation and unclear how and 
why these references buttress the Appeals Chamber’s position.245  
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber did not mention the text of Article 7(2) of the Statute what 
influence it may have on the determination of customary international law, echoing earlier 
pronouncements of the ILC, the Appeals Chamber set the low-end threshold of CAH as being 
more than merely ‘isolated or random acts.’246 The case law of the ICTY makes it impossible 
to exclude serial killers and acts of organised crime syndicates from the ambit of CAH. Thus, 
judges at the ICC will have plenty of encouragement from the ad hoc tribunals should they 
wish to stretch the ambit of CAH.
247
 But they will have to reckon with the plain words of the 
Statute,
248
 which indicate a more restrictive view, should they attempt to do so.
249
 The gravity 
threshold on admissibility is another factor that may restrain judicial attempts to expand CAH 
beyond recognition. The perpetrators of CAH must have ‘knowledge of the attack’. 
Although, the mental element, which is in addition to the general knowledge and intent to 
commit the underlying crime, is less demanding than the ‘specific intent’ required for 
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genocide.
250
 The ‘contextual elements’ for CAH, connects specific act with the broader 
context of the particular crimes, according to Maria Kelt and Herman von Hebel.
251
 
Policy issue raises some difficulties about the demarcation line between CAH and ‘ordinary’ 
crimes and consequently, the role and scope of international criminal law. Could 
organisations such as political parties, terrorist or similar others orchestrate CAH under 
Article 7 ICCSt such as in Kenya?
252
 Four theories relate to the ‘policy element.’ 
(1) That there should be no policy element advanced by Guénaël Mettraux and Jordan J 
Paust et al and adopted in tribunal (ICTY) jurisprudence.
253
   
(2) That there must be a State policy advanced by Cherif Bassiouni’s, William Schabas et 
al.
254
 
(3) The theory requiring ‘state-like’ organisations and  
(4) The broader theories encompassing organisations with ‘any capacity’ to direct CAH by 
Laila W Sadat et al.   
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The last two theories are those reflected in the Pre-Trial Chamber decisions of the ICC.
255
 
However, advocates of theory 3 (state-like) and theory 4 (any capacity) seem to agree that 
CAH do not and should not include random crime waves, that a policy element is necessary 
to sustain the coherence of  CAH, and that CAH may be initiated or endorsed by non-state 
organisations.  The question therefore is: what standard is required to constitute an 
organisation? The debate spreads across the academia and judiciary as to the necessity of 
incorporating policy requirement in the chapeau of CAH in the Statute and of what scope is 
such a requirement? Whilst some scholars qualify the policy requirement as a necessary 
element on the one hand on the other hand others see it as relevant up to establishing other 
elements such as the widespread or systemic attack.
256
 In the jurisprudence of  the ICTY
257
 
and the ICC, the former held that: the existence of a policy underlying the crimes committed 
is not an autonomous element of CAH, but may be a relevant evidence in establishing the 
systemic character of an attack against the civilian population, whilst the later in Article 7(2) 
(a)
258
 clearly incorporates a state or organisational policy as an autonomous element of the 
crime, though the use of policy as an element of crime does not inevitably breed a different 
CAH concept than the recognition of the policy as a relevant evidence to establish the other 
elements.
259
 
It is generally agreed that isolated, individual and randomly committed acts of violence are 
excluded from the scope of CAH within the ICC jurisdiction.
260
 The Tadic judgment  
excluded isolated and random acts of individuals from the concept; restricts it to crimes 
committed in the context of only widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population and implies that there must be some form of  governmental or organisational 
policy to commit these acts. However, recognising ‘policy’ in subsequent jurisprudence as a 
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necessary and implicit requirement of this concept became increasingly questionable 
resulting in the rejection of the approach at the Kunarac Appeals Chamber judgment, which 
held that: ... Neither the attack nor the acts of the accused needs to be supported by any form 
of ‘policy’ or ‘plan’ there was nothing in the Statute or in customary international law at the 
time of the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit 
these crimes. (…) proof that an attack was directed against a civilian population and that it 
was widespread or systematic, are legal elements of the crime to prove, it is not necessary to 
show the result of the existence of a plan or policy.
261
 Thus the existence of a plan or policy 
may be evidentially relevant, but it is not a legal element of the crime.
262
 That ‘policy’ is a 
relevant factor is affirmed in the Krstic judgment.
263
 The policy element thus ascertains a 
certain level of organisation in the case of a mere widespread attack and assures that random 
acts committed pursuant to an individual plan cannot qualify as CAH.
264
 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber I has interpreted the policy element as being synonymous with the systematic 
attack-requirement,
265
 thereby effectively replacing the alternative widespread or systematic 
attack requirement with a cumulative widespread and systematic attack requirement.  
Though, Pre-Trial Chamber II held that the formal nature of a group and its level of 
organisation should not be the defining criterion. Instead, a distinction should be drawn on 
whether a group has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values.
266
 
On the other hand the policy element is expressly recognised in the Statute as an element of 
CAH; hence ICC must give effect to the element. The judiciary must justify their decisions 
based on reasons
267
 and the reasoning must be rule based
268
 particularly under international 
criminal law as laid out in Statutes and or judicial decisions.
269
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The ‘State-like’ Theory: - The approach by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul (late) in his dissent 
(Kenya’s post election investigation authorisation) has much to commend, there is a tendency 
for Judges to take the ‘easier’ route of adopting expansive and popular approaches without 
sufficient rigorous analysis.  Judge Kaul’s reasoning in purposefully resisting such temptation 
and adhering to a principled analysis and methodology, including his inquiry into drafter’s 
intent and assessment of the purpose of the policy element.  While agreeing with this 
methodology, the doubt that these considerations may not have compelled quite so stringent a 
standard is unresolved.
270
 Scholarly literature including articles by Cherif M Bassiouni, Claus 
Kress and William Schabas advance some meticulously-reasoned and compelling arguments 
as to the justification for the policy element and in support of a comparatively demanding 
requirement of a ‘state-like’ organisation.  Significant considerations include the need: (1) to 
focus on crimes that affect peace, security and well-being, (2) to focus on crimes less likely to 
be addressed and prosecuted by states (whether because the state is behind the crimes or 
because they are committed by a powerful group that the state cannot stop), (3) to focus on 
harms by entities who have a ‘responsibility to protect’; and (4) to ensure an appropriate 
jurisdictional/resource allocation so that the ICC focuses on the worst cases, each of the 
arguments seems plausible and sustainable. Scholarly attention to date favours the dissent 
approach the ‘majority approach’ also offers a plausible and sustainable account, which 
warrants greater reflection, to explain why the more flexible majority approach is sound.  
Waves of crimes where individuals act on their own initiatives and are unconnected would 
not constitute CAH. But under customary international law could we say the same to be true? 
An aggregate of crimes by individuals acting on their own initiative do not amount to an 
‘attack’. Logically, accepted proposition are (A) an ‘attack’ cannot be the random acts of 
individuals acting on their own initiative. (B) The acts must be directed, instigated, actively 
or passively encouraged by some source other than the individuals.
271
 Thus, the policy 
element is the proposition agreed upon and expressed not in the negative but as a positive 
requirement. The policy element provides the thread of connection between otherwise 
disparate acts, so that they may be described collectively as an attack directed against a 
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civilian population. CAH focus on the collective character of the perpetrators; thus require 
state or organisational policy according to David Luban in the ‘Theory of crime against 
humanity’.272 
Additionally, Article VI of IMT defines the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court.
273
 In 
three distinct paragraphs, it listed the core offenses, namely crimes against peace, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.
274
 An important element is often overlooked; Article VI begins 
with a preambular paragraph stating that the offenders must have been ‘acting in the interests 
of the European axis countries.’275 This is a gloss on the statement that ‘crimes against 
international law are committed by men,’ to the extent that the ‘men’ must be acting in the 
interest of a State. Critical perusal of the Nuremberg judgment issued in 1946 makes it clear 
that the central nature of the prosecution was to the policy of the Nazi state.
276
 In practice, 
however, there has been few if any before the international tribunals involving 
entrepreneurial villains who have exploited a situation of conflict in order to advance their 
own perverse personal agendas. Essentially, all prosecutions have involved offenders acting 
on behalf of a State and in accordance with a State policy, or those acting on behalf of an 
organisation that was State-like in attempts to exercise control over territory and seize 
political power, such as the Republika Srpska.
277
  
Additionally, in 2005 an expert commission of inquiry mandated by the UNSC to investigate 
whether Genocide was being committed in Darfur answered the question ‘whether or not acts 
of Genocide have occurred?
278
 Not by examining the acts of individual offenders, but by 
concluding ‘that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.’279 Besides, 
with the growing focus on ‘gravity’ as a test to distinguish cases that deserve the attention of 
                                                          
272
 David Luban, ‘A Theory of Crimes against Humanity’ 29 (2004) Yale Journal of International Law 85-167. 
273
 82 UNTS 279 (1945) Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, the Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal Article 6(Nuremberg 
Charter). 
274
 ibid. 
275
 ibid. 
276
 William A Schabas, ‘State Policy As An Element Of International Crimes’ (2008) 98 The Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology.  
277
 A de facto independent country and after 1995 became one of the two political entities that compose Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
278
 SC Res 1564, 12, UN Doc S/RES/1564 (Sept 18, 2004). 
279
 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights in Darfur para 518, UN DOC S/2005/60 (25 Jan 2005); a contrary opinion is Ademola Abass, 
‘Proving State Responsibility for Genocide: The ICJ in Bosnia v Serbia and the International Commission of 
Inquiry for Darfur’ Fordham International Law Journal (2007) 31.  
103 
 
international tribunals, a State policy requirement may prove useful.
280
 Crime waves of 
unconnected individuals or from numerous spontaneous groups are ‘normal’ crimes, and 
should not engage international jurisdiction.
281
 Consequently, where a minor organisation 
commits crimes on a small scale (non-widespread) then the mere fact of being meticulously 
planned does not convert those crimes (heists, assassinations) into CAH; they are still 
common crimes. 
3.2.6  Gender Crime a Crime Against Humanity 
‘Forced pregnancy’ as a crime became problematic to accept when the Statute was being 
drafted, some believed it might be construed as creating an obligation upon States to provide 
women who had been forcibly impregnated with access to abortion.
282
 A definition of the 
term was finally agreed to mean: ‘the unlawful confinement of a woman; forcibly made 
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out 
other grave violations of international law.’ The definition shall not in any way affect 
national laws relating to pregnancy.
283
 
The definition reassures States that the Statute would not conflict with their anti-abortion 
laws;
284
 also making it possible to prosecute sexual violence as an act of torture. In Kunarac, 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that sexual violence gives rise to severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, adding that it was not necessary to provide visual 
evidence of suffering by the victims, as this could be assumed.
285
 Rape is not defined in the 
Statute but left to the judges to determine however a few months after the adoption of the 
Statute, the ad hoc tribunals had developed two different definitions of the crime of rape. The 
first proposed by the Rwanda Tribunal in Akayesu, noted that ‘the central elements of the 
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Crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts.’286 It 
defined the crime as: ‘a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive’287 The definition was broad enough to encompass forced 
penetration by the tongue of the victim’s mouth, which most legal systems would not 
stigmatise as rape, but prosecuted as a form of sexual assault. But the trial Chamber of the 
ICTY had a mechanical and technical definition of rape to be ‘sexual penetration, however 
slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other 
object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator’.288 
The Elements of Crime lean towards the second of these approaches, but with some slight 
divergences: ‘The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a 
sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 
of the body.’ Many legal systems consider that only a woman may be a victim of rape.289 The 
EOC provides a signal that men may also be victims of the crime in a footnote indicating that 
‘[t]he concept of ‘invasion’ is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral.290 
3.2.7 Persecution and Some other Crimes Against Humanity 
Persecution is a criminal act under Article 7 (1) (h) ICCSt. ‘Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectively on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, and 
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds recognised as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.’ The list of groups is considerably larger than any previous 
definition. However, the words ‘in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’ narrow its scope considerably. This is a 
departure from previous definitions and reflects recent judicial interpretations which require 
acts of persecutions to be ‘of the same gravity or severity as the other enumerated crimes’ in 
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the provision on CAH.
291
 A Trial Chamber of the ICTY said, ‘although the Statute of the ICC 
may be indicative of the opinio juris of many States, Article 7(1) (h) is not in consonant with 
customary international law’, and rejected in particular the requirement that persecution be 
connected with a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or another act of CAH as too 
narrow,
292
 by comparison with earlier interpretations of CAH, the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY described the provision as ‘expansive’ in Blasˇkic.293 The Elements of Crime explain 
that, in the act of persecution, the perpetrator ‘severely deprived, (contrary to international 
law), one or more persons of fundamental rights’.294 A judgment of the ICTY holds that the 
CAH of persecution ‘derives its unique character from the requirement of a specific 
discriminatory Intent.’295 The case law has defined persecution as an act or omission that 
discriminates, denies or infringes on a fundamental right laid down in international customary 
or treaty law.
296
  
The Rome Statute leaves open opportunity for further development in the final paragraph of 
the list of CAH, dealing with ‘other inhumane acts’. In the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, 
concerns have been expressed that ‘this category lacks precision and is too general to provide 
a safe yardstick for the work of the Tribunal, hence, contrary to the principle of the 
‘specificity’ of criminal law’.297 According to Professor Kai Ambos, the provision is ‘a 
classic example of punishment by analogy in contradiction to the lex stricta requirement 
under Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute.’298 The ICTY suggested that the legal parameters of 
‘other inhumane acts’ could be found in a set of basic rights appertaining to human beings 
drawn from the norms of international human rights law. It views ‘other inhumane acts’ as a 
residual category, providing CAH with the flexibility to cover serious violations of human 
rights that are not specifically enumerated in the other paragraphs of the definition, on the 
condition that they are of comparable gravity. The examples given by the Tribunal of 
inhumane acts not specifically listed in the definition of CAH in the Statute of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal are the forcible transfer of groups of civilians, enforced prostitution and enforced 
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disappearance of persons.
299
 In the Akayesu decision, the ICTR used ‘other inhumane acts’ to 
encompass such behaviour as forced nakedness of Tutsi women.
300
 The ICTY concluded that 
the compulsory bussing of thousands of women, children and elderly persons from Potocari, 
in the Srebrenica enclave, consisted of ‘inhumane act’.301 The bussed victims being unaware 
of their destination, struck and abused by Serb soldiers as they boarded the buses, 
overcrowded, unbearably hot and stoned as they travelled, after disembarking, the victims 
had to march several kilometres.
302
 
Under the Rome Statute, the concept of ‘other inhumane acts’ may actually be narrowed by 
the addition of the words ‘of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’. It is open to question whether the acts 
of sexual indignity condemned by the ICTR would now fit within the restrictive language of 
the Rome Statute. The provision was criticised by a Trial Chamber of the ICTY for failing ‘to 
provide an indication, even indirectly, of the legal standards which would allow identification 
of the prohibited inhumane acts.
303
 Article 7
304
 concludes with two further paragraphs that 
define some of the difficult terms of paragraph 1. Accordingly, the term ‘attack’ is defined, as 
well as ‘extermination’, ‘enslavement’, ‘deportation or forcible transfer of population. 
Torture, forced pregnancy, persecution, the crime of apartheid and ‘enforced disappearances 
of persons’, some of these definitions reflect customary law, but some go further. They are 
also influenced by and have themselves influenced the case law of the ad hoc tribunals. 
Article 7(2) (b) describes the CAH of ‘extermination’ as ‘the intentional infliction of 
conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to 
bring about the destruction of part of a population’, noting that previous judgments had not 
defined the term, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY adopted the definition proposed in the Rome 
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Statute. It held that insertion of this provision means ‘that the crime of extermination may be 
applied to acts committed with the intention of bringing about the death of a large number of 
victims either directly, such as by killing the victim with a firearm, or indirectly, by creating 
conditions provoking the victim’s death’. The Trial Chamber also referred to the EOC, which 
states that ‘the perpetrator should have killed one or more persons’ and that the conduct 
should have been committed ‘as part of a mass killing of members of a civilian 
population.’305 
Torture is defined in Article 7(2) (e) as ‘the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; 
except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions’. There is nothing to suggest that the perpetrator must be in 
some official capacity, or that the torture must be conducted for a prohibited purpose. 
Nonetheless, Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
306
 includes, in its definition of torture, the requirement 
that it be inflicted ‘for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or suspected of 
having committed, intimidating, coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by, at the instigation of, 
with the consent, acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity’. The ad hoc tribunals have regularly described the definition in the Convention 
against Torture as a reflection of customary international law.
307
 However, decisions in 
Kunarac et al take the view, consistent with the text of the Rome Statute, that customary 
international law does not require that torture be committed by a person acting in an official 
capacity.
308
 The ICTY specifically referred to the Rome Statute (Miroslav Kvocka et al) as 
evidence that customary law does not impose an official capacity criterion as part of the 
crime of torture.
309
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3.2.8 Conclusion 
This part of the chapter examined CAH principally from the Nuremberg trials to the Rome 
Statute, noting that the ICTY went beyond the Nuremberg precedents by declaring that ‘CAH 
could be committed in peace time.’ Hence, the nexus with violence is seen as ‘obsolescent’ as 
‘there is no logical or legal basis for the requirement’ anymore, hence the requirement of a 
nexus with violence set out in Article 5 ICTYSt has been described as ‘purely jurisdictional’. 
The section also considered the debate on ‘policy’ as an element of CAH, the varying views 
and authorities, including the opposing views on the meaning of ‘state like’ or ‘organisation’ 
and the implication of its interpretation as an element of crime against humanity. Above all, it 
is obvious that the reach of ICC’s jurisdiction over customary CAH is limited in several 
ways. It is therefore suggested that states seeking to enact legislations to adequately reach the 
breadth of CAH should not enact legislation that simply copies Article 7 of the Statute.
310
   
Enacting legislations that can reach all customary CAH can be important for a state that 
prefers to have an option to prosecute accused persons while fulfilling its duty under 
customary international law ‘aut dedere aut judicare’. 311 Consequently, if states ever adopt a 
general or regional multilateral treaty on CAH as such, definitional elements should be 
broader than those currently found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute in other not to be 
limiting.
312
 The constitutive instrument should be broader than the definitional elements of 
CAH as is in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
313
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Part 3 
The Crime of Genocide 
‘… an attack upon human diversity, that is, upon a characteristic of the “human status” without which the very 
words 'mankind' or 'humanity' would be devoid of meaning.’314 
David Luban 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This part of the chapter will examine the concept of Genocide defined in Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute (the Statute),
315
  in conjunction with the 1948 Genocide Convention (GC).
316
 
The background to the Crime of Genocide (a crime against humanity), the development of 
the law on genocide and the present state of international criminal jurisdiction encompassing 
relevant contributions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the ICTY
317
, the ICTR
318
 
and numerous domestic courts on Genocide will further be examined. Genocide is a crime 
under customary international law, the legal analysis of its specific intent requirements 
(Dolus Specialis) will be highlighted with decided cases and reports. The main purpose of the 
chapter therefore is to fully analyse and understand the theory of genocide in order to 
appreciate its relevant prosecutorial challenges under the Statute, the chapter concludes by 
establishing that although genocide is a crime against humanity, it is of the highest threshold 
requirement of intent to establish its liability under international criminal law. 
3.3.2 The Concept of Genocide  
The definition of Genocide in the Genocide Convention has been incorporated into the Rome 
Statute, ICTYSt, ICTRSt and other court’s instruments established by or with the support of 
the UN.
319
 The Genocide Convention defines genocide in Article 2 as:   
‘... any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such’: 
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 (a) Killing members of the group;  
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
The acts must be committed with specific intent (an additional mens rea) to destroy in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such. The ICTR in Akayesu
320
 found 
that the systematic rape of Tutsi women in Taba province constituted the Genocidal act of 
‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the targeted group.’ 
Additionally, the crime of genocide within the 1948 Convention includes: conspiracy to 
commit genocide, direct public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, 
and complicity in genocide.
321
 Although, earlier drafts of the convention listed political 
groups amongst those covered by the intent requirement, but this category did not make it to 
the final list. Some governments feared they would be vulnerable to the charge of genocide if 
deliberate destruction of political groups fell within the crime’s compass.322 Excluded also 
was the concept of cultural genocide destroying a group through forcible assimilation into the 
dominant culture. The drafting history makes clear that the 1948 convention was meant to 
cover physical destruction of a people; the sole echo of efforts to include the notion of 
cultural extermination in the convention refers to forcibly transferring children of a targeted 
group to another group.
323
 
3.3.3  Responsibility for Genocide under the Rome Statute 
Genocide has two phases: the first being the destruction of the national pattern of the 
oppressed group (which the overall objective would be the disintegration of the political and 
social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
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existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health and 
dignity of the individuals belonging to such groups) the other being the elimination of the 
lives of the individuals/key individuals belonging to such groups. The imposition may be 
made upon the remaining oppressed population or upon the territory alone after removal of 
the population and colonisation of the area by the oppressor’s nationals.324 The legal 
foundation was laid during the Nuremberg trials, although, the Nuremberg charter did not use 
the term Genocide in its definition of CAH, but the term was used in indicting major war 
criminals at Nuremberg, accused of having conducted deliberate and systematic 
extermination of national groups within the civilian population of certain occupied territories 
in order to destroy in particular, a class of people. The Prosecutors invoked the term in their 
closing arguments and appeared in the judgments of several US military tribunals at 
Nuremberg.
325
 
Building on the intellectual and legal foundation laid by the IMT in the Streicher decision,
326
 
Article 3 (c) of the GC declares that ‘direct and public incitement (communication, 
broadcasts, publications, drawings, images, or speeches) to commit genocide’ is a crime.327 
The ‘public’ nature distinguishes it from an act of private incitement (punishable under the 
Genocide Convention as ‘complicity in genocide’)328 incitement must be ‘direct,’ the listener 
should understand the speech to be a call to action.
329
 Moreover, public incitement to 
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genocide can be prosecuted even if Genocide is never (inchoate crime) perpetrated.
330
 Proof 
of result is not necessary for the crime to have been committed, but has potentials to spur 
genocidal violence. The intent of the speaker matters, not the effectiveness of the speech in 
causing criminal action making the law preventative rather than reactive.
331
 
The ICTR regards it ‘the crime of crimes’;332 it became the first crime adopted in the Statute 
with virtually no controversy.
333
 Article 6 of the Statute defines Genocide;
334
 the provision is 
essentially a copy of Article 2 of the GC, often criticised for being excessively restrictive and 
difficult to apply to many cases of atrocities, but has stood the test of time, for the Rome 
Conference to maintain a fifty year old text evinces’ that Article 6 of the Statute codifies a 
customary international norm.
335
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3.3.4 Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part (Dolus Specialis) 
Dolus specialis or ‘special intent’,336 distinguishes Genocide from other crimes defined in the 
Rome Statute
337
 the act of killing or other acts defined in Article 6
338
 must be committed with 
specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as 
such. The perpetrator’s intent must be ‘to destroy’ the group. During the debates surrounding 
the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the forms of destruction were grouped into three 
categories: physical, biological and cultural. Cultural genocide was the most difficult of the 
three, because it could well be interpreted in such a way as to include the suppression of 
national languages and similar measures. The drafters of the Convention considered such 
matters to be left to human rights and voted to exclude cultural genocide from the scope of 
the definition.
339
  
But contemporary interpretation of genocide should not be limited by the intent of the 
drafters back in 1948.
340
 The words ‘to destroy’ can readily bear the concept of cultural as 
well as physical and biological genocide, and bold judges might be tempted to adopt such 
progressive construction.
341
 The decisions of the ICTY in Krstic´ 
342
 suggest that the law may 
be evolving in this direction.
343
 Other judgments (Radoslv Brdanin) adopt a more restrictive 
interpretation.
344
 Though, evidence of ‘cultural genocide’ has proven to be an important 
indicator of the intent (Karadzic and Mladic) to perpetrate physical genocide.
345 The definition 
of genocide contains no formal requirement that the acts must be committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack, or part of an organised plan to destroy the group.
346
 
Although, the Jelisic´case
347
 upheld the theory of a lone genocidal maniac,
348
 in the same 
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case, the Appeals Chamber confirmed that ‘the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal 
ingredient of the crime. However, in the context of proving specific intent, the existence of a 
plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases.
349
  
The Darfur Commission of inquiry in 2004
350
 concluded that genocide was not being 
committed in Sudan essentially because it failed to find evidence of a State plan or policy.
351
 
The Elements of crimes
352
 require that an act of genocide ‘took place in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the group or conduct that could itself 
effect such destruction.’353 The words ‘in whole or in part’, indicate a quantitative dimension. 
The quantity contemplated must be significant.
354
 Intent to kill only a few members of a 
group cannot be said to be genocidal. The prevailing view is that, where only part of a group 
is destroyed, it must be a ‘substantial’ (Jelisic´) part.355 The reference to quantity is in the 
description of the mental element of the crime, what is important is not the actual number of 
victims but rather that the perpetrator intended to destroy a large number of members of the 
group. The number of victims becoming significant is the proof of such a genocidal intent. 
The greater the number of victims, the more logical the intent is to destroy the group ‘in 
whole or in part’. Another interpretation is that genocide is deemed committed if a 
‘significant part’ of the group is destroyed. This significant part may be persons of ‘special 
significance’ to the group (Sikirica et al) such as the leadership of the group.356 Although, the 
ICTY extended the approach to cover men (Krstic´) of military age,
357
 ‘in part’ could also 
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mean that the crime may be committed in a very small geographic area against a group 
defined by its borders, such as the Muslim population of the town of Srebrenica, attacked by 
Bosnian Serb forces in 1995.
358 
The destruction must be directed at one of the four groups listed in the definition: national, 
ethnical, racial or religious. The classification is often criticised because of its limited scope. 
Attempts to include political and social groups within the definition became rejected the 
second time after 1948 during the drafting of the Rome Statute.
359
 The dissatisfaction with 
the narrowness of terms did reflect in the first conviction for genocide by the ICTR
360
 it 
stated that the drafters of the Genocide Convention meant for the definition to apply to all 
‘permanent and stable’ groups, a questionable interpretation because it goes beyond the text 
of the Statute.
361
 The ‘stable and permanent’ approach to the definition of genocide was not 
followed by other Trial Chambers of the ICTR  (Kayishema)
362
 which also found no echo in 
the case law of the ICTY,
363
 the common meaning of such concepts as ‘racial groups’ also 
has changed considerably since 1948.
364
  
Taken as a whole, the four terms correspond closely to what human rights law refers to as 
ethnic or national minorities,
365
 the real difficulty with attempting to find precise definition of 
the terms is its reliance on an objective conception of the protected groups. Almost without 
exception, the international tribunals have opted for a subjective approach, by which the 
groups are defined according to the attitudes of those who persecute them rather than 
pursuant to some scientifically verifiable list of parameters,
366
 again using the Darfur 
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genocide. 
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Commission example and concluding that the persecuted tribes of Western Sudan were 
subsumed within the scope of the Crime of genocide to the extent that victims and 
persecutors ‘perceive each other and themselves as constituting distinct groups’.367 This 
essentially subjective view towards the identification of groups contemplated by the 
definition of genocide has gained increasing acceptance in the case law (Semanza) of 
international tribunals.
368
 The victims persecuted, were not only because the Janjaweed 
militias saw them as a ‘permanent and stable group’, but rather because they considered them 
to be a ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. Once the subjective approach, which 
relies essentially on the perpetrator’s perception of the victim group, is adopted, no need to 
enlarge, by interpretation, the accepted definition of the crime of genocide.
369
 
Defining the crime of Genocide ends with the words ‘as such’, according to the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTR, the words ‘as such’ are ‘an important element of genocide’, included 
in the 1948 convention to reconcile the divergent views as to whether or not motive should be 
an element of the crime: The term ‘as such’ has the effet utile of drawing a clear distinction 
between mass murder and crimes in which the perpetrator targets a specific group because of 
its nationality, race, ethnicity or religion.
370
 The term ‘as such’ clarifies the specific intent 
requirement. It does not prohibit a conviction for genocide in a case in which the perpetrator 
was also driven by other motives, legally irrelevant in the context.
371
 
The definition of the mental element (mens rea) of Genocide, found in the provision, is 
followed by five paragraphs listing the punishable acts of genocide, an exhaustive list and 
cannot properly be extended to other acts of persecution
372
 directed against ethnic minorities. 
Atrocities known as ‘ethnic cleansing’373 will for this reason be prosecuted as CAH rather 
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than as genocide,
374
 killing is the core of the definition, the most important of the five acts of 
genocide. The ad hoc tribunals held that killing is synonymous with murder or intentional 
homicide.
375
 (Although the Elements of Crimes say the term ‘killing’ is ‘interchangeable’ 
with ‘causing death’, which seems to leave room for unintentional homicide). 
The second act of genocide, causing serious bodily or mental harm, refers to acts of major 
violence falling short of homicide. In the Akayesu decision,
376
 the ICTR gave rape as an 
example of such act and that such conduct may include ‘acts of torture, rape, sexual violence 
or inhuman or degrading treatment’.377 The third act of genocide, imposing conditions of life 
calculated to destroy the group, applies to cases like the ‘forced marches’ of the Armenian 
minority in Turkey in 1915, but none of the acts defined in Article 6 ICCSt is genocidal if not 
accompanied by the specific intent. In cases where the intent falls short of the definition, 
prosecution may prevail (Jelesic) for CAH or war crimes.
378
 Specific intent to destroy is 
inherent to genocide, distinguishing it from CAH.
379
 However, genocidal acts could be 
treated as CAH.
380
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
term, and no specific crime goes by that name, the practice cover a host of criminal offenses. The United 
Nations Commission of Experts in a 1993 report to the Security Council defined ‘ethnic cleansing’ as ‘rendering 
an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.’ 
ethnic cleansing was carried out in the former Yugoslavia by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest, 
detention, extrajudicial executions, rape, sexual assault, confinement of the civilian population, deliberate 
military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of properties. 
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3.3.5 Responsibility, Intent and Joint Criminal Enterprise 
Liability for genocide could be established under the extended form of joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE) within Article 25(3) (a) ICCSt, laid down in the legal characterisation 
offered by Brdanin responsibility
381
 that a crime not part of the common purpose arises if the 
commission of the crime is foreseeable and the accused willingly took the risk to commit the 
Crime. In Brdanin, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY stated that a participant in this 
extended form of JCE could be guilty of genocide even without having the specific intent to 
destroy a protected group.
382
 Judge Shahabuddeen dissenting in Brdanin is of the opinion that 
‘specific intent has always ever been present.383 William Schabas also adds a voice by 
pointing out that the physical perpetrator could be ignorant of the genocidal plan whilst the 
guiding mind behind the physical perpetrator is the individual likely to possess such specific 
intent required.
384
 Evidence must show an accused, guilty of genocide pursuant to Articles 
25, 27, 28 and 30 of the ICC Statute. Article 25 refers to ‘Individual criminal responsibility.’ 
The specific intent requirement for genocide would be difficult to prove for a lower level 
perpetrator, who many times would not be wholly conscious of the big picture in relation to 
the events immediately occurring.
385
  
Cherif Bassiouni also pointed out that the crime of genocide articulated in Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute focuses on those who plan, initiate, and carry out the genocidal policies,
386
 for 
instance the actus reus for persecution in the ICTY Statute does not require a link to crimes 
enumerated in the Statute, but on the other hand, its definition may encompass crimes not 
listed in the Statute because of its broad concept. However, there must be undoubtedly 
defined limits on the extension of persecution type of crimes stated in Kupreskic.
387
 The mens 
rea for persecution is higher than other types of crimes within the ambit of CAH, but lower 
than that for genocide. Persecution ‘derives its unique character from the requirement of a 
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specific discriminatory intent’388 and in various cases,389 it was emphasised that 
discriminatory intent can be shown in different forms of denial or infringement on a 
fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law.
390
 The distinction 
between genocide and persecution lies in mens rea that is, the perpetrator ‘of Genocide must 
intend to destroy all or part of a protected group, while the perpetrator of Persecution need 
not have such intent, though persecution can be seen in many other forms of inhuman and 
discriminatory intent other than intent to destroy.
391
 
A perpetrator can be an individual acting in private capacity
392
 provided his acts find support 
from a general state policy, but if state officials commit this offence acting in a private 
capacity, there must be some sort of explicit or implicit approval or endorsement of the State 
authorities or at least his offence must fit clearly within such a policy,
393
 similar to genocide, 
the jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals clarified that CAH can be committed by state authorities 
and their agents, as well as by non-state entities.
394
  
3.3.6 The Auto-Genocide Principle 
Where majority of victims share same ethnic (Khmer Rouge) identity, scholars have invoked 
the concept of auto-genocide, arguing that it is possible to satisfy the 1948 Convention’s 
definition even where perpetrators sought to kill a substantial portion of their own 
ethnic/national group, others admit that if majority of victims got killed for reasons that may 
be broadly termed political, but form certain minority groups, such as the Muslims and 
Khmer Buddhists, being specifically targeted for destruction, the argument would be that the 
crimes against these groups remain genocidal.
395
 The Jurisdiction of the Court established in 
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2006 to prosecute senior surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, a joint enterprise of the United 
Nations and the Government of Cambodia
396
 includes genocide.
397
 The lack of precedents 
enforcing the Genocide Convention left experts able to do little more than speculate 
knowledgeably about whether well-known candidates for ‘Genocide’ met the legal definition. 
In recent times, international tribunals and national courts are increasingly clarifying 
definitional ambiguities and serving notices that those responsible for genocide may face 
justice. If States meet their obligations to convict for genocide, they have then begun to meet 
their duties to prevent it or stop it in its deadly tracks.
398
 
3.3.7 Obligation to Cooperate Under the Genocide Convention 
At what point does the obligation under GC kick in? Professor Schabas argues that no 
obligation to cooperate arises under the GC unless it is established that genocide has in fact 
occurred. Where there is in fact no genocide, parties to the Convention do not have the 
obligations that the Convention imposes to cooperate with relevant international criminal 
tribunals and in particular no obligation to arrest. 
However, Article VI of the Convention
399
 states: ‘persons charged with genocide’ shall be 
tried (by an international tribunal or by the Courts of the territorial state). If this obligation 
does not arise, until it is established that genocide has occurred then how is it to be 
determined whether genocide has occurred? Seemingly, this issue is only determined when 
prosecutions take place for genocide. Professor Schaba’s views may result in a situation 
where a State simply refuses to prosecute for genocide because it has not been established to 
its satisfaction that genocide has indeed occurred, instead, letting the matter to be determined 
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by relevant judicial processes, are there relevant obligations for ICC parties? Arising under 
the Rome Statute or under the UN Charter? This is significant in that Article 103
400
 of the UN 
Charter obligates over other obligations for UN members under any other treaty.
401
 The 
possibility that relevant obligations are UN Charter obligation arises because the Darfur 
situation was referred to the ICC through Security Council Resolution otherwise the situation 
could have been clumsy prosecuting under intervention law.
402
 
3.3.8 Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide  
State Parties to the Rome Statute are under obligation to cooperate with the ICC
403
 in the 
enforcement of arrest warrants. However, two decisions of the African Union (AU) binding 
on its member States require arrest warrants not be enforced.
404
 Thus, African States that are 
members of the AU and State Parties to the Rome Statute are confronted with conflicting 
obligations.
405
 These cannot be resolved by principles of interpretation. The impasse requires 
a political solution.
406
 
The Incitement Provision of the GC took on new importance in the wake of the Genocide in 
Rwanda, between April and July 1994, members of the Hutu majority annihilated the Tutsi 
minority, the ICTR in 1997 indicted three Rwandans for ‘incitement to genocide’: Hassan 
Ngeze who founded, published, and edited Kangura (Wake Others Up!), a Hutu-owned 
tabloid that in the months preceding the Genocide published vitriolic articles dehumanising 
the Tutsis as inyenzi (cockroaches) though never called directly for killing them; and 
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza founders of a radio station called Radio 
Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) that indirectly and directly called for murder, 
providing names and locations of people to be killed. In the days leading to and during the 
massacres, RTLM received help from Radio Rwanda, the government-owned station; 
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programs relayed to villages and towns throughout the Country by a network of transmitters 
operated by Radio Rwanda. At the heart of the Rwanda ‘Media Trial’ in 2000 which centred 
on free speech rights. ‘A key question is what kind of speech is protected and where does the 
limits lie’? Said Stephen Rapp a senior prosecutor for the Tribunal, ‘it is important to draw 
that line, and give the world some guidance.’407 
In December 2003, the ICTR handed down its verdict in Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimanaen et 
al.
408
 the Judges convicted Ngeze, Nahimana, and Barayagwiza for direct and public 
incitement to genocide. The Tribunal held: ‘Without a firearm, machete or any physical 
weapon, you caused the death of thousands of innocent civilians.’409 In framing their verdict, 
the judges noted: ‘This case raises important principles concerning the role of the media, 
which have not been addressed at the level of international criminal justice since 
Nuremberg.
410
 The power of the media to create and destroy fundamental human values 
comes with great responsibility. Those who control the media are accountable for its 
consequences. The prosecutors’ burden involved the interpretation of euphemisms (in order 
to prove the ‘direct’ nature of the incitement), such as the phrase “go to work” as a call to kill 
the Tutsi and the Hutu who opposed the Rwandan regime. That an individual or group killed 
someone in response to the radio broadcasts or newspaper articles was not required, to prove 
the incitement to genocide charge. 
In January 2007 lawyers for the defendants in the Rwanda ‘Media Trial’411 appealed the 
Tribunal’s decisions on numerous grounds, but the Tribunal in November affirmed the charge 
of ‘direct and public incitement to commit genocide’ for Ngeze and Nahimana.412 The Judges 
reversed the finding of guilt against Barayagwiza, ruling that only RTLM broadcasts made 
after 6 April 1994 (when the genocide began), constituted ‘direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide,’ and that Barayagwiza no longer exercised control over the employees of 
the radio station at that time. (The Tribunal did affirm the findings of guilt against 
Barayagwiza on different grounds, for instigating the perpetration of acts of genocide and 
CAH) because of the reversal of some charges against the three defendants, the Judges 
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lowered the defendants’ sentences: Nahimana’s from life to 30 years, Negeze’s from life to 
35 years, and Barayagwiza’s from 35 to 32 years.413 
Does ‘hate speech’ or ‘direct public incitement’ to commit genocide create liability? The 
Rwanda Media case emphasises that incitement to commit genocide requires a calling on the 
audience (be they listeners or readers) to take action of some kind, absent such call, 
inflammatory language may qualify as hate speech but does not constitute incitement.
414
In 
many jurisdictions ‘hate speech’ has been criminalised.415 The Trial judgment in the Bikindi 
case,
416
 Simon Bikindi was a famous composer and singer from Rwanda who distinguished 
himself in the run-up to the 1994 genocide by using his music and fame to drum up support 
for the Hutu-led regime, and by fostering ethnic hatred throughout the carnage. He was 
accused of incitement for composing and performing songs like Nanga Abahutu (I hate these 
Hutu an anti-Tutsi song). According to prosecution witnesses who appeared before the ICTR, 
Bikindi’s song was not only an invitation to hate Tutsi, given the context of the civil war, but 
to be ready to kill them as well. The ICTR Trial Chamber was not in the end persuaded that 
Bikindi’s songs amounted to incitement to commit genocide. Instead, the Judges convicted 
Bikindi for statements that he made (using loudspeakers) in the Rwandan 
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countryside during the Genocide (where he asked his audience, among other things, Have 
you killed the Tutsi here? and referred to Tutsis as ‘snakes’. The Bikindi case illustrates that a 
sophisticated understanding of cultural context (notably linguistic usage and subtlety) is 
critical for the legal determination of the directness of any alleged incitement to genocide. 
In contrast to the Rwanda Tribunal, the International Crime of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide has played virtually no role in the prosecution of genocide at the ICTY the 
prosecution of atrocities other than genocide has pre-dominated the proceedings, most experts 
believe that mass communication in the former Yugoslavia was employed chiefly for 
spewing hate propaganda, rather than incitement to commit genocide as defined in strictly 
legal terms.
417
 The Crime of Incitement remains firmly in place on the international legal 
stage, in 1998 an incitement provision was included in Article 25(3) (e)
418
 in conjunction 
with Article 6 ICCSt on Genocide. In 2008, after seven years of negotiations, the European 
Union (EU) adopted a framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia.
419
 The 
document’s principal contribution is the EU-wide prohibition of public incitement and hatred 
against persons of a different race, colour, religion and national or ethnic origin, punishable 
by a prison sentence of one to three years. The document also prohibits public approval, 
denial, or gross trivialisation of international crimes, notably genocide, and is an outgrowth of 
pre-existing European laws prohibiting Holocaust denial. The Genocide Convention’s Article 
3 (c) has recently been invoked in the spirit of genocide prevention.
420
  
                                                          
417
 William A Schabas, ‘On the Genocide Convention’ a paper delivered to the human right international 
criminal law forum [2011] London. 
418
ICCSt (n 1) Article 25. 
419
 The Council of the European Union, on 28 November 2008 adopted the Framework Decision on combating 
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law 16325/1/08 REV 1 (Presse 
344); Publicly  inciting to violence or hatred, via public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other 
material; publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945, as well as crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, when the conduct 
is carried out in a manner likely to incite violence or hatred against such a group or members of a group. 
420
 On 26 October 2005, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the ‘World without Zionism’ conference in 
Tehran called for the State of Israel to be ‘wiped off the map.’ Ahmadinejad has continued to make public 
speeches either directly or indirectly calling for Israel's destruction; in 2006, Israeli diplomats proposed to 
charge Ahmadinejad with direct and public incitement to genocide before the International Criminal Court. 
Irwin Cotler, the former Canadian Minister of Justice and Member of the Canadian Parliament, has also argued 
that the Iranian president is guilty of state-sanctioned incitement to genocide, incitement that is both “direct and 
public” as defined in the Genocide Convention. Additionally, in June 2007, the US House of Representatives 
passed a resolution calling upon the UNSC to charge Ahmadinejad with violating the Genocide Convention by 
his repeated calls for Israel to be annihilated. Government officials in the United Kingdom and Australia have 
adopted similar stances to that of the Americans, to date, no international legal proceedings for incitement to 
genocide have moved forward against Ahmadinejad. 
125 
 
3.3.9 Conclusion 
This part of the Chapter evaluates genocide as a crime under the Rome Statute, the status of 
the Crime is customary under international law, and defined in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. The section also examines the specific intent requirement to establish liability 
for the crime of genocide and the crime of persecution which can only be committed against 
individuals/group members on the ground of their identifiable properties,
421
 characterised 
either by national, ethnical, racial, or religious identity.
422
 
Genocide as a crime of ‘universal jurisdiction’423 can be prosecuted by courts other than those 
where the offence is committed.
424
 It is also established that the Crime of genocide can be 
committed against any individual, civilian or combatant whilst CAH ‘may only be committed 
against any civilian population.’425 ‘Persecutions embrace actions that may not be prohibited 
by national legal systems. …such actions may take the form of acts other than murder, 
extermination, enslavement, or deportation’, since no specific target group is necessary for 
persecutions to be established, therefore ‘civilians or members of the armed forces may be 
victims of this class of crimes.
426
 While nearly all instances of genocide would constitute 
CAH, not all CAH will meet the legal definition of genocide. Unlike CAH which does not 
have a specific international convention, there is a convention for genocide and also included 
in the Rome Statute.  
The section concludes with the relevance of hate speech and the Media as tools for 
perpetrating or inciting to commit genocide. In the next section the Theory and the Kampala 
definition of the Crimes of Aggression will be examined as specified within the Rome Statute 
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of the International Criminal Court in conjunction with the General Assembly resolution 
GAR 3314 (xxix). 
Part Four 
The Crime of Aggression 
‘Universal peace has been one of the great historical dreams of humankind. Unfortunately, it remains a dream 
whose realisation eludes the desperate needs of man.’ 
Cherif M Bassiouni 
3.4.1 Introduction  
 
This segment examines, the Crime of aggression (aggression) under Articles 5
1
 (d); defined 
in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute (the Statute),
427
 in consonant with relevant provisions of 
the United Nations Charter.
428
 Aggression is a core crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, 
although an unsettled area of law, but the Kampala conference in 2010,
429
 defined and 
adopted ‘Aggression’ into the Statute pending full ratification and enforcement by 1 January 
2017. The lack of sufficient resources and jurisprudence relating to aggression will limit 
analysis in this section for the most part to textbooks, writings/opinions of relevant authorities 
and academic publications. Although, aggression was not to be added as a substantive crime 
under the Statute, at the Rome Conference (RC),
430
 but the German and Japanese delegations 
insisted on the inclusion of the Crime of Aggression in the statute, having been an 
international crime,
431
 ‘crimes against peace’, the term used during the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals.
432
 Prosecution of the crime then, makes it part of customary international 
law, in confirmation, the House of Lords, in R v Jones
433
 held that ‘aggression’ formed part 
of customary international law, therefore, part of a country’s domestic law. Also, the High 
Command case held: ‘that aggression needs both a criminal act and a mental element’434 and 
where there is no aggressive intent, there is no evil inherent in a nation being militarily 
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strong,’435 for instance, Switzerland being heavily armed to protect its neutrality, same 
applies to military build-ups of years, as long as they were undertaken on grounds of self-
defence,
436
 the leadership actions cannot be regarded as criminal.
437
 Having established that 
aggressive action must be committed with criminal intent, it remains to be assessed how it 
can be shown that an individual intended his acts to be of an aggressive nature. 
This section will also examine the procedures and consensus reached at the Kampala 
conference on the amendments of the Statute, the definition and adoption of the Crime of 
Aggression and current state of affairs of the Crime pending its ratification and concludes 
with expectation towards enforcement of the Crime by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). 
3.4.2 Background to the Crime of Aggression   
The doctrine of ‘just war’ (jus ad bellum)438 depicts attempts made by early scholars439 to 
restrict recourse to confrontation; the emergence of the Westphalian system
440
 (a notion of 
State sovereignty and equality) brought the acceptance of the right of States to wage war in 
self-defence.
441
 War, Von Clausewitz proclaimed is the ‘continuation of political activity by 
other means.’442 However, efforts have been undertaken to limit the traditional jus ad bellum, 
with the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907
443
 although, it failed to ban war, due to 
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the outbreak of the First World War (WW1),
444
 it was undisputed that ‘States had an 
unrestricted right to go to war and acquire territories (Uti possidetis)
445
 by right of conquest.’  
Unleashed conflicts, unprecedented destructions, deaths and eroding traditional power 
balance created opportunities to re-evaluate ideas aimed at preserving peace. Consequently, 
the Versailles negotiations a crucial part of the final peace deal established the League of 
Nations. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (LN) provides that: ‘the League 
is to protect the territorial and political integrity of States from aggression’. Although, it 
could not be interpreted as a legal prohibition of aggression since other provisions in the 
Covenant allowed recourse to war in certain circumstances. Meanwhile, the Paris Peace 
Conference endeavoured to deal with those who, in the eyes of the Victors, had initiated the 
war. 
The period between the two world wars saw a number of attempts to outlaw wars and define 
the Concept of Aggression. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact
446
 in its provisions, outlawed war 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Union Forces of the United States in April 24, 1863, during the American Civil War. The Lieber Code was the 
first official comprehensive codified law that set out regulations for behaviour in times of martial law; 
protection of civilians and civilian property and punishment of transgression; deserters, prisoners of war, 
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as an ‘instrument of national policy.’ without a definition of aggression447 neither did it 
contain penal sanctions in this respect.
448
 Two draft treaties prepared under the auspices of 
the League of Nations;
449
 declared aggression an international crime.
450
 Although, the 
Council of the League of Nations later condemned the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the 
Soviet action against Finland as acts of ‘aggression’, but did not base its decisions on Article 
10 of the Covenant
451
 and therefore did not apply any legal notion of aggression.
452
 
Ultimately, the outbreak of the Second World War (WW11)
453
 and the decline of the League 
of Nations rendered obsolete further discussion on defining Aggression.
454
 
But, at the London Conference the Allies decided to include aggression as an international 
crime, Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter
455
 provided for individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes against peace namely, planning, preparation, initiation, waging of a 
war of aggression in violation of international treaties, agreements, assurances, participation 
in a common plan and or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing is a 
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culpable offence.
456
 Additionally, the IMT Charter,
457
 for the first time in international law, 
stated that Heads of States or high officials were not immune from prosecution.
458
 Although, 
defendants during trials argued that they were subjected to ex post facto law which was in 
contradiction of internationally recognised principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
459
 But the 
Tribunal in its judgment rendered on 30 September to 1 October 1946, proclaimed that 
‘crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced,’460 thereby laying the groundwork for what is now an established principle of 
international criminal law - individual criminal responsibility.
461
 
Aggression can be seen in Articles 1(1) and 39 Of the United Nations Charter with no 
amplification of its meaning. The General Assembly (GA) asks the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to formulate the principles emanating from the Nuremberg trials and work 
began in 1950: Principle VI repeats the definition of ‘crimes against peace’ from the 
Nuremberg Charter.
462
 The difficulties in defining ‘aggression’ led to the suspension of work 
of the ILC on the Code of Crimes in 1954. The General Assembly further appointed a fifteen-
member special committee on the definition of Aggression
463
 attempts to agree on a 
definition of aggression generated ‘more aggression than the definition sought.’464 It took 
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three more special committees to deliberate on the definition,
465
 in December 1974 after 
stormy debates
466
 the GA adopted a consensus definition of aggression.
467
 The preamble 
proves, it was meant to be an instrument of guidance for the SC in its determination of 
aggression under Article 39 of the UN Charter.
468
 After listing a number of acts that 
constitute aggression, Article 5(2),
469
 of the GA definition of aggression establishes that a 
‘war of aggression is a crime against international peace’ and distinguishes between ‘Acts of 
aggression’ and the ‘Crime of aggression’. ‘Aggression gives rise to international criminal 
responsibility’, the resolution was aimed at States not individuals470 hence, no mention of 
individual liability; Resolution 3314 (xxix)
471
 had not been intended as an instrument of 
criminal prosecution, though became a starting point in defining the Crime of Aggression.
472
 
At the Rome Conference, due to varying objectives, a precise meaning of the term ‘war of 
aggression’ could not be reach. Some pressed for a precise definition (the United States) that 
could be applied in future, whilst the Soviet Union, wanted something vague.
473
 Over the 
years, different political states agendas shaped the discussions on aggression.
474
 Discussions 
surrounding the definition of aggression to be included in the Rome Statute came to a halt as 
States involved found it difficult to agree on what constitutes acts of aggression.
475
 The 
Bureau of the Rome Conference suggested on 10 July 1998, that if generally acceptable 
provisions and definitions of the Crime of Aggression could not be developed forthwith, 
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aggression would be dropped from the Statute.
476
 This provoked discontent amongst 
delegates and forced the Bureau to reconsider its stand.
477
 The non-aligned countries insisted 
and pursued a ‘compromise on the addition of aggression as a generic crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court
478
 pending the definition of its elements by the preparatory 
committee or a review conference at a later date’.479 Agreements on the final day of the 
conference authorised the Court to exercise jurisdiction over aggression once the crime is 
defined and its scope designated in a manner consistent with the purposes of the Statute and 
ideals of the United Nations with a provision adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 
123 ICCSt defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall 
exercise jurisdiction.  
During the Rome Conference, the Preparatory Commission had a working group on 
aggression which met throughout the life of the Commission, the Coordinator of the Working 
Group issued a paper in 2002 setting out parameters of the issue framing the debate,
480
 a 
number of complex questions including the definition to be adopted, the roles for the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and relevance of other provisions of the Statute concerning 
issues of complicity in prosecution for the crime; its work continued by the Special Working 
Group on the ‘Crime of Aggression’ (SWGCA)481 established under the authority of the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP) with a view to preparing proposals well ahead of the 2009 
Review Conference. 
3.4.3 Deliberations up to Kampala  
The first review conference of the Rome Statute took place in Kampala, Uganda from 31 
May to 11 June 2010. While the 8
th
 session of the ASP, the last opportunity States Parties had 
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to decide on important issues before the Conference, took place on 18‐26 November 2009, to 
deliberate on issues to be discussed at the Review Conference in Kampala, thus, the ASP 
forwarded to the Review Conference proposals for amendments concerning the revision of 
Article 124 of the Statute, possible adoption of provisions on the Crime of Aggression and 
the first of the proposals put forward by Belgium to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to 
cover the use of certain weapons in armed conflicts not of international character. 
Furthermore, the ASP created a working group on amendments to serve as an apparatus to 
examine deliberations submitted for future intended proposals at the review conference.  
The main objective of the Review Conference is to consider a limited number of amendments 
to the Statute, focusing particularly on the Crime of Aggression; the revision of Article 124 
ICCSt and the amendment to Article 8 of the Statute to include the use of certain weapons as 
war crimes in conflicts not of international character. The Bureau of the ASP was determined 
to limit the scope and number of amendments for fear of undermining the integrity of the 
Statute. Mr Rolfe Fife, focal point for the Review Conference, said: ‘the key criteria for the 
success of the Conference may have less to do with amendments to the Statute than with the 
kind of overall message conveyed to the international community at large about international 
justice.’482 The Review Conference was ideally placed to redress the prevailing negative 
perception that the ICC is a western construct focused on targeting Africa, rather, that Africa 
is a crucial partner in the development of international justice mechanisms to combat 
impunity. 
3.4.4 Challenges before the Review Conference 
As States parties to the ICC met in 2010 to consider the future of the Crime of Aggression, 
two issues emerged. First, what is the relationship between the Crime which denotes 
individual responsibility and State’s responsibility and how would the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
the Crime be triggered. The Crime of Aggression presupposes an aggressive war by a State or 
non-State actors, though the UN assigns the SC the responsibility to determine when a State 
has engaged in aggressive war, (Article 2(4), Article 39, Article 41 and 42 UN charter); to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Secondly, the ICC had to decide on the 
precise definition and elements of the Crime of Aggression not every act of aggression needs 
constitute a crime and not every participant in the Aggression should be liable. The Crime 
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requires an act of aggression by a state or non-state actor and knowledge of participation in 
the policy or plans of aggression on the part of the accused, who must have direct high level 
responsibility for the conduct of the war. So, defining the Crime of aggression at the RC 
involved three approaches.
483
 One favours generic approach, the other advocates specific 
approach and the third suggests a combination of the two approaches, those favouring the 
‘specific approach’ argues that a detailed list such as the GAR 3314 (xxix) will be clearer, 
legally more certain and consistent with other definitions set out in Articles 6–8 of the 
Statute, contending that this is a requirement of Article 22
484
 ICCSt. The generic approach 
proponents’ believe it is more pragmatic to acknowledge the impossibility of predicting all 
instances (some space for ‘ironing out the creases’)485 of which the Crime of Aggression 
might be established.  
The third school argues a combination of the two analogous to the definition of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ in Article 7 ICCSt. A proposal preferred the concept of ‘crime of 
aggression’ using the term ‘war of aggression’, the prevailing view believed, this is too 
restrictive, debates surrounded whether the result of an act of aggression should be reflected 
in the definition, by requiring that it leads to military occupation,
486
 regarding Article 5(2) 
(this is the version of the Statute before the amendments) ICCSt
487
 that the definition ‘shall 
be consistent with relevant provisions of the UN, ‘implying the role the SC may or should 
play’488 noting that Article 39 UN Charter declares that determining situations of aggression 
is a prerogative of the SC,
489
 but could other bodies make such a determination? The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Opinion in Congo v Uganda
490
 determined that an 
act of aggression had occurred. Judge Bruno Simma wrote: 
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It is true that the UNSC, … [paragraph 150 of the Judgment] never 
gone as far as expressly qualifying the Ugandan invasion as an act of 
aggression, even though it must appear as a textbook example of the 
first one of the definitions of ..Illegal use of force’ laid down in GAR 
3314 (xxix). The Council will have had its own – political – reasons 
for refraining from such a determination. But the Court, as the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, does not have to follow 
that course. It’s very raison d’être is to arrive at decisions based on 
law and nothing but the law, keeping the political context of the cases 
before it in mind, of course, but not desisting from stating what is 
manifest out of regard for such non-legal considerations.
491
 
The SC being the only arbiter of situations of aggression implies that the ICC can only 
prosecute aggression after the Council pronounces on the subject, a view seen as an 
encroachment on the independence of the Court; could mean, no permanent member of the 
SC would ever be subjected to prosecutions of aggression.
492
 Furthermore, leaving the 
determination by the Court essentially to a political body is implausible. Judge Schwebel of 
the ICJ noted that a SC determination of aggression is not a legal assessment but based on 
political considerations, such as the Nicaragua case;
493
 that the SC is not acting as a court. 
Other difficult issues involved characterising individual participation in the Crime of 
aggression profoundly a ‘State crime’.494 Appling Article 25 ICCSt, dealing with 
participation within the jurisdiction of the Court seems complex. Concepts, like superior 
responsibility Article 28,
495
 seem irrelevant in cases of aggression. Defining aggression as a 
‘leadership crime’ appears to be the consensus, limiting liability to persons who ‘exercise 
control over or direct the political or military action of a State.’ What about accomplices and 
allies - encouraged - attacking other countries? The occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, 
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(suspecting the United States (1974)) meeting the proposed definition of aggression.
496
 It 
would be necessary if the Statute includes similar cases of inciting or abetting aggression, 
punishable with other crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. Confining prosecutions to 
leaders, be they those of the State committing the Crime or accomplices, is consistent with 
existing policy of the Office of the Prosecutor as well as the preliminary case law of the Pre-
Trial Chambers on the gravity threshold of admissibility.
497
 Regulation 29 of the Court 
provides:  
1. In the event of non-compliance by a participant with the provisions of any regulation, or 
with an order of a chamber made there under, the Chamber may issue any order that is 
deemed necessary in the interests of justice. 
2. This provision is without prejudice to the inherent powers of the Chamber. 
It is not clear what these inherent powers may be. The subject of inherent powers of the 
international criminal tribunals is one of considerable controversy in case law and literature 
but not within scope of this chapter.
498
 
3.4.5 The Kampala Definition of the Crime of Aggression 
The definition of the Crime of Aggression in RC/Res 6 (Article 8 bis ICCSt) adds a political 
element to the ICC, undermining its independence. The definition is based on UNGAR 3314 
(xxix) of 14 December 1974, designed as a political guide in determining States 
responsibility for aggression.
499
 RC/Res 6 also introduces an element of gravity, not 
otherwise recognised by the UN Charter. Resolution 3314 (xxix) adopted in Kampala allows 
for special jurisdictional requirements compared to other crimes under the Rome Statute; 
demonstrates ‘fundamental unwillingness’ of States to accept judicial intervention but risks 
lack of support.
500
 RC/Res 6 is said to undermine the fundamental purposes of the ICC.
501
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The jurisdictional reliance on the SC may erode the independence of the Prosecutor and or 
the Judiciary which may consequently lead to impunity. To allow States determine whether 
the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression in respect of their nationals 
result in continued impunity and a failure to reaffirm the UN Charter.
502
 Resolution 3314 
(xxix) subjects’ determination of criminal liability to political motivations and reduces 
judicial independence. The final definition of aggression included in the Statute is that 
recommended by the (SWGA) prior to Kampala. No changes were made to the text; the 
definition under Article 8 bis of the Statute, states: 
 1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ‘act of aggression’ means the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following 
acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (xxix) of 14 December 1974, 
qualify as an act of aggression. 
The Act of aggression is the use of armed force by one State against another without the 
justification of self‐defence or authorisation by the SC. The ASP met in Kampala, Uganda, in 
2010; adopted amendments to the ICC Statute which define the Crime of Aggression and 
provides for the Jurisdiction of the Court over it, enabling the ICC to exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime if 30 States ratify or accept the Amendments. Furthermore, the Court may not 
exercise jurisdiction over aggression until 1 January 2017. The amendment provides for a 
further decision of the ASP to activate jurisdiction of the Court over aggression in addition to 
the Statute ratification of the Kampala amendments which is slow,
503
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beginning of 2016 is needed for the court to exercise jurisdiction over aggression in 2017, the 
amendments take effect for each state party one year after depositing the instrument of 
ratification.
504
  
After the Kampala conference, the question arose whether the ICC will be able to exercise 
jurisdiction over aggression committed by a State party which has not accepted the Kampala 
amendments and has not ‘opted out’ of the Kampala regime? Whether a state victim (or 
claims to be a victim) of aggression has accepted the Kampala amendment suffices to give 
the Court jurisdiction over the (alleged) crime,
505
 will the aggression regime be the same as 
the Regime relating to other crimes? Would jurisdiction be on the basis of territoriality or 
nationality? Would States implement aggression into their national laws and on what 
jurisdictional regime? Would aggression be treated akin to other international crimes at 
national courts? Prosecute for it with broad universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction? Is 
aggression indeed different?
506
 It is argued that domestic courts of the alleged aggressor state 
and domestic courts of the victim are the only domestic courts entitled to prosecute for 
aggression,
507
 again to what extent would it be interpreted as being limited by any relevant 
international law principles regarding the Jurisdiction of the domestic courts? These issues 
the Court will have to contend with, and could take time to resolve. 
3.4.6 Article 8 bis and Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression 
Draft Article 8 bis distinguishes between ‘Acts of aggression’ (what a state does) and the 
‘Crime of aggression’ (what a leader does). ‘Acts of aggression’ is defined as ‘the use of 
armed forces by a State against the Sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
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Nations’.508 This follows a reference to a list of ‘Acts’ in accordance with GAR 3314 (xxix) 
qualifying as acts of aggression’.509 Although, Resolution 3314 (xxix) deals with state 
responsibility but had considerable support as the basis for the definition in the present 
context. The drafting of Article 8 bis is aimed at avoiding the open-ended nature of GA 
Resolution 3314 (xxix), that the SC may decide that something which meets the definition is 
nonetheless not an aggression and on the other hand, that acts other than those on the list may 
be regarded by the SC as acts of aggression. The SC being a political body may act in a 
completely unprincipled and arbitrary manner. A criminal court constrained by the principle 
of legality
510
 must be more translucent. The list in Article 8 bis (2) may be open-ended to the 
extent not saying that no other acts can amount to aggression. However, any other potential 
candidate must surely be interpreted ejusdem generis with the existing list. 
Article 15 bis (3) ICCSt stipulates ratifications, and adoption of the amendment to the Statute 
before
511
 1 January 2017 to activate ICC’s jurisdiction over the Crime. As decided by 
the Review Conference in a consensus, so that the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over 
aggression once the amendments come into force, but could some of the decisions made in 
Kampala be legally questionable? Would the legal effect the drafters sought to achieve be 
questionable? Who will be bound by the amendments?
512
 The agreement is examined and 
areas of significant ambiguity highlighted.
513
 The negotiations on ‘aggression’ at the 
Conference generated debates as to whether the amendments should come into force under 
Articles 121(4) or 121(5) ICCSt. On the one hand is ratification by 7/8ths of the State Parties 
with the amendments binding on all, on the other hand any amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 
8 of the Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the 
amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification. In respect of a State 
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Party that has not accepted the amendment the Court shall not exercise jurisdiction regarding 
a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its 
territory. Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland submitted papers in Kampala which attempted to 
bridge the divide. However, the Review Conference decided that the amendments shall enter 
into force in accordance with Article 121(5) ICCSt.
514
 Opposition arose from Japan, but not 
strong enough to block the consensus. It is not yet clear whether the decision taken in 
Kampala that the amendments shall come into force in accordance with Article 121(5) is 
binding. Can a State oppose this decision or an accused person arguing that the amendments 
can only come into force in accordance with Article 121(4)? Could an opposing State or 
defendant challenge the ‘decision’? Arguably, all that was done in Kampala was to adopt a 
text (Vienna Convention)
515
 the adoption of a text does not customarily create legal 
obligations for States or the Court and will not allow bypassing of the binding text of Article 
121 as it exists. 
The alternative view would be if Article 121(5) did not apply on its face, somehow the parties 
in Kampala have amended the Article such that it now applies. Such a conclusion would raise 
a number of issues of fact and (treaty) law which will require further examination. Whether 
the Kampala ‘decision’ to bring the amendments into force by Article 121(5) is in itself 
binding or not, the view that Article 121(5) is the applicable provision is a reasonable one. 
Article 121(5) applies only to amendments to Arts 5, 6, 7 and 8. Also, a claim can be made 
that the amendments are all a package intended to bring into effect the ‘new’ crime and that 
the intention behind Article 121(5) is that it applies to amendments dealing with the creation 
of new crimes.
516
 By agreeing on Article 121(5), State Parties decided to impose additional 
conditions before the Court can prosecute for aggression. The Court may only exercise 
jurisdiction over aggression committed one year after 30 states have ratified the amendments. 
Furthermore, the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression will only commence once a decision is 
made to that effect, after 1 January 2017 by the States Parties. The decision is to be made by 
at least 2/3rds majority. This is waiting for about seven years before the Aggression 
amendments become operational. These conditions apply to prosecutions commenced as a 
result of State Party referral and proprio motu prosecutions (Article 15 bis) as well as 
prosecutions resulting from SC referral (Article 15 ter). Additionally, an important 
procedural element of the Kampala package on aggression is when aggression proceedings 
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are triggered by a state party or propo motu the entire Pre-Trial division need to authorise the 
commencement of investigations.
517
 This specific institutional device complements the 
substantive requirement that a State’s act of aggression must constitute a manifest violation 
of the UN Charter. 
Determining how to go about the trigger mechanisms, enshrined in Articles 13 (a) and (c) 
ICCSt became contentious during the RC. Although, the jurisdictional scope for ICC’s action 
on the Crime of aggression in cases of SC inaction will remain very limited for a while. 
Firstly, the ICC will be precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression 
with respect to acts of aggression by and against non-state parties.
518
 Secondly, the exercise 
of jurisdiction in cases of acts of aggression committed by one state party against another will 
be governed by the consent principle. Though, the technique by which the latter principle will 
operate does not reflect the formulation of the second sentence of Article 121(5) of the 
Statute due to the ‘opt-out regime’ that is to apply with respect to an alleged aggressor 
state.
519
  
The political approach of the SC to the determination of aggression would add a political 
context to the ICC’s jurisdiction which may undermine its role as an independent court,520 
with the adoption of RC/Res 6, the Prosecutor is now required to notify the SC
521
 of any 
potential investigation, which arises proprio motu or by State referral, before proceeding with 
the investigation of the Crime.
522
 If the Security Council determines that an act of aggression 
has not occurred, or remains silent for six months from the date of notification, the Prosecutor 
can only proceed with the investigation if authorised to do so by the Pre-Trial Division,
523
 
such conduct by the SC results in a delayed prosecution.  
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Furthermore, the entire pre-trial division is required to sit instead of an individual Chamber. 
This means the Prosecutor must satisfy a larger bench than for the other crimes listed in 
Article 5 ICCSt by implication it is argued that this creates a higher threshold for the 
Prosecutor to meet.
524
 Although, the Prosecutor may ultimately be authorised by the Pre-Trial 
division to continue an investigation, such investigation may still be deferred at the behest of 
the SC under Article 16 ICCSt.
525
 Prevailing diplomatic and political circumstances within 
the SC may cause the higher threshold to be applied selectively.
526
 If any member of the P5 
(SC permanent five) vetoes a determination of aggression, it may be ‘tantamount to giving 
immunity to the P5 and their allies’.527 Subjecting the Prosecutor to the SC power 
subordinates the ICC to an inherently political organisation affecting the independence of the 
Court.
528
 This adds a political dimension to determining the Crime of Aggression and creates 
an ‘imbalance’ in relation to other crimes529. The politics of the SC will always play a part in 
the ICC’s jurisdiction.530 While RC/Res 6 was an important landmark in the development of 
international criminal law, the Role of the SC has highlighted the risks of a political body 
interfering in judicial proceedings.
531
 
3.4.7 Who will be bound by Article 15 bis? 
The researcher is of the opinion that the opt-out provision is an unsettled area of the law. 
Who is required to opt-out? If the requisite ratification is achieved and decisions made on or 
after January 2017 to activate the aggression provisions, are all State Parties bound? Would 
the Court have jurisdiction over aggression committed by the nationals of all State Parties 
except they opt-out or does the Court only have jurisdiction over nationals of State Parties 
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that have ratified the amendment? Schabas and Kevin Jon Heller are of the opinion that all 
States parties are bound unless they opt-out.
532
 Article 121(5) proffers that the amendments 
only enter into force for those States that have ratified or accepted it, further the provision 
states: ‘the Court may not prosecute with respect to the Crimes committed by nationals of or 
on the territory of those whose State Parties have not accepted.’533 ‘Any State Party may 
lodge a declaration referred to in Article 15 bis prior to ratification or acceptance.’ By 
referring to opt-out prior to ratification or acceptance, could it be referring to those who have 
not yet ratified or accepted? And opens up the possibility that such States need to opt-out. 
However, this clause may also be read as referring simply to the time within which a ratifying 
or accepting State must opt-out, if it wishes to do so, that is, if a State party ratifies or accepts 
the amendment and wishes to opt-out, it needs to have done so before it ratifies or accepts.
534
  
Ratification by 30 States is necessary for the SC referral mechanism to be triggered.
535
 A 
State may wish to ratify to bring that part of the amendment into effect but to opt-out of the 
State referral and proprio motu prosecutions mechanisms.
536
 Secondly, a State may wish to 
bring the amendments into effect generally while excusing itself 
from ratification prosecution,
537
 an argument consistent with Article 121 (5) of the statute 
that States parties who do not opt out are bound, meaning a presumption of acceptance to the 
amendment unless such a state opts-out. Only those who opt-out are to be regarded as not 
accepting the amendment thereby maintaining the principle of (presumed) consent by not 
expressly opting-out. The ability to opt-in and opt-out
538
 may allow State Parties take an à la 
carte approach to the Crime of aggression,
539
 which may reduce the ICC’s chances of ending 
impunity and reinforcing the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force. Only State parties 
that ratify amendments to Article(s) (5
2
) – 8ter of the Statute (by opting-in) are bound by the 
amendments.
540
 It is argued that Article 121(5) of the Statute is a ‘loop hole’, as it allows 
States to decide whether they wish to be subjected to the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
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aggression.
541
 If States do not accept RC/Res 6, the ICC will not have jurisdiction over that 
State party’s nationals as perpetrators or where aggression is waged upon it.542 
The effect of allowing States to opt-out is that the ICC will have jurisdiction over that State 
as a victim of aggression, but not over that State’s nationals as perpetrators.543 As such, there 
are only two possible circumstances over which the ICC will have jurisdiction.
544
 First, where 
a State Party that opt-in aggresses another State Party who has opted-in.
545
 Secondly, where a 
State party has opted-in aggresses a State Party who has opted-in and subsequently opted-
out.
546
 The second scenario results in States being covered as victims but not as aggressors.
547
 
The ICC’s ability to apply the Rules of international criminal law independently and equally 
to all State parties could be weakened, if not ‘utterly destroyed.’548 In addition, circumstances 
may arise in which the Court does not have jurisdiction over a potential crime of aggression 
because one of the State Parties has not opted-in, but would have jurisdiction over other 
crimes in relation to the same conflict,
549
 on war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide established through the Nationality of the perpetrator or the territory upon which the 
Crimes manifest. If one of these two States ratified the Rome Statute, the Court has 
jurisdiction. However, the Jurisdiction over the Crime of aggression requires both perpetrator 
and victim States to have opted-in to the Amendments. The alternative means of determining 
jurisdiction through the opt-in and opt-out provisions undermine the ICC’s attempt to address 
all relevant crimes with equality. The circumstances which flow from these provisions have 
been labelled ‘hypocritical,’ ‘discreditable’ and having no legal basis.550  
3.4.8 The Crime of Aggression and Liability of Non-Military Leaders 
Defining the ‘Crime of Aggression’ indicates that not every act of aggression is the basis for 
criminal responsibility; it is only those which by their character, gravity and scale constitute a 
manifest violation of the UN Charter. The limitation was strongly debated, but most 
participants (Review Conference) accepted it in return for removal of any requirement that a 
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‘war of aggression’ or that the list of acts in the definition of ‘Act of aggression’ be more 
limited than the GAR 3314 (xxix) list. 
Consequently, the Crime of aggression is a ‘leadership’ crime, a proposition captured by the 
element that the perpetrator has to be in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State. Extensive discussions ensued about how this 
applies to the likes of an industrialist closely involved in the organisation of the State but not 
a formal part of its structures,
551
 could such persons be liable to prosecution? By choosing the 
language used at the Nuremberg, namely ‘shape and influence’ rather than ‘exercise control 
over or to direct,’552 then, what personal responsibility for those who plan, prepare and 
initiate aggressive invasions? In the US v Von Leeb et al
553
 ‘The High Command case’ 
accents that in addition to knowledge, the accused must be in a position to affect the 
aggressive policy underlying the war. The case thus establishes that:  
War is the exerting of violence by one state or politically organised 
body against another, the implementation of a predetermined political 
national policy by means of violence. Wars are contests by force 
between political units but the policy that brings about their initiation 
and actual waging of the war is done by individuals, this principle 
applies to just and unjust wars, initiation of an aggression (criminal 
war) and also the waging of a defensive (legitimate) war against 
criminal aggression
554
  
When war is formally declared or the first shot is fired the initiation of the war has ended, 
from then on there is waging of war between two adversaries. War whether lawful or 
unlawful is the implementation of a national policy. If the policy under which it is initiated is 
criminal in its intent and purpose it is so because the individuals at the policy making level 
had criminal intent and purpose in determining the policy. If war is the means by which the 
criminal objective is to be attained then the waging of the war is but an implementation of the 
policy and the criminality which attaches to the waging of an aggressive war should be 
confined to those who participate in it at the policy level. An unlawful war of aggression 
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connotes of necessity a lawful war of defence against aggression.
555
 The Court in the high 
command case provided further articulation of the meaning of aggressive war, and the 
elements to be found to hold a military commander responsible in the Crime of aggressive 
war. The Court focused on intent and purpose of a war to determine its lawfulness, waging a 
war of aggression can also be found within the meaning of Article 11(1) (a) of the Control 
Council Law No 10.
556
 
Before the IMT, it was understood that international law concerned itself with actions of 
sovereign states and that to apply the Charter to individuals would amount to the application 
of an ex post factor law but the Tribunal said: The extension of punishment for crimes against 
peace to leaders of the Nazi military and government was a logical step. That acts of 
government and its military power are determined by individuals who are in control and 
determine the Policies that result in those acts. Mass punishment is illogical; there is no 
precedence in international law and no justification in human relations.
557
 Individuals who 
plan and lead a Nation into an aggressive war should be held accountable for crimes against 
peace but not those who merely follow the leaders and aid in the participation, the same way 
that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war.
558
 Also the IG Farben case
559
 
demonstrates the difficulty attempting to assign liability for aggressive war outside top 
governmental and military policy makers. The Court considers the role of key leaders in 
industry who were indisputably essential to Germany’s war effort. Yet the Court invokes a 
slippery slope argument; why did it do so? Was this strictly legal or a decision based on 
policy considerations? The result does not mean that individuals outside the Spheres of 
government and the Military could never be liable for aggression. In US v Alfried Krupp et 
al,
560
 charging industrialists with aggression, the US Military Tribunal emphasised, we do not 
hold that industrialists as such, could not be guilty upon such charges, however, the Tribunal 
acquitted all 12 defendants, who held high level management positions in their businesses.  
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Additionally, a French military tribunal ultimately reached the same result with respect to 
five accused industrialists in the Case of Rochling in Part 11(1) (f) War Crimes. Initially, the 
General Tribunal convicted Hermann Rochling alone for aggression after finding that once 
the aggressive war was under way, he undertook a leadership position ensuring the continued 
production of steel and iron in the occupied countries to support the war effort. At that point, 
the Court found that Hermann Rochling
561
 stepped out of his role, as an industrialist and 
accepted high administrative position in order to develop the German ferrous production. The 
judgment was later reversed. However, by the Superior Military Government Court of 
France, which cited both the IMT judgment and the decision in the IG Farben case in 
concluding that ‘the degree of participation necessary to make an originator of a crime 
against peace punishable is very high’ this is so, to avoid mass sentences of low ranks to be 
precise the ordinary soldier. 
3.4.9 Consistency with the Rome Statute  
Part II of the Statute deals with ‘jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law.’ The 
‘definition’ of Aggression562 fits within the framework; along with genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The ‘precondition provisions to the exercise of jurisdiction’563 and 
Article 17 (admissibility) give operational effect to the principle of complementarity which 
may raise some challenges. Part III, the ‘General Principles of Criminal Law’ needs careful 
examination. The principles in Part III are default rules which apply in the absence of other 
choices, would the provisions of Article 25(3)
564
 (‘Individual criminal responsibility’) and 
Article 28
565
 (‘responsibility of commanders and other superiors’) apply without 
modification? Does the basic structure of Article 30 ICCSt which distinguishes between 
‘mental’ and ‘material’ elements provide a suitable framework conceptualising aggression?566 
Are the ‘grounds for excluding criminal responsibility’567 (Article 31)568 apt for aggression? 
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What about mistake of fact and mistake of law (Article 32)
569
 and superior orders (Article 
33)?
570
 
Article 12 ICCSt on ‘Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction’ would it raise some 
conceptual and policy questions? It provides that, in the case of referrals by a State or where 
the Prosecutor is acting proprio motu,
571
 the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if either the 
Territorial State or the State of which the accused is a national, is a party to the Statute or has 
made special acceptance of the Jurisdiction.
572
 How does this play out in respect to the crime 
of aggression? It is generally agreed that if a national of a non-party commits genocide, CAH 
or war crimes on the Territory of a State Party there is jurisdiction in the Court because the 
Territorial State is a Party. But, in the case of aggression, what if the Aggressor State is not a 
party? Where is aggression committed? Is it committed only where the leader acts in the 
capital of the aggressor state? Or is it committed also where its effects take place - on the 
victim’s state? The widespread support in the SWGCA for the view that, in accordance with 
the principle of the (France v Turkey) Lotus case,
573
 the effects in the victim’s State enables 
territorial categorisation thus sufficient to trigger the Jurisdiction of the Court.
574
  
On ‘ratification’ issue, there might be no need for ratification of the provisions by both the 
Aggressor State and the Victim State. Earlier suggestions from ILC with little support from 
state practice makes jurisdiction over ‘aggression’ rest either in the aggressor state or in an 
international tribunal, but not in the victim state or in a state exercising universal 
jurisdiction.
575
 If such is so then, the argument for requiring both the Victim State’s and the 
Aggressor State's consent to jurisdiction would become stronger. Article 17 ICCSt on 
admissibility/complementarity may raise some potential problems which have not been 
addressed in the literature on complementarity. It provides that the Court shall determine a 
case to be inadmissible in several situations. The first is when a case is being investigated or 
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prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.
576
 The second situation is where ‘the 
case has been investigated by a state with jurisdiction and the State has decided not to 
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or 
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute’.577 A third is where the person ‘has already been 
tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint’ another trial by the Court is not 
permitted under the ne bis in idem provision.
578
 The question to be resolved ultimately by the 
Judges is: what is meant by ‘a State which has jurisdiction’? Obviously territorial and 
nationality States must in principle be encompassed. What about a state acting on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction? Many states claim universal jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity. Can such an exercise of jurisdiction trump the Court’s? 
Aggression is believed to be more complicated; universal jurisdiction over it seems 
controversial as has been noted.
579
 
Issues relating to Part III were reasonably resolved, applying the general provisions
580
 such as 
Article 25 (3) ICCSt. Defining the ‘Crime of aggression’ inherited from the Preparatory 
Commission and the ILC tended to include all the modes in which a leader could participate 
in the Crime within a single provision.
581
 Drafting Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Statute took 
cognisance of the ‘Principal’ perpetrator in mind, the responsibility of other participants fell 
within Article 25(3)
582
 and a clarification of Article 25(3)
583
 was thought necessary by 
some,
584
 which helped the structure to fit within the Statute. A comparable problem was 
whether the attempt provision in Article 25 ICCSt
585
 should be applied to aggression, as it 
applied to other crimes within the Statute. Following earlier ILC drafts, suggestions made 
about responsibility for a threat to commit aggression being rejected after desultory 
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discussion,
586
 but agreed that the way ‘act of aggression’ was drafted,587 it would be 
impossible to conceive of an ‘attempted’ aggression by a state, the definition applies only to 
completed acts
588
 though, there could be extreme cases where a leader tried participating in 
an ‘aggression’ but unable to do so. Thus, no amendment made to the existing attempt 
provision, a related issue could have been whether an inchoate conspiracy to commit 
aggression might be rendered criminal, as was the case at Nuremberg
589
 but the consensus 
articulated not to go down that road.
590
 
Article 28 ICCSt provides an alternative mode of liability to Article 25,
591
 namely the 
principle of command responsibility. It establishes the negligence of a military commander to 
crimes committed by his forces if he fails to take necessary steps to prevent or punish. The 
issue of superior responsibility based on the theory of recklessness. It may seem unlikely that 
prosecutions for aggression would be brought on such theories (or that they are consistent 
with the basic nature of the crime), but no specific provision was made by the Working 
Group on this.
592
 Article 30 default rule of ‘intent and knowledge’ in respect of material 
elements was thought adequate, which is why the definition of aggression has no specific 
reference to a necessary mental element.
593
 Article 31 ICCSt has a handful of grounds for the 
exclusion of responsibility which could be agreed upon, like insanity, intoxication, self-
defence, and duress. There may occasionally be some mileage here for an accused leader. 
More importantly is paragraph 3 of the Article which provides that at trial, the Court may 
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consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those … where such a 
ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in Article 21.
594
 The procedures relating to 
the consideration of such a ground shall be provided for in the Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure’.595 The procedure for asserting international law defences596 is likely to be 
particularly significant where a leader alleges that in fact the state was acting in self-defence, 
with the approval of the SC, or pursuant to any other ground which he or she alleges has the 
support of treaty or customary law, arguments about the legality of humanitarian intervention 
may need to be structured.
597
 When Resolution 3314 (xxix) was being negotiated, 
consideration arose as to detailed examination of potential defences. A crime in many 
domestic systems is a combination of the prima facie case minus the defences. The principle 
of legality requires significant specificity in defining the defences. Some strategy of ‘leaving 
it to the judges’ is, however, in play during (aggression) negotiations. 
Article 33 ICCSt permits a defence of superior orders in some cases, perhaps only in the case 
of war crimes. It became difficult to get a specific agreement rendering it inapplicable to the 
Crime of Aggression,
598
 but the leadership nature of the Crime renders it extremely unlikely 
that the defence will work in this context. 
3.4.10 The Consensus and Conditions For the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
The five permanent members of the SC (P5) have taken the position that Article 39 UN 
Charter, confers on them ‘exclusive’ power to determine the existence of an act of aggression 
and thus a SC pre-determination of aggression is an essential precondition to the exercise of 
the ICC's jurisdiction. Article 24 UN Charter
599
 confers ‘primary’ power on the Council for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. But that ‘primacy’ is not exclusive, the 
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GA made several findings of aggression, the United States, United Kingdom, and France co-
sponsored the 1950 uniting for peace resolution,
600
 which permits removal of aggression 
issues to the General Assembly and all five (P5) voted pursuant to that resolution. Non-
permanent members added that the ICJ had addressed issues relating to aggression.
601
 
Therefore, the agreement on the conditions under which the Court will have jurisdiction over 
the Crime of Aggression became contentious, particularly the role of the SC. The 
compromise position reached in Kampala now codified in the Statute as Articles 15bis and 
15ter. Article 15bis, covers State referrals and investigations commenced by the Prosecutor 
proprio motu whilst Article 15ter covers the exercise of jurisdiction resulting from SC 
referrals,
602
 similar to the current regime under Article 13(b) of the Statute, a referral by the 
SC authorises the Prosecutor to investigate crimes committed by nationals of States parties 
and non-States parties equally.
603
  
The RC adopted the amendments by consensus otherwise the decisions could have been 
taken by two-thirds majority of State Parties. The advantage of a consensus is that it puts the 
collective strength of members behind such decisions offering the best guarantee for full 
implementation. Disadvantages are its slowness and the risk of a single member blocking it. 
The threat of a vote is therefore crucial. The conditio sine qua non for successful decision-
making by consensus is the chair of the meeting. His authority, expertise, and experience to 
guide the process, maintain good relations with all participants having their full confidence, 
to intervene whenever necessary which came to bear in Kampala.
604
 The agreement in 
Kampala reflects a textbook model example of decision-making by consensus. Almost every 
State party from the outset indicated that it had a strong preference for consensus decision-
making, wanting to avoid voting as it could be divisive for the ICC, the logic for consensus is 
the flexibility and willingness to compromise demonstrated by all the parties.
605
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The Court will need to adjust its practice in light of the amendment in particular by 
developing procedures for the entire Pre-trial division to authorise an investigation.
606
 The 
negotiations not only brought attention to important issues but also provided concrete 
recommendations and sterling examples of best practice that may be utilised by the ICC in 
seeking to fulfil its mandate.
607
        
3.4.11 Beyond the Kampala Review Conference 
The adoption of the Crime of aggression (definitions) in Kampala confirmed the sustained 
commitments of States to establish a new international legal order in which impunity for 
egregious crimes will no longer be tolerated. The importance of the Rome Statute system for 
international peace, the rule of law and human rights was re-confirmed in Kampala; the fact 
that the RC came to agreement on resolutions concerning the addition of new crimes to the 
Statute reflects the trust State Parties place on the role the ICC plays. Improving the 
effectiveness of the Statute, particularly in the areas of cooperation and complementarity 
during the RC is exemplary. The Conference highlighted the importance of concrete action 
by States in these areas, one key measure being the adoption of national implementing 
legislations. The stocktaking exercise conducted provided an excellent opportunity to reflect 
on key areas of interest for the ICC’s functioning.608          
Article 88 ICCSt obliges State Parties to ensure that there are procedures available under their 
national laws for cooperation with the ICC. Several States made pledges to adopt National 
legislation and other measures to enhance their ability to cooperate effectively with the ICC. 
The declaration on cooperation adopted by the RC also emphasised the importance of 
compliance with requests for cooperation from the Court,
609
 complementarity a fundamental 
issue at the RC, reiterated the primary responsibility of States to investigate and prosecute the 
most serious crimes of international concern.
610
 The Kampala compromise brought 
international criminalisation of aggression within effective jurisdiction of the ICC. The 
adoption marks a critical point in the completion of the Rome Statute. Although, France and 
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the United Kingdom had firmly and consistently indicated that the compromise package was 
undermining the position of the SC but reconciled their loyalty to the ICC with their loyalty 
to the SC as members of the P5. 
3.4.12 Challenges Ahead After the Kampala Conference Accord  
Domestic implementation and some procedural elements of the criminalisation of aggression 
under the Statute will require further consideration. The opt-out and restriction of the exercise 
of jurisdiction over non-states parties under Article 15 bis may have to be reconciled with the 
regime of declarations of acceptance of jurisdictions under Article 12(3). It is unclear how 
Article 15 bis would operate in the context of Article 12(3) declaration by a non-state party, 
would such a declaration suffice to entail direct jurisdiction over the acceptance of 
aggression? Is there a possibility for the author of the declaration to opt-out of aggression 
despite the wording of Rule 44,
611
 which states that ‘the declaration under Article 12, 
paragraph 3, has as a consequence on the acceptance of jurisdiction in respect of the Crimes 
referred to in Article 5 in relevance to the situation and the provisions of Part 9, and any rules 
thereunder concerning States Parties, shall apply?’612 
Secondly, the issues of complementarity and implementation will need to be addressed by 
States.
613
 At present, the prospects of domestic investigation and prosecution of aggression 
are limited, due to the character of aggression, a leadership crime; States immunity has 
significant relevance in the exercise of domestic jurisdiction. Jurisdictional immunities 
recognised by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case
614
 limit the potential scope of investigations 
and prosecutions by the ‘Victim State’ or ‘bystander’ States. At the same time, many 
domestic legal systems are ‘unable’ to investigate and prosecute aggression in the light of its 
‘unavailability’ within their ‘national judicial system’.615 The Crime of aggression is absent 
in many domestic penal codes, and where it is even codified, it is often defined by reference 
to ‘war of aggression’, rather than the ‘acts of aggression’ listed in GAR 3314 (xxix).616 If 
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complementarity is meant to function as intended with respect to the Crime of aggression, 
then new implementing legislation will have to be adopted.
617
 Otherwise, the ICC will remain 
the default point of entry for years to come. 
Thirdly, aggression raises fresh issues with respect to victim participation under the Statute. 
The definition of victims under Rule 85 is tied to atrocities against individuals or protected 
property and objects of specific organisations and institutions.
618
 However, in the context of 
many acts of aggression, the typical victim is a ‘state’. What does this mean for victim 
participation? Are the interests of the ‘Victim’ States sufficiently taken into account by 
ordinary forms of state participation (Rule103) in proceedings? Extending victim 
participation to state representatives in the context of aggression would give the reparations 
regime a completely new direction. It would introduce a surrogate forum for interstate 
reparation through criminal proceedings before the ICC. This may ultimately run against the 
purpose and mandate of the Court. 
Finally, an observation is whether the ICC is ripe to take on the exercise of jurisdiction over 
aggression at this early stage of its existence, in light of its current docket, such as its record 
of proceedings in the first cases, and unresolved issues (eg the treatment of the 12(3) 
declaration by the Palestinian Authority), one may assume that officials inside the institution 
are not particularly unhappy that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Crime of aggression is 
not an immediate reality after Kampala. Academics like Niels Blokker and Claus Kress 
analyse the compromise from a negotiator's perspective. They argue that the Consensus in 
Kampala marks a ‘historic achievement,’ which is likely to face criticism from different 
interest groups, but represents a breakthrough for international criminal justice and 
international security law. David Scheffer, former US war crimes ambassador and negotiator 
at the Rome Conference, takes a closer look at some of the critical points and open ends of 
the substantive provisions on the crime of aggression. He offers fresh thoughts relating to 
four areas: (A) the ‘magnitude test’, (B) Security Council determinations, (C) temporal 
jurisdiction, and (D) the scope of ICC jurisdiction. He argues that the jurisdictional division 
resulting from the Kampala compromise is ‘a slap on the equality of states’, but concedes that 
‘most major shifts in the international system begin that way.’ 
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Donald M Ferencz a member of the Non-governmental organisations (NGO) delegation in 
the SWGCA places developments in Kampala in perspective to ‘the promise of Nuremberg’ 
and the dynamics of power politics. He argues that the Kampala compromise treated 
aggression as a ‘patient’ who has been put ‘in a medically induced coma in order to save its 
life’. Taken as a whole, these contributions send a signal of ‘cautious optimism’. Kampala is 
neither ‘the end’, nor the ‘beginning of the end’, but a fresh impulse for the continuing 
journey towards the criminalisation of aggression.
619
  
3.4.13 Conclusion 
This part of the chapter has examined the Kampala accord, the finale of almost a century old 
debate about the criminalisation of aggression as a crime, the codification of the existing 
body of crimes under customary international law and the closure of the last remaining 
important lacuna contained in the substantive part of the ICC Statute. The final package 
adopted in Kampala reflects the complexity of various interests at stake. Perceptibly, the 
solution provoked criticisms and concerns about the ICC's limited jurisdictional reach in 
cases of SC inaction. Kampala signifies good legal milestone in the most sensitive area of 
international criminal justice and by implication, international security law in general. 
‘Kampala’ brought the Crime of aggression not only into the effective jurisdiction of the ICC, 
but also a significant step to the advancement of international criminal law.
620
 
This part of the chapter also examined the prospect of the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over 
the Crime, removes aggression partly from the realm of policy and places it more firmly on 
the ‘radar screen’ of domestic legislators, prosecutors, and judges. A fundamental step 
towards greater accountability of political and military elites and compliance and entails a 
seismic shift in international criminal justice. The Kampala definition extends criminalisation 
from its current focus on gross human rights violations and victims' rights to interstate 
relations, the protection of state interests ‘sovereignty’, ‘territorial integrity’, ‘political 
independence’, and the preservation of peace that is, the absence of the unlawful use of 
armed force. This strengthens the international justice system, in particular its application to 
and impact on politics. It also evaluated that the ICC may act in tandem with the UN system, 
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and facilitates the work of the SC, to serve as a complement to collective security by 
providing independent checks and balances. This dualism is reflected in the Kampala 
resolution. The Prosecutor could be mandated to ‘ascertain’ the determination of an ‘Act of 
aggression’ by the SC.621 The requirement to notify the UNSG of a situation under 
examination and the corresponding sharing of ‘information and documents’ may facilitate the 
work of the UN bodies.
622
 But the ICC maintains independent decision-making authority as a 
judicial institution
623
 and ultimately empowered to proceed with investigations and 
prosecution, even in the absence of a SC determination,
624
 ultimately, reshaping the workings 
of the collective security system, where aggression has long remained a sleeping beauty,
625
 a 
victory for the independence of the ICC. While the definition was always considered the 
easier part of the two big aspects of aggression - conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction 
being the other - this was no small achievement.
626
 
Voices to extend the criminalisation of aggression to ‘aggressive acts by non-state entities 
(such as terrorist armed groups, organised insurgents, liberation movements, and the likes) 
against a State’627 have not been accommodated. The list of acts is taken verbatim from 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (xxix). It will be for the Court to interpret whether the 
wording of Article 8 bis (2) leaves room for the extension of aggression to other acts of 
aggression.
628
 The Kampala definition reflects shades of modernity, but remains 
‘conservative’ at the same time. It extends individual criminal responsibility from the 
traditional concept of ‘war of aggression’ to ‘acts of aggression’ under Article 8 bis. This is 
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reflected in the nexus of the leadership requirement to state action and the definition of the 
term ‘act of aggression’ ‘the use of armed force by a State.’629  
Finally, it is recommend that the ratification necessary from thirty State Parties should be 
deposited as a matter of urgency in order to possibly nip in the bud another pending world 
war calamity, having critically examined the behaviour of some current powerful nations and 
their activities in light of the recent aggressive action of Russian in Ukraine. In the next 
chapter the thesis will evaluate the core prosecutorial challenges the Court faces in exercising 
its jurisdiction over the substantive crimes enumerated in this chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Challenges Prosecuting under Article 5 of the Rome Statute 
...the Court’s strategic plan identifies establishing the International Criminal Court as a model of public 
administration (as) one of its three central goals... 
Secret Human Rights Watch letter to the ICC OTP 
 
‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions ... laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged 
must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.’ 
 John Rawls 
4.1 Introduction 
The search light of the International Criminal Court (ICC/the Court)
1
 beams on countries 
engaged in egregious crimes. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
2
 is an 
overspill from Rwanda. Similarly, the overflow of violence from Syria to Iraq prompted Iran 
to be fully engaged. Whilst the crises in Libya, Central African Republic (CAR), Somali and 
Mali spread across Kenya; affecting countries like Cameroun and Nigeria due to the large out 
flow of ammunitions.  
The ICC since its inception has encountered prosecutorial challenges, undermining its 
legitimacy and credibility within the international community.
3
 These challenges must be 
confronted a conditio sine qua non for the Court’s continued existence. Therefore, this 
chapter examines core challenges of the ICC in its attempt to address these atrocities. The 
Statute (the Rome Statute) provides a template for the definition of serious crimes reflecting 
our common heritage of law.
4
 Critical analyses of the difficulties faced by the Court in 
navigating the complex relations with national governments, their judicial institutions and 
affected populations, to deliver justice, whilst investigating and prosecuting cases of 
atrocities in spite of on-going major human-rights violations will be evaluated.  
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To date, the ICC has produced four main verdicts: two convictions, one withdrawal of 
charges against President Kenyatta due to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) being unable to 
establish the elements of crimes ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and one acquittal,5 for this reason, 
the lack of efficiency and effectiveness by the Court in achieving expected results has led to a 
serious decline in the perception of its legitimacy; comprehensive improvements are critical 
for the Court’s capacity to prosecute crimes that threaten international peace and security.6 It 
is fundamental to ensure justice is served to fulfil the raisons d'être of the Court’s creation. 
The chapter concludes with the relevance of these challenges for future of international 
justice mechanisms by noting that decent internal productivity and cohesion does lead to 
positive external results. In other words external credibility or legitimacy is highly dependent 
on the legitimacy within.
7
 
4.2 Stratifying the Challenges of the International Criminal Court 
What challenges does the Court face? This chapter highlights on the one hand internal 
challenges and on the other hand external challenges. The ICC needs appropriate intervention 
to achieve the Court’s intended purpose as an international organisation and a legal entity.8 
The operation of the Court needs to be improved upon, to increase acceptance, borrowing a 
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leaf from the theory of Organisational Behaviour (OB) the overall challenge of the Court has 
been stratified into intrinsic and extrinsic challenges. The intrinsic challenges are internal to 
the Court such as its administrative nature, group dynamics, information technology and its 
judicial work while the extrinsic challenges are external to the Court; may affect the Courts 
ability to dispense justice and combat impunity, such factors include: better acceptance, 
increased membership, and a ‘pull on legitimacy.’9 
4.3 Challenges Intrinsic to the Court 
Investigations and situation referrals start with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), the OTP is 
a key organ of the Court;
10
 results of its output translate to successes or failures of the Court 
to a large extent. Criticism of the Lubanga case is rooted in inadequate field investigations 
and narrow scope of charges,
11
 whilst Germain Katanga became convicted (7 March 2014)  as 
an accessory to war crimes and crimes against humanity (CAH),
12
 Ngudjolo’s case scrutiny 
stems from the prosecution’s inability to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt.13 In 2006 
during the third year of Ocampo’s (first ICC prosecutor) term, public dissatisfaction began to 
mount. Antonio Cassese, the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY),
14
 severely criticised Ocampo’s performance and investigation strategy, 
Louise Arbour the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also submitted a 
report, which clearly expressed her discontent with the ICC investigation proceedings and 
performance.
15
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Five ‘situations’ have been referred to the Prosecutor by States Parties16 (Uganda, the DRC, 
Mali and the CAR I & II) two situations (Darfur/Sudan and Libya) have been referred by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
17
 the Darfur/Sudan situation referred 31 March 
2005
18
 and the Libyan situation at the beginning of March 2011, through unanimous UNSC 
decision.
19
 Pre‐Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants against Al- Bashir,20 and Muammar 
Gaddafi with two of his top aides in the Libyan situation.
21
 The Prosecutor acting proprio 
motu
22
 started investigation in Kenya (a request partly from Kofi Anan who mediated an end 
to the post‐election violence in early 2008)23 also the investigation into the situation in Cote 
d’Ivoire24 is proprio motu. 
A fundamental request exerted on the Prosecutor from the Chambers is that the OTP should 
not take steps to initiate pre‐trial or trial proceedings, until there is certainty and sufficient 
evidence, such as, almost completed investigations are ideal before pre‐trial proceedings so 
that focus shifts from investigations to prosecution, meaning that the Pre‐Trial Chamber will 
have the ability to complete the preparatory work of the cases; the accused, informed of all 
facts, while the Pre‐Trial Chamber rules on protective measures. Trials should commence 
soon after the decision confirming the charges without unnecessary time gap. There is need 
for improvement regarding the general work methodology and investigations within the OTP. 
Ensuring cooperation, efficient structures and efforts to have highly qualified prosecutorial 
staff is necessary. It is imperative that the OTP should have no room for improvisation or 
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muddling through. The Court needs a highly professional prosecutorial engine to achieve its 
purpose.
25
  
Transparency challenge entails a preliminary examination process requiring the Prosecutor to 
determine whether a situation meets reasonable basis to proceed with a formal investigation. 
In order to determine situations that most warrant investigations, the Prosecutor establishes a 
four-phase process. Once information is filtered and identified satisfactory under 
jurisdictional constraints, the OTP assesses its admissibility
26
 using considerable discretion to 
determine a situation’s admissibility. The OTP needs to prioritise to determine situations 
most grievous and thus warranting investigation. Clarified guidelines and methodology used 
for the gravity threshold when determining situations admissibility would alleviate 
prosecutorial discretion and inconsistencies in implementation. Once the gravity threshold is 
improved upon and legally supported, decisions reached using this threshold for admissibility 
would enhance legitimacy and credibility of the Court.  
Improved transparency and communication would also show commitment to independence, 
objectivity, and impartiality in conducting preliminary examinations. Transparency promotes 
positive perception among stakeholders that the Court is committed to good process; 
upholding intentions for meaningful justice through adherence to guidelines and principles of 
independence, impartiality and objectivity. Transparency also assists in alleviating criticism 
concerning decisions made during the preliminary examination process.
27
 The investigation 
team of the OTP provide the foundation on which all proceedings and trials are built. 
Thorough investigations are a critical challenge to ensure that the Prosecution presents strong 
cases. So far, the Prosecution has faced shortcomings why? The Court has handed down only 
a few judgments and a recent withdrawal of charges against the accused Kenyan President.
28
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28 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06; The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and 
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164 
 
It has also released four accused for lack of evidence after charges failed to be confirmed 
during the Pre-Trial stage including some parties in the Kenyan trial. Much of this can be 
attributed to failures by the OTP.
29
 Reasons behind such failures are structural obstacles 
within the OTP, paying specific attention to the organisation of the Office and its 
investigative teams is necessary, of the first 30 individuals charged by the Court, 15 have 
appeared before it, of the 15 individuals, the OTP failed to have charges confirmed against 
four at the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), prompting their release from custody. 
Insufficient research coupled with lack of resources for investigation
30
 lead to certain crimes 
being overlooked; poor investigation results in weak cases.
31
 The OTP also instructs 
investigators to limit the number of charges in certain cases, for example, after 18 months of 
investigating killings and other crimes in the Lubanga case, the OTP directed investigators to 
focus only on child soldiers;
32
 many critics felt the charges brought against of Mr Lubanga 
did not accurately reflect the Crimes committed by him.
33
 The acquittal of Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui dented the external image of the Court. The decision attracted criticisms from human 
rights groups blaming the OTP for not building a strong case.
34
 The Judges cited inconsistent 
and unreliable witness evidence, the lack of testimony from witnesses that could have played 
a key role, unfamiliarity with the region in question and no evidence collected until three 
years after the alleged atrocities weakened the case. The Prosecutor could not prove ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ that Ngudjolo Chui was commander of the military group at the time of the 
2003 killing of approximately 200 residents of the Bogoro village in the DRC and thus not 
found guilty of the alleged crimes so released from custody.
35
 Another major issue in the case 
was the interpretation of Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute (indirect criminal 
responsibility).
36
 Trial Chamber Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert opined under her 
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interpretation of the Article, that the case could not be supported. She disagreed with the 
PTC, that she found no basis for indirect perpetration because ‘perpetration through an 
organisation finds no support in the Statute,
37
 a key aspect in this decision is the fact that the 
Judges found problems not just with the substance of the case, but also with the way it was 
handled by the Prosecution.
38
 
The ‘standard of proof elements’ is another challenge within the Court’s operation. The 
Prosecution often fail to meet the standards of proof necessary to confirm charges, due to 
heavy reliance on secondary evidence, bringing charges before the case is ready and broad 
claims being made without substantial evidence to back it up.
39
 The OTP must improve its 
overall management in order to adopt better policies and procedures in the future that will 
build stronger cases which not only can be won at trials but also represent charges of crimes 
committed.
40
 The Statute requires the OTP to meet high standards of proof at investigations. 
First, the OTP is to determine potential crimes in a situation and its admissibility, whether a 
reasonable basis exists, and a formal investigation follow.
41
 Thus, the OTP may issue arrest 
warrants through the PTC by submitting charges that meet the lowest standard of proof 
provided that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused person committed the 
crime.
42
 Once the accused is in custody, the next standard of proof must be met to confirm 
the charges at the PTC, this standard of proof is sufficient (evidence) to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that the accused committed the crimes, if this standard is not met the 
accused is released from custody, otherwise it proceeds to trial.
43
  
The final standard of proof required to convict the accused is to prove ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’44 that the accused is guilty of the Crimes for which he/she is charged.45 The OTP is 
often found wanting during the PTC stage because Judges feel the OTP came unprepared. 
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This criticism shows two primary issues; (1) That the Chief Prosecutor was willing to move 
ahead before the case was fully developed, and (2) That the investigation team on site are 
unable to gather strong enough evidence to build the case.
46
 In Prosecutor v Callixte 
Mbarushimana
47
 (DRC), the Judges noted in accordance with Article 67(1) (a),
48
 that the 
defendant must be told of the charges being brought against him prior to trial; that charges 
against him are broad crimes committed in a large geographic area, rather than specific 
incidents. The Chamber claims it appears to be an attempt by the Prosecution to allow for 
new charges to be added at a later date
49
 and questioning why it was unable to present 
specific evidence regarding specific crimes committed in other regions,
50
 this conflicts with 
Article 67,
51
 in the view of the judges, the defendant is made unaware of the charges brought 
against him, also Article 74 (2)
52
 does not allow for new charges without following the 
procedures outlined in the Statute.
53
 Due to these issues as well as a lack of evidence or 
reliance on a single witness in some cases, PTC-I declined to confirm the charges against 
Callixte Mbarushimana. The Appeals Chamber upheld the decision, and the defendant was 
released from custody.
54
 
                                                          
46
 Ruto and Sang on trial for charges of crimes committed between 1- 4 January 2008 when violence erupted in 
Kenyan Presidential election dispute between the then incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and his challenger 
Raila Odinga. The OTP (Bensouda) moved to the appeals chamber to challenge a decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, which rejected her request to amend the temporal scope of the charges. In dismissing her appeal, the judges 
said they relied on Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute which bars the prosecutor from amending charges once a 
trial is underway. 
47
 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10. 
48
 ICCSt Article 67; Rights of the accused: 1) In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to 
a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to 
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality; (a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, 
cause and content of the charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks; Article 67 Rome 
Statute. 
49
 Ruto and Sang on trial for charges of crimes committed between 1- 4 January 2008 when violence erupted in 
Kenyan Presidential election dispute between the then incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and his challenger 
Raila Odinga. The OTP (Bensouda) moved to the appeals chamber to challenge a decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, which rejected her request to amend the temporal scope of the charges. In dismissing her appeal, the judges 
said they relied on Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute which bars the prosecutor from amending charges once a 
trial is underway. 
50
 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10; Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges. 
51
 ICCSt (n 1). 
52
 ibid Article 74: Requirements for the decision: 2. The Trial Chamber’s decision shall be based on its 
evaluation of the evidence and the entire proceedings. The decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges and any amendments to the charges. The Court may base its decision only on evidence 
submitted and discussed before it at the trial. Article 74 Rome Statute. 
53
 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10; Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges. 
54 ibid; Mr Mbarushimana is allegedly criminally responsible for: Five counts of crimes against humanity: 
murder, torture, rape, inhumane acts and persecution; Eight counts of war crimes: attacks against the civilian 
population, murder, mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman treatment, destruction of property and pillaging. On 16 
December 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I decided by Majority to decline to confirm the charges against Mr 
167 
 
Another major problem for the Prosecution has been attaining reliable witnesses before going 
to trial. Several times the Prosecution found it difficult to establish the credibility of 
witnesses before the Court. The Prosecutor v Bahr Idriss Abu Garda
55
 from Sudan is an 
example of a case where the OTP went to the PTC before they had strong witnesses prepared. 
The Judges at the PTC sought to find ‘substantial grounds to believe’ three specific 
allegations in order to confirm the charge against Mr Abu Garda that:  
(1) He participated in a meeting to plan an attack,  
(2) He participated in a second meeting before said attack, and  
(3) He formed a ‘common plan’ with other military leaders to orchestrate the attack. 
After citing inconsistent witness testimony, the Judges refused to confirm the first charge 
claiming that the witnesses presented by the OTP are unreliable and that others presented 
through anonymous confidential statements, are insufficient.
56
 The second charge was fully 
contingent on the testimony of one witness, whose identity is said to be confidential and 
unknown to the defence. Whilst the Chamber had found that Mr Abu Garda controlled the 
militant group at some point, the third charge was unconfirmed as the judges cited a lack of 
and inconsistency in evidence.
57
 The Judges concluded that ‘the evidence tendered by the 
Prosecution in support of the allegations is scanty and unreliable, that the Chamber is 
unsatisfied; that there are substantial grounds to believe the Crime alleged against Mr Abu 
Garda.
58
 While all three judges agreed not to confirm the charges, the case still produced 
separate opinions as Judge Cuno Tarfusser believed the Chambers went too far in analysing 
why the charges could not be confirmed stating ‘the lacunae exposed by the mere factual 
assessment of the evidence is so basic and fundamental that the Chamber need not conduct 
detailed analysis of the legal issues pertaining to the merits of the case.’59 The lack of strong, 
reliable witnesses and the failure to thoroughly assess the evidence noted by the Judges 
shows that the case is an example of the OTP willing to go to trial once it believes it can 
prove that there are ‘sufficient grounds to believe’ the charges, rather than when he believes 
the case is fully prepared. 
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Judge Hans-Peter Kaul noted that the underlying problem causing the OTP to go to trial 
before being sufficiently prepared may be that the OTP is looking to gather only enough 
incriminating evidence to meet the minimal standard of proof required to advance the case. 
While charges against the first two named defendants in the Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali
60
 of Kenya were confirmed, 
Judge Kaul offered a dissenting opinion that criticised the OTP procedure.  
His opinion partly rests on the fact that he does not believe the ICC has jurisdiction in the 
case, criticising the investigative techniques of the OTP, he noted that the OTP must present 
its allegations with ‘sufficient evidence’61 in accordance with Article 61(5) of the Statute.62 
He proceeds to explain how in pursuit of this ‘sufficient evidence,’ he believes that the 
Prosecutor violated Article 54 of the Statute.
63
 He then explains that the Prosecutor is a truth 
seeker, rather than a partisan lawyer and by trying to make sure that charges are confirmed, 
he is proving to not investigate exonerating circumstances as equally as incriminating, 
thereby violating Article 54.
64
 He adds, in his opinion that it would be ‘risky; if not 
irresponsible’ for the Prosecutor to go to the PTC with only sufficient evidence to believe 
while hoping to find new and stronger evidence to satisfy Article 66 (2), (3)
65
 in trial, in 
which the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ threshold is required.66 This is a criticism of the policy 
and approach of the OTP as a whole, claiming that its methods of investigation cause it to 
lose confidence in cases presented by the Prosecution. The Statute states that for an accused 
to be convicted, the Prosecution must prove its case to the highest standard of proof.
67
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The Lubanga case also drew criticism from the Chamber at various points. While the Judges 
eventually ruled in favour of continuing the case, they concluded that the testimony from the 
intermediaries and associated witnesses could not be relied upon,
68
 essentially because of 
unsupervised actions of three of the principal intermediaries.
69
 Despite the fact that Lubanga 
was convicted, the OTP was criticised for using unreliable evidence, lack of evidence, and 
inconsistent witness testimony; in addition to a general feeling that the Crimes for which 
Lubanga was charged did not accurately reflect the damage he caused in the region. The 
numerous instances in which the Chamber criticised the OTP for weakness in its cases show 
that the unstated policy of the (former) Prosecutor was to take a case to Chambers as soon as 
he felt there was sufficient evidence to establish ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the 
person committed the crime.
70
 In addition this potentially violates certain Articles in the 
Statute, it also adds pressure on the Prosecutor and the investigation team to find enough 
evidence in continuing the trial and prove ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that the accused is 
guilty in order to gain a conviction,
71
 making it more difficult for the OTP to gather 
supplementary evidence whilst also proceeding with an active trial. These demonstrate the 
difficulties often faced in trial to establish conviction; the strategy could be for two reasons, 
first to save resources and to get to trial as quickly as possible, second, possible pressure on 
the Prosecutor to hold actual court proceedings hence wants to move as quickly as possible to 
court.
72
  
The lack of resources, moving too quickly, inconsistent investigation team, and reliance on 
meeting only the lowest standard of proof necessary to proceed to trial created the problems 
the OTP faces today. Despite the reasons for short investigations some ex-investigators 
believe these ideas failed, in regard to representing the entire range of victimisation as the 
Lubanga case focused only on child soldiering. Limiting the scope of the charges frustrated 
investigators,
73
 leading to damaging the morale of the investigation team, and the fact that 
they operate with inadequate numbers of investigators. This also led to high turnover amongst 
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employees of the OTP, many citing ‘burn-out’ and dissatisfaction with the way in which their 
opinions are valued being the cause of the turnover.
74
  
Losing experienced investigators can be costly, as new employees/investigators would take 
some time to learn to familiarise themselves with situations under investigation. Despite the 
change of leadership to Fatou Bensouda from Moreno-Ocampo as Chief Prosecutor, it does 
not appear that the OTP policy has changed. Calls for specific cases to only focus on certain 
crimes in a region frustrate investigators; they feel important crimes are being overlooked. 
Another problem created by focusing on certain crimes is that it does not really solve any 
problems, for example, Lubanga gained a conviction, but he is a relatively low rung on a low 
ladder, settling for him overlooks the real problem of why these crimes are occurring.
75
 
Outside influences also impact on the OTP’s investigation, teams are relatively small and the 
Chief prosecutor wants to move to trial so quickly, that it relies significantly on secondary 
sources at times.
76
 These include documentation and reports from organisations such as the 
United Nations and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs). It also includes information 
from intermediaries used to identify witnesses. Relying heavily on such sources present risks 
to the Prosecution as individuals and organisations presenting such data are unlikely to 
scrutinise the material to ensure its accuracy and reliability. Furthermore, such organisations 
may have their own agenda not in alliance with the interests of the OTP. During testimony in 
the Lubanga case, the lead investigator testified that ‘one must concede that the procedure of 
investigation of humanitarian groups, in my (sis) opinion, is more a sort of a general 
journalism than legalistic investigations.
77
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A major obstacle within the Court is the Organisational Structure of the OTP. The OTP is 
divided into three divisions, the Investigation, Prosecution and Jurisdiction 
Cooperation/Complementarity Division (JCCD) each with a divisional head answerable to 
the Chief Prosecutor. Investigation teams assigned to cases have same structure. The structure 
is often problematic, leads to inefficiencies such as delays and damaged investigations. An 
analyst had stated that each division represented in the investigation team felt like a separate 
entity, operating with individual goals rather than working as a team.
78
 When a situation 
comes under investigation, the OTP sends a team to gather information. The teams 
encompass each member of the three divisions and report directly to the Executive 
Committee (Ex Com), made up of the Chief Prosecutor and the heads of each division.
79
 The 
divisions are to work together and build evidence to be used in court. However, a lack of 
cooperation amongst the different units leads to inefficient investigative practices,
80
 such as: 
duplication, lack of communication and cooperation to mention a few. Also, by the time the 
Investigation division arrives to interview witnesses, it is often found that witnesses had been 
interviewed by the JCCD; not understanding why they needed to be interviewed again.
81
 
Unwillingness to share information among the three divisions even though they are supposed 
to be working together is noticeable and reported.
82
  
4.4 Funding and Budgetary Challenges  
Investigations run by the OTP are affected by resource allocation from 2009-2011 the OTP 
opened investigations into three more situations and ten cases; yet the added workload did not 
significantly increase the budget to account for this
83
 despite additional situations and cases 
from Mali, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Libya in 2010-2013. However, the 2013 OTP budget is 
only 1.04% greater than that of 2010.
84
 Over the first ten years of its existence, the amount of 
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money given to the OTP averaged 24.1% of the total ICC budget. This is low in comparison 
with the budgets of the OTP in the ICTY and the ICTR, which averaged 30.8% and 27.7% 
respectively of their tribunal’s total budgets over their first 10 years.85 In 2012, the ICC 
requested 19.6% increase in the overall budget to deal with the expanding caseload, but some 
of the biggest donors to the Court, specifically Japan, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy, 
insist on zero percent growth.
86
 Requests for additional funds in 2013 have also been met 
with similar resistance by members of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP),
87
 meaning that 
the workload of the Court and that of the OTP will continue to grow while finances lag, this 
indirectly affects overall performance. It is unlikely investigation teams will become larger; 
the 2013 budget called for 46 professional staff members, just two more than the 2012’s.88 
Shortcomings in budgetary resources translate to restraints on human resources and manifest 
challenges. The Court cannot afford to staff adequately to deal with the innumerable duties of 
the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS),
89
 Office of the Public Counsel for 
Victims (OPCV) and Chambers that have developed in respect of victims’ participation, 
particularly in the application process, in effect, trial efficiency can be put at risk, which in 
turn may impair impartiality.
90
  
Two situations referred by the Security Council (SC) to the ICC, Sudan in 2005 and Libya in 
2011 came with a caveat stating that ‘the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, 
including expenses relating to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, 
shall not be borne by the United Nations but by parties to the Rome Statute and States that 
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wish to contribute voluntarily.
91
 Regardless of Article 115 ICCSt on possibility of a UN 
funding.
92
 Without a policy change, Security Council referrals will become a financial burden 
on the Court.
93
 
4.5 Charges Representative of Crimes 
The selection of individuals to indict and the appropriate selection of crimes to charge them 
with are critical. So far the final verdict and charges against defendants are limited and not 
representative of the crimes committed.
94
 Lubanga’s conviction on conscription, enlistment 
and use of child soldiers are unrepresentative of the ‘range of criminality’ present in the 
DRC, or of that which Lubanga and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) could be 
responsible for. Mathieu Ngudjolo charged with a broader spectrum of crimes; isolated to one 
attack on the village of Bogoro in February 2003. This also is clearly not representative of the 
range of criminality in the DRC. 
Undue pressure on investigators to hasten performance has been an obstacle to gathering 
thorough, unbiased evidence sufficient for issuing a representative sample of charges. The 
OTP states that in the face of challenging investigative environments, it is required, 
‘whenever possible, to present expeditious and focused cases while aiming to represent the 
entire range of criminality.’95 A former ICC analyst stated in an interview that he believes 
that Lubanga was only charged with the use of child soldiers due to the interest of time and 
that the intention was to bring additional charges later. The pressure to act quickly in this case 
is partly the Prosecutor’s fear that Lubanga would soon be released from detention in the 
DRC.
96
 This resulted in a hurried process; Lubanga was only charged on three counts 
involving the recruitment, conscription and use of child soldiers. 
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Regardless of whether the OTP had sufficient evidence for the few crimes it charged Lubanga 
with but also ignoring other major international crimes such as murder and sexual violence 
allegedly committed. Judge Fulford stated that ‘the Prosecutor failed to charge Mr Lubanga 
with sexual violence… even though Mr Moreno-Ocampo made repeated public claims that 
the militia was responsible for widespread rape.’97 Thus, while Lubanga was ultimately 
convicted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, the case left out thousands of victims of 
other crimes, and justice was not fully served. While time is important, it should not impinge 
on the quality of investigation processes or affect which charges are brought against suspects. 
Former ICC investigators claim disregard of expertise several times by the OTP due to the 
pressure to act quickly with instructions ‘to drop a year and a half of investigative work and 
focus solely on the use of child soldiers,’ despite a substantial collection of evidence for other 
crimes. Others claim investigations had to stop to present evidence at court as soon as 
possible
98
 some claimed it was difficult to get the OTP’s permission to conduct field 
investigations. Additionally, that the OTP’s leadership repeatedly second-guessed 
investigators decisions and at times hindered the investigation process by re-directing 
investigative directions based on outside influences.
99
  
In Kenya, the OTP cited government obstruction of access to evidence and threats to 
witnesses as a major obstacle in gathering sufficient evidence.
100
 Nonetheless, many Kenyans 
felt that the Prosecutor could have conducted investigations more effectively to ensure that 
charges against the six initially accused were upheld.
101
 The charges in the Kenya cases have 
been more representative of the nature of the crimes committed during the country’s 2007-
2008 political upheavals, with charges of rape and other inhumane acts being confirmed for 
two of the four individuals charged, in addition to charges of murder, deportation and 
persecution.
102
 The appeal of a ‘narrow approach’ is that it appears to be clean, simple and 
more effective for obtaining a conviction. Prosecuting limited charges is clearly a less 
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daunting task than prosecuting for charges that address the breadth of crimes committed. 
Thus, using this narrow approach is potentially an effective way to get through investigations 
rapidly and secure a conviction. However, the pressure to reach a conviction should not 
outweigh the importance of discovering the truth and serving justice in a fair and 
representative manner. Furthermore, it is not necessarily true that prosecuting on limited 
charges will make it easier to secure conviction Ngudjolo was acquitted even though he was 
only charged for crimes committed during the attack on Bogoro in 2003.
103
  
The OTP’s narrow charging strategy has been very damaging to acceptance of the Court’s 
credibility. A 2006 NGO conference the Beni Declaration stated that: ‘...a limited charge is 
treacherous; with no improvements made, [the] charges risk offending the victims and 
strengthening the growing mistrust in the work of the Court.’104 André Kito, a Congolese 
human rights activist, stated: he ‘regretted that crimes like ‘sexual violence, summary 
executions and pillaging’ were excluded from the trial.105 To improve these perceptions and 
support for the ICC, the OTP must follow in practice its policy of charging crimes 
representative of the criminality and victimisation. Ensuring that justice is served to bolster 
support for the ICC is paramount. The OTP must ensure that investigations include 
examination of incriminating and exonerating evidence not only for crimes committed by 
opposition groups, but also by government officials. 
4.6 Challenges within the Court’s Judiciary (the Chambers) 
The Court’s Judiciary could be said to be inundated with a number of challenges including 
self‐criticism to move the Court forward.106 The role of the Pre‐Trial Chambers and their 
relationship with the Trial Chambers set forth in the Statute has not been definitively 
clarified. How can a sensible division of labour be achieved between pre‐trial and trial 
proceedings? How far can the Trial Chamber utilise the findings of the Pre‐Trial Chamber in 
order to avoid repetition when taking evidence?
107
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Another serious problem for the Court is adequate protection of witnesses and victims due to 
the far away location of ‘situation States.’ Those prepared to testify often face great risks and 
real threats. Procedural rules explicitly permit witnesses and victims to be made anonymous 
through ‘redactions’.108 Certainly, this fundamentally threatens the rights of the accused to a 
fair trial.
109
 The increased practice of ‘redactions’ during trials has become challenging for 
the Court; difficult to change if tactical advantages are derivable.
110
  
Disputes arise within the Court’s chambers about the roles victims and their organisations can 
play during proceedings. The dilemma is the victims participation envisaged by the Statute, 
but how is this achieved without upsetting proceedings? The current system of victim 
participation looks disappointing. It is symbolic, often distorted, by certain practices of legal 
representatives of the victims, such as, the trend that lawyers collect mandates from victims; 
with these documents they apply to be admitted as legal representatives of victims and to 
obtain legal assistance funds from the Court, which are quite generous, but uncertain whether, 
afterwards, they still inform and seek the views of the victims concerned. Victims must be 
given genuine and authentic participation. Alternatively, why not through the appearance of 
elders or self‐chosen representatives of villages affected by the Crimes in question?111 
4.7 Speed of Proceedings and Trial 
The fundamental right of the accused, to be tried without undue delay constitutes another 
challenge for the Court.
112
 Prosecution of crimes at national and international levels differ, 
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although, the processes require thorough consideration and determination of the criminal 
charges, the complexity and magnitude of international crimes are exceptional which 
influence the pace of conducting and concluding such trials.
113
 The reasons for the tempered 
pace of progress of the first proceedings before the ICC relate to a number of factors, such as 
interlocutory appeals, victims’ participation and the disclosure process of incriminating and 
exonerating evidence by the prosecution to the defence.  
Being the first permanent International Criminal Court, steps taken by the chambers, parties, 
participants and the Registry are on undiscovered grounds.
114
 The Rome Statute represents an 
international legal framework, based on a fusion of fundamental concepts of criminal and 
procedural laws, mainly taken from the Romano-Germanic and common law systems.
115
 
Although the practice in the system from which the concepts originate have grown and 
developed for centuries, but the sui-generis character of proceedings before the Court 
confirms, no common practice to rely upon.
116
 Furthermore, the character of the ICC leads to 
the conclusion that practices before the ad hoc international and hybrid tribunals
117
 are not 
per se applicable before it, but may provide guidance on a case by case basis.
118
 Some norms 
and provisions within the Statute resulted from compromises over legal, political and 
diplomatic views. Thus, there are lacunae within the legal framework of the Court which 
require a thorough process of interpretation.
119
As Professor Akande declared:
120
  
‘...it took far too long for the ICC to issue a detailed decision on the 
immunity [Head of State] issue.
121
 The decisions came almost three 
years after the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber first issued an arrest warrant 
for Bashir in March 2009 and after the ICC has on several occasions 
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reported States to the UN Security Council for failing to cooperate 
with regard to Bashir’ arrest and surrender.’  
The ICC judges delayed dealing with the immunity issue, then came the African Union (AU) 
argument that Al-Bashir was immune from arrest as a Head of State of a non-party State; 
calling on its members not to cooperate with the ICC; the resulting tension proved damaging 
to the Court; Article 98 ICCSt requires the Court to deal with the issue of immunity. In the 
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber on Al-Bashir’s arrest warrant and the Gaddafi Arrest 
Warrant, the Chamber had held that: The current position of Omar Al-Bashir as Head of a 
non- Party State to the Statute has no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction over the present 
case.
122
 The Court believes it addressed the question of the position of Heads of States, but it 
failed to consider customary international law of immunity and the interplay between Articles 
27 and 98 of the Statute dealing with immunity but appears, contradictory at first glance, 
however, a supplementary discussion of the immunity will be examined in the next chapter.   
4.8 Restorative Justice  
The ICC’s unique mandate to provide restorative justice challenges the Court to define and 
establish adequate support system for victims. Different from other international tribunals, 
the ICC is permanent, with the potential to alleviate victims of the after effects of horrific 
crimes experienced. To maximise this potential, the Court’s overarching strategy must be 
streamlined to efficiently satisfy its four underlying principles, namely to: achieve positive 
complementarity, provide focused investigations/prosecutions, address the interests of 
victims, and maximise the impact of the Court’s work.123 Restorative justice is a judicial and 
social reform emerging from the legal framework of the Court. While the ICC proceedings 
enable victims to speak of their harms and experiences, their ‘voices’ are largely absent from 
its judgment. To address this issue, the ICC needs to develop and maintain a level of 
‘restorative justice coherence’ to manage victims’ expectations of its justice approaches.124 A 
core idea of restorative justice is that the people most affected by a problem should discuss 
within themselves how it should be dealt with. This has not been the case with the ICC.
125
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Certainly, the global economic crisis dominates discussions of the Court’s budget and future, 
the recession could be a factor affecting State Parties’ financial obligations. Additionally, 
many State Parties have lost faith in the Court’s ability to utilise its resources effectively. 
Hence, the ability of the Court to fully implement transitional justice is below expectation.  
4.9 Internal Oversight Mechanisms  
Complications inherent in complementarity and in determining gravity have exemplified 
problems in selecting situations by the OTP, further to these, politics and ‘a presumed 
African bias’ inhibits international support for the Court.126 In recent years, the ICC has come 
under concerted attacks by the political elites, State Parties and governments whose leaders 
are under scrutiny of the Court.
127
 These challenges have taken a range of forms, 
governments have at times sought to use the ICC as a political tool against political 
opponents, or to enhance leverage over recalcitrant States a tool which can be revoked when 
political interests require.
128
 Attacks on the Court’s legitimacy and manipulation as a political 
tool continue to affect the Court’s credibility; State Parties to the Court have grown to about 
123 States of which about 34 are AU members.
129
  
Seventeen years after the Court’s founding document and entering into force of the Rome 
Statute peace or justice is still illusive. The Court’s unique structure and jurisdiction are 
meant to provide a permanent global challenge to impunity. However, its legitimacy and 
credibility are undermined by its deficiencies. The Court experiences difficulties achieving 
intended results, taking nearly ten years from inception to deliver its first (March 2012) 
conviction. The declining credibility elicited by various challenges is systemic enabled by the 
ASP,
130
 an oversight mechanism for the Court.
131
 Politics inherent in such an assembly have 
prevented serious pursuit of its role. The ASP has failed to hold the Court accountable for its 
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dismal results; moreover,
132
 it is yet to address personnel issues that affect strategic decisions 
and the rules inherent in the procedural process of the Court.
133
 The ASP needs to be more 
assertive and more alive to its responsibilities, for the Court to ensure fruitful and reliable 
results. 
4.10 Judges of the International Criminal Court 
The ICC parades exceptionally qualified, capable, and committed judges but evident 
exceptions tend to overshadow this, such as ‘Judges with little or no trial experience’ that 
have allowed proceedings to drag coupled with ‘legally unfounded rulings.’134 These 
practices diminish the integrity of individual trials and create uncertain challenges for the 
future of the Court. William Pace from the Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
(CICC) observes thus: ‘a number of shouldn’t judges really be there.’135 Are judges not 
fundamental to the success of the Court? Consequently, is it not essential that the Judges are 
qualified and well versed in the processes of the ICC and international criminal justice? The 
Rome Statute (Article 36) outlines that judges shall:
136
 
• …be chosen from among persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity… 
• ‘…have established competence in criminal law and procedure and the necessary relevant 
experience… or have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as 
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights…’ 
• ‘…have excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the 
Court.’137  
Does recruiting Judges lacking these prerequisites ominously undermine the Court? It leads 
to loss of confidence in the Court; the fear that criminals will remain unpunished.
138
 A former 
Judge Adrian Fulford noted: ‘The Court will be judged by our ability to dispense 
international criminal justice at the highest level that means securing those accused of the 
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world’s most egregious crimes before the Court and delivering timely and fair justice.’139 
Cherif Bassiouni added another voice to Judge Fulford’s by stating that the acceptance of the 
ICC is largely contingent on ‘the respect and esteem in which its judges are held, of their 
competence and commitment to the cause.’140 In other words, the legitimacy and credibility 
of the Court directly result from judges and their ability to efficiently and effectively 
administer trials. Their deficiencies undermine the authority of the Court.  
Judges Kuniko Ozaki
141
 and Miriam Santiago
142
 illustrate the subpar quality of judges of the 
Court. Although Judge Ozaki fulfils the technical requirements of the Statute, she does not 
hold a law degree nor does she have any legal qualifications. Subsequently, the Court faces 
‘the prospect of a defence lawyer appealing a case on the basis that the judge was not 
qualified.’143 The appeal process will only increase trial time which desperately needs a 
substantial reduction. Judge Santiago, on the other hand, is a judge that fails to meet the 
requirements of the Statute; she does not speak fluently an official language of the Court.
144
 
Therefore, Ozaki and Santiago exemplifies the lack of adequate oversight actions from the 
ASP.
145
 This later resulted in the Bureau advancing the implementation of the Advisory 
Committee on nominations of judges
146
 outlined in the Statute
147
 and in 2011 the ASP 
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adopted recommendations from the Bureau to establish the Advisory Committee
148
 and in 
late 2012, elections decided the composition of the committee.
149
 
4.11 Challenges Extrinsic to the International Criminal Court  
Legitimacy- the ICTY and ICTR set precedents for international criminal justice by holding 
many perpetrators of heinous crimes accountable for their actions, which echoed the idea to 
establish a permanent international criminal court, the approval around the world is evinced 
by overwhelming participation at the Rome Conference. However, optimism for the Court's 
success was dampened at the outset when three of the UNSC's P5 members (the US, China 
and Russia) voted against its inception. Additionally, slow rate of adoption of the Statute, 
impact the Court in many ways. These factors served to undermine the intended apolitical 
nature of the Court, and greatly affect its legitimacy.
150
 
Legitimacy is cardinal to the Court’s success as it represents the collective acceptance of an 
authority that is deemed lawful and justified in their decisions over its sphere of influence.
151
 
This attribute is essential in maintaining the Court’s prominence in the global community as 
an objective and believable institution. Credibility is public recognition of the Court’s 
integrity and reliability; this credibility must first radiate from within the Court operations, 
structures, approaches and decisions a sum total of what can be said to be the behaviour of 
the Court which will manifest into external motivations towards the Court. Courts are 
inherently different from ordinary political institutions because they depend upon their 
unique makeup to fulfil the judicial commitments for which constituents hold them 
accountable. The processes and results of a court often contribute heavily to the framing of 
this opinion, and their capacity to ‘do justice and otherwise contribute to better the human 
condition’ relies heavily on democratic accountability and transparency.152 Nienke Grossman 
states that: ‘the extent to which an international court implements the objectives it was 
created for may also affect its legitimacy.’153 Thus, a court’s legitimacy is fundamentally 
                                                          
148
 ICC-ASP, ICC-ASP/11/Res 2, 21 November 2012. 
149
 Election of the Advisory Committee on Nominations- 2012 Nomination; modified 27 November 2012. 
150
 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP Oxford 1990) 41-50; Henry M and 
others, ‘The International Criminal Court, Confronting Challenges on the path to justice’ [2013] Jackson School 
of International Studies Task Force Report University of Washington. 
151
 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990) 41-50. 
152
 Henry M and others, ‘The International Criminal Court, Confronting Challenges on the path to justice’ 
[2013] Jackson School of International Studies Task Force Report University of Washington. 
153
 Grossman Nienke, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’ (2013) 86 Temple Law Review; 
Jackson M H and others, ‘The International Criminal Court Confronting Challenges on the Path to Justice’ 
[2013] Jackson School of International Studies Task Force Report University of Washington. 
183 
 
dependent on the public perception that it is operating to the fullest and best of its ability 
toward upholding the rule of law. The ICC is no exception. It is imperative that the ASP and 
other interested actors perceive the Court as fulfilling the goals laid out for it in the Statute.
154
 
Confusion in defining institutional roles is evident in many international justice institutions 
that is, to what extent should they punish perpetrators due to moral responsibility and in 
pursuit of some broader social goals, such as peace or reconciliation? The ICC considers that 
punishing perpetrators combats impunity, contributes broadly to peace and stability. The 
Court is also able to rebuild relationships as evident through reparation in the Thomas Dyilo 
case,
155
 the provisions on reparation and victim participation during trials provided for in the 
Statute, requires delivering justice that has direct and tangible impact on the parties 
involved.
156
 
Consequently, the Court is often criticised for being detached from the realities on ground in 
the affected States being based at The Hague far away from the victims. These problems thus 
undermine its legitimacy.
157
 The disengagement from local affairs is thus not merely a 
symptom of international approach to justice but a deliberate policy separating the act of 
punishing perpetrators from its likely political, legal, social and cultural consequences. Thus 
enhancing distributive justice -giving perpetrators what they deserve- or deterrent justice - 
eradicating a culture of impunity by dissuading future criminals from offending – should be a 
primary objective of the Court.
158
 Considering that the impact of justice is beyond the remit 
of the Court, which may hamper the Court’s work by jeopardising its perceived impartiality 
and serve to further distance the Court from and undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
local population.
159
 An objective in the preamble of the Statute is to deter egregious crimes 
by putting an end to impunity for perpetrators and thus contribute to the prevention, 
guaranteeing lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice.
160
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Thus, justice in the form of punishment should not be pursued for justice sake alone, but also 
to dissuade potential perpetrators from committing similar crimes. However, this challenge 
appears to be a narrower interpretation of its role going by the words of the former prosecutor 
of the ICC in 2007 in London. He held that:  
...International justice can’t bring change in a country, like Uganda 
with a leadership problem which is major, the ICC has to be modest in 
its inability to deal with all crimes, train lawyers and prosecutors for 
domestic jurisdiction (outside its scope) and still fulfil its judicial 
mandate.
161
 
The inability of the Court to capture or arrest the indicted Lord Resistance Army (LRA) 
leaders of Uganda (Joseph Kony)
162
 has made the Court more cautious approaching the 
situation in the DRC. Hence, focusing on less senior militia leaders such as Thomas Lubanga, 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo and emphasising that the Court’s primary role is to 
fulfil its legal mandate rather than selecting cases that it believes may have a tangible impact 
on the conflict situation in the DRC,
163
 such confused role is prevalent in international justice 
institutions because the actors involved usually come from and continue to be based outside 
the conflict zones they address. Questions of political impact take on greater significance for 
international institutions because of their openness to criticism that they unjustly impose 
international norms
164
 and violate the Sovereignty of states and citizens engulfed by 
conflict.
165
   
A Court of law must be perceived as legitimate
166
 in order to be trusted to make judgments 
that satisfy the people it serves. Credibility is equally vital because the ICC serves the global 
community. Its lack of enforcement mechanisms forces the Court to rely on the cooperation 
of national governments for successful investigations and prosecutions. If the Court is 
perceived as legitimate and credible, domestic governments will be more inclined to support 
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investigations and enforce arrest warrants.
167
 If the legitimacy and credibility of the Court 
increase, there will be a direct improvement in its effectiveness.
168
 
The Court’s Relations with National Governments- the disparagement that the ICC 
represents a form of neo-colonial imposition in the domestic affairs States and responding to 
issues of such results in managing complex relations with domestic governments and 
balancing respect for sovereignty of States in which the Court investigates with the need to 
address crimes committed by National governments,
169
 for instance, the ICTR faced 
difficulties in its relations with the Rwandan government which opposed the establishment of 
the Tribunal on grounds that it was based outside Rwanda with limited temporal 
jurisdiction
170
 from January to December 1994. Thus, ignoring previous crimes committed by 
the Hutu regime, while eschewing the death penalty for convicted genocidaires. Relations 
between the ICTR and Kigali soured further in 2000 when the ICTR chief Prosecutor Carla 
Del Ponte announced, she intended commencing investigation into alleged atrocities 
committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the ruling party in Rwanda. The 
government responded by blocking the travel of ICTR personnel and witnesses between 
Rwanda and Arusha, effectively stalling the Tribunal operations.
171
  
Although, the ICC is aware of local political issues and tries to build positive relations with 
national governments. The complementarity principle enables it to consider whether States 
are unwilling or unable to prosecute crimes. To make such determinations, the ICC needs 
close working relations with the national political/judicial officials. Furthermore, as the ICC’s 
temporal jurisdiction began in 2002 it will often have to investigate crimes during on-going 
conflict situations, thus requires it to cooperate with domestic officials to ensure the security 
of its investigators and other personnel.
172
  Beyond these challenges, the ICC has avoided 
prosecuting members of the Congolese and Ugandan government in other to ensure the 
security of its personnel on the ground to facilitate efficient investigations. But is the ICC 
serious about investigating Museveni’s role in the conflict?  Or aligned with the political elite 
in Ugandan government? These are unanswered questions, on the lips of watchers after the 
                                                          
167
 Henry M Jackson, and others ‘The International Criminal Court Confronting Challenges on the Path to 
Justice’ [2013] Jackson School of International Studies Task Force Report University of Washington.  
168
 ibid. 
169
 Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth, Jeremy Farrall (ed) The Role of International Law in Rebuilding 
Societies after Conflict (Great Expectations) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009) 260. 
170
 ibid.  
171
 ibid. 
172
 ibid.  
186 
 
former prosecutor Ocampo appeared with President Museveni at a London press conference 
in 2003 at the opening of the Uganda investigations.
173
 
The case selection in the DRC and Uganda led to a perception among many affected 
communities that the Court is linked to the governments. The choice of the Ituri warlords 
(Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo) exemplifies that investigating 
atrocities is problematic with immense political caution characterising the ICC’s strategy, 
other areas of serious conflict included Kinshasa with little evidence to connect President 
Kabila to atrocities committed in Ituri in spite suspicion of his previous support to various 
rebel groups including Germain Katanga’s (2nd conviction).174 FRPI (Front de Résistance 
Patriotique en Ituri) continuing violence in other provinces particularly North and South Kivu 
and Katanga where government forces and the Mai-Mai militia backed by Kabila are directly 
implicated in serious crimes,
175
 whilst Ituri displayed little capacity to destabilise the 
government, the researcher thinks it is another trade-off to ensure the security of ICC 
investigators/personnel and United Nations peacekeepers working in the conflict prone 
eastern region.  
It is also believed that the ICC intended to avoid implicating government officials in the lead-
up to the DRC’s first post-independence (July 2006) elections. Pressure from foreign donors 
on the ICC to avoid causing political instability was colossal.
176
 Principally, the UN and 
European Union (EU) decanted millions of Dollars towards the election, regarded as the most 
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expensive UN support poll in history.
177
 This sends a message to major perpetrators that their 
senior political or military status could insulate them from prosecution;
178
 apparently Bosco 
Natanda a senior military commander in the DRC and former leader of the Rwanda-backed 
rebel group the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), in 2009 became 
integrated into the Congolese army as part of a peace agreement.
179
 However, in 2013 
Natanda turned himself in and he is currently in custody of the Court at The Hague.     
In Uganda, the ICC investigates the LRA not the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) 
creating a perception of being one-sided, that the ICC has become Museveni’s political 
tool.
180
 In spite of local and international human rights groups reporting grave atrocities 
committed by the UPDF in Northern Uganda particularly the forced displacement of about 
1.5 million civilians into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps.
181
 Though Ocampo 
emphasised, that the ICC may investigate UPDF suspects given the reliance on government 
for continued presence in Uganda and its good relationship with key Ugandan officials, the 
approach would not lead to the much desired judicial results to build support among State 
Parties that will perceive it as an institution in the fight against impunity. Conversely, the 
danger that the Court is unwilling to prosecute difficult cases relating to crimes committed by 
senior government and military officials jeopardises the Court’s long time legitimacy among 
populations affected by conflict.
182
 
National Justice Institutions and the Rule of Law- the complementarity regime of the ICC 
is designed primarily to overcome problems associated with the concurrent system of the ad 
hoc tribunals and establish a better relationship with the domestic/transitional justice 
institutions. In the DRC and Ugandan situation complementarity was undermined, why? The 
ICC’s relation with national institutions could be said to be closer to the concurrent system 
than to complementarity, this is because the ICC played the dominant role. The Court’s focus 
                                                          
177
 ibid. 
178
 Museveni Uganda, DRC Kabila, Kenyatta Kenya.  
179
 In April 2012, Ntaganda led a mutiny and became one of the main leaders of a new Rwanda-backed rebel 
group, the M23. M23 fighters have been responsible for widespread war crimes, including summary executions, 
rapes, and forced recruitment of children; but in March 2013, following infighting between two M23 factions, 
Ntaganda turned himself in to the US embassy in Rwanda and was flown to The Hague where he awaits trial 
before the International Criminal Court. 
180
 Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth, Jeremy Farrall (ed) The Role of International Law in Rebuilding 
Societies after Conflict (Great Expectations) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009) 262. 
181
 ibid; Rebecca Horn, ‘Coping with displacement: problems and responses in camps for the internally 
displaced Intervention’ (2009) 7 The Northern Uganda IDP Profiling Study110 – 129. The Lead Donor Agency: 
United Nations Development Programme (Uganda September 2005). 
182
 ibid.  
188 
 
on Ituri which arguably has the best functioning local judiciary, while mass atrocities 
continue in provinces where judicial resources lack severely brings to question what 
complementarity is meant to achieve?
183
   
In Northern Uganda the ICC opened the case on grounds for which it is not adequately 
equipped to respond, to open an investigation on the basis that Uganda’s military and police 
capacity are deficient in addressing serious crimes, not minding the fact that the ICC itself 
has neither military nor police capacity.
184
 It has inadequately recognised the capacity of 
domestic transitional justice institutions to investigate and prosecute serious crimes. The ICC, 
a global institution appears more concerned with achieving legal successes with minimum 
standards than cooperating with local institutions to ensure that the Court assumes 
responsibility only for cases that cannot be prosecuted domestically such as those concerning 
sitting members of government, that Countries refuse to prosecute,
185
 without arrests there 
can be no trials and without the trials victims will again be denied justice and potential 
perpetrators may be encouraged to commit new crimes with impunity. As the Court does not 
have the power to arrest the accused, it is incumbent on states [in fact obligatory] or 
international organisations to help out. Thus, ensuring the necessary cooperation is a primary 
challenge for both the ICC and the State Parties.
186
 
Integrating with Affected Population- to who is justice delivered? Is it the international 
community? Affected victims or other parties? The ICC reveals itself as victim centred,
187
 
encourages victim participation at all stages of its operation, victims may make submission to 
chambers during trials or appeals. The Statute allows judges to include reparations in 
sentences.
188
 The first time an international court is empowered to require an individual to 
compensate victims. The ICC may require convicted perpetrators to provide reparations 
directly to the victims or through the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) established in 2002 and 
overseen by a board of directors.
189
 As the Court will rely on public acceptance for 
eyewitness testimony in gathering evidence, outreach therefore fulfils moral obligation and 
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vital to the Court’s success. However, there are numerous challenges for the Court to fulfil its 
mandate, role and judicial activities, hence, the Court must be understood by a variety of 
audience. In this respect, the Court’s outreach programme190 has been created to ensure that 
affected communities in situations subject to investigation or proceedings can understand and 
follow the work of the Court through the different phases of its activities. Outreach is one of 
the Court’s various external communications functions which also include external relations 
and public information as defined in the Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public 
Information and Outreach.
191
 The challenge of external relations refers to the constructive 
dialogue between the Court and States Parties, Non-States Parties, international 
organisations, Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) and other key partners with the aim 
of building and maintaining support and co-operation facilitating the Court’s ability to fulfil 
its statutory mandate. Whilst the challenge of public information relates to the process of 
delivering accurate and timely information about the principles, objectives and activities of 
the Court to the public at large as well as to specific audiences, through a variety of means.
192
 
Logistics, Safety and Security Challenges- the role of the ICC to bring an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes to the international community and to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes constitutes a sombre challenge. Consequently, the 
Court is active in situations of on-going conflicts where crimes continue to be committed and 
providing challenges in terms of security and protection. The important tasks for field offices 
are to conduct investigations for the Court. Additionally, field operations of the Court target 
facilitating victims’ applications for participation, protection, relocate witnesses and support 
counsel for the defence including conducting outreach programmes to the affected 
communities.
193
 Operations in regions of on-going conflict emphasise that security in the 
field is of ubiquitous concern, sensitive and must be carried out to ensure the safety of all 
staff members’, victims, witnesses and other parties involved. In this respect, field presence 
have, often, been reduced, cancelled or postponed.
194
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The OTP faces significant logistic challenges due to the nature of the Court’s field work. The 
speed with which they can perform their activities is influenced by the fact that the regions in 
which the work of the Court is conducted are not easily accessible. Moreover, the target 
groups with which the Court interacts with in the field represent a variety of ethnic groups 
within one region.
195
 The language barrier that exists in these circumstances is another factor 
of influence contributing to the overall challenges.  
Witness Reliability Challenges- a core problem with the ICC’s witness protection 
programme is that it relies on local partners to carry out protection measures. In Kenya, for 
instance two witnesses disappeared, while others are ‘recanting’. At times, witness protection 
agencies are accountable to the accused (Kenya) it is implausible that necessary testimonies 
would be obtained making it essential that the cases remain at the ICC. Initially envisaged in 
the Kenya case is that witnesses on one side of the political divide would testify against 
perpetrators on the other side. Now that Ruto and Kenyatta have formed a coalition, 
witnesses are required to testify, essentially, against their own. It is unclear how the Court 
would deal with this problem,
196
 for instance dropped ICC Witnesses (Samuel Kosgei and 
Simon Rotich), Speak out on ‘Coaching’ by the OTP to testify against Ruto. Kosgei added 
that he was also asked to say that he was present at a place where it is alleged that an oathing 
ceremony took place.
197
 ‘I was given details about oaths and told by the OTP to say that dogs 
were slaughtered at the Molo Milk Plant. But I don’t even know where this milk plant is,’ he 
claimed. Kosgei, who was accompanied by another witness, Simon Rotich, further claimed 
that he was given Sh50, 000 for his accommodation and a further Sh373, 000 for him to 
testify against Ruto. Rotich also alleged that he was given 3,000 euros (Sh348, 683) as an 
inducement to remain on the case. They both explained how they were taken to Arusha where 
they were ‘coached’ before being taken to the Netherlands.  
The duo claimed that they were intimidated by the OTP officials after indicating that they 
wanted to pull out of the case.
198
 ‘They took one of my children away and placed him in 
foster care to force me into testifying against Ruto and Sang. When I refused, they had me 
declared as an illegal immigrant in Netherlands but I was later released and my son was 
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brought back to us,’ alleged Rotich. Kosgei and Rotich both claimed that the initial accounts 
they gave to the Waki Commission and used by the OTP was changed and other details 
unknown to them inserted.
199
 The ICC investigation covers a wide area, during and or after 
conflicts and does so with limited resources, resulting in depending on partners for 
information about the environment in question. The Court needs local partners to help 
conduct outreach in local languages; in the field to liaise with victims and witnesses, facilitate 
victims’ participation in legal proceedings. The challenge is enormous to function efficiently 
and undertake these tasks. Thus, the Court relies on ‘intermediaries’200 who facilitate contact 
or provide a link between one of the organs of the Court or Counsel on the one hand, and 
victims, witnesses, beneficiaries of reparations or affected communities on the other hand.
201
 
Without intermediaries, the Court would be unable to function reasonably properly
202
 and 
implement the outreach helps to realise victims’ rights to participate in Court proceedings 
entrenched in the statute. 
Effectiveness and the Challenges of Victims Participation- the Rome Statute created the 
possibility for victim’s participation in proceedings before the Court, a breakthrough 
innovation in international criminal justice.
203
 Facilitating victim participation in proceedings 
before the Court allows victims’ voices to be heard, not only as witnesses providing 
testimony, but in their own right, as participants to the proceedings.
204
 The participation of 
victims is a key ingredient of trials and as such yet un-codified and undeveloped source of 
international criminal law. The Court therefore, creates a unique path for victims to 
participate as envisaged by the drafters of the Statute.
205
 The opportunities for participation 
and reparations to victims should be given meaningful effect while ensuring that the 
implementation of these rights will not jeopardise the rights of the accused guaranteed under 
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the Statute and other international treaties resulting in unfair trials.
206
 The participation of 
victims in proceedings creates several types of challenges.
207
 
First, are practical difficulties, the Court operates in complex (conflicts areas) circumstances 
with obstacles to reach large numbers of victims in unstable situations to ensure they know 
how to participate in proceedings before the Court and have the support needed to assist them 
in applying.
208
 Secondly, the challenges of victim participation are multi-faceted in legal 
terms. Although, the Statute and the Rules of the Court provide mechanisms for victims to 
participate directly in proceedings,
209
 the Chambers must supplement the structure provided 
in the Statute and make several important decisions on fundamental questions relating to 
victim participation,
210
 such as: at what stage can victims participate in proceedings before 
the Court? Who can be considered a ‘victim’ and what specific criteria should be applied 
during proceedings in Court? How can victims prove their identity and what document does 
the Court accept as evidence of their identity?  What role should the Court’s Office of Public 
Counsel for victims play, particularly in light of the large numbers of potential victims? How 
does the Court safeguard the safety and well-being of victims who participate in proceedings? 
What role could victims who want to remain anonymous have in proceedings before the 
Court? There have been several appeals on victims’ issues before the Appeals Chamber 
highlighting the difficulty of determining the Chambers interpretation of these questions. 
Victims’ applications to participate in proceedings have been received in all situations in the 
DRC, Uganda and Darfur.
211
 Considering the magnitude of crimes before the ICC, the 
number of participating victims may become such that their participation forms an additional 
factor of weight on the pace with which the proceedings can be concluded. Although, actual 
influence will depend on the scope of their right to present their views as part of the 
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proceedings and the modalities by which victims are to enjoy this right, it is important to note 
that this fundamental and novel concept is indeed one of the challenges for the ICC today.
212
 
Procedural Challenges of Disclosure- apart from the potential challenge of witness and 
victims’ protection and the power of the Trial Chamber to restrict disclosure of certain pieces 
of prosecution evidence to the defence. The need to consider how disclosure of information 
can impact on communities in the affected areas is important.
213
 The Court has been 
confronted with intricate questions and particularly in relation to the situation in DRC where 
the Chambers have had to address the whole system of disclosure in relation to the 
confirmation of charges and the preparations prior to the commencement of the trial.
214
 The 
Trial Chamber may authorise non-disclosure of the identity of witnesses prior to the 
commencement of a trial if the protection or the safety of witnesses, victims and members of 
their family requires doing so. The Court must also safeguard the rights of the accused and 
strike a balance to ensure that the safety and security of victims and witnesses are not 
compromised.
215
 Additional factor relating to restrictions on disclosure which both Pre-Trial 
Chamber I and Trial Chamber I have had to confront is the treatment of confidential 
information, materials and the possible tension between the disclosure requirements pursuant 
to Article 67(2)
216
 and agreements of confidentiality pursuant to Article 54(3) (e).
217
 This in 
fact, created problems during the Prosecutor v Thomas Dyilo case (see chapter 3.1.8) that the 
Trial Chamber stayed the proceedings; awaited the determination of the Appeals Chamber on 
the issue.  
The Court and States Cooperation- States cooperation is a crucial factor in determining the 
credibility of the ICC. The cooperation of States and other organisations in carrying out its 
responsibility is key to the success of the Court. Part 9 of the Statute provides legal 
framework of international cooperation and judicial assistance on the basis of which State 
Parties shall cooperate with the Court during investigation and prosecution of crimes within 
its jurisdiction.
218
 Support and cooperation is required in a variety of activities including the 
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arrest and surrender of suspects.
219
 Cooperation with states and non-states parties is essential 
for investigating, charging, and enforcing arrests under the Court’s jurisdiction. Better 
encompassing decisions will ensure its longevity; a global presence aimed at deterring mass 
atrocities and maintaining international peace and security is more desirable.
220
 The ICC is 
dependent on effective cooperation
221
 with State Parties on key issues of arrest and surrender 
of the accused; the lack of enforcement power to detain and arrest suspects weakens the 
Court’s ability.222  
Another difficulty the Court faces is volatile security situations and the complexity of 
collecting relevant evidence.
223
 Serious crimes committed during armed conflicts and at other 
times, a result of superior orders and efforts to cover-up responsibilities for the crimes. 
Pursuing its task, the Court is caught between poles of brutal power politics, law and human 
rights. Thus, the Court is hampered by adverse political storms, indeed political rebuke. The 
Darfur situation is an example.
224
 Since 2007 it has become particularly noticeable that 
certain State Parties try to restrict funding for the Court. This is apparent and persistent, often 
same States make sweeping demands for more outreach for victims, more and more situations 
and more work referred to the Court.
225
 
4.12 Ratification of Aggression, External Complexities and the Court  
A challenge ahead, is that all possible means must be exhausted to ensure that the ICC will, 
after 2017 exercise jurisdiction over the Crime of aggression. A task essentially for State 
Parties, to ratify, support and make possible, the implementation of the Crime of aggression 
amendments adopted through a consensus decision, at Kampala in June 2010.
226
 Early 
ratification by as many State Parties as possible is the best protection against possible 
attempts to reopen the Kampala compromise. However, more efforts are necessary to make 
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the criminalisation of aggression a reality.
227
 The Court should endeavour to do all within her 
powers to encourage State Parties and non-members alike to ratify the amendments. The 
Rome Statute recognises the primacy of national prosecutions. It thus reaffirms state 
sovereignty, especially the sovereign and primary rights of states to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction.
228
 Thus, creates two levels of international criminal jurisdiction which 
complement each other. The first level is by states with their national criminal law systems, 
(complementarity principle) over those responsible for international crimes.
229
 The second 
level is by the International Criminal Court, the Court will only act as a last resort in cases 
where national criminal law systems are unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.
230
 
This complexity needs time to be fully accepted and observed by all concerned to realise the 
full potentials. Complementarity has created conflicting forces. Hence, a dilemma for the 
Court, if States discharge their primary obligations to prosecute crimes or genuine national 
reconciliations,
231
 the Court will have reduced cases on the one hand, on the other hand, the 
Court needs exemplary and successfully handled cases if at all. Why? It is because the 
international community and State Parties have the legitimate desire to see concrete evidence 
that the ICC is a meaningful and useful institution. The second major limitation is that the 
Court is fully dependent on effective cooperation and support of State Parties. The Court has 
no executing machinery/force of its own; dependent on effective and timely cooperation from 
State Parties.
232
 A design by the founders, which means, the Court is characterised by this 
structural weakness, to enforce decisions. Also by default that state sovereignty should 
prevail.
233
 A third limitation is the logistics (see above 4.11) problem.
234
 Other limitations 
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and impediments are ‘Realpolitik’ and States’ interests which will continue as obstacles to 
the effectiveness of the ICC.
235
 To be a more credible international court, it is essential that it 
continues to conducts her activities in a manner purely judicial, objective, and apolitical.
236
 
4.13 The Effectiveness of Victims Participation  
Victims’ participation lacks a formal framework making its application during investigations 
and trial proceedings difficult. The unprecedented approach to victim participation is fraught 
with bureaucratic, logistics, and communicative hindrances including: accessibility for 
victims, inefficiencies processing the applications by the Court, and unrealistic expectations 
of victim participation. These issues weaken the Court’s ability to achieve representative, 
restorative, and swift justice. Modifications by the Court can address the issues and focus on 
the fundamental objective of the ICC to deliver justice. The Court extends its reach beyond 
punitive justice to restorative justice with victim participation mechanisms outlined in the 
Statute and RPE.
237
 Restorative justice, also known as reparative justice, relies on the premise 
that a victim’s ultimate resolve relies on ability to influence the extent of and eventually 
receive, reparations. It is a dedication to involve victim’s personal interests in pursuit of 
justice by actively participating in the process to influence reparations by offenders.
238
 In 
participating, victims obtain the conceptual rights to an acknowledgement of their harm, 
incorporation in the judicial process to pursue truth-finding, and access to reparations that 
consider protection, compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation. While victim participation 
surfaced in 2006, the first decision on reparations is yet to be fully rendered. ‘Victims in 
cases before the ICC hail from poor backgrounds, weakened economies and poor social 
safety nets’239 the delay is harmful to the prospect of restorative justice and challenges the 
credibility of the Court. 
The application process is cumbersome and contributes to trial inefficiencies. In practice, 
victim participation has not had the effects intended by the ICC. It has been costly, despite 
                                                          
235
 Cherif M Bassiouni, ‘The International Criminal Court: Quo Vadis?’ (2006) 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 421; Kai Ambos, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes at the National and International Level: 
Between Justice and Realpolitik’ in Wolfgang Kaleck, Michael Ratner, Tobias Singelstein & Peter Weiss (ed) 
International Prosecution of  Human Right Crimes (Springer ,England 2007) 224. 
236 Hans-Peter Kaul, ‘Construction Site for More Justice: The International Criminal Court after Two Years’ 
(2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 370; Hans-Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court: 
Current Challenges and Perspectives (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 575. 
237
 ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence Rule 85. 
238
 Aronchick Liane, ‘Question and Answers on Victim Participation at the ICC’ (the Hague, 22 February 2013). 
239
 ibid. 
197 
 
unavailable resources for reparations needed to give meaning to victim participation.
240
 The 
nature of crimes reviewed at the ICC is the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community.’ These crimes result in massive number of victims, and victim 
participation aims to extend participation in the trial beyond witness testimony to 
acknowledge the amount of people affected. Distinct from witness statements, victim 
participants include those that are either not eligible or do not wish to serve as a witness, the 
opportunity to submit their testimonies. Technically, this benefits the Court and the victims. 
The intended benefit to the Court is to facilitate ‘truth finding’ in a trial. Victim participation 
is meant to expand the Chamber’s perspective of the situation and facilitate a fair verdict. The 
intended benefit for victims include: facilitating empowerment and disclosure in their judicial 
participation, awarding restorative justice, enabling healing and rehabilitation and facilitating 
community reconciliation through reparations.
241
  
The definition of a victim was carefully formulated to achieve these aims while also 
maintaining impartiality. Rule 85 of the RPE identifies victims before the ICC as ‘natural 
persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.’242 This natural person must be someone whose ‘safety, physical, 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy’243 have been harmed ‘individually or 
collectively’ by the crimes which occurred in a situation identified by the ICC.244 A victim 
can also include organisations or institutions with humanitarian facets.
245
 To be recognised as 
a victim, one must meet these requirements of victim status upon review of their application. 
Victims of alleged crimes are encouraged to submit an application to the Victim Participation 
and Reparations Section (VPRS) within the Registry with their personal accounts of harm. In 
the application they can elect to apply as a participant or as a victim seeking reparations. The 
Registry is required to log all potential applicants before passing the applications on to 
Chambers, which then decides whether victims will receive victim status to either participate 
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or to be considered for reparations. If the victim is admitted as a participant they are also 
eligible for reparations.
246
  
A victim can qualify to participate in two capacities. First, victims can be admitted to a 
situation under investigation or to a particular case. Victims participating in the trial stage 
must have to specify the aspect of the proceeding in which they wish to participate. When a 
victim is admitted in one of the capacities, Chambers refer their approved application back to 
the Registry, which then assigns legal representatives. In practice, Common Legal 
Representatives (CLRs) have been the norm. Through their legal representative, participants 
are allegedly given the ‘right to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence during the trial 
proceedings.’247 Following a trial, victims may ‘challenge the admissibility or jurisdiction of 
a case’ in the investigation phase by ‘submitting observations to the Court.’248 These rights 
seem supremely advantageous in the ability to influence reparations. 
However, the reality of victim participation is not as rewarding as alleged, of the four 
underlying obstacles of victim participation two pertain to limitations of the Court 
mechanisms and the other two to the nature of crimes pursued by the Court. Other obstacles 
within the Court include maintaining impartiality in a case despite the limited resources at the 
ICC. Additional obstacles pertain to the massive number of victims affected and their 
inaccessibility culturally and geographically. Addressing these obstacles without a formally 
streamlined framework for the Court has created logistic, bureaucratic, and communicative 
issues harming the prospect of a fair and impartial trial as well as its credibility. The key 
issues include: the difficulty for victims in applying, the inefficient evaluation of victim’s 
applications at the Court, and the mismanagement of false expectations in victim 
participation. These issues are not irreconcilable and thus can be amended with appropriate 
attention.
249
 The Court will hardly have the capacity to recognise the countless number of 
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victims of serious crimes.
250
 The Lubanga trial alone attracted about 2,228 victim’s 
applications to participate only 129 got admitted as participants,
251
 represented by two legal 
teams.
252
 A victim’s ability to participate in an ICC proceeding should not be determined by 
the proficiency in applying, but the current application process does just that. Applications 
are difficult to access and their requirements for identity and submission are rigorous given 
the reality of victims’ circumstances. Victims of the Court are spread over vast areas of the 
region under investigation, often in remote areas, making both access and submission a 
difficult exploit. The application is only available online on the ICC website and at scanty 
field offices in regions under investigation
253
 besides, for an application to be considered it 
must be sent to the Court in hardcopy.
254
 The application process could be frustrating for 
victims.
255
 Rule 89 of the RPE require victims to ‘provide an array of personal information to 
prove their identity, information on their experience of crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
Court and justify how they suffered harm.’256  
In Uganda, ‘many areas have been…ravaged by conflict; communication and travelling 
between these areas are difficult.’257 Also, victims have to apply and undertake these 
obstacles individually even members of the same family are required to submit separate 
applications.
258
 Considering the obstacles victims of crimes investigated by the ICC face, 
victim participation leaves more to be desired. Reassessing the bureaucracy and logistics 
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involved could free up the process of victim participation for reparations, making victim 
participation more meaningful. Also to resolve this dilemma, the Court may frequently elect 
collective representation for victim participation. Although, collective representation can 
dilute meaningful Court-Victim relationships to symbolic levels if not properly managed. 
At times victims who are successfully admitted to participate are often difficult to access, due 
to remote locations and some security concerns, creating obstacles in realising their rights in 
participation. Compromised communication impairs the victim’s right to be informed of trial 
proceedings and public decisions in order to make their relevant submissions.
259
 A victim’s 
desire to be a participant in a trial may arise from the desire to have their suffering 
acknowledged to influence the restoration of their psychological state and their 
community.
260
 Breach in communication could dilute meaningful participation, which 
compromises restorative justice and contributes to a deflated perception of the Court. Some 
victims oppose ICC involvement… for fears that prosecutions will prolong bloodshed and 
that foreign models of retributive justice will not bring reconciliation to their communities.
261
 
Restorative justice relies on communication with victims to incorporate them in the pursuit of 
justice in order to adhere to their personal and community rehabilitation. If this 
communication is polluted with misgivings and fallacious promises, the premise of 
restorative justice is compromised. Hence, it is unwise of the Court to continue to allow 
misconceptions to discredit their mission to provide justice.
262
 
4.14 The State of Reparations 
The Court face challenges when a defendant is declared penniless and unable to pay.
263
 There 
is difficultly establishing how the OTP and the Registry investigate the resources of 
defendants, public records of such procedures are unavailable.
264
 The challenge of making the 
departments that investigate reparations more effective by reporting their process and 
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procedures through public records thereby improving transparency will ensure the 
effectiveness of the investigation and also prevent flaws within the internal structure of the 
Registry and the OTP. 
The RPE 98 clarifies that ‘The Court may order an award for reparations against a convicted 
person to be deposited with the Trust Fund.
265
 The award for reparations thus deposited in the 
Trust Fund shall be separated from other resources of the Trust Fund and shall be forwarded 
to each victim.’266 The role of the TFV267 is crucial in the ICC’s reparations system because it 
not only accepts the reparations but also allocates it to the victims. Although, the award could 
potentially be on an individual or collective basis, the TFV allocates reparations mostly 
through collective awards because it is practically more difficult to distribute reparations to 
individual victim.
268
 In 2012, the ICC ordered its first reparations awards against Thomas 
Lubanga.
269
 However, these should be paid by the TFV, not by Lubanga because of his 
indigent status. TC-1 found that Lubanga has no asset, and no property identifiable, that can 
be used for reparations purposes.
270
 Lubanga is only able to contribute non-monetary 
restitution; participation on his part would be through symbolic gestures, such as public or 
private apology to the victims.
271
 The fact is that Lubanga will not contribute any financial 
asset to compensate the loss by victims, the tasks will be undertaken by the TFV as decided 
by TC-1. However, although undertaking Court-ordered reparations awards by the TFV are 
improvements over the previous systems of victim redress, there are still problems that the 
ICC must consider in regard to its current process. 
4.15 Responses to the Court’s Requests 
Despite the ASP’s actions to promote State cooperation, four main problems have emerged:  
1) Lack of timeliness in response to the Court’s requests,  
2) Slow pace of enacting implementing legislation,  
3) Erratic cooperation in enforcing arrests, and  
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4) Lack of funding relating to the UNSC situation referrals.  
These problems constitute major hindrances to the Court’s work; the ASP must prioritise 
steps to address them.
272
 The Court makes a range of requests to States for assistance in 
investigating, prosecuting, arresting, sentencing, tracing, freezing of assets, witness 
relocation, and many more. An examination of the ICC reports on cooperation from 2009 to 
2011 reveals that while cooperation with the Court was ‘generally forthcoming,’ one trend of 
concern to the Court was the ‘considerable number of cooperation requests’ to which states 
did not adequately respond.
273
 The Court states that: the failure of ‘states’ to cooperate can 
compromise its ability to carry out its mandate and that unanswered requests generate 
additional costs to human resource.
274
 Responses common to States that fail to fulfil 
cooperation requests is that they lack relevant procedures in their domestic laws 
(implementing legislation) to complete such requests.
275
 Nonetheless, the Court accentuates 
that States lack of implementing legislation ‘does not absolve them to be fully cooperative, an 
obligation to the Court under the Statute.’276 Besides, the implementing legislation, the ASP 
never holds States accountable for not fulfilling the Court’s requests in a timely manner. 
Generally, there are no consequences for failing to respond to and or execute the Court’s 
requests. Under Article 87(7) of the Statute, the Court can refer an instance of non-
cooperation to the Assembly of States Parties.
277
 However, the 2009 report
278
 stated that the 
Court had not chosen to exercise that power in any of the cases in which States failed to 
comply with a request.
279
 Only in 2011did the Court take actions against Chad and Malawi 
for failing to arrest Al-Bashir during his visits to those countries.
280
 
Implementing legislation refers to national legislation that integrates the Rome Statute into 
National jurisdiction for the fulfilment of State obligations requested under the Statute.
281
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Article 88 obliges States to enact implementing legislations.
282
 Article 86 is specific on State 
obligations to cooperate. State Parties must cooperate with the Court on a range of matters, 
including but not limited to: the arrest and surrender of suspects, execution of searches, 
seizures, transport of witnesses, suspects, sentenced persons, providing requested records, 
documents, protection of victims, tracing, freezing assets and properties including producing 
of evidence.
283
 The wide range of responsibilities serves as a reminder of the extent to which 
the Court relies on State cooperation to succeed in its mission.
284
 However, the 
implementation of Article 88
285
 by ‘State Parties’ has been slow to occur, 16 years plus after 
the creation of the Statute, about half of Party States have not met one of the most critical 
Statute obligations. In 2014, about 65 State Parties out of the 123 members have enacted 
some form of implementing legislation or the other.
286
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Additionally 35 State Parties have draft legislation that is awaiting passage.
287
 However, 
some State Parties that have enacted implementing legislation; adopted the Statute definition 
of crimes, but have not developed procedures for cooperation. When that is taken into 
account, not all State Parties have implemented legislation on cooperation with the Court.
288
 
The lack of implementing legislation poses a barrier to full cooperation with the Court.
289
 In 
the absence of a more rigorous demand for States to prioritise implementing legislation, there 
are few incentives for states to speed up the process. Just as with cooperation with Court 
requests, it is necessary for the ASP to establish accountability mechanisms in this area. The 
mechanism could potentially combine regular reporting requirements and deadlines for 
various stages of the drafting and legislation passage process. 
Unaccomplished arrest warrants are troubling;
290
 this is due to erratic cooperation by States. 
Despite the fact that France, Belgium, the DRC, and Côte d’Ivoire have arrested and 
surrendered suspects to the ICC, but Sudan, and some other African states have declined to 
enforce arrest warrants in some situations such as: Sudan (Darfur) and Kenya for various 
political reasons.
291
 It is imperative that the ASP does not allow States to shield perpetrators 
from prosecution. Whilst the ASP has responded to States’ failure to execute arrest warrants 
by adopting procedures on non-cooperation, the experience so far suggests limited efficacy of 
the procedures, which are mainly aimed at fostering dialogue between the non-cooperative 
States and the Bureau.
292
 The Bureau in 2012 took these steps with Chad and Malawi after 
both allowed Al-Bashir to visit their territories. Malawi was willing to engage with the 
Bureau and ultimately chose not to allow Al-Bashir enter into its territory again without being 
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arrested, which resulted in the relocation of the 2010 African Union Summit to Ethiopia.
293
 In 
contrast, Chad reaffirmed its position with the AU
294
 and that its actions in not arresting Al-
Bashir were consistent with international law and the Statute,
295
 and also the researcher is in 
favour of this position of non-compliance.  
The mixed results that the Bureau encountered indicate that the procedures on non-
cooperation need to be further developed and strengthened, particularly to emphasise the role 
of diplomatic pressure. While Malawi eventually reversed its position after its interaction 
with the Bureau, it is likely that this decision was also influenced by the fact that the US had 
frozen $350 million of Malawi’s developmental aid fund.296 The US foreign aid agency 
Millennium Challenge Corporation specifically highlighted Al-Bashir’s visit as one of the 
concerns that led to the suspension of funds.
297
 
4.16 States and The Immunity Challenge Before The Court 
The key question about immunity before the ICC is: to what extent does immunity arise in 
the context of the Court’s proceedings?298 The question divides into two, first does an 
accused have immunity from prosecution before the ICC? Secondly, does the accused, 
separate from the ICC proceedings, have immunity from National authorities acting on the 
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request of the ICC? Customary international law should be the Court’s approach on this 
issue.
299
 The ICC finds no immunity before international tribunals and no immunity if 
National authorities are acting at the request of the Court. This broad approach is weak 
Professor Akande argues. He noticed that the customary law approach by the Court deals 
with ratione materiae jurisdiction and not ratione personae jurisdiction. Also the customary 
law examples cited by the court are more of situations where States are (ICC) treaty bound, 
rather than Non-State Parties to the ICC. Akande favours an approach that removes immunity 
before the ICC and within National systems of states that have become parties to the Rome 
Statute. However, in the case of UN Security Council referrals for situations involving Non-
State parties, he argues that those States can be seen as bound in the same manner as a State 
Party.
300
 The Malawi decision,
301
 issued a day before the Chad decision, is the first detailed 
decision regarding the immunity of Al-Bashir by the Court. The Pre-Trial Chamber held: 
‘That customary international law creates an exception to Head of 
State immunity when international courts seek a Head of State’s arrest 
for the commission of international crimes. There is no conflict 
between Malawi’s obligations towards the Court and its obligations 
under customary international law; therefore, Article 98(1) of the 
Statute does not apply.’
302
 
The Chamber therefore, held that Malawi and Chad by failing to arrest and surrender Al-
Bashir failed to comply with their obligations to cooperate with the ICC.
303
 Moreover, the 
Chamber held that it has ‘sole authority’ to decide whether immunities are applicable in a 
                                                          
299
 ICCSt (n 1) Article 21 ‘Applicable law’. 
300
 Dapo Akande, ‘State Cooperation and Immunities The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court: 
Achievements, Impact and Challenges [2012] Universiteit Leiden Grotius Centre for International Legal 
Studies; Dire Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi On Cooperation, Immunities, and Article 98’ 
(2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 199. 
301 Decision Pursuant to the Article 87(7) on the Failure of the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the 
Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court With Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al 
Bashir, Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 December 2011; Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 
December 2011. 
302 ibid para 43. 
303 ICCSt (n 1) Article 86. 
207 
 
particular case
304
 and that by failing to bring the issue of immunity to the ICC for 
determination there had been a further breach of the obligation to cooperate.
305
 
The result reached by the Pre-Trial Chamber that Al-Bashir is not immune from arrest is 
debateable; the reasoning and approach of the Court causes more to be desired and has faced 
criticism from academics like Schabas, Akande, Dire Tladi and others. Stating that as a 
matter of international law National authorities could not depart from the immunity which 
customary international law grants Heads of States from arrest by other Nations the 
researcher is again in support of this notion. 
4.17 External Influences On The International Criminal Court 
A further phenomenon; a challenging reality which can affect the Court‘s position and make 
its work the subject of international debate or controversy [as we currently have] concerns the 
temptation for some States wanting to instrumentalise the Court for their political purpose 
and interests.
306
  ‘As a former German Ambassador; a Judge of the ICC [late] I am neither 
blind nor naïve in this regard.’307 Already, the so‐called self‐referrals of some African State 
Parties like Uganda and the DRC
308
  have led to comments that leaders of those States used 
the ICC against political opponents. But as a legal and a judicial institution governed by the 
Statute we have to apply its Articles and there is no doubt that we have State Party referrals 
under Article 13(a) ICCSt; there is also no doubt that terrible mass crimes have been 
committed in Uganda and the DRC
309
 which the ICC had to investigate and prosecute.
310
 It is 
a fact that the referral of crimes committed in Darfur/Sudan through Security Council 
resolution 1593 in 2005 and the subsequent ICC activities including the arrest warrant against 
President Al-Bashir led to considerable international debate. A further noteworthy case is the 
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referral of the Libyan situation through SC Resolution 1970 in March 2011. ‘The Security 
Council’s decision demonstrates that the ICC is indeed an international reality.’311  At this 
juncture the researcher ponders on the SC’s in-decision regarding Syria if truly in the words 
of Judge Kaul that the: ‘SC decision demonstrates clearly…’ the intention to protect 
humanity or a tool in the hands of the high and mighty. There are also other, less positive 
elements and circumstances which have to be considered such as: first, the total financial 
burden of the Libya investigation was on the ICC and not on the UN this affected seriously 
the Courts budgetary planning for 2011/2012.
312
 Second, Nationals of Non‐States Parties, for 
example US nationals, are exempted from ICC Jurisdiction, with exactly the same provisions 
in the Statute. Lastly, the Court, its Presidency was not consulted or informed as a courtesy 
measure before the referral.
313
 
It is worthy of note that whatever powerful States or the SC decide with regard to the ICC 
should not be held against the Court, in such situations the Court is helpless; the ‘Security 
Council’ continues to be the masters of the game. We know this from experience, lack of 
support or political moves by States which make the role of the ICC questionable or 
controversial may lead to misunderstandings or criticisms to which the Court, as a purely 
judicial, neutral and non‐political institution, cannot really respond to.314 Hence, the ICC has 
been labelled a tool of powerful nations in its selection of situations to investigate. The Court, 
however, maintains that its choice of cases is based primarily on a situation’s ability to meet 
the requirements for investigations. First on Jurisdiction, whether the situation occurs in a 
member state (if not, the Court can only investigate the situation following a UNSC referral) 
and involves crimes that fall within the Court’s mandate. Second, admissibility whether the 
government is unable or unwilling to prosecute offenders in contrast to a country calling for 
national prosecutions via the complementarity principle and whether crimes committed meet 
the threshold of gravity. Lastly, in the interests of justice, the Court must belief that an 
investigation would promote justice in the situation.
315
 Nonetheless, Countries such as 
Palestine, Colombia, and Syria, have been cited as situations protected from investigation by 
powerful nations better known as non-accountability regions or accountability free zones.  
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The Court’s failure to investigate situations involving States with ties to powerful UNSC 
member, (a comprehensive discussion of this issue is examined in the next chapter on 
jurisprudence of the ICC) coupled with its continued focus on Africa, fostering the belief of 
many that the ICC is subject to political influence.
316
 The Court’s decision to open more 
investigations into African situations reveals the tendency to overlook situations involving 
‘allies’ with UNSC members. Unease about the ICC’s political nature grows stronger as 
situations warranting investigation continue to go unchecked by the Court, and its failure to 
address such concerns has only served to enhance the distrust and frustration of some States.  
4.18 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the Court in her attempt to prosecute under Article 5 ICCSt, its 
jurisdiction ratione materiae by examining the Court’s prosecutional strategies and 
difficulties through its internal and external challenges. The chapter establishes that the 
success of the OTP is relatively a direct measure of the Courts overall success; without it the 
ICC cannot achieve its mandate or prove itself as a credible and unbiased institution. The 
OTP therefore cannot serve as a successful organ of the ICC until it resolves a number of 
problems within its operation. While some of these problems are concrete and structural, 
many pressing issues have to do with the policy, leadership, and motivation within the Office. 
Both the tangible and intangible problems within the OTP must be resolved to create an 
environment in which it can operate effectively. Judges in both the Pre-Trial and Trial 
Chambers accuse the OTP of sloppy work, in some cases claiming that it had little or no 
factual basis for its allegations. This is largely a reflection of poor leadership and structural 
defects within the Office, as such effectiveness must be enhanced such as continuity amongst 
investigative teams is important rather than rotating investigators between conflicts; the size 
of teams should be planned based on the scope of the conflict and remain consistent 
throughout the duration of the investigation.
317
 The ICC’s success will be defined mostly by 
its trial record and strongly, focused investigations are required to yield results. The aim 
should be to increase the likelihood of charges being confirmed in PTCs by producing better 
and substantial evidence.  
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The difficult task on the part of accomplishing justice by the Court has been broadly 
evaluated mindful of the fact that success within the Courts operation will contribute a 
milestone to the total overall dispensation of justice. However, States parties must draw 
appropriate conclusions from the fact that the Court has no executive powers, no police, no 
armed forces, limited financial resource and other executive mechanisms. State cooperation is 
essential to the Court’s success in delivering justice. Consequently, State Parties and the 
Court must in a foreseeable future develop a new system of best practices and effective 
cooperation.
318
 The ICC can only be as strong as the States parties make it to be. In the next 
chapter the Jurisprudence of the Court will be considered to establish the culture of the Court 
since its inauguration.   
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Chapter Five 
The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court 
 
… Attempts to use foreign models of judicial organisations and procedures may lead to frustration and may thus 
be a misuse of the comparative method...  
Otto Kahn-Freund 
1
 
 
5.1 Preamble 
This chapter examines the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (the Court/ICC)
2
 
and relevant jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY),
3
 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
4
 and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).
5
 Examining the situations and cases under the jurisdiction of 
the ICC will be the main focus, and the purpose of the chapter, is to comprehend the 
challenges confronting the Court and in establishing the culture of the Court prosecuting 
under Article 5 of the Rome Statute (the Statute).
6
 Crime against humanity (CAH)
7
 is often 
charged in all situations and one of the bases for the Court’s ‘ratione materiae’ jurisdiction. 
The chapter also critiques the jurisprudence of the Court with the hope of moving towards a 
standardised theory of CAH, that not only respects State sovereignty but also within the 
mandate of the Court to prevent and punish ‘unimaginable atrocities that profoundly touch 
the conscience of humanity; devoid of unnecessary external influences to prosecute.’ In all, 
of the 8 situations investigated by the Court, 22 cases are under prosecution out of numerous 
communications received by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The chapter accomplishes 
by stimulating discussions and analyses of the Court’s case laws in relation to other criminal 
tribunals. 
                                                          
1
 Otto Kahn-Freund ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 the Modern Law Review 1. 
2
 2187 UNTS 3 37 ILM 999 (1998) (ICCSt). 
3
 UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993) 32 ILM 1203 (1993) (ICTYSt). 
4
 UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994) 33 ILM 1598 (1994) (ICTRSt). 
5
 2178 UNTS 138; UN Doc S/2002/246 (SCSL). 
6
 ICCSt (n 2). 
7
 ICCSt (n 2) Article 7. 
212 
 
5.2 Jurisprudence on Immunity before International Tribunals 
The case of Malawi’s failure to arrest Al-Bashir, a Head of a State not party to the ICC, 
despite the arrest warrant by the ICC,
8
 and Malawi’s argument of Al-Bashir’s immunity 
under customary international law,
9
 and also, that it did not arrest President Al-Bashir being a 
member of the African Union (AU); it had aligned itself with the position of the AU, calling 
on its members not to cooperate with the ICC in respect to the Al-Bashir case.
10
 
Consequently, in the arrest warrant decisions on Al-Bashir
11
 and Gaddafi,
12
 the Pre-Trial 
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Chamber referred to Article 27 of the Statute which provides (1) that official capacity as 
Head of State or Government shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under 
the statute and (2) that immunities which may attach to the official capacity of a person under 
national or international law shall not bar the Court from exercising jurisdiction. However, 
referring to Article 98(1),
13
  which states that: 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
The Chamber accepts academic literature and suggests that, acceptance of Article 27(2) 
ICCSt, implies waiver of immunities for the purposes of Article 98(1) ICCSt with respect to 
proceedings conducted by the Court. However, the critical issue is: what is the position of the 
Head of a State that is not party to the Rome Statute? And therefore has not accepted Article 
27 ICCSt. The chamber held that: international law does not afford immunity to Heads of 
States in respect of proceedings before international courts. In its view, this means that Heads 
of States not party to the Rome Statute are not immune from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Yet, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber went on to say that all national authorities arresting and surrendering 
the Head of State to an international tribunal would not act inconsistently with their 
obligations under international law.
14
 Thus Article 98(1) was not even engaged. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber in reaching its decision makes reference to the provision of the 
Statutes of the Nuremberg tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, the ICTY and the ICTR which all 
say that the official position of the accused shall not relieve him from criminal responsibility. 
Customary international law however establishes that Heads of states are immune from 
prosecution for acts conducted while in office giving possibility of immunity from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
With Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 12 December 2011; Decision rendue en application de l’article 87-7 de le Statut de Rome 
concernant le refus de la Republique du Tchad d’acceder aux demandes de cooperation deliverers par la Cour 
concernant l’arrestation et la remise d’Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 13 December 2011. 
12
 ICC-01/11-13 27-06-2011, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi. 
13
 ICCSt (n 2). 
14
 Dapo Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir's 
Immunities’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 333; Dapo Akande, ‘ICC Issues Detailed 
Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (. . . At long Last . . .) But Gets the Law Wrong’ EJIL Talk <www.ejiltalk.org/> 
accessed 3 July 2014.     
214 
 
jurisdiction of international tribunals.
15
 Saying that official capacity does not exclude 
criminal responsibility is not necessarily saying that, that person may not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of particular tribunals,
16
 of course, no one today asserts that official capacity in 
itself excludes criminal responsibility.
17
 Secondly, the Nuremberg tribunal, the Tokyo 
Tribunal and the ICTR/ ICTY instruments in question are construed as removing immunity 
and binding on the relevant States. States arguments for immunity of their officials are 
subject to the legal instrument which arguably removed such immunity.
18
 The precedents 
referred to by the Pre-Trial Chamber do not establish that the Head of a State not party to the 
instruments establishing an international tribunal will not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
that tribunal. Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in the Arrest 
Warrant case does not say this either.
19
 The ICJ only stated that foreign ministers may be 
subject to criminal proceeding in certain international courts, where they have jurisdiction.
20
 
The only precedent that makes the point the Pre-Trial Chamber makes, is the decision of the 
SCSL
21
 in the Charles Taylor case. But the logic of that decision is just as flawed as that of 
the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber.22  That the ICTY in Prosecutor v Blaškić (Objection to issue of 
Subpoenae duces tecum, 1997) recognised that immunity does not vanish because a tribunal 
is international, as did Judge Shahabuddeen in Prosecutor v Krstic in his dissenting opinion. 
This also appears to be the position adopted in this study.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber in citing the practice for the rule, fails to mention the practice of 
States Parties to the Statute, some States have national legislation, implementing the ICC 
Statute, confirming the distinction between the immunity of State Parties to the Statute and 
the immunities of non-party States. Recognising that the former waived their immunities via 
Article 27 but the latter have not.
23
 The argument for a lack of immunity in international 
tribunals is that the international law immunity of foreign Heads of States from national 
authorities is necessary to prevent national interference in the ability of a foreign State to 
                                                          
15
 Customary law allows immunity for heads of state and government and stipulates that a head of state has 
immunity, which includes personal inviolability, special protection for his or her dignity, immunity from 
criminal and civil jurisdiction, and from arrest and/or prosecution in a foreign state on charges concerning all 
crimes, including international crimes. Under international customary law, acting heads of State, heads of 
government and foreign affairs ministers enjoy total immunity ratione personae. 
16
 Dapo Akande (n 14).    
17
 ibid. 
18
 ibid. 
19
 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) ICJ Reports (2002). 
20
 ibid. 
21
 SCSL (n 5). 
22
 Dapo Akande (n 14).    
23
 ibid.       
215 
 
engage in international action but that this danger does not arise with international courts 
since they are independent of States and act impartially.
24
 This argument is adopted by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, which cites Antonio Cassese on this point.
25
 This is quite an odd 
argument to make given that international courts are often created by States. The basic 
distinction being made between international and national courts fails to stand up to scrutiny 
as it would appear that what a State cannot do individually, it can do by agreement with some 
other States. It is a known fact that immunity ratione personae
26
 are not removed because of 
allegations of international crimes.
27
 If the theory put forward by the Pre-Trial Chamber is 
right the reason for it is not the nature of the crime but that of the tribunal being international 
in nature. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision tends to ignore Article 98, the Chamber further states: ‘that 
the unavailability of immunities in respect to prosecutions by international courts applies to 
any act of cooperation by States which forms an integral part of those prosecutions.’28 Is the 
intention to make Article 98 redundant by the Pre-Trial Chamber? This would be contrary to 
the principles of treaty interpretation.
29
 
5.3 Immunity, Security Council Referrals and the International Criminal Court 
Under Security Council referrals, immunity plausibly could be explained by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber that referral of situations by the UN Security Council has the consequence of States 
being bound by the Statute under Article 27. The effect is that the States concerned would be 
regarded being bound as a State party to the Rome Statute.
30
 Taking this route would have 
built on the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in the Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant situation where it 
stated that (para 45) by referring the Darfur situation to the Court, pursuant to Article 13(b) of 
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the Statute,
31
 the UNSC has accepted that the investigation into the said situation, as well as 
any prosecution arising there from, will take place in accordance with the Statute, the 
Elements of Crimes and the Rule of Procedure as a whole, such that the Security Council’s 
referral makes relevant Article 27 of the Statute and,
32
 Sudan shall be bound by that 
decision.
33
 The Chamber at para 46 claims:
34
 
‘... that when cooperating with this Court and therefore acting on its 
behalf, State Parties are instruments for the enforcement of the jus 
puniendi of the international community whose exercise  has been 
entrusted to this Court when States have failed to prosecute those 
responsible for the Crimes within its jurisdiction.’ 
However, it should be noted that the entire international community has not entrusted 
jurisdiction to the Court, less than two thirds of the States of the world have done so. The 
other one third cannot simply be ignored.
35
 Also, Article 103 UN Charter
36
 states that 
members' obligations under the UN Charter override their obligations under any other treaty. 
Thus, countries cannot use other treaties such as the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO)
37
 to 
override their UN Charter obligations.
38
 However, not all academics share this opinion, Dire 
Tladi for instance had this to say: ‘I do not share this opinion, while I do not share Akande’s 
assessment of the relationship between Article 98(1) and Article 27, which a priori excludes 
officials of non-states parties from being the object of a cooperation of arrest, to arrest and 
surrender except in situations of Security Council referrals as well as his assessment that a 
Security Council referral effectively turns a non-state party into a state party,’ I do accept that 
on both counts his views are plausible.
39
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In the famous Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ held: ‘immunity would not be available before 
‘certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction.’40 By implication, the ICJ 
is saying that immunity would remain before ‘certain international criminal courts.’ The Pre-
Trial Chamber’s statement is much more absolute.41 Then the Pre-Trial Chamber turns to the 
post-second world war tribunals. The citations do not refer to the issue of Head of state 
immunity but rather to the defence of official capacity.
42
 There is a distinction. This can be 
seen in the Rome Statute itself, where Article 27(1) deals with official capacity; Article 27(2) 
deals with immunity. The immunity of Heads of States results from customary international 
law. They cannot be deprived of it because other States so decide, whether they do this by 
their domestic law or under the canopy of a treaty. It is precisely for that reason that Article 
27(2) was included in the Statute. In the absence of Article 27(2), even States Parties would 
be able to invoke immunity.
43
 
5.4 Article 5 Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court 
The Jurisprudence of the ICC over crimes within its jurisdiction leaves more to be desired. 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) opines divergent views on the correct interpretation of 
Article 7 of the Statute. In spite of the fact that the Crime should be committed pursuant to a 
‘State or Organisational policy,’ some views critically entangle customary international law 
approach to the Crime; others are more succinct with open-ended interpretation, a few proffer 
unconventional reading of Article 7 and some unduly restrictive interpreting the text.
44
 While 
the Statute encourages judges to construe definitions of crimes ‘strictly,’45 with any doubt 
accruing to the benefit of the accused,
46
 the conflict regarding proper scope of application of 
Article 7 ICCSt is evident in the dissenting and majority opinions in the Pre-Trial Chamber 
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II’s decision authorising the ICC Prosecutor to open investigation into the post-election 
violence in Kenya.
47
  
The dissent in the Kenya case by the Court’s former second Vice- President, Judge Peter 
Hans- Kaul [late] attracts positive scholarly attention.
48
 Copious scholars have implicitly or 
explicitly aligned themselves with the dissenting judgment,
49
 referring positively to the focus 
of the dissent on the ‘historic context of the adoption of CAH’50 and its ‘careful reasoning’ 
and ‘methodological transparency,’51 is an important contribution to the understanding of 
CAH.
52
 The dissent
53
 raises concerns about the capacity of the Court to absorb cases sent to it 
and the challenges of the Prosecutor’s overall strategy. The technical requirements of the 
Court’s substantive law as a means to protect the Court’s workload or correct a perception of 
                                                          
47
 ICC‐01/09, the Prosecutor requests for authorisation from the Pre‐Trial Chamber to proceed with an 
investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya in relation to the post‐election violence of 2007‐2008, 
pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute 26 November 2009. See also, ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010. 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Kenya Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court, to which the situation in the 
Republic of Kenya has been assigned, issues the present decision pursuant to article 15(4) of the Rome Statute 
on the "Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15" submitted by the Prosecutor on 26 
November 2009. 
48
 Claus Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes Against Humanity: The Concept of Organisation within the 
Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23  Leiden Journal of 
International Law  855; Charles C Jalloh, ‘Situation in the Republic of Kenya’ (2011) 105 American Journal of 
International Law 540; William A Schabas, ‘Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, ‘The Joker at the 
International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 847; 
Darryl Robinson, ‘Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised by Challenges at ICC’ European Journal of 
International Law: Talk, <http://www.ejiltalk.org> accessed 3 July 2014. 
49
 Leila N Sadat (n 46).  
50
 Claus Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes Against Humanity: The Concept of Organisation within the 
Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of 
International Law  855; Charles C Jalloh, ‘Situation in the Republic of Kenya’ (2011) 105 American Journal of 
International Law 540; William A Schabas, ‘Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, ‘The Joker at the 
International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International La 847; Darryl 
Robinson, ‘Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised by Challenges at ICC’ EJIL Talk 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org> accessed 3 July 2014; William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute Oxford Commentaries on International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2010) 137,87. 
51
 Claus Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes Against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the 
Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 862. 
52
 Leila N Sadat (n 46) 334. 
53
 ICC-01/09-01/11, 15 March 2011; Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto et al. dissenting Opinion by Judge 
Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-Trial Chamber II's ‘Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear 
for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang" paragraph 2 of the decent reads: 2. I 
am unable to accept the decision of the Majority and the analysis that underpins it. I continue to believe that the 
ICC lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae in the situation in the Republic of Kenya, including in the present case. I 
am not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes alleged, which occurred during the 
violence that took place between 30 December 2007 and the end of January 2008 in Uasin Gishu and Nandi 
Districts, were committed pursuant to the policy of an organisation within the meaning of Article 7(2) (a) of the 
Statute; thus, I am not satisfied that the crimes alleged constitute crimes against humanity pursuant to article 7 of 
the Statute.  
219 
 
prosecutorial overreaching are necessary. Judge Kaul partly relies on the Nuremberg 
precedent to underscore his conclusion that only States or quasi-State like organisations 
following criminal policies should be tried by the Court.
54
Adding a voice to the dissent is 
Darryl Robinson who illuminated on the ‘policy element’ underlying CAH as defined by the 
Statute. He stresses that the debate over the ‘policy element’ goes to the heart of what these 
crimes are about and focuses discussion on the decision issued by Pre-Trial Chamber II in 
March 2010, authorising an investigation into the situation in Kenya.
55
 He noted that the 
Kenya situation raised some questions on the nature of the entities that would meet the 
threshold of an ‘organisation’ under the Rome Statute. He also distinguishes the Chamber’s 
two approach to policy element required for proving CAH, which is the ‘glue’ that connects 
individual crimes together as part of a ‘widespread or systematic attack’.56  
He explains that, in the Kenya decision, the majority (Judge Trendafilova and Judge 
Tarfusser) adopted a broad definition of the term ‘organisation’ based on the ‘capacity’ to 
direct CAH. This approach means that the mere existence of an organisation that has the 
capabilities to direct such crimes could be enough to distinguish them from ‘ordinary’ crimes. 
Judge Kaul, however, argued in his dissent for a more stringent standard of ‘state-like 
organisations’ as a requirement of Article 7(2) (a) of the Rome Statute.57 
5.5 Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court v Ad Hoc Tribunal’s 
In Prosecutor v Kupreškić,58 the prosecution withdrew charges under Article 2 ICTY statute 
from an indictment (on grave breaches)
59
 and substituted it with CAH charges,
60
 arguing that 
the change became necessitated due to newly acquired evidence and better understanding of 
the underlying criminal conduct. The Prosecution further pointed out that while Article 2 
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allegations would require proof of ‘international character’ of the armed conflict in question, 
CAH charges would not, hence, a more expeditious trial without prejudice to the defendants, 
the Trial Chamber agreed and accepted the amended indictment.
61
 
An examination of this jurisprudence underscores important procedural differences between 
the practice at the ad hoc tribunals and before the ICC, namely, the absence of an extensive 
‘vetting’ of the substance of a case by the judiciary prior to trial.62 Although, indictments are 
confirmed by a Judge of the ICTY (and the same is true at the ICTR), the assessment by the 
confirming judge is largely limited to whether or not ‘a prima facie case exists,’63 which 
occurs ‘where the material facts pleaded in the indictment constitute a credible case which 
would (if not contradicted by the accused) be a sufficient basis of the charge.’64 At the 
ICTY/ICTR, arrest warrants follow the confirmation of the indictment; then arresting of the 
accused, when transferred to the Court, the accused is formally charged based upon the 
confirmed indictment. Prosecutors may formulate an indictment with multiple and 
cumulative charges assuming that the ‘Articles of the Statute referred to are designed to 
protect different values,’ and that each ‘Article requires proof of a legal element not required 
by the others.’65 They may also charge in the alternative, and need not choose among 
different heads of responsibility, or different theories of the case, if they can establish a prima 
facie case supporting each allegation. The practice is quite streamlined compared to the 
process at the ICC, where there is no ‘indictment’ but, following the issuance of the arrest 
warrant, and sometimes following Article 15 (proprio motu) authorisation decision; 
confirmation hearings are held by the Court. The ICC confirmation decisions to date involve 
a much more searching review of the case than the ICTY pre-trial proceedings.
66
 
Furthermore, an overview of the ICC case law on modes of liability by Van Sliedregt
67
 is that 
the ICC distances itself from the ICTY jurisprudence on the theory of joint criminal 
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enterprise (JCE), a theory much criticised. Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute suggests a 
different mode of liability that recognises the criminal ‘mastermind’ as a principal 
perpetrator. However, the theoretical basis for the concept of ‘co-perpetration’ is different 
from the one underlying JCE. Van Sliedregt noted two approaches that can be used in the 
interpretation of Article 25(3): the normative ‘control over the act’ approach and the 
naturalistic approach.
68
 She criticised the fact that the normative approach applied to Article 
25(3) (a) has been taken to apply to the whole of Article 25(3) and stresses that such an 
interpretation did not reflect the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute. She argues that 
expressive justice requires that liability be branded in a way that reflects the gravity and 
nature of the Crime, and thus emphasised the importance of maintaining a distinction 
between principal and accessory liability. As it is important to communicate to the victims 
and the international community who was the mastermind of the crimes, she expresses her 
hope that the Court takes a textual approach to Article 25(3).
69
 
5.6 Jurisprudence of the ICC over Self Referrals  
In accepting Uganda’s ‘self-referral’, the Prosecutor notified the Ugandan authorities that it 
would interpret the scope of the referral ‘consistently with the Rome Statute,’ and analyse the 
Northern Uganda crimes ‘by whoever committed it.’70 After investigations, the Prosecutor 
applied for arrest warrants for five Lord Resistant Army (LRA) suspects, including Joseph 
Kony, charging them with war crimes and CAH.
71
 
The ICC later joined the case against Katanga
72
 and Chui
73
 in the DRC; 
74
 tried by Trial 
Chamber II.
75
 The Pre-Trial Chamber collectively confirmed six charges in the Katanga case, 
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which was the first major decision of the ICC, applying Article 7 of the Statute,
76
 based on 
the elements of CAH, the decision in Katanga relied on the ad hoc tribunal’s jurisprudence, 
but diverged in three particulars. First, the Pre-Trial Chamber seemed to cumulate all 
elements of ‘widespread’, ‘systematic’ and ‘organisational policy,’ holding: 
‘In the context of a widespread attack, the requirement of an 
organisational policy pursuant to Article 7(2) (a) of the Statute 
ensures that the attack even if carried out over a large 
geographical area or directed against a large number of victims, 
must still be thoroughly organised and follow a regular pattern. 
It must also be conducted in furtherance of a common policy 
involving public or private resources.’77 
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s opinion is that the attack must be ‘thoroughly organised,’ 
widespread and systematic.
78
 The argument that if a leader wishes to terrorise a population 
into submission by engaging in large-scale but seemingly random acts of violence that 
followed no discernible pattern, those acts should be characterisable as CAH if sufficiently 
widespread and carried out pursuant to a policy. The 1991 International Law Commission 
(ILC) Draft Code of Crimes, cited by the Pre-Trial Chamber to support its analysis of ‘state 
or organisational policy,’ is clear that ‘either one of these aspects (systematic or widespread) 
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77
 ibid.  
78
 This formulation was most recently reiterated by PTC III in the decision pursuant to Article 15 authorising 
investigation in Côte d’Ivoire. Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, Case No ICC-02/11, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute of the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire (3 October 2011) 
para 43. 
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in any of the acts enumerated in the draft article is enough for the offence to have taken 
place,’79 for the meaning of ‘policy,’ a view of the majority in the Kenya case,80 the Chamber 
wrote:  
...A policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a 
specific territory or by any organisation with the capability to commit 
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. The 
policy need not be explicitly defined by the organisational group. 
Indeed, an attack which is planned, directed or organised – as opposed 
to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence – will satisfy these 
criterion...
81
 
Additionally, the DRC case proceeded beyond the arrest warrant phase filed against Callixte 
Mbarushimana, charged with war crimes, CAH and persecution. On 16 December 2011, the 
majority in Pre-Trial Chamber I, with presiding Judge Monageng dissenting, declined to 
confirm the charges against him.
82
 Admittedly, the case against the accused was unusual – the 
Prosecution alleged that he formed part of a common plan that had for its essential (criminal) 
purpose ordering the Forces Démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) to create 
a humanitarian crisis in the DRC by committing atrocities against civilians in order to further 
the political goals of the FDLR. The Prosecution did not accuse him of ordering the atrocities 
directly, but rather, that he allegedly furthered the criminal campaign by orchestrating a press 
offensive to hide the FDLR’s activities from the watchful eyes of the international 
community, thereby enabling the FDLR to continue and conceal its activities. The Pre-Trial 
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 International Law Commission, 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
Article 21. 
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ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998) para 580. It seems that this authority is only of limited persuasive value 
given its own rejection by the ICTR in subsequent cases, such as Semanza; the same is true at the ICTY. In the 
Kenya confirmation decisions, PTC II addressed this seeming anomaly. 
82
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for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the confirmation of charges. 
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Chamber I found substantial grounds to believe that the FDLR had intentionally committed 
terrible atrocities upon civilians in the Kivu province of the DRC,
83
 but then retreated from 
the logical implication of that conclusion: ‘that these attacks implied the existence of a ‘State 
or organisational policy’ to attack the civilian population of the region,84 from the facts set 
forth by the Pre-Trial Chamber – that the FDLR had a policy of attacking civilians. Judge 
Monageng argued in her dissent,
85
 that although the case against Mbarushimana is ‘not a 
conventional one,’ it would seem to present ‘triable issues’ deserving more rigorous fact 
finding that only a Trial Chamber can provide.
86
 The Appeals Chamber disagreed, and later 
confirmed the majority’s decision not to confirm the charges, finding that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber had applied the appropriate legal and evidentiary standards to the case.
87
 
Other situations before the ICC is the ‘self-referral’ cases involving the (CAR) Central 
African Republic.
88
 Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo, was charged and brought to trial (Bemba), is 
a Congolese national accused by the Prosecutor to have led the forces of the Mouvement de 
Libération du Congo (MLC) in supporting CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé against rebel 
forces commanded by François Bozizé. The arrest warrant for Bemba indicted him for war 
crimes and CAH. The Pre-Trial Chamber II issued a decision confirming some but not all 
charges,
89
 due either to cumulative or lacking in evidentiary support.
90
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Press US 2009) 302 citing Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No ICC-01/05-01/08; Arrest Warrant 
Case para 33; the existence of a State or organisational policy is an element from which the systematic nature of 
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 Ibid; The Pre-Trial Chamber retained the murder and rape charges as crimes against humanity, but declined to 
confirm charges of torture as a cumulative charge that was ‘subsumed’ by the count of rape; also the Pre-Trial 
Chamber confirmed three of the five war crimes counts (murder, rape and pillaging), but declined to confirm 
charges of torture as a war crime on the grounds that the evidence of specific purpose was lacking para 291. The 
Pre-Trial Chamber also declined to confirm the crime of outrages upon personal dignity, again on the basis that 
this count constituted ‘cumulative charging’ because the ‘essence of the violation of the law underlying these 
facts is fully encompassed in the count of rape, para 310. This finding of the Pre-Trial Chamber is arguable. 
Many of the acts identified did involve rape, but others were associated with but not necessarily constitutive of 
the crime of rape and represented an effort on the part of the Prosecutor to capture not only the rapes but the 
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This represents a significant departure from the practice at the ad hoc tribunals.
91
 The Pre-
Trial Chamber also examined the contextual elements of CAH, following Katanga and 
arguably narrowed the meaning of ‘civilian population’ however, in its finding that 
‘according to well-established principle of international humanitarian law, civilian population 
comprises all persons who are civilians as opposed to members of armed forces and other 
legitimate combatants.’92 The holding omits any discussion of (or citation to) the Martić 
case,
93
 and particularly its holding regarding the status of individuals who are hors combat.
94
  
5.7 The Court’s Jurisprudence over Some Situations  
Sudan/Darfur 
on 18 September 2004, the Security Council established a Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws to determine 
whether or not acts of genocide had occurred in Sudan/Darfur and to identify the perpetrators 
of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.’95 The 
Commission’s report concluded that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed militias 
operating in Darfur
96
 were responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law such as ‘indiscriminate attacks, killing of civilians, torture, enforced 
disappearances, destruction of villages, rape; other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and 
forced displacement.’97 The Commission found these acts conducted on a widespread and 
systematic basis, and could therefore constitute CAH, but concluded that the Government of 
Sudan had not ‘pursued a policy of genocide,’98 and recommended that the Security Council 
refer the Darfur situation to the ICC,
99
 given that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute 
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found that Bemba could not be charged as a co-perpetrator under article 25(3)(a), but instead could only be 
charged under article 28(a) with command responsibility as a military commander who had effective authority 
and control or the MLC troops alleged to have committed the crimes in question para 446. 
92
 ibid para 78. 
93
 Prosecutor v Milan Martić, Case No ICTY-IT-95-11-A Judgment (8 October 2008) para 297; Prosecutor v 
Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (7 May 1997). 
94
 ibid para 297, 306. 
95
 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, p 2 S/2005/60 (1/02/ 
2005). 
96
 The Janjaweed are described in the Report at para 98-39. 
97
 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur para 3. 
98
 ibid para 4; the issue of genocide is addressed in para 489-522 of the Darfur Commission’s Report. 
99
 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur para 5. 
226 
 
otherwise, the Sudanese defendants could not be brought before the Court.
100
 The UNSCR 
1593 in 2005 referred the situation in Darfur, dating back to 1 July 2002, to the ICC 
Prosecutor.
101
 The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 in favour,
102
 none against, and 
four abstentions, the United States, China, Algeria, and Brazil.
103
  
Whereas Sudan is not a State Party to the ICC, the Court argues that the resolution is binding 
on all UN member States including Sudan.
104
 At this juncture the researcher notes Dire Tladi, 
Paula Gaeta, Dapo Akande, William Schabas et al for a contrary opinion on this issue.
105
 
Under the ICC Statute, the ICC was authorised, but not required, to accept the case.
106
 The 
OTP opened an investigation and issued arrest warrants for six individuals. The first to be 
charged is the State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmad Muhammad Harun and an 
alleged Janjaweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb), with war crimes 
and CAH.
107
 The charging pattern is similar to that exhibited in the earlier three ‘self-referral’ 
cases, with CAH used independently of war crimes for elements of social harm such as 
Persecution, and to provide an alternative theory of liability for many crimes such as murder, 
rape and inhumane treatment. The war crime counts, as in the earlier cases attempt to capture 
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(Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012) 54,74. 
106
 Frederic L Kirgis, ‘UN Commission’s Report on Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Darfur: 
Security Council Referral to the International Criminal Court’ [2005] American Society of International Law 
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other elements of the attack such as property destruction (including food stores, mosques) and 
pillaging, as well as attacks on the civilian population.
108
The third and perhaps most 
controversial warrant targeted Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir and 
included counts of war crimes, CAH and genocide. The OTP initiated investigation in June 
2005. The Sudanese government also created its own special courts for Darfur in an effort to 
stave off the ICC’s jurisdiction, however, the Court’s efforts were widely criticised as 
unacceptable.
109
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a first warrant on 4 March 2009 for seven counts of war 
crimes and CAH.
110
 After a successful prosecutorial appeal, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
subsequently found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that ‘Omar Al-Bashir is 
criminally responsible . . . for charges of genocide.’111 Although, the Genocide charges 
largely track the CAH counts, a finding of genocide by the Court could be important in terms 
of public opinion and even State responsibility under the genocide convention. President Al-
Bashir challenged the legality of the warrant against him. The African Union reiterated its 
opposition to the ICC’s practice of issuing arrest warrants against AU members states Heads 
of State,
112
 raising the spectre of continued heated debates about the appropriateness and 
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effectiveness of the ICC’s intervention in Africa.113 Nonetheless, the ICC prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda in December 2014 said the Court was halting investigations in order to shift 
resources to other urgent cases, and lambasted the UNSC for failing to push for Al-Bashir’s 
arrest. 
The Post-Election Violence in Kenya 
In March 2010, the Court initiated an investigation into the 2007, early 2008 post-election 
violence in Kenya
114
 via the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.115 Conflict ensued following 
an election in which Kenyans accused Mwai Kibaki of stealing the election mandate from the 
then ‘ruling president Raila Odinga. Hence, tensions between the ethnic Kikuyu supporters of 
Kibaki and the ethnic Luo and Kalenjin supporters of Odinga resulted in an estimated 1,000 
deaths and displacement of over 400,000 people.
116
 Kenyan authorities arguably failed to 
thoroughly investigate the conflict or try the offenders prompting the Court to intervene. The 
Kenyan government claims that Kenyan courts are willing and able to prosecute offenders, in 
attempts to invoke its rights to complementarity or for a hybrid African Court intervention 
instead of the ICC on the matter; made multiple requests for the UNSC to defer the 
investigation based on Article 16 ICCSt,
117
 fearing the disruption of the upcoming March 
2013 elections and could weaken recently forged ethnic bridges.
118
 The request to try cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/ Dec 397(XVIII), 30 January 2012, xx 6 and 8. For ICC ASP decisions on cooperation see e.g. 
ICC Resolution on Cooperation, ICC-ASP/10/Res 2, 20 December 2011 and ICC Resolution on the 
Strengthening of the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, ICC-ASP/10/Res 5, 21 
December 2011, x 6; See also, ICC Kampala Declaration, Declaration RC/ Decl1, 1 June 2010, x 7 and 
generally the Kampala Declaration on Cooperation, Declaration RC/Decl 2, 8 June 2010. 
113
 African Union, On the Decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Pursuant 
to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the alleged failure by the republic of Chad and the Republic of Malawi 
to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of 
President Omar Hassan Al Bashir of the Republic of Sudan (9 January 2012) the fourth case in the Sudan 
situation involved three individuals accused of attacks on African Union Peacekeepers. They received 
summonses to appear and did so; because all three cases involve only war crimes, they add little to this Article, 
although it is interesting to note that one of the cases was dismissed by Pre-Trial Chamber I. Prosecutor v Bahar 
Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges (8 February 2010). On 23 April 2010, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I issued a decision rejecting the Prosecutor’s application to appeal the decision. The other two are 
currently awaiting trial. 
114
 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No ICC-01/09, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to Article 15 (26 November 2009). 
115
 ICCST (n 2) Articles 13 (c) & 15 (1); ICC: Judges Approve Kenyan Investigation. 
116
 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2013: Kenya,’ 25 Feb, 2013; Henry M Jackson and others ‘The 
International Criminal Court Confronting Challenges on the Path to Justice’ [2013] Jackson School of 
International Studies Task Force Report University of Washington.  
117
 ICCSt (n 2) Article 16 Deferral of investigation or prosecution. 
118
 Kenya's government asks the UN Security Council to halt the trials of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his 
deputy at the ICC; also a draft resolution seeking the deferral of investigations in Kenya was submitted by 
Rwanda, a Security Council member to the United Nations Security Council for considerations. However, the 
229 
 
nationally was denied and Kenya unable to prove effective prosecution of those accused.
119
 
The UNSC refuses to defer the investigation.
120
 Kenyan officials and the AU have 
increasingly been uncooperative with ICC enterprise leading discontents amongst AU 
Member States wary of the Court’s presence in Africa.121 
The Waki Commission, an international commission of enquiry had initially investigated the 
violence,
 122
 and handed in its report to the Court.
123
 The decision of 31 March 2010 where 
the Pre-Trial Chamber II articulated its view as to the legal requirements for the ‘contextual 
elements’ of CAH, including the ‘civilian population’ requirement, the ‘state or 
organisational policy’ requirement, and the ‘widespread or systematic’ nature of the attack 
required and concluded that the relevant evidentiary and legal standard was whether there 
was a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ under Articles 15(3) & 53 ICCSt (initiation of an 
investigation)
124
 the majority concluded that in evaluating the available information provided 
by the Prosecutor, the Chamber is satisfied that there exists a reasonable justification to belief 
that a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court has, is being committed in Kenya.
125
  
However, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul suggests that all requirements and contextual elements must 
meet the standards fully.
126
 In his opinion, the contextual elements of CAH stated in the 
Statute had not been satisfied, on the notion of ‘State or organisational policy,’ so did not 
authorise the Prosecutor to proceed. The Pre-Trial Chamber II followed prior ICC decisions 
on the contextual elements of CAH, reiterating that the ‘attack on the civilian population 
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requirement, is not restricted to a ‘military’ attack, but could be a ‘campaign or operation 
carried out against the civilian population.’127 It also followed the Bemba case128 by 
suggesting that the potential civilian victims of a crime under Article 7 of the Statute are 
groups distinguished by nationality, ethnicity, or other distinguishing features. This 
formulation is objectionable because it potentially imports a discriminating intent and 
therefore should be treated as persecution within the limits of the Rome Statute. However, on 
5 December 2014, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against Mr. Kenyatta, but the case 
against William Samoei Ruto and others still continues. 
Jurisprudence over the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire 
On 18 April 2003, Côte d’Ivoire a non-State Party to the ICC, lodged a declaration with the 
Court’s registrar under Article 12(3) of the Statute accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for 
crimes committed in its territory since 19 September 2002. This declaration was signed by 
the Foreign Minister under the former Côte d’Ivoire’s President, Laurent Gbagbo, and 
confirmed by its current President, Alassane Ouattara on 14 December 2010.
129
 The 
Prosecutor subsequently applied to Pre-Trial Chamber III for permission to open an 
investigation pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute. In describing the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that, since a coup attempt in 2002, which resulted in the de facto 
partition of the country into a northern zone controlled by the armed opposition (the Forces 
Nouvelles) and a southern zone controlled by President Gbagbo, the country existed in a 
situation of ‘no peace, no war,’ or ‘intermittent civil war.’130 This situation persisted with loss 
of life and the commission of ‘atrocities attributable to the two sides, including extra-judicial 
killings, massacres, enforced disappearances, and numerous incidents of torture.’131 The 
situation worsened with the presidential elections held first on 31 October 2010, and 
subsequently on 28 November 2010. On 3 October 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber III granted the 
Prosecutor’s request for authorisation to open investigations proprio motu into the situation in 
Côte d’Ivoire. 
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In deciding whether to authorise the investigation,
132
 the Pre-Trial Chamber relied on prior 
case laws, relating to CAH, the prosecution submitted that a reasonable basis exits to believe 
that not only pro-Gbagbo, but also pro-Ouattara forces may have committed CAH. The Pre-
Trial Chamber accepted the Prosecutor’s assertions as to the attack by pro-Gbagbo forces, 
finding that it was committed pursuant to a state policy,
133
 widespread and systematic.
134
 
Having addressed the contextual elements with respect to the pro-Gbagbo forces, it found a 
reasonable basis to believe that murder,
135
 acts of rape,
136
 arbitrary arrest and detention,
137
 
enforced disappearances, torture and other inhumane acts had been committed during the 
period of post-election violence from 28 November 2010 onwards.
138
  
The Pre-Trial Chamber then turned to the acts of violence alleged to have been committed by 
pro-Ouattara forces. Referencing Judge Kaul’s dissent in the Kenya situation, it noted that 
‘there is disagreement within the jurisprudence of the Court on the criteria required for a 
group to constitute an organisation for purposes of Article 7.’ It finessed the difficulty by 
concluding that the pro-Ouattara forces in this case would qualify in the eyes of both the 
majority and the dissent as an organised armed group in a party to a non-international armed 
conflict.
139
 It also agreed that the attack was widespread or systematic and involved murder, 
rape, imprisonment and other severe deprivations of physical liberty.
140
 War crimes allegedly 
committed by both sides, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that armed conflict not of 
international character existed in Côte d’Ivoire from 25 February 2011 to 6 May 2011,141 a 
shorter period than that of CAH offenses. Though, the declaration of Cote d’Ivoire took effect 
from 19 September 2003, the Chamber limited the temporal scope of the inquiry 
considerably.
142
 On 23 November 2011, a warrant of arrest was issued for Laurent Koudou 
                                                          
132
 ICCSt (n 2) Article 15(3)-(4). 
133
 Situation in Cote d’Ivoire, Case No. ICC-02/11 para 51; ICCSt (n 2)Article 7(1) 
134
 ibid para 62. 
135
 ibid para 67. 
136
 ibid para 72. 
137
 ibid para 76. 
138
 ibid para 82, 86. 
139
 ibid para 99. 
140
 ibid para 103-14.  
141
 ibid para 127. 
142
 The Chamber relied upon earlier cases to find first, that generally speaking, only crimes committed prior to 
the date the Prosecutor files the request for authorisation may be considered, but second, nonetheless crimes 
committed after that time may be investigated if they, ‘at least in a same attacks (crimes against humanity) or 
the same conflict (war crimes) ibid para 177-79. Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi took issue both with the 
‘overall approach’ to the Article 15 analysis of the majority as well as with the temporal scope of the authorised 
investigation. Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No ICC-02/11, Dissent of Judge Silvia Fernandez 
de Gurmendi, (3 October 2011) para 9. 
232 
 
Gbagbo;
143
 turned over to the ICC on 30th November 2011, and became the first Head of 
State to be taken into custody by the Court. 
The Prosecutor had proprio motu
144
 opened investigation into the violence.
145
 The 
Presidential election was intended to unify the country after having been divided by ethnic 
tension since the 2002 civil war. However, Laurent Gbagbo, the sitting president, did not 
accept the election result in favour of the President elect Alassane Ouattara. The conflict 
lasted until April 2011 upon intervention favourable to Ouattara. It claimed an estimated 
3,000 lives and left 500,000 people displaced
146
 The Ivorian government accepted and 
allowed the Court’s ad hoc jurisdiction.147 The investigation148 again drew criticisms from the 
AU, within the Ivorian government, and Ivorian citizens for failure to equally indict members 
of the two sides in the conflict.
149
 The Court issued arrest warrants for only Laurent Gbagbo 
and his wife Simone Gbagbo. Thus, Ivoirians feel the Court is naming followers of Gbagbo 
‘enemies’ of the state and followers of Ouattara ‘friends,’ despite a feeling amongst many 
that neither party was entirely guilty or innocent during the conflict.  
In response, the OTP maintains it is utilising a ‘sequencing’ policy in the investigation,150 
indicting suspects of one group before moving on to investigate members of the other group, 
the course is disrupting, rather than maintaining, peace. Indeed, Guillaume Soro, Gbagbo’s 
former Prime Minister and a member of Ivory Coast National Assembly, stated: ‘it was 
precisely, not to be accused of victor’s justice that the Ivorian government brought in the 
ICC…Yet, the ICC, issued only a few arrest warrants, all against the Gbagbo allies151 such a 
tactic, Soro stipulated, could further fuel political tension and lessen the Court’s ability to 
effectively investigate the situation or obtain cooperation from Ivorian citizens.’ The Court, 
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despite such criticism, is yet to alter its investigative strategy, which has allowed Ivorian 
frustration towards the Court fester and grow. 
Jurisprudence over the Libyan Situation 
On 26 February 2011, the SC adopted Resolution 1970, referring the Situation in Libya to the 
Court based on the provisions in the Statute,
152
 necessitated by Libya not being a State Party 
to the ICC.
153
 The Prosecutor submitted a request to Pre-Trial Chamber I for warrants of 
arrest against Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al Sanousi for (murder 
and persecution) CAH.
154
 No armed conflict had existed, and no allegations of genocide had 
been made, CAH became the only charges that could be levied against the accused. An 
investigation was opened by the OTP into the situation in Libya,
155
 following the Libyan 
uprising
156
 that resulted in an estimated 11,500 casualties. Initially, the regime, led by 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, attempted to quell the rebellion through the use of unlawful 
arrests, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, gang rape, and summary executions; the rebels 
attempted to overthrow the government through similar tactics.
157
 Consequently, the UNSC 
approved Resolution 1973 to establish a no-fly zone over Libya and authorised all necessary 
measures, short of foreign occupation, to end the conflict.
158
 UN Member States began to 
assist the rebels through aerial assaults; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took 
over military operations and carried out thousands of air strikes on the Government 
stronghold of Benghazi until October 2011. In August, opposition forces, the National 
Transitional Council (NTC), gained control of most of the country and announced the 
liberation of Libya. Issued arrest warrants to date
159
  remain unexecuted.
160
 It did not initially 
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raise same questions of ‘policy’ as did the Article 15 decision in the Kenya case – however 
some criticism of the Prosecutor’s action based on an alleged lack of ‘gravity’ of the harm 
echo the concern of Judge Kaul in the Kenyan situation about trivialising the notion of CAH 
through its overuse.
161
 Currently, only two of the three accused are in the custody of the 
Libyan authorities, while Muammar Gaddafi is confirmed deceased and the case against him 
closed.
162
 
The Court’s investigation into the Libyan conflict has drawn criticism from the international 
community, consequently, the AU and the NTC, has been uncooperative with the Court. The 
NTC claims that the investigation violates Libyan State sovereignty and refuses to transfer 
Abdullah Al-Senussi and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, indicted suspects, to The Hague for trials, 
insisting on trying the Gaddafi(s) in Libya.
163
 Additionally, some sections of the International 
Community claim that the NATO airstrikes violates international law and resulted in the 
death of innocent civilians; the Court is yet to thoroughly investigate this allegation.
164
 
Investigations have been hindered by criticisms.
165
 There is proof that during the capture of 
Muammar and Saif Gaddafi, the NTC tortured them,
166
 a violation of international law, and 
the speculation that the NTC is responsible for Muammar’s death.167 Additionally, In January 
2013, Gaddafi appeared in court faced with security charges claiming he was unlawfully 
communicating with the ICC.
168
 The Court’s failure to stop the trial or apprehend Gaddafi 
also highlighted its inability to compel compliance from members.
169
 In order to gain greater 
legitimacy and authority, the Court must increase its capacity to compel cooperation with 
investigations and compliance with Court orders from member states. 
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The Court’s Jurisprudence over Mali 
The Court opened an investigation into the situation in Mali in 2013,
170
 after a self-referral in 
2012.
171
 Conflicts began in January 2012 following Muslim extremists’ seizure of Northern 
Mali and subsequent implementation of a harsh interpretation of Sharia law resulting in 
thousands of deaths and human rights violations by both Malian government forces and the 
extremists as the two groups struggle for dominance. The entrance of French and Nigerian 
forces in December 2012 stopped rebel forces from gaining greater territorial control of the 
country, however they are yet to be completely defeated and foreign militaries are reluctant to 
relinquish control to the weak Malian government, fearing another militant surge by the 
rebels,
172
 due to the Malian government’s inability to subdue or investigate the conflict, the 
Court formally launched an investigation. Compared to such earlier investigations, the Court 
faces little criticism in Mali, given the self-referral nature, however the Court’s decision to 
open another investigation into an African situation reinforces the AU claims that the Court is 
targeting Africa. (As at the time of writing, the conflict in Mali is still ongoing).
173
  
The issuance of arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir, created tensions between the AU and 
the ICC and has continuously grown.
174
 The AU’s major criticisms of the ICC has been 
reinforced by the Court’s actions not opening investigation into other situation outside of 
Africa but opened investigations into States that did not desire intervention (Kenya and 
Libya) and indicted another sitting (Muammar Gaddafi) Head of State perceived by the AU 
and the International community to hold diplomatic immunity.
175
 As a result, the AU 
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increasingly opposes the ICC intervention and has attempted to impede investigations 
through actions that have delegitimised the authority of the Court.
176
 
Available information at the time of the OTP’s initial report on Mali indicated ‘a reasonable 
basis to believe that war crimes have been committed in Mali since January 2012’ The crimes 
include murder, mutilation, torture, rape, pillaging, passing of sentences and carrying out 
executions without due process.
177
 Cruel treatment and intentionally directing attacks on 
protected objects. Places of the alleged commission of crimes include the regions of Gao, 
Timbuktu and Kidal (North of Mali). The OTP attributes alleged crimes to various militias; 
commits to a fair investigation of the groups involved in the situation in Mali. The Prosecutor 
Bensouda stated in a press release on 28 January 2013 that her Office ‘is aware of reports that 
Malian forces may have committed abuses’ and reminded all parties to the conflict, of the 
ICC’s ‘jurisdiction over serious crimes committed within the territory of Mali, from January 
2012 onwards.’ The OTP reaffirms commitment to justice on all sides of the conflict stating 
that ‘All those alleged to be responsible for serious crimes in Mali must be held accountable.’ 
That investigation adheres to this apparent commitment and brings charges against those 
most responsible, irrespective of their political inclination. To maintain political neutrality 
during investigations and charge those most responsible for the crimes in Mali, the OTP must 
charge crimes that represent the range and gravity of criminality and not tempted to bring 
narrow charges,
178
 for example for the destruction of cultural property. Although, attaining a 
conviction this way appears to be a success for the Court, the implications for the victims of 
crimes that go unaddressed means incomplete justice.
179
 
Given the scale and volume of situations under the ICC investigation, it is appropriate for the 
OTP to be selective and focused on investigations and charges. However, to fully serve 
justice in a fair and inclusive manner, the OTP must ensure that the charges are reflective of 
the range of criminality in every situation, and that individuals most responsible for these 
crimes are indicted. Following this policy and ignoring external pressures to secure quick 
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convictions or cooperate with state governments will enhance perceptions of the Court’s 
impartiality, credibility and relevance to the pursuit of international criminal justice.  
The Court’s Jurisprudence over Palestine 
In April 2012, the OTP officially refused to investigate atrocities committed in Palestine as a 
result of the Israel/Palestine conflict.
180
 The OTP based the decision on the indeterminate 
nature of Palestinian statehood at the time. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
did not recognise Palestine as a State and, therefore, (not minding its original jurisprudence 
on the all-encompassing ‘State like theory’) it was ineligible for investigation.181  Many 
international organisations and others questioned this reasoning, as the situation in Palestine 
seems to meet the requirements for an ICC investigation despite issues of statehood.
182
 Over 
130 governments recognise Palestine as a State,
183
 it holds ‘non-member observer entity’ 
status at the UN (upgraded to ‘non-member observer state’ status following the November 
2012 vote),
184
 ‘non-member observer’ status at the ICC, and considers itself to be a state 
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since the 1980s.
185
 Additionally, it accepted ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court and admits itself 
to be incapable of prosecuting offenders, consequently the situation in Palestine, arguably, 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Court.
186
 Furthermore, in regard to gravity, researchers 
estimate that there have been over 40,000 casualties of the conflict since 2002.
187
 This figure 
greatly outnumbers that of several situations currently under investigation by the ICC,
188
 thus 
the situation meets the gravity threshold.  
An ICC investigation into the Israel/Palestine conflict would force both countries to take 
responsibility for the actions of their citizens, the investigation would promote justice. The 
Court’s refusal to investigate the situation in Palestine despite its perceived ability to meet the 
requirements for investigation indicates that the Court’s actions were motivated by factors 
other than admissibility. Academics, such as Professor John Dugard a former Special 
Rapporteur for the UN Commission on Human Rights and the International Law 
Commission, cite United States (US) opposition to the investigation as the Court’s reason for 
refusing to investigate.
189
 The US opposed numerous attempts to hold Israel accountable for 
its illegal actions said Professor Cherif Bassiouni
190
 and voted against passing a UN 
resolution granting Palestine statehood in November 2012.
191
 In this regard, the Court has 
been reluctant to investigate the situation in Palestine out of fear of US discontent rather than 
inadmissibility. Again on 30 December 2014, falling short of the required number of yes 
votes from the United Nations Security Council members which failed to adopt a draft 
resolution that would have affirmed the need to reach within 12 months a peaceful solution to 
the situation in the Middle East and would have paved the way to a Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as its capital if the majority on the UNSC grants Palestine full UN membership. 
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As of writing, the Israel/Palestine conflict is still ragging with death toll well over 2000
192
 
and numerous properties destroyed.
193
   
In 2014 alone, more than 1,400 Palestinians have been killed in the ongoing hostilities. 
According to the UN, the majority of those killed have been Palestinian civilians, including at 
least 252 children. Three civilians and 61 Israeli soldiers have also been killed by 
indiscriminate rockets or mortars fired from Gaza, There is mounting evidence that war 
crimes have been committed by all parties. Over several decades, Amnesty International has 
collected compelling evidence of war crimes and other crimes under international law 
committed by Israel, Hamas and Palestinian armed groups, but perpetrators on both sides 
continue to enjoy impunity, leading ongoing injustice for victims of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity said Salil Shetty, Amnesty International’s Secretary General and that ‘an 
International Criminal Court investigation is crucial to end the pervasive culture of impunity. 
All sides must push for the Court to investigate such crimes in order to halt the vicious cycle 
of violations and injustice once and for all. An open letter to the UN Security 
Council recently published by Amnesty International, urges its members to take immediate 
steps to refer the situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories to the Prosecutor 
of the ICC, among other actions, including imposing a comprehensive arms embargo, to 
address the crisis.
194
  
The UN Security Council has repeatedly failed to take effective action to respond to 
violations in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories or hold perpetrators accountable, 
in large part because of opposition from the USA, which has repeatedly vetoed resolutions 
critical of Israel. On some occasions the USA has been the sole voice against all other 
members of the Council. The UN Security Council must not stand by yet again and bear 
witness to mounting atrocities. It must seize this moment to act decisively for justice, said 
Salil Shetty. The Palestinian Authority has been consistently pressured by the USA, Israel, 
Canada, the UK and other EU Member States not to take steps to grant the ICC jurisdiction; 
such pressure has included threats to withdraw financial assistance on which the Palestinian 
authority depends on.
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However, Palestinians have formally joined the International Criminal Court on 1 April 2015, 
and became the newest State Party to the International Criminal Court treaty a key step 
towards being able to pursue Israelis for alleged war crimes. The Palestinians accepted the 
ICC's jurisdiction from 13 June 2014, shortly before the 50-day Gaza Conflict. 16 January 
2015, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, opened 
a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine. The Prosecutor's decision follows 
the Government of Palestine's accession to the Rome Statute on 2 January 2015 and its 
declaration of 1 January 2015, lodged under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute – the Court's 
founding treaty – accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC over alleged crimes committed ‘in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014.’ Upon receipt 
of a referral or a valid declaration made pursuant to article 12(3) of the Statute, the 
Prosecutor, in accordance with Regulation 25(1) (c) of the Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, and as a matter of policy and practice, opens a preliminary examination of the 
situation at hand. Accordingly, the Prosecutor has opened a preliminary examination into the 
situation in Palestine. The Office will conduct its analysis in full independence and 
impartiality. But the big question yet to be answered is: does the United Nations formally 
recognise it as a State?
196
 
The Court’s Jurisprudence over Colombia 
The situation in Colombia has been under review by the ICC since 2005
197
 armed conflict in 
the State claims lives and homes of citizens.
198
 The conflict, according to the Colombian 
prosecutor’s office, has resulted in deaths, displacements, disappearances and torture of over 
75,000 people since 2005,
199
 despite measures taken by Colombian authorities, the violent 
nature of the conflict is sombre. The ICC claims it has not opened investigation into the 
conflict because the Colombian court system is attempting to fulfil the requirements of 
complementarity through implementation of a new law, The Justice and Peace Law (JPL), to 
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punish members of the warring groups. The JPL, however, is thought by many to be 
inadequate in its punishment of criminals.
200
 A report issued by the Institute for Criminal 
Law and Justice in 2010 cited many shortcomings of the JPL and insinuated that it would be 
in the best interests of Colombia if the ICC intervenes.
201
 The Court, nonetheless, has failed 
to open an investigation. African countries, including Kenya, Sudan, and Libya attempted to 
invoke their rights to complementarity through Article 17 of the Rome Statute in order to 
exclude ICC investigations in their Nations their requests were staved off by the ICC.
202
  
In each case, the Court evaluates the national judicial system to be inadequate and insists on 
trying offenders at The Hague. In the case of Colombia, however, the OTP has given the 
national judicial system authority to prosecute offenders despite criticism by the international 
community that Colombia is incapable of adequately trying the accused and that its JPL is 
simply being used as a shielding mechanism for the most serious offenders.
203
 The JPL offers 
‘pseudo amnesty’ to the para-militaries high command by issuing minimal sentences rather 
than severe sentences, for crimes often committed by the high command, such as rape, 
murder, and kidnapping. It also allows for the US to extradite para-military commanders,
204
 
detrimental to Colombian courts to convict local perpetrators due to inadequately proving the 
guilt of Colombian nationals, and difficult for Colombian authorities to gain access to 
extradited detainees.
205
 Moreover, as those extradited are often high-level offenders, it is 
difficult for Colombian prosecutors to try them for crimes committed in Colombia.
206
 
Additionally, the Colombian judiciary does not have the means to effectively prosecute those 
who have violated international law nonetheless the Court is yet to revoke Colombia’s 
privilege to try cases internally.  
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The ICC’s failure to issue a formal investigation into the situation in Colombia has often been 
questioned by parties who feel that the Colombian judicial system has failed to satisfy the 
requirements of complementarity. Numerous groups, including an ICC roundtable discussion 
group, have outlined various challenges the Colombian judicial system has failed to 
overcome and its apparent unwillingness to prosecute crimes that would implicate the State 
as a guilty party.
207
 Also, current extradition policies with the US are detrimental to achieving 
justice in Colombia. Thus, abundant information is available why the Court should open an 
investigation. Its failure to do so exemplifies other factors at play. The US involvement in the 
Colombian situation may play a role in the Court’s decision as the US has a strong 
relationship with the Colombian government,
208
 depends on Colombia as an important source 
of energy and an integral economic and geopolitical gateway to South America, and has 
nearly 1,400 civilian or military officials stationed in Colombia at any given time,
209
 as such, 
the US is vested in maintaining the status quo in Colombia in order to sustain the current 
Colombia-US relation.  
If the ICC investigates the Colombian situation, there could be a regime change, disruptive to 
current US-Colombia relations and the US’s access to Colombian resources. Additionally, 
US civilian and military officials in Columbia would be vulnerable to ICC prosecution. Thus, 
the US ostensibly opposes an official investigation into the Colombian situation in favour of 
continuing the status quo. The ICC’s failure to investigate the situation in Colombia despite 
evidence of its inability to fulfil the requirements of complementarity indicates that its 
decision is based on factors which appear heavily influenced by the US interests. 
The Court’s Jurisprudence over Syria 
Attempts to overthrow the ruling Syrian regime began by opposition factions in 2011; still 
ongoing in 2014, an estimation of over 70,000 human lives have been lost, with human rights 
violations by the government and opposition forces in the country.
210
 The Syrian conflict 
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meets the gravity threshold; has claimed more lives than some conflicts under official 
investigation by the Court. Moreover, the National government is unwilling to investigate and 
prosecute the crimes committed and still being committed. Government forces continue to 
commit atrocities.
211
 The only criterion for investigation that has not been met by the 
situation in Syria is that of jurisdiction ratione loci, because Syria is not a Party State of the 
Court and has not accepted the ad hoc jurisdiction from the Court, the Court must attain 
UNSC approval to investigate. International organisations have asked the UNSC to refer the 
situation to the ICC for investigations,
212
 but it failed to do so and the Court unable to open 
investigations in Syria.  
The failure has occurred because Russia and China, being permanent members of the UNSC 
with veto powers, have strong alliances with Syria,
213
 and have repeatedly vetoed movements 
to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC, quashed other initiatives to persuade the UNSC on the 
Syrian situation, calling them ‘ill-timed’ and counterproductive.214 Nonetheless, various 
groups and organisations, including the Human Rights Watch, the UN, Arab League, and 
European Union Foreign Affairs Council, continue to attempt to manipulate the situation in 
Syria by appealing to the UNSC and implementing bilateral sanctions against Syria.
215
 Still, 
the ICC has the greatest capacity to hold all parties responsible for their actions, but unable 
to, due to the supervening circumstances. 
The Court’s Jurisprudence over the Central African Republic  
The government of the Central African Republic (CAR) referred the situation in the Country 
to the ICC (in December 2004) under Article 14,
216
 being a State Party to the Statute, the 
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crimes are within the Jurisdiction of the Court and committed on CAR territory. The OTP 
opened an investigation in May 2007.
217
  
The Trial Chamber III on 22 November 2010 commenced trial (Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo) for two charges of CAH and three charges of war crimes. On 20 November 
2013, a warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido was issued by the 
ICC for offences against the administration of justice allegedly committed in connection with 
the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.
218
 On 25 November 2013, Fidèle 
Babala Wandu and Aimé Kilolo Musamba got transferred to the ICC Detention centre. On 27 
November 2013, Aimé Kilolo Musamba and Fidèle Babala Wandu, made their initial 
appearance before the ICC. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo appeared with them as well, 
following his arrest, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo was transferred to the ICC detention 
centre on 4 December 2013 and made his first appearance before the Court on 5 December 
2013. Narcisse Arido will be surrendered to the Court upon completion of the relevant 
national judicial proceedings in France.
219
Mr. Bemba is allegedly criminally responsible, as 
military commander under Article 28 and accused of two counts of CAH charges: murder 
(Article 7(1) (a) of the Statute ) and rape (Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute ); Three counts of war 
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DRC Parliament and Deputy Secretary General of the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo), and Narcisse 
Arido (a Defence witness); Judge Cuno Tarfusser found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that these 
persons are criminally responsible for the commission of offences against the administration of justice (Article 
70 of the Rome Statute) by corruptly influencing witnesses before the ICC and presenting evidence that they 
knew to be false or forged. The suspects, it is alleged, were part of a network for the purposes of presenting false 
or forged documents and bribing certain persons to give false testimony in the case against Mr Bemba. 
219
 ICC-01/05-01/13, The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido. 
245 
 
crime charges: murder (Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute); rape (Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the 
Statute); and pillaging (Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute),
220
 the trial continues at the Court. 
However, on 30 May 2014, the ICC Prosecutor received another referral from the Central 
African authorities regarding crimes allegedly committed on CAR territory since 1 August 
2012; on 24 September 2014, following an independent and comprehensive preliminary 
examination, the Office of the Prosecutor announced the opening of open a second 
investigation in the Central African Republic (CAR) with respect to crimes allegedly 
committed since 2012, the situation is assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber II. 
Situation on a Registered Vessel of the Union of the Comoros 
The Presidency at the ICC on 5 July 2013 assigned ‘the Situation on registered vessels of the 
Union of the Comoros, the ‘Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia’ to Pre-Trial 
Chamber I.
221
 This is a procedural matter only, and is not the beginning of an investigation. 
On 14 May 2013, the OTP received a referral from the Union of the Comoros, ‘with respect 
to the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza Strip.’222 
The referral makes reference to seven vessels that were allegedly attacked and requests the 
Prosecutor to investigate the event, specifically on ‘one of the passenger vessels of the 
humanitarian aid flotilla bound for Gaza on 31 May 2010, in which nine victims were killed 
on board and dozens seriously injured, a consequence of the attacks by the Israel Defence 
Forces… in international waters.’ According to the referral, the vessel was within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Comoros, while two other vessels allegedly attacked are within 
the territorial jurisdiction of Greece and Cambodia respectively. 
223
 The referral makes 
reference to Article 12(2) (a) of the Statute, which allows the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction 
over crimes committed on board a vessel, if the State of registration of that vessel is a State 
Party to the ICC. Comoros, Greece and Cambodia are all State Parties to the Rome Statute.
224
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5.8 Gender Crimes and the International Criminal Court’s Jurisprudence  
Gender crimes have been an issue at international courts since the Nuremberg trials, although 
it had no place in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) despite ‘extensive 
evidence’ of sexual violence.225 The ICTR/ICTY changed the attitude; provided a template 
for the ICC for successful conviction of perpetrators of gender crimes. The ICTR convicted 
Jean-Paul Akayesu in 1998, the Mayor of the Taba commune in Rwanda,
226
 accused of 
various charges of genocide and CAH, including rape and outrages upon personal dignity, the 
case of Akayesu is the first to recognise rape ‘as an instrument of Genocide and a CAH.’227 
The Akayesu case highlights gender crimes and sexual violence as priority(s) for international 
criminal justice. However, subsequent cases revealed that investigations of gender crimes 
could be problematic. In the Prosecutor v Musema and Kajelijeli
228
 involving charges of rape 
and murder, the ICTR did not procure convictions because the evidence was inadequate to 
convict ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.229  
The ICTY prioritised gender crimes than did the ICTR, due to the fact that ‘the UN resolution 
establishing the ICTY specifically referenced sexual violence against Muslim women, the 
resolution creating the ICTR made no mention of the topic.’230 The ICTY since 1995 charged 
more than seventy individuals with crimes of sexual violence; convicted about thirty up till 
2011.
231
 The Tribunal decided on cases of sexual violence against men, such as those of 
Dŭsko Tadíc.232 Given the ICTY’s success in gender crimes investigations, it becomes 
possible for the ICC to investigate gender crimes better with priority? The ICTY’s strategic 
approach to investigations makes sure that the evidence is comprehensive, using forensic 
evidence, investigating crime scenes, and interviewing other witnesses.
233
 Without proper 
training of investigators, the ICC will be unable to collect evidence needed to bring a proper 
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case against a perpetrator,
234
 while the OTP’s charging record for crimes of sexual violence 
has improved, much work remains to be done. 
The Statute defines gender crimes in Article 7(1)(g) and Article (8)(2)(b)(xxii) as CAH and 
war crimes respectively including ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity.’235 Gender crimes may also be charged as genocide with acts such as ‘imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group.’236 However, gender crimes have not 
been a priority during investigations at the ICC to date. Legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
ICC could be improved prosecuting the crime.
237
 Currently, charges for gender-based crimes 
have been brought in about seven situations; in 11 of the 16 cases.
238
 Despite their 
prevalence, convictions on gender crime charges by the Court have not been achieved, 
making investigations of gender crimes a major issue to the ICC.
239
 Women in the DRC 
situation admitted to being held as sexual slaves whom captors refer to as ‘food;’ makes it 
difficult for them to return to their normal lives following the anguish they experienced.
240
 
Female victims of gender crimes are considered impure a result of cultural stereotypes 
associated with sex, making the crime destructive to their lives.
241
 Sexual violence does leave 
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severe impact on males as well. In the DRC, men also came forward as victims of sexual 
violence; the crime includes genital violence, enforced nudity, enforced sterilization, 
enforced masturbation, and rape, or forced rape of other victims.
242
  
The post-election conflict in Kenya also brought to light gender crimes against men. Other 
acts reported are genital amputation and forced circumcision.243 Many go unreported due to 
the trauma caused by such crimes and societal stigma attached.
244
 Crimes against men in 
particular become a weapon against the community. By showing the men - leaders of the 
community - in a vulnerable position, unable to protect their communities; therefore the 
perpetrators have control,
245
 further example of improper investigations came to light with 
the acquittal of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a leader from the Front for National Integration 
(FNI) from the Ituri region of the DRC. Ngudjolo was acquitted
246
 on 18 December 2012 of 
various charges of war crimes and CAH including ‘raping of women and girls, torture, and 
the forced recruitment of children.”247 The reason for his acquittal was not that the judges 
perceived Ngudjolo to be innocent but that the Prosecutor could not prove ‘without a 
reasonable doubt’ that he was involved in the attack.248 
The ICC has since shown some positive changes such as, in the case of a former officer of the 
FPLC, Bosco Ntaganda from the Ituri region. In 2006, the original arrest warrant was issued, 
and Ntaganda was charged for the conscription of child soldiers, similar to Lubanga’s 
without a charge for gender offence.
249
 However, in July 2012, the OTP submitted a second 
application charging Ntaganda with further crimes committed in the Ituri district including 
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murder and gender offences.
250
 Similarly, the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo from the 
situation in the CAR, described as ‘the first case before the ICC to be focused nearly 
exclusively on sex crimes.’251 Considering that Bemba is the former vice president of the 
DRC, ‘the charges are against highest level perpetrators before the ICC.’252 A successful 
prosecution and conviction in this case would demonstrate a positive approach to combating 
gender crimes. 
5.9 Transitional Justice Jurisprudence and the International Criminal Court 
The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) established the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) at its 
third plenary meeting in 2002, in accordance with Article 79 of the Statute an improvement 
over the problems experienced by the ad hoc tribunals.
253
 TFV is to provide assistance for 
victims of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.254 The ASP is required to manage the 
activities and projects implemented by the Fund subject to the decision (Article 79(3)) taken 
by the Court.
255
 The ASP designed the Trust Fund Regulations to govern the conduct of the 
Fund, adopted at its fourth session in 2005.
256
 The ASP established a Board of Directors to 
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directly manage the Fund; to facilitate the substantial work done by the Board; a Secretariat 
was established at its sixth plenary meeting.
257
 The commitment of the Court to transitional 
justice for victims is regarded as a plus for international criminal justice. Transitional justice 
provides a way for a community to transit from a period of mass violence to stability by 
rebuilding its society, community and addressing redress for victims. To achieve this aim, 
mechanisms integrated into the Rome Statute secure essential rights to victims of mass 
atrocity, unlike previous (ICTY/ICTR) ad hoc tribunals. According to Article 75
258
 one of the 
mechanisms is to distribute reparations awards to victims to rebuild their lives after mass 
violence.  
The TFV a key mechanism has two principal mandates: (1) implementing court-ordered 
reparations awards and, (2) using voluntary contributions from various sources to provide 
general assistance to victims.
259
 Whereas legal mechanisms of the Court may be broadly 
inadequate to the Victims, the TFV promotes transitional justice by restoring the lives of 
victims through the implementation of reparation awards and collective assistance projects. 
The OTP and the Registry investigate a defendant’s resources through asset-tracing, when 
allocating reparations awards and promoting transitional justice. The TFV has been 
instrumental in helping victims rebuild their lives. After the Court orders reparations awards 
against a defendant, the TFV cooperates with the Court in allocating reparations. When a 
defendant is declared indigent, the responsibility to pay for restitution/reparations falls on the 
TFV.
260
 General assistance projects benefit those victims who do not qualify for Court-
ordered reparations by offering transitional support to rebuild their lives. To maintain 
adequate funding for both mandates, the TFV must capitalise on key fundraising methods 
such as lobbying for earmarked and multi-annual donations.
261
 
The shortcomings of the ad hoc courts are attributed to their design as a punitive mechanism 
and therefore did not focus on victim redress. These shortcomings include limited mandates 
                                                          
257
 ICC-ASP/3/Res.7 (PDF): Establishment of the Secretariat of the Trust Fund for Victims. The third ASP, held 
in September 2004 in The Hague, decided to establish a Secretariat “to provide such assistance as is necessary 
for the proper functioning of the Board of Directors in carrying out its tasks”. The resolution also ‘calls upon 
governments, international organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities to contribute voluntarily to 
the Fund.’ 
258
 ICCSt (n 2). 
259 Leila N Sadat (n 46) 
260
 Katerina Henshaw and Eunbi Cho, ‘Transitional Justice for the Future,’ in Jackson M H and others ‘The 
International Criminal Court Confronting Challenges on the Path to Justice’ [2013] Jackson School of 
International Studies Task Force Report University of Washington.  
261
 ibid. 
251 
 
for reparations awards, the lack of enforcement by the national courts responsible to bringing 
compensation claims under Rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of the 
ICTR/ICTY which states that, ‘pursuant to relevant national legislation, a victim claiming, 
may bring an action in a national court or other competent body to obtain compensation.’262 
The lack of outreach to help victims obtain reparations limited such opportunities.
263
  
The RPE of the ICTR/ICTY mandated ‘the return of any property and proceeds acquired by 
criminal conduct…to their rightful owners.’ Consequently, the provisions limited restitution 
to the return of stolen property but did not handle physical and mental injuries of the 
victims.
264
 In contrast, the ICC includes all aspects of restitution, compensation, and 
rehabilitation when awarding reparations; restitution alone does not constitute full and 
complete recovery for the victims. The Registry working with the TFV allocates these awards 
to victims who have applied and qualified under Rule 85 of the RPE.
265
 Victims that fit into 
this definition may request individual or collective compensation by completing an 
application. The application is then filed with the Registry and the Court may award the 
victims individually or collectively. Article 75 of the Rome Statute defines victims’ 
reparations.
266
 Lastly, rehabilitation includes ‘medical and psychological care as well as legal 
and social services.’267 
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5.10 Jurisprudence Over the definition of the Crimes Against Humanity 
The discussion of the ‘Policy’ element by the majority and Judge Kaul’s dissent opinion 
contributes significantly to the Court’s early jurisprudence to the definition of CAH. The 
Kenyan situation presented a different scenario from other situations before the Court. Kenya 
held closely contested national elections on 27 December, 2007, pitting incumbent President 
Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) against the main opposition candidate 
Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). On 30 December, 2007, Kenya’s 
Electoral Commission declared, President Kibaki as re-elected, this triggered a series of 
‘violent demonstrations and targeted attacks in several locations within Kenya.’268 The 
violence resulted in about 1,220 ‘reported killings of civilians, more than 900 acts of rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, the internal displacement of 350,000 persons, and 3,561 
reported acts causing serious injury.’269 Violence took place in six out of eight regions of the 
country,
270
 brutal as described in the prosecution’s application, in waves and targeted specific 
groups, ‘tribes perceived as political opponents.’271 Groups associated with the ODM and the 
PNU initiated the attacks and counter attacks against opponents, and evidence of massacres 
and torture committed by the police.
272
 During the initial phase of the violence, attacks 
appeared largely to target PNU supporters; subsequent attacks were directed at ethnic groups 
perceived affiliated to the ODM; police attacks appeared to be directed towards ethnic 
communities perceived opposed to their own ethnic affiliation, or against gang members.
273
 
Although, the majority of the Pre-trial chamber noted that the ‘Policy requirement’ was 
eventually abandoned by the ad hoc tribunals, but nonetheless ‘deemed it useful and 
appropriate to consider the definition of the concept in earlier cases.’274 Relying on this 
jurisprudence and the work of the ILC, the majority gave Article 7
275
 a reading that appears 
to be supported by referencing the Trial Chamber’s opinion in the Blaškić case before the 
ICTY, the majority noted that the plan or policy to commit an attack may be inferred from the 
commission of a series of events and listed possible contributory factors, including, but not 
                                                          
268
 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No ICC-01/09, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to ICCSt (n 2) Article 15 (26 November 2009) para 4. 
269
 ibid para 56. 
270
 ibid. 
271
 ibid para 74. 
272
 Ibid para 104-106. 
273
 ibid para 114; there is little information on police attacks and their organisation in the opinion or the 
Prosecutor’s request for authorisation. The evidence adduced thus far suggests that the police attacks severely 
worsened the scope and gravity of the violence and aggravated the attacks by rival groups. 
274
 ibid para 86. 
275
 ICCSt (n 2). 
253 
 
limited to, the establishment of military structures, the mobilisation of armed forces, the 
general content of a political program, alterations to the ethnic composition of populations, 
and discriminatory measures directed against particular groups.
276
 Claiming to follow the text 
of Article 7,
277
 the majority also read ‘State’ and ‘organisational’ disjunctively, a view 
claimed to be supported by texts in Arabic, French, Russian and Spanish languages;
278
 led the 
majority to conclude that ‘the formal nature of a group and the level of its organisation should 
not be the defining criterion.’279 Instead, ‘a distinction should be drawn on whether a group 
has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values.’280 Thus, not only 
that the organisation should be ‘State-like,’ but that the policy need not have been conceived 
at the highest level of the State, meaning that ‘regional or local organs of the State could 
satisfy the requirement of a State policy.’281 
Judge Kaul disagreed, arguing that the juxtaposition of the notion ‘State’ and ‘organisation’ 
in Article 7(2) (a) of the Statute indicate that even though the constitutive elements of 
statehood need not be established those ‘organisations’ should partake of some characteristics 
of a State,
282
 including a hierarchical structure with power over its members.
283
 Finding that 
there was no ‘organisation’ satisfying these criteria in the Kenyan situation, he concluded: 
...Local politicians, civic candidates or aspirants, councillors and 
business people meeting and allegedly financing the violence do not 
form an ‘organisation’ with a certain degree of hierarchical structure 
acting over a prolonged period of time. . . . Local politicians using 
criminal gangs for their own purposes [the question is: can this ever 
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happen in an erudite society? The researcher does not believe it will] 
is an indicator of a partnership of convenience for a passing occasion 
rather than an ‘organisation’ established for a common purpose over a 
prolonged period of time. Further, opportunistic violence and acts of 
individuals
284
 . . . equally does not allude to an ‘organisation’ 
characterised by structure and membership.
285
 
The evidence cited suggests ‘chaos, anarchy, a collapse of State authority and failure of law 
enforcement agencies,’ but not a CAH. He rejected the use of ICTY case law by the ICC 
without distinguishing and endeavoured to link CAH in Article 7 to the Nuremberg historical 
experience.
286
 His opinion evinces not ‘marginalising’ or ‘downgrading’ the notion of 
CAH,
287
 and implies that the majority’s view may ‘infringe upon State sovereignty,’ 
‘broadening the scope of ICC intervention almost indefinitely,’ and ‘turning the ICC . . . into 
a hopelessly overstretched, inefficient international court, with related risks for its standing 
and credibility.’288 
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The majority and dissenting opinions offer very different views of the ICC’s mandate. The 
majority focused principally upon the gravity of the harm, the brutality of the violence, its 
widespread and systematic nature and the preliminary stage of the proceedings. Given the 
complete absence of real guidance on this question, the majority looked to the resolution of 
similar questions before other international criminal tribunals and the work of the ILC on the 
question of non-State actors and CAH. The guiding principle of the majority was faithfulness 
to the ICC’s mandate to ‘protect human values.’289 Judge Kaul’s approach suggests a textual 
and historical exegesis could provide an appropriate test said Leila Sadat. Several experts 
welcome Judge Kaul’s rigorous approach, whilst criticising the majority for adopting a broad 
definition of ‘organisation’ that will require extensive case by case analysis.290 Although, 
Judge Kaul’s opinion is suggested to ignore the work of the ILC (which had prepared the 
original draft of the ICC’s Statute as well as the Draft Code of Crimes) and does not account 
for a substantial body of work suggesting that a policy element may be one way to distinguish 
between ordinary and international crimes and thereby confer international jurisdiction.
291
 
Undeniably, jurisdiction can be conferred either because particular interests of the 
international community have been injured (l’ordre public international), because of the 
scale of the harm or because the problem is one incapable of solution by individual states.
292
 
Indeed, Article 7 of the Rome Statute is quite different from Article 6(c) of the IMT 
Statute.
293
 Judge Kaul’s picture of ‘chaos, anarchy; and a collapse of State authority’ is 
exactly the kind of situation in which victims of atrocity crimes might require international 
intervention in the guise of the ICC, and is precisely the kind of situation which the framers 
of the Statute would not wish to exclude as CAH if possible and where no national 
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jurisdiction acts.
294
 In recognition of this, Judge Kaul reinvigorated his understanding on two 
additional pillars referring to Article 22
295
 the caution to construe definitions of crimes 
‘strictly,’ with any benefit of the doubt accruing to the accused, and reference to the 
principles of interpretation found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLOT).
296
 VCLOT advocates ‘ordinary meaning should be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of the Treaty’s object and purpose. 297 What is not clear is 
how the text of Article 7(2) (a) itself can resolve the issue of what ‘state or organisational’ 
means. Indeed, footnotes 52-53 of the dissent note that scholars do not agree upon the 
meaning, but concludes that the juxtaposition of the words ‘State’ and ‘organisation’ in the 
same line indicates that organisations that may author CAH must ‘partake of some 
characteristics of a State.’298  
Ultimately, given the absence of a clear answer from the text, VCLOT instructs us to 
examine ‘the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.’299 As 
noted the policy element was added to the definition of Article 7 as an afterthought, intended 
to avoid the possibility of random or isolated acts coming within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The second argument accentuates a very difficult problem of interpretation with respect to the 
Rome Statute more generally. As the constitution of an international organisation, a broadly 
purposive and teleological approach to the Statute’s provisions is necessary and 
appropriate.
300
 Embedded within the constitution of the ICC is a criminal code, the provisions 
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of which must be interpreted with deference to the principle of legality in particular cases 
before the Court, and in accordance with Article 22’s admonition not to create crimes by 
analogy. Article 22, however, sheds little light on the interpretative question before the ICC 
in this case, for the question raised is not about the rights of a particular accused or set of 
accused to a fair trial, but more generally, what the framers meant by the word ‘organisation’ 
in Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute. That question, given its fundamental jurisdictional 
importance to the understanding of CAH in the Rome Statute, is a question that only an 
examination of the Statute’s object, purpose and context (as well as travaux préparatoires 
and the decisions of other tribunals as aids to interpretation) can resolve, and a teleological 
approach to the question appears both necessary and appropriate. 
Finally, neither the dissent nor the majority explicitly addressed in the Kenya case, the 
relationship of Article 7 of the Rome Statute to customary international law. The dissent does 
suggest that the ICC ignores in this circumstance the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals in 
interpreting Article 7.
301
 Yet those Tribunals expressly based their authority and 
jurisprudence on CAH as customary international law. When Article 7 was codified, the 
question of the ‘policy’ element had not been settled by the ICTY/ICTR, and its inclusion 
was therefore not inconsistent with the work of those tribunals, particularly if its inclusion 
was meant to exclude random and isolated acts from the ambit of Article 7.
302
 Although, the 
limiting language in the chapeaux of each of the three crimes states that the provisions are 
‘for the purpose of this Statute,’303 because the Statute applies to nationals of non-State 
parties through the possibility of referral by the Security Council, having such provisions in 
the Statute and interpreted consistently with customary international law could be deeply 
advantageous. Undoubtedly, one of the primary challenges posed by the accused in the 
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Sudanese and Libyan situations is to the political legitimacy (and universal application) of the 
substantive norms in the Statute. Moreover, in spite of the provisions of Article 10 of the 
Statute,
304
 Article 7 is increasingly seen by international and national courts and tribunals, 
including the ICTY, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, US federal courts and the UK House of Lords, as embodying customary 
international law of CAH.
305
  
The ICC Statute cannot be viewed in isolation from the work of the ad hoc tribunals. It is true 
that the Rome Statute does not reference the Statutes and jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals, unlike the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
306
 However, Article 21
307
 
explicitly permits the Court to apply customary international law to fill gaps in the Statute 
and the Elements of Crimes.
308
 Given the absence of definitional provisions in the text of 
Article 7 and the Elements of CAH accompanying Article 7 ICCSt, it is apparent that 
customary international law must provide a residual basis for the interpretation and 
application of CAH at the ICC. Indeed, it has become increasingly evident that whether or 
not the Rome Statute definition was intended to represent a codification of customary 
international law (and there are arguments in both directions), it has become accepted as 
such, and must be read in light of other ostensibly customary definitions of CAH found in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.
309
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Yet the need for the Court to rely on customary international law the source of law, from 
which the definition is derived, suggests that the jurisprudence of the ICC should not depart 
extensively from the jurisprudence at those tribunals, nor does the text or drafting history of 
Article 7 support such a departure. The framers expressly retained the formulation of the ILC 
that the policy must be authored by a State or organisation.
310
 Thus, the restrictive approach 
taken to CAH not only by the dissent in the Kenya case, but in the Katanga, Bemba, and 
Mbarushimana confirmation decisions seem to be consistent with the text and legislative 
history of Article 7.
311
 As some scholars have suggested, the answer may be to align the 
jurisprudence of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals as regards the application of the ‘policy’ 
element, by interpreting element ‘as a minimalist threshold excluding random action.’312 
Judge Kaul’s thoughtful dissent and legal conclusions highlights the need for the OTP to 
charge for CAH where the application to a situation is clear-cut not boarder-line cases that 
could lead to disputes. It is important that the Court clearly defines the term ‘organisation’ at 
the earliest possible time. The framers of the Rome Statute being aware of the potential for 
resistance to the Court, and the Statute are replete with procedural devices and filtering 
mechanisms to ensure that the Court respects State sovereignty. These include the 
requirement of complementarity, the possibility of challenges to admissibility and 
jurisdiction, the possibility of Security Council deferral, the gravity requirement, robust 
defence and human rights protections and the very rigorous vetting of cases before trial by 
the Court’s judiciary, for the Court to fulfil its mandate it will be critical prosecuting the 
CAH successfully as a substantive crime under its jurisdiction. 
5.11 Conclusion 
The ICC has investigated about 22 situation and 8 cases of the numerous communications 
received from the international community as at the time of this research. This chapter 
focuses on the jurisprudence of the Court since its inception, analysing critical issues such as 
interpretation of policy elements, organisational elements, and State-like elements considered 
either restrictively or unrestrictedly, noting that the law is unsettled on these issues in spite of 
the codification in the Statute. Consequently, political intricacies and judicial effectiveness 
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are addressed at the ICC and the Court’s jurisprudence became relevant contributing to this. 
Responsibilities fall on the ASP, civil society, other international institutions and the Judges 
of the ICC to bring to life words that represent the promises made at Rome. Is it true, false or 
a coincidence that the Court’s investigations target African perpetrators? More work needs to 
be done to counter such perceptions and stir the Court to achieve it purpose and intent. The 
chapter also considers gender crimes in a renewed effort to push the Rome Statute further and 
the OTP to be more pragmatic establishing liability for gender crimes,
313
 Article 54 (1) (b) of 
the Statute reiterates investigation of gender crimes. A well-articulated training program for 
the OTP should become a priority to ‘boost staff competence on gender issues.’314 The OTP 
must develop an effective operational strategy for prosecuting international crimes ‘as the 
engine of the Court, systematic efforts for professional investigations and effective 
cooperation are the fuel for the entire Court’s success.’315 In the next chapter the research will 
conclude by proffering relevant ambitious recommendations and the way forward for a better 
adjudication of international criminal justice.  
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Chapter 6 
The Future of the International Criminal Court  
‘La justices sans la force est impuissante’1 (Justice without force is irrelevant) 
6.1 Research Findings 
The thesis critically examined the prosecutorial challenges of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC/the Court) and its legal architecture the Rome Statute (the Statute),
2
 bothering on 
the Courts legitimacy and credibility in her attempt to deliver justice and end impunity for 
perpetrators of heinous crimes. It begins with the Conceptualisation of crimes, analyses of the 
theoretical approach to current international criminal law and the Court’s modus operandi 
prosecuting under the Statute. The Thesis further examines the Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae 
of the Court namely: Crimes against Humanity (CAH), the Crime of Aggression, War Crimes 
and the Crime of Genocide within the Principles of public international law, criminal law, 
international humanitarian law, human rights law and customary laws of war. It also 
considers the Jurisprudence of the Court from its inception to establish the Court’s Culture 
and concludes with relevant recommendations encompassing  case and court management to 
improve current sub-optimal level of performance in accomplishing its raisons d'être and the 
possible future of prosecutions at the Court as the main contribution to knowledge. 
The creation of the ICC is a demonstration of the will of the international community to bring 
to justice those responsible for egregious crimes, prevent impunity of such atrocities and 
deliver justice to the Victims of such crimes. In attempts to achieve the set objectives, many 
accused and affected communities question the Court’s approach; claiming that all the Cases 
out of about 22 situations before the Court are located in same geographical continent and 
geographical jurisdiction is not part of the Court’s jurisdiction, could this be an evidence of 
the Court’s behaviour in a particular way or a coincidence? Triggering mistrust for the Court, 
and portraying the Court as being politically motivated. However, the major problem with the 
ICC and its modus operandi is rooted in the unending fault lines of international law, to be 
precise the tension between state sovereignty, international accountability and political 
affiliations. The push back by Libya, for example, against the Trial of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, 
the son of former Libyan strongman, at The Hague is one example. The same is true, until the 
turn around for Kenya when the Court recently dropped charges against the Kenyan President 
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for lack of evidence to prove the Charges beyond reasonable doubt, and for Al- Bashir, the 
need to maximise judicious use of resources led to suspending the case against him. 
Key players in the International Panorama such as: the United States, China, Russia, Israel 
and some others are not State Parties to the ICC. China, the United States and Russia 
constitute 60 percent of the United Nations Security Council (Permanent 5) members where 
they often wield their veto powers against the collective will of the International Community. 
The United Kingdom and France are the only permanent members of the Security Council 
that are parties to the Rome Statute. While China, the US and Russia are desirous of holding 
leaders and dissidents from member and non-member states to the Rome Statute who commit 
crimes under the Jurisdiction of the ICC accountable, these countries are not in themselves 
willing to have their leaders and citizens held accountable under that same framework to 
which they subject others. The subtext is that leaders and citizens of these countries are 
immune from the Crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. The US was proactive at the 
inception and setting up of the necessary machinery leading to the establishment of the Court 
but ended up lobbying other countries not to ratify the Rome Statute. 
Under public international law, it is an established fact that States are unwilling to 
compromise their sovereignty, the underlying philosophy for proposals during the 
Commission’s work on the creation of the Rome Statute, which led to the Complementarity 
Regime enshrined in the Statute for it to be commonly accepted. Hence, the Travaux 
Préparatoires reveals the Intention to establish an international criminal court with very 
limited powers, based on a system that respects states’ sovereign superiority. Thus, the 
Research establishes at this critical period that the ICC needs visionary leadership, practical 
and effective support from all stake-holders more than ever before. Choices made now by the 
Assembly of State Parties (ASP) about the Court’s effectiveness, core functions, size, 
cooperation and political backing will affect not only the Court’s operations and visible long-
term impact, but also the viability of international criminal justice enterprise; crucial areas for 
the ICC success stand out for the ASP attention, many areas of the Court’s operations must 
be improved upon to make its work more effectiveness, transparent, better acceptance of its 
decisions compelling motivations thereby improving legitimacy and credibility perception 
towards the Court, the areas highlighted by the thesis are intrinsic to the Court, the internal 
dynamics such as its operational and administrative nature, particularly its judicial work 
through the Chambers and investigation team. The extrinsic influences relevant to the Court 
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will also affect its acceptance, cooperation towards the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
to combat impunity and render justice to victims leading to improved international 
recognition, increased membership, timely payment of subscriptions, increased legitimacy 
and credibility for the Court.  
6.2 Recommendations 
The Research establishes that the International Criminal Court is a political organisation up to 
its establishment
3
 (see 2.19) importing the theory of ‘Organisations’. Article 4 of the Statute, 
makes the Court a legal creature
4
 emanating from international political permutations and has 
been unduly influenced
5
 by powerful nations evident in indicting and non-indictment of some 
sitting Heads of States, not minding the Principle of immunity under customary international 
law.
6
 Consequently, support for the Court has diminished to varying degrees, in member and 
non-member States; this poses a major problem for the Court that derives its legitimacy 
particularly from the support of Member States and the International Community as a whole. 
In order to shore up support, the ICC must address the criticisms raised by the international 
community as stake holders in providing global peace and security. 
Furthermore, the Theory of ‘Organisational Behaviour’ helps address other complex 
problems of the Court, firstly, it enables the Researcher to understand the Behaviour of the 
Court established through its jurisprudence. Secondly, how the Behaviour as an organisation 
affects the Court’s internal make-up such as its staff (group dynamics) and their motivation7 
towards the accomplishment of their duties. Thirdly, to understand the Behaviour of the 
Court in the context of external stake holders such as members and non-member States. 
Consequently, how the Courts behaviour determines or motivates these external elements 
leading to the Court’s acceptance thereby improving credibility and legitimacy. Acceptance 
of the Court’s decisions increases the possibility of avoiding truancy in obligations to the 
Court in-respect of payments of subscriptions and or donations to the Court to carry out some 
of its operations. The Behaviour of the Court like any other organisation does affect its 
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performance internally and or externally. An attempt to probe the Organisational Behaviour 
of the Court and proffer some solutions could to some extent minimise the Prosecutorial 
challenges the Court faces. The Research also establishes the need to breed a new life into 
and reinvigorate the Court in line with new challenges. Much of the Criticisms of the ICC 
originate from within the African Union (AU) member states.
8
  At the inception of the Court, 
many AU member States actively supported negotiations that created the Rome Statute.
9
 
However, the AU became progressively opposed to the Court’s behaviour after, the first 
major change in the AU-ICC relationship occurred after the Court opened investigations in 
2005 into Sudan (a non-member state) following a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
referral. The issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir led many 
AU Member States to oppose the warrant.
10
 Thereafter, the relationship between the two 
bodies significantly deteriorated, posing a major problem for the ICC, which derives its 
authority and legitimacy from the support of the international community and individual 
States. African member states, specifically, represent the greatest conglomeration of ICC 
member States on any one continent, numbering about 33 in total, consequently their support 
play a vital role in maintaining the ICC’s legitimacy; as such, the ICC must address concerns 
raised by the AU and its members.  
Court Management Recommendation- revitalising the ICC’s image starts at the Core of its 
internal structure, namely the ASP and the four organs of the Court.
11
 Although, the organs of 
the Court are separate branches, they should work fairly independently (to provide checks 
and balances) and collaboratively to progress performance and meet high standards and 
obligations expected of them in the Statute.
12
 Improving the internal relationships within the 
ICC, specifically the affairs of the ASP, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the Judges, 
will lead to respect and motivation creating legitimacy, and credibility from internal 
members, external member and non-member states. 
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It is time for the Court’s Registry an organ of the Court13 to be fairly more independent14 to 
perform more effectively and encouraged to develop a special department or a lobby-
committee to liaise particularly with non-member States and other important stake-holders in 
the interest of the overall objective of the Court in actualising her mandate. This committee 
could be an extension to the already overreaching programme currently designed for the 
grassroots where the Court is present, however the Committee will operate at a higher level 
and more relevant to induce more ratification by all and sundry. Other relevant duties could 
be to lobby for more funds even from established blue-chip companies to actualise the 
Court’s programmes and discuss with States Parties that are less positive about their 
contributions to the Court. Destructive violence that shocks humanity is usually not a single 
event, but a process developing over time requiring planning and resources.  The reality is 
that egregious crimes could be prevented by acting and mobilising on adequate information 
as well as having courage and political will to act as at when due not after atrocities.  
Recommendation in Respect of the Assembly of State Parties- the Rome Statute states that: 
the ASP is the Management, Legislative and Oversight body of the ICC.
15
 The Assembly’s 
duties include, but not limited to, matters of budgetary concerns, making appropriate 
amendments to the Statute and providing oversight management to the Organs of the Court.
16
 
Consequently, the ASP acts as the check to balance the Actions of the Organs of the Court. 
However, in the first few years of the ICC, the absence of effective management from the 
ASP is prevalent as it failed to effectively manage and monitor the activities of the Organs, 
resulting in a sub-par output from the OTP; a lack of cohesion within the Divisions of 
qualified and knowledgeable judges and investigators.
17
 It is time for the ASP to re-organise 
and establish a more permanent management structure such as the Bureau or a subsidiary to it 
if necessary under Article 112 (4) (an administrative department to run the day to day 
activities of the Court separately, recruit, plan, train and develop a bank of 
professionals/investigators in regions, this could over a period reduce over dependence on 
State Parties) an expansion of the already laid down structure responsible directly to the ASP 
like the OTP, rather than the current situation where the Prosecutor as a line manager; also 
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acts in support/operations capacity of the Court is a conflict of roles and could to a reasonable 
extent undermine performance of the Role of the OTP. Additionally, the Statute establishes 
four organs of the Court however, further reading of the Functions of the Registry highlights 
that the Registry is not that independent, from the Appointment of the Registrar to a host of 
its other functions largely subsumed into the Presidency;
18
 this also leads unconsciously to 
ineffectiveness.  
The ASP is the only body able to hold the OTP accountable for poor performance, as well as 
adequately address the perception of bias against the Court, but its passive behaviour 
contributes to the increasing negative sentiments that further undermine the Court. The 
Assembly must take action by mobilising States Parties that are members of the UN General 
Assembly and on the Security Council to open up a discussion on UN funding for referrals. It 
is critical that State Parties build on their collective efforts to help the Court secure the 
resources it needs to carry out all relevant activities and if necessary diplomatic engagement. 
The ASP must resolve to make the ICC a workable endeavour. The world would be better-
off, with an efficient and effective ICC and effort should be made to protect the determination 
that led to its inauguration as a court. Holding insensitive leaders accountable through the 
ICC is important to secure the interest of the Vulnerable anywhere in the world to sustain 
peace and security for mankind is essential to humanity. The AU leaders and its members 
should be as always at the forefront of championing the course of the ICC in this critical time.  
Though a very difficult task to accomplish, but there should be a push for further 
amendments to the Statute or a creation of an additional legal framework under Article 121 
ICCSt to establish enforcement procedures. Justice without enforcement (Blaise Pascal) is no 
justice. The achievement of improved credibility and legitimacy starts when the leadership of 
the Organisation initiates a revitalisation or modification of its actions to adequately fulfil its 
obligations, duties and mandates. The effects will trickle down to all other divisions. 
Legal Case Management Recommendation- this thesis establishes that the Court must 
improve on its knowledge and methodologies for managing the life cycle of cases more 
effectively; to develop sophisticated information management workflow practices that are 
tailored to meet specific needs and requirements the Legal field. The Challenge to deliver 
results at lower costs with greater effectiveness, thus the OTP must develop practice-specific 
processes and utilise contemporary technologies to assist in meeting such challenges. Law 
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practice management processes and technologies include case and matter management, time, 
litigation support, research, communication, collaboration, data mining, modelling, data 
security, storage, and archive accessibility. A credible investigation report generation 
approach would resolve a lot of problems at trial proceedings and on the field. Improving 
cooperation and communication within investigation teams is important to streamline the 
investigative process resulting in faster and better outcomes while using fewer resources to 
accomplish objectives. It is important for investigators to work together as a unit, share facts, 
information and harness resources for better results that would lead to better prosecution. 
Working disjointedly also undermines the plight of victims. 
Success in carrying out international justice is important, that the ICC holds perpetrators of 
the most serious international crimes accountable and focus on prosecuting ‘those who bear 
the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes, based on the Evidence that emerges in 
the course of an investigation.’19 Generally, ‘those most responsible’ are considered to be the 
highest-ranking individuals in the chain of command that was responsible for the alleged 
crimes.
20
 While the official charging strategy of the OTP as explained in its prosecutorial 
Strategy reports is adequate, the charging strategy in practice has been too narrow both in 
terms of who is indicted and which crimes alleged perpetrators are charged with. In order to 
achieve justice, the Charges brought against alleged perpetrators in any given situation must 
be a representative sample of the scope of crimes. The case of Lubanga, for example, did not 
include charges of sexual violence, murder, pillaging, etc even though these crimes were 
allegedly committed, resulting in many victims’ resentment toward the ICC since they were 
excluded from the Justice process as a result of the narrow charging strategy. The ICC 
investigators must also conduct investigations that encompass various parties to the conflict. 
The policy of focusing on ‘those most responsible’ is ideal because this tactic more directly 
addresses the root of the conflicts, for this reason the OTP must target ‘those most 
responsible’ not only from rebel groups, but also from other parties to the conflicts. Situations 
in which the OTP only prosecute one side, such as in the DRC, Ivory Coast and Uganda, have 
damaged perceptions of the Court’s credibility by generating ideas that the cases reinforce 
‘victor’s justice’ and are therefore politically biased. If members of the losing party in a 
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conflict are the only ones punished for egregious crimes committed, and the winning party 
goes free, then the process is perceived as merely a political extension of the conflict a 
‘victor’s justice’ rather than a true justice guided by an independent pursuit of truth.21  
Investigators must adhere to the policy of investigating; charging those most responsible by 
bringing charges for crimes representative of the scope and gravity of criminality in each 
situation, justice will not be fully served and the legitimacy of the Court will be jeopardised if 
anything less. At stake is the success of the ICC, not only the survival of the institution itself, 
but also the legacy of international criminal justice as a fair and effective method to deliver 
justice, discourage impunity and promote post-conflict peace. If the ICC is to achieve its 
overall goals of upholding ‘quality justice’ and developing as a ‘well-recognised and 
adequately supported institution,’22 the charging strategy must be fair, unbiased and 
representative. 
Recommendations in Respect of the Judges of the Court- the thesis suggests achieving a 
sensible division of labour and cohesion between the Pre‐trial and Trial chambers is 
important so that the Trial Chamber can utilise the findings of the Pre‐Trial Chamber in order 
to avoid repetition when taking evidence at trials. Continuing professional development 
(CPD) training is also recommended if not already in place for the Judges. The thesis also 
recommends that the Judges come up with rigorous and impeccable analyses that will 
positively contribute to the development of international criminal justice particularly on 
issues with grey areas and yet to be settled in international criminal law.   
Recommendations in Respect of the Office of the Prosecutor-   the OTP has been a major 
source of concern, a main organ of the Court, significant internal changes are essential in 
order to improve productivity and subsequently the legitimacy and credibility of the Court. 
To make an internal overhaul, the ASP needs to provide adequate oversight on the OTP 
(Article 112 (2) (B) ICCSt) being the only committee with such authority. It is critical that 
the ASP exacts its authority to monitor the Independence of the OTP otherwise the Court will 
continue to perform sub-optimally in delivering justice. Consequently, developing high 
ethical standards would enhance cohesion and high performance for all prosecutors 
occupying the office. It would also help to ‘provide a common framework for conceptualising 
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the Prosecutor’s obligations under the ICC Statute’ and ‘would lower the likelihood of major 
ethical disagreements and promote goal congruence within the OTP similar to the Code of 
Conduct for counsels.’23 Additionally, it would unify the Court and enhance credibility, 
which are fundamental challenges of the ICC. 
The Statute provides that the Prosecutor has a term of nine years and ineligible for re-
election.
24
 Debatably, the length of the term of office and the prohibition from re-election are 
challenging, a nine year term could be a long period for a person to be in charge of the OTP. 
The Prosecutor could become too comfortable in office resulting in a dysfunctional 
performance. The prohibition of the Prosecutor running for a second term could also be 
limiting, losing focus or lack motivation to perform up to standard. Hence, amendment for a 
shorter term of four or five years is recommended to keep up a sustained performance level 
and a possibility of a re-election after the expiration of the first term. This regenerates 
motivation that keeps the Prosecutor inspired to fulfil the Roles expected for a potential re-
election. The success at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia is worthy of 
emulation for the ASP to evoke, in favour of a five year term with the potential to renew for 
an additional term, this change would afford the ASP adequate checks on the OTP without 
intruding on its independence. It will motivate the Prosecutor to fulfil the Requirements 
outlined in the Statute and the Code for the OTP. The Prosecutor as the head of the OTP 
needs to be apt. The output of the OTP needs to take significant strides in producing 
successful trials to increase legitimacy and credibility.
25
  
With all formal investigations into situations focused on Africa, the gravity threshold can 
appear to be applied selectively and justice only brought against less powerfully inclined 
states. The OTP, by taking into account qualitative factors when conducting preliminary 
examinations of situations and clarifying the use of gravity in determining admissibility 
would improve the Court perceived legitimacy, as its decisions would be of a more objective 
nature. In order to limit self-referral from becoming a ‘political tool’ used by governments 
who want to undermine opposition and turn the ICC into a court of first instance, the 
Prosecutor needs to investigate various sides responsible for the conflict equally and be 
guided by evidence only, rather than by political affiliations and outside pressures. 
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First, without amending the Statute, the OTP must internally raise its standards of proof. It is 
common for the OTP to go to the Pre-Trial Chambers (PTC) as soon as it believes it has 
sufficient evidence to meet the minimally required standard of proof. Meeting the lowest 
standard of proof is risky because it means that the OTP will need to continue to look for 
more evidence to meet subsequent standards as the case progresses to trial. This is more 
likely to be avoided if the OTP raises its standard to establishing ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
before approaching the PTC.  
Lastly, having continuity and stability amongst larger and older investigation teams will 
ensure investigators gain a deep contextual knowledge of a conflict and the ability to gather 
more reliable evidence that will stand up to scrutiny in court. Above all, ‘the Office of the 
Prosecutor is the Engine of the Court; must develop an effective body and systematic efforts 
for professional investigation for prosecuting international crimes and effective cooperation 
are the fuel for the entire Court.’26 
Recommendations Relating to Enforcement of the Court’s Decision- the Court’s lack of its 
own enforcement mechanism and the diverse geographic range of its work entail dependence 
on States cooperation to carry out the work. The Court stated in its 2009 and 2011 reports that 
the lack of cooperation by States impairs its efficiency, performance, and the Integrity of 
legal proceedings.
27
 In recent years the Lack of cooperation by states has emerged as a major 
problem for the Court. The ICC relies on domestic judicial systems and their law 
enforcement mechanisms to carry out its mandates. Thus, the success of the OTP 
investigations and prosecutions depend on the willingness of the International Community to 
assist the Court. As a result, the behaviour and reputation of the Court is essential, as it has 
the ability to boost or discourage this cooperation. 
The primary responsibility to prosecute using the Substantive Crimes under the Statute lies 
with States, but not subject to detailed treaty provisions on mutual legal assistance, including 
extradition, between states. Hence, prosecution of these crimes in national courts are often 
hindered by the lack of an international legal framework for cooperation between States. The 
lack of detailed treaty provisions regarding mutual legal assistance for the prosecution of core 
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crimes creates a gap, efforts should be made through the ASP on how to fill this gap. 
Consequently, it is recommended that sanctions (no matter how light) should be designed and 
attached to behaviour of State Parties who refuse to cooperate and carry out roles and 
obligations expected of them. Mindful of the fact that sanctions could be counterproductive at 
times, but it should also be noted that States are conscious of the negative perceptions 
derivable or accruing from such disciplinary actions.  
Recommendation In Respect of Restorative Justice- following an effective and fair charging 
strategy is critical for the OTP to maintain credibility and proper dispensation of restorative 
justice. Charging relatively ‘insignificant’ perpetrators can contribute to perceptions that the 
Court is not effective and leaves victims unsatisfied. Additionally, charging only individuals 
who represent one party to the conflict risks undermining perceptions of the Court’s 
impartiality. In regards to which crimes are charged, the OTP has tended to bring a select 
charge in the interest of time and cost cutting. The charges that the OTP has chosen have not 
always reflected the scope of crimes committed or represented the main types of 
victimisation. This has left gaps in justice served to victims, and has undermined perceptions 
of the Court’s legitimacy in civil society and the international community.28 Furthermore, 
charging a section of the conflict and letting others get away sets the Stage for future conflicts 
and does not adequately serve justice as victims of the limited crimes charged will not be 
encompassing or representative of all victims and therefore limit the dispensation of 
restorative justice particularly through the mechanism of Trust Fund for Victims.  
Recommendation on Outreach Strategies- for the Court to fulfil its mandate, roles and 
judicial activities it must be understood by a variety of audience hence, the Court’s outreach 
programme has been created to ensure that affected communities in situations subject to 
investigation or proceedings can understand and follow the work of the Court through the 
different phases of its activities. The Outreach serves as a critical function for the ICC in 
developing a network of communication between the Court and the victims far away from 
The Hague. By spreading accurate knowledge of the judicial proceedings within situation 
countries, the outreach unit increases the scope of justice for victim communities, eases the 
investigation process, and strengthens the legitimacy of the Court. The Court faces three main 
challenges in respect of effective outreach: low levels of awareness, misconceptions, and the 
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process of leaving countries post-trial. It is important that the ICC improves on its current 
strategies and resolve these issues in order to fulfil the Court’s mandate.29 
The Berkeley Human Rights Centre conducted evaluations of outreach efforts in Uganda 
(2010), CAR (2010), and the DRC (2008). The rate of awareness and understanding remains 
low for all countries. The outreach unit has been slow to combat these impressions thereby 
delegitimising the ICC in the eyes of many such as in Côte d'Ivoire. However, the Research 
notices a considerable improvement to the 2010 report above but a lot still needs doing in this 
respect to shore up support for the Court. Outreach plays an invaluable role in the work of the 
Court. The future of the ICC hinges on its ability to obtain global legitimacy among States 
and their people. Outreach serves a critical function in improving understanding and demand 
for international justice, especially in countries where the Rule of Law is weak. Making the 
outreach unit more effective, means more communities will understand the mission of the 
Court and support its roles thereby shore-up legitimacy for the Court.
30
 Moreover, it 
establishes and fosters sensitive relationships with victims. Although, the ICC could be 
regarded as a punitive organisation but victims are central to the Court’s mandate and 
success. It is obligated to provide restorative justice through trial participation, reparations, 
and the Trust Fund for Victims, all these would be enhanced with improved Outreach 
Strategies. 
Could Amnesty Be An Option/Recommendation Under the Rome Statute?- the primary 
objective of the ICC is to stop impunity and deliver justice; in achieving these objectives the 
primary responsibility to prosecute perpetrators of unimaginable atrocities under the Statute 
lies with State Parties under the Complementarity Regime (Article 17 ICCSt). The Statute is 
partly designed to overcome problems associated with the Concurrent system or primacy of 
the ad hoc tribunals and establish a better relationship with the domestic transitional justice 
institutions and respect State’s sovereignty. Under the Rome Statute it will be a travesty of 
justice if national proceedings are designed to shield perpetrator of crimes under whatever 
sham,
31
 in an attempt to wipe the slate clean. Article 16 already provides for the deferment of 
trials if the international community through the Security Council feels a trial by the ICC 
would be against the peace and justice of the international community. 
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It should also be noted that the ICC is a court of last resort principally designed to bring to 
justice those who normally would have escaped it. The Court will only act as a last resort in 
cases where national criminal law systems are unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.
32
 The Researcher does not necessarily expect the Court to be 
inundated with the responsibility of granting amnesty in its attempt to deliver justice. 
Amnesty should be a prerogative of National jurisdiction such as the South African approach 
with a transparent intention to heal and build nationhood rather than a cover-up. 
Consequently, an opportunity for this is possible under Article 17 of the Statute. Whilst 
Article 20 ICCSt does not preclude the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over the conduct of 
persons who have been granted amnesty via truth commissions
33
 and amnesty tribunals,
34
 
Article 53 of the Statute also permits the Prosecutor to abandon an investigation, if it would 
not serve the interest of justice.  
Besides, accepted treaty norms and principles of customary international law deny the 
legality of amnesties offered under national law,
35
 and any scope of national amnesty laws to 
expunge criminal or civil liability of human rights violators is ultimately unsustainable under 
international law.
36
 Hence, it is recommended that the ICC should not be used as a conduit of 
escape for perpetrators or to exonerate serious human rights violators from liability for 
criminal conduct under international law. 
6.3 Future of Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court  
After over 50 years of legal and political permutations, in 1998 the Rome Statute, the 
instituting treaty of the ICC regarded as one of the most important treaty/development in 
international law since the adoption of the UN Charter (1945) established the first permanent 
International Criminal Court. By enabling prosecution under Article 5 of the Statute, the ICC 
upholds the idea of maintaining an end to impunity for egregious crimes, for the Court to 
fully realise its potentials, it must show that it can be a successful permanent institution with 
clear standards, goals, successful prosecutions and convictions of the Accused in different 
parts of the world. The establishment of the ICC demonstrates the need for a world criminal 
court. Restricting the Role of the ICC by complimentary, the Rome Statute and the States that 
                                                          
32
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33
 South African truth commission. 
34
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are party to the Treaty created a ‘last resort’ Court that will be utilised if a country is unable 
or unwilling to prosecute serious international criminals. It is hoped that in due course the 
ASP would consider through an amendment the inclusion of ‘Terrorism’ as a crime in its own 
right to the list of substantive crimes under ICC jurisdiction. Notwithstanding, the difficult 
status of terrorism in international law as a crime, additionally, in not too distant future, the 
surest and swiftest approach for the Prosecution of terrorists will be before an international 
tribunal with extensive international backing, The ICC would represent the best tool of the 
international community to combat terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice.
37
 Furthermore, 
the future of the Court should encompass prosecution of human trafficking arguably regarded 
as modern slavery, a growing issue, affecting men, women and children. This could come 
under an expanded Article 7 of the statute on the Crime against Humanity, despite the 
provisions contrary to slavery and other inhumane acts already within the Article. Although, 
the restriction and interpretation bothering on the policy and state like elements under this 
Article could be cumbersome to a possible prosecution as it is yet unsettled under 
international criminal law. It is hoped that this element is settled either through case laws by 
the Court or through an amendment procedure as specified in the legal framework. 
International acceptance, flexibility and adaptability of the Court and the Statute are needed 
for the overall success and survival of the Court in a constantly changing world. These would 
ensure the long-term success and stability of the Court. Adjustments have to be made to 
consolidate a foothold in the global community. Although again, the ICC is a necessary tool 
for building peace and stability into the future, but as of now, one of the main goals for the 
Court should be to prevent itself from becoming irrelevant in this process by remaining 
apolitical. Participation from powerful nations such as the United States and the other 
permanent members of the Security Council is essential to the survival and effectiveness of 
the Court, a full universal membership would be an appropriate future to recommend for the 
Court, in the endless struggle between traditional power politics and crucial efforts to 
strengthen the Rule of law within the international community. The significance of the 
International Criminal Court and its growing impact on the rights, duties; interests of 
numerous actors on the international scene and its increasing scope of authority calls for a 
deeper and more proactive inquiry about the way the Court achieves her intended purpose. 
The Thesis therefore suggests possible reviews into future annexation of the International 
Criminal Court as a permanent, independent and judicial arm of the United Nations to 
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strengthen the Court to achieve its purposive goals with the power of the United Nations 
behind it, this is worthy of consideration. After all, the genesis of the Court emanates from 
the United Nations, and so far the International Court of Justice (ICJ) an organ of the United 
Nations has performed independently and well enough to assure the International Community 
that annexing the ICC as a permanent criminal court and an independent organ of the United 
Nations leaves no doubts that it would achieve its aims better. 
This thesis also seeks to motivate relevant stakeholders to engage in a serious debate about 
what justifies the authority of the International Criminal Court and to what extent that 
authority should be. The thesis adds to the body of literature and knowledge in the field of 
Public International Law (International Criminal Law) and better administration of justice 
particularly at the International Level. The study thus establishes an intercourse between law 
and Organisational Behaviour. Noting that the International Criminal Court is a legal entity 
(Article 4 ICCSt) hence a corporate personality, a corporate personality is subject to 
extinction if not satisfactorily managed. Managing the International Criminal Court inside-
out is a conditio sine qua non for its continued existence. As a legal personality it must 
imbibe relevant theories of successful multinational organisations if the Intention is to 
succeed. As an analytical paper the Thesis establishes the need for the Court and the 
Assembly of State parties to be more proactive in the fight against impunity and to remain 
dispassionate.  
6.4 Final Remarks 
The ICC is a milestone in international criminal justice, an era that brings perpetrators in 
positions of authority theoretically accountable to the International Community. However, it 
is yet a dream come through, the Court has been accused of being part of a neo-colonialist 
plot against sovereign States, the claim though arguable, has gained credence amongst 
Academics, States and Institutions. The African Union claim of unlawful issuance of warrant 
of arrest to sitting Heads of States with diplomatic immunity triggers outcry and creates a no-
win situation. Hence, States have become increasingly hostile towards the ICC. On the 
opposing side are criticisms by non-governmental and humanitarian organisations. The AU 
has delegitimised the Courts authority by its refusal to comply with court orders, thus 
highlighted one of the Court’s major weaknesses, the lack of enforcement mechanisms which 
leaves the Court in a precarious situation, exposing the Court’s inability to oblige compliance 
from Member States. Without a mechanism in place to compel performance, the AU faces no 
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reprimand for its actions; therefore, little reason to oblige the Court in the future, to remedy 
the situation and avoid repetition of similar actions, the Court must improve its capacity to 
compel compliance from Member States. The crux of the matter from the point of view of 
this research is the enforcement power of the Court. Understandably, expressly avoided 
during the creation of the Statute due to States sovereignty, this is an area that needs 
reassessment and possibly a review by the ASP in order not to render the Court a toothless 
bulldog. To maintain widespread support within the international community, the Court 
needs to maintain political neutrality, avoiding perceptions of victor’s justice will improve 
the willingness to cooperate and assist in its proceedings. Investigations and indictment must 
be perceived as fair and representative. States are more likely to support the ICC in its work if 
it is perceived impartial and independent. 
Violent atrocities continue unabated where poverty is rife with serious human rights and the 
Rule of law subject to abuses. The enormous resources required to prosecute violations of 
international criminal law, requires the coming together of the international community to 
make the ICC a workable and acceptable institution for the betterment of mankind supporting 
the Theories of globalisation that the world is in did a global village. The Aircrafts (MH 370, 
MH17 and others) lost brought the International Community together as search parties. 
Additionally, the Chibok girls (bring back our girls campaign) adopted from Nigeria brought 
the International Community together. The ICC must not be allowed to collapse, it should be 
reformed to achieve its intent and purpose. A world order of peace and justice is best served 
by co-operation not confrontation; the ICC has a critical role to play; there is a need for some 
trade-off between underlying principles of States sovereignty and protecting the Hegemony 
of humanity. 
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